Commit dd23a669 authored by Dan Carpenter's avatar Dan Carpenter Committed by Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo

sctp: potential read out of bounds in sctp_ulpevent_type_enabled()

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1729105


[ Upstream commit fa5f7b51 ]

This code causes a static checker warning because Smatch doesn't trust
anything that comes from skb->data.  I've reviewed this code and I do
think skb->data can be controlled by the user here.

The sctp_event_subscribe struct has 13 __u8 fields and we want to see
if ours is non-zero.  sn_type can be any value in the 0-USHRT_MAX range.
We're subtracting SCTP_SN_TYPE_BASE which is 1 << 15 so we could read
either before the start of the struct or after the end.

This is a very old bug and it's surprising that it would go undetected
for so long but my theory is that it just doesn't have a big impact so
it would be hard to notice.
Signed-off-by: default avatarDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
parent 3d700a6e
......@@ -141,8 +141,12 @@ __u16 sctp_ulpevent_get_notification_type(const struct sctp_ulpevent *event);
static inline int sctp_ulpevent_type_enabled(__u16 sn_type,
struct sctp_event_subscribe *mask)
{
int offset = sn_type - SCTP_SN_TYPE_BASE;
char *amask = (char *) mask;
return amask[sn_type - SCTP_SN_TYPE_BASE];
if (offset >= sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe))
return 0;
return amask[offset];
}
/* Given an event subscription, is this event enabled? */
......
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