1. 10 May, 2016 4 commits
    • Andy Lutomirski's avatar
      perf/core: Change the default paranoia level to 2 · 0161028b
      Andy Lutomirski authored
      Allowing unprivileged kernel profiling lets any user dump follow kernel
      control flow and dump kernel registers.  This most likely allows trivial
      kASLR bypassing, and it may allow other mischief as well.  (Off the top
      of my head, the PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR output during /dev/urandom reads
      could be quite interesting.)
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Acked-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      0161028b
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew) · 5c56b563
      Linus Torvalds authored
      Merge fixes from Andrew Morton:
       "2 fixes"
      
      * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>:
        zsmalloc: fix zs_can_compact() integer overflow
        Revert "proc/base: make prompt shell start from new line after executing "cat /proc/$pid/wchan""
      5c56b563
    • Sergey Senozhatsky's avatar
      zsmalloc: fix zs_can_compact() integer overflow · 44f43e99
      Sergey Senozhatsky authored
      zs_can_compact() has two race conditions in its core calculation:
      
      unsigned long obj_wasted = zs_stat_get(class, OBJ_ALLOCATED) -
      				zs_stat_get(class, OBJ_USED);
      
      1) classes are not locked, so the numbers of allocated and used
         objects can change by the concurrent ops happening on other CPUs
      2) shrinker invokes it from preemptible context
      
      Depending on the circumstances, thus, OBJ_ALLOCATED can become
      less than OBJ_USED, which can result in either very high or
      negative `total_scan' value calculated later in do_shrink_slab().
      
      do_shrink_slab() has some logic to prevent those cases:
      
       vmscan: shrink_slab: zs_shrinker_scan+0x0/0x28 [zsmalloc] negative objects to delete nr=-62
       vmscan: shrink_slab: zs_shrinker_scan+0x0/0x28 [zsmalloc] negative objects to delete nr=-62
       vmscan: shrink_slab: zs_shrinker_scan+0x0/0x28 [zsmalloc] negative objects to delete nr=-64
       vmscan: shrink_slab: zs_shrinker_scan+0x0/0x28 [zsmalloc] negative objects to delete nr=-62
       vmscan: shrink_slab: zs_shrinker_scan+0x0/0x28 [zsmalloc] negative objects to delete nr=-62
       vmscan: shrink_slab: zs_shrinker_scan+0x0/0x28 [zsmalloc] negative objects to delete nr=-62
      
      However, due to the way `total_scan' is calculated, not every
      shrinker->count_objects() overflow can be spotted and handled.
      To demonstrate the latter, I added some debugging code to do_shrink_slab()
      (x86_64) and the results were:
      
       vmscan: OVERFLOW: shrinker->count_objects() == -1 [18446744073709551615]
       vmscan: but total_scan > 0: 92679974445502
       vmscan: resulting total_scan: 92679974445502
      [..]
       vmscan: OVERFLOW: shrinker->count_objects() == -1 [18446744073709551615]
       vmscan: but total_scan > 0: 22634041808232578
       vmscan: resulting total_scan: 22634041808232578
      
      Even though shrinker->count_objects() has returned an overflowed value,
      the resulting `total_scan' is positive, and, what is more worrisome, it
      is insanely huge. This value is getting used later on in
      shrinker->scan_objects() loop:
      
              while (total_scan >= batch_size ||
                     total_scan >= freeable) {
                      unsigned long ret;
                      unsigned long nr_to_scan = min(batch_size, total_scan);
      
                      shrinkctl->nr_to_scan = nr_to_scan;
                      ret = shrinker->scan_objects(shrinker, shrinkctl);
                      if (ret == SHRINK_STOP)
                              break;
                      freed += ret;
      
                      count_vm_events(SLABS_SCANNED, nr_to_scan);
                      total_scan -= nr_to_scan;
      
                      cond_resched();
              }
      
      `total_scan >= batch_size' is true for a very-very long time and
      'total_scan >= freeable' is also true for quite some time, because
      `freeable < 0' and `total_scan' is large enough, for example,
      22634041808232578. The only break condition, in the given scheme of
      things, is shrinker->scan_objects() == SHRINK_STOP test, which is a
      bit too weak to rely on, especially in heavy zsmalloc-usage scenarios.
      
      To fix the issue, take a pool stat snapshot and use it instead of
      racy zs_stat_get() calls.
      
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160509140052.3389-1-sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.comSigned-off-by: default avatarSergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
      Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>        [4.3+]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      44f43e99
    • Robin Humble's avatar
      Revert "proc/base: make prompt shell start from new line after executing "cat /proc/$pid/wchan"" · 1e92a61c
      Robin Humble authored
      This reverts the 4.6-rc1 commit 7e2bc81d ("proc/base: make prompt
      shell start from new line after executing "cat /proc/$pid/wchan")
      because it breaks /proc/$PID/whcan formatting in ps and top.
      
      Revert also because the patch is inconsistent - it adds a newline at the
      end of only the '0' wchan, and does not add a newline when
      /proc/$PID/wchan contains a symbol name.
      
      eg.
      $ ps -eo pid,stat,wchan,comm
      PID STAT WCHAN  COMMAND
      ...
      1189 S    -      dbus-launch
      1190 Ssl  0
      dbus-daemon
      1198 Sl   0
      lightdm
      1299 Ss   ep_pol systemd
      1301 S    -      (sd-pam)
      1304 Ss   wait   sh
      Signed-off-by: default avatarRobin Humble <plaguedbypenguins@gmail.com>
      Cc: Minfei Huang <mnfhuang@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      1e92a61c
  2. 09 May, 2016 11 commits
  3. 08 May, 2016 1 commit
  4. 07 May, 2016 10 commits
  5. 06 May, 2016 14 commits