- 08 Aug, 2018 18 commits
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Andi Kleen authored
For SMT specific workarounds it is useful to know if SMT is active on any online CPU in the system. This currently requires a loop over all online CPUs. Add a global variable that is updated with the maximum number of smt threads on any CPU on online/offline, and use it for topology_max_smt_threads() The single call is easier to use than a loop. Not exported to user space because user space already can use the existing sibling interfaces to find this out. Signed-off-by:
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Cc: acme@kernel.org Cc: jolsa@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1463703002-19686-2-git-send-email-andi@firstfloor.orgSigned-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> CVE-2018-3620 CVE-2018-3646 (cherry picked from commit 70b8301f) Signed-off-by:
Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Thomas Gleixner authored
Split out the inner workings of do_cpu_down() to allow reuse of that function for the upcoming SMT disabling mechanism. No functional change. Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Acked-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
Provide information whether SMT is supoorted by the CPUs. Preparatory patch for SMT control mechanism. Suggested-by:
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
If the CPU is supporting SMT then the primary thread can be found by checking the lower APIC ID bits for zero. smp_num_siblings is used to build the mask for the APIC ID bits which need to be taken into account. This uses the MPTABLE or ACPI/MADT supplied APIC ID, which can be different than the initial APIC ID in CPUID. But according to AMD the lower bits have to be consistent. Intel gave a tentative confirmation as well. Preparatory patch to support disabling SMT at boot/runtime. Signed-off-by:
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Andi Kleen authored
For the L1TF workaround its necessary to limit the swap file size to below MAX_PA/2, so that the higher bits of the swap offset inverted never point to valid memory. Add a mechanism for the architecture to override the swap file size check in swapfile.c and add a x86 specific max swapfile check function that enforces that limit. The check is only enabled if the CPU is vulnerable to L1TF. In VMs with 42bit MAX_PA the typical limit is 2TB now, on a native system with 46bit PA it is 32TB. The limit is only per individual swap file, so it's always possible to exceed these limits with multiple swap files or partitions. Signed-off-by:
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by:
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Andi Kleen authored
For L1TF PROT_NONE mappings are protected by inverting the PFN in the page table entry. This sets the high bits in the CPU's address space, thus making sure to point to not point an unmapped entry to valid cached memory. Some server system BIOSes put the MMIO mappings high up in the physical address space. If such an high mapping was mapped to unprivileged users they could attack low memory by setting such a mapping to PROT_NONE. This could happen through a special device driver which is not access protected. Normal /dev/mem is of course access protected. To avoid this forbid PROT_NONE mappings or mprotect for high MMIO mappings. Valid page mappings are allowed because the system is then unsafe anyways. It's not expected that users commonly use PROT_NONE on MMIO. But to minimize any impact this is only enforced if the mapping actually refers to a high MMIO address (defined as the MAX_PA-1 bit being set), and also skip the check for root. For mmaps this is straight forward and can be handled in vm_insert_pfn and in remap_pfn_range(). For mprotect it's a bit trickier. At the point where the actual PTEs are accessed a lot of state has been changed and it would be difficult to undo on an error. Since this is a uncommon case use a separate early page talk walk pass for MMIO PROT_NONE mappings that checks for this condition early. For non MMIO and non PROT_NONE there are no changes. Signed-off-by:
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Andi Kleen authored
L1TF core kernel workarounds are cheap and normally always enabled, However they still should be reported in sysfs if the system is vulnerable or mitigated. Add the necessary CPU feature/bug bits. - Extend the existing checks for Meltdowns to determine if the system is vulnerable. All CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown are also not vulnerable to L1TF - Check for 32bit non PAE and emit a warning as there is no practical way for mitigation due to the limited physical address bits - If the system has more than MAX_PA/2 physical memory the invert page workarounds don't protect the system against the L1TF attack anymore, because an inverted physical address will also point to valid memory. Print a warning in this case and report that the system is vulnerable. Add a function which returns the PFN limit for the L1TF mitigation, which will be used in follow up patches for sanity and range checks. [ tglx: Renamed the CPU feature bit to L1TF_PTEINV ] Signed-off-by:
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Stefan Bader authored
This adds the following model numbers to intel-family.h: - INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE (commit 311f7770) - INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM (commit 0047f598) CVE-2018-3620 CVE-2018-3646 Signed-off-by:
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Andi Kleen authored
The L1TF workaround doesn't make any attempt to mitigate speculate accesses to the first physical page for zeroed PTEs. Normally it only contains some data from the early real mode BIOS. It's not entirely clear that the first page is reserved in all configurations, so add an extra reservation call to make sure it is really reserved. In most configurations (e.g. with the standard reservations) it's likely a nop. Signed-off-by:
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Andi Kleen authored
When PTEs are set to PROT_NONE the kernel just clears the Present bit and preserves the PFN, which creates attack surface for L1TF speculation speculation attacks. This is important inside guests, because L1TF speculation bypasses physical page remapping. While the host has its own migitations preventing leaking data from other VMs into the guest, this would still risk leaking the wrong page inside the current guest. This uses the same technique as Linus' swap entry patch: while an entry is is in PROTNONE state invert the complete PFN part part of it. This ensures that the the highest bit will point to non existing memory. The invert is done by pte/pmd_modify and pfn/pmd/pud_pte for PROTNONE and pte/pmd/pud_pfn undo it. This assume that no code path touches the PFN part of a PTE directly without using these primitives. This doesn't handle the case that MMIO is on the top of the CPU physical memory. If such an MMIO region was exposed by an unpriviledged driver for mmap it would be possible to attack some real memory. However this situation is all rather unlikely. For 32bit non PAE the inversion is not done because there are really not enough bits to protect anything. Q: Why does the guest need to be protected when the HyperVisor already has L1TF mitigations? A: Here's an example: Physical pages 1 2 get mapped into a guest as GPA 1 -> PA 2 GPA 2 -> PA 1 through EPT. The L1TF speculation ignores the EPT remapping. Now the guest kernel maps GPA 1 to process A and GPA 2 to process B, and they belong to different users and should be isolated. A sets the GPA 1 PA 2 PTE to PROT_NONE to bypass the EPT remapping and gets read access to the underlying physical page. Which in this case points to PA 2, so it can read process B's data, if it happened to be in L1, so isolation inside the guest is broken. There's nothing the hypervisor can do about this. This mitigation has to be done in the guest itself. [ tglx: Massaged changelog ] Signed-off-by:
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by:
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Tom Lendacky authored
Create a pgd_pfn() macro similar to the p[4um]d_pfn() macros and then use the p[g4um]d_pfn() macros in the p[g4um]d_page() macros instead of duplicating the code. Signed-off-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e61eb533a6d0aac941db2723d8aa63ef6b882dee.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by:
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Linus Torvalds authored
With L1 terminal fault the CPU speculates into unmapped PTEs, and resulting side effects allow to read the memory the PTE is pointing too, if its values are still in the L1 cache. For swapped out pages Linux uses unmapped PTEs and stores a swap entry into them. To protect against L1TF it must be ensured that the swap entry is not pointing to valid memory, which requires setting higher bits (between bit 36 and bit 45) that are inside the CPUs physical address space, but outside any real memory. To do this invert the offset to make sure the higher bits are always set, as long as the swap file is not too big. Note there is no workaround for 32bit !PAE, or on systems which have more than MAX_PA/2 worth of memory. The later case is very unlikely to happen on real systems. [AK: updated description and minor tweaks by. Split out from the original patch ] Signed-off-by:Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Linus Torvalds authored
If pages are swapped out, the swap entry is stored in the corresponding PTE, which has the Present bit cleared. CPUs vulnerable to L1TF speculate on PTE entries which have the present bit set and would treat the swap entry as phsyical address (PFN). To mitigate that the upper bits of the PTE must be set so the PTE points to non existent memory. The swap entry stores the type and the offset of a swapped out page in the PTE. type is stored in bit 9-13 and offset in bit 14-63. The hardware ignores the bits beyond the phsyical address space limit, so to make the mitigation effective its required to start 'offset' at the lowest possible bit so that even large swap offsets do not reach into the physical address space limit bits. Move offset to bit 9-58 and type to bit 59-63 which are the bits that hardware generally doesn't care about. That, in turn, means that if you on desktop chip with only 40 bits of physical addressing, now that the offset starts at bit 9, there needs to be 30 bits of offset actually *in use* until bit 39 ends up being set, which means when inverted it will again point into existing memory. So that's 4 terabyte of swap space (because the offset is counted in pages, so 30 bits of offset is 42 bits of actual coverage). With bigger physical addressing, that obviously grows further, until the limit of the offset is hit (at 50 bits of offset - 62 bits of actual swap file coverage). This is a preparatory change for the actual swap entry inversion to protect against L1TF. [ AK: Updated description and minor tweaks. Split into two parts ] [ tglx: Massaged changelog ] Signed-off-by:
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Andi Kleen authored
L1 Terminal Fault (L1TF) is a speculation related vulnerability. The CPU speculates on PTE entries which do not have the PRESENT bit set, if the content of the resulting physical address is available in the L1D cache. The OS side mitigation makes sure that a !PRESENT PTE entry points to a physical address outside the actually existing and cachable memory space. This is achieved by inverting the upper bits of the PTE. Due to the address space limitations this only works for 64bit and 32bit PAE kernels, but not for 32bit non PAE. This mitigation applies to both host and guest kernels, but in case of a 64bit host (hypervisor) and a 32bit PAE guest, inverting the upper bits of the PAE address space (44bit) is not enough if the host has more than 43 bits of populated memory address space, because the speculation treats the PTE content as a physical host address bypassing EPT. The host (hypervisor) protects itself against the guest by flushing L1D as needed, but pages inside the guest are not protected against attacks from other processes inside the same guest. For the guest the inverted PTE mask has to match the host to provide the full protection for all pages the host could possibly map into the guest. The hosts populated address space is not known to the guest, so the mask must cover the possible maximal host address space, i.e. 52 bit. On 32bit PAE the maximum PTE mask is currently set to 44 bit because that is the limit imposed by 32bit unsigned long PFNs in the VMs. This limits the mask to be below what the host could possible use for physical pages. The L1TF PROT_NONE protection code uses the PTE masks to determine which bits to invert to make sure the higher bits are set for unmapped entries to prevent L1TF speculation attacks against EPT inside guests. In order to invert all bits that could be used by the host, increase __PHYSICAL_PAGE_SHIFT to 52 to match 64bit. The real limit for a 32bit PAE kernel is still 44 bits because all Linux PTEs are created from unsigned long PFNs, so they cannot be higher than 44 bits on a 32bit kernel. So these extra PFN bits should be never set. The only users of this macro are using it to look at PTEs, so it's safe. [ tglx: Massaged changelog ] Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
commit 3c9fa24c upstream. The functions that were used in the emulation of fxrstor, fxsave, sgdt and sidt were originally meant for task switching, and as such they did not check privilege levels. This is very bad when the same functions are used in the emulation of unprivileged instructions. This is CVE-2018-10853. The obvious fix is to add a new argument to ops->read_std and ops->write_std, which decides whether the access is a "system" access or should use the processor's CPL. Fixes: 129a72a0 ("KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std", 2017-01-12) Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com> CVE-2018-3620 CVE-2018-3646 Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
commit ce14e868 upstream. Int the next patch the emulator's .read_std and .write_std callbacks will grow another argument, which is not needed in kvm_read_guest_virt and kvm_write_guest_virt_system's callers. Since we have to make separate functions, let's give the currently existing names a nicer interface, too. Fixes: 129a72a0 ("KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std", 2017-01-12) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
commit 79367a65 upstream. Wrap the common invocation of ctxt->ops->read_std and ctxt->ops->write_std, so as to have a smaller patch when the functions grow another argument. Fixes: 129a72a0 ("KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std", 2017-01-12) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Stefan Bader authored
Ignore: yes Signed-off-by:
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- 12 Jul, 2018 4 commits
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Stefan Bader authored
Signed-off-by: -
Ross Lagerwall authored
Update the features after calling register_netdev() otherwise the device features are not set up correctly and it not possible to change the MTU of the device. After this change, the features reported by ethtool match the device's features before the commit which introduced the issue and it is possible to change the device's MTU. Fixes: f599c64f ("xen-netfront: Fix race between device setup and open") Reported-by:
Liam Shepherd <liam@dancer.es> Signed-off-by:
Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com> Reviewed-by:
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1781413 (cherry picked from commit 45c8184c) Signed-off-by:
Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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Ross Lagerwall authored
Fixes: f599c64f ("xen-netfront: Fix race between device setup and open") Reported-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Stefan Bader authored
Ignore: yes Signed-off-by:
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- 14 Jun, 2018 9 commits
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Stefan Bader authored
Signed-off-by: -
Borislav Petkov authored
i486 derived cores like Intel Quark support only the very old, legacy x87 FPU (FSAVE/FRSTOR, CPUID bit FXSR is not set), and our FPU code wasn't handling the saving and restoring there properly in the 'eagerfpu' case. So after we made eagerfpu the default for all CPU types: 58122bf1 x86/fpu: Default eagerfpu=on on all CPUs these old FPU designs broke. First, Andy Shevchenko reported a splat: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 823 at arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h:163 fpu__clear+0x8c/0x160 which was us trying to execute FXRSTOR on those machines even though they don't support it. After taking care of that, Bryan O'Donoghue reported that a simple FPU test still failed because we weren't initializing the FPU state properly on those machines. Take care of all that. Reported-and-tested-by:
Bryan O'Donoghue <pure.logic@nexus-software.ie> Reported-by:
Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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Andy Lutomirski authored
Systems without an FPU are generally old and therefore use lazy FPU switching. Unsurprisingly, math emulation in eager FPU mode is a bit buggy. Fix it. There were two bugs involving kernel code trying to use the FPU registers in eager mode even if they didn't exist and one BUG_ON() that was incorrect. Signed-off-by:
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: yu-cheng yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b4b8d112436bd6fab866e1b4011131507e8d7fbe.1453675014.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
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Andy Lutomirski authored
In eager fpu mode, having deactivated FPU without immediately reloading some other context is illegal. Therefore, to recover from FNSAVE, we can't just deactivate the state -- we need to reload it if we're not actively context switching. We had this wrong in fpu__save() and fpu__copy(). Fix both. __kernel_fpu_begin() was fine -- add a comment. This fixes a warning triggerable with nofxsr eagerfpu=on. Signed-off-by:
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Andy Lutomirski authored
We have eager and lazy FPU modes, introduced in: 304bceda ("x86, fpu: use non-lazy fpu restore for processors supporting xsave") The result is rather messy. There are two code paths in almost all of the FPU code, and only one of them (the eager case) is tested frequently, since most kernel developers have new enough hardware that we use eagerfpu. It seems that, on any remotely recent hardware, eagerfpu is a win: glibc uses SSE2, so laziness is probably overoptimistic, and, in any case, manipulating TS is far slower that saving and restoring the full state. (Stores to CR0.TS are serializing and are poorly optimized.) To try to shake out any latent issues on old hardware, this changes the default to eager on all CPUs. If no performance or functionality problems show up, a subsequent patch could remove lazy mode entirely. Signed-off-by:
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yu-cheng yu authored
This issue is a fallout from the command-line parsing move. When "eagerfpu=off" is given as a command-line input, the kernel should disable MPX support. The decision for turning off MPX was made in fpu__init_system_ctx_switch(), which is after the selection of the XSAVE format. This patch fixes it by getting that decision done earlier in fpu__init_system_xstate(). Signed-off-by:
Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: yu-cheng yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1452119094-7252-4-git-send-email-yu-cheng.yu@intel.comSigned-off-by:
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Andy Lutomirski authored
After fixing FPU option parsing, we now parse the 'no387' boot option too early: no387 clears X86_FEATURE_FPU before it's even probed, so the boot CPU promptly re-enables it. I suspect it gets even more confused on SMP. Fix the probing code to leave X86_FEATURE_FPU off if it's been disabled by setup_clear_cpu_cap(). Signed-off-by:
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yu-cheng yu authored
The function fpu__init_system() is executed before parse_early_param(). This causes wrong FPU configuration. This patch fixes this issue by parsing boot_command_line in the beginning of fpu__init_system(). With all four patches in this series, each parameter disables features as the following: eagerfpu=off: eagerfpu, avx, avx2, avx512, mpx no387: fpu nofxsr: fxsr, fxsropt, xmm noxsave: xsave, xsaveopt, xsaves, xsavec, avx, avx2, avx512, mpx, xgetbv1 noxsaveopt: xsaveopt noxsaves: xsaves Signed-off-by:
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Stefan Bader authored
Ignore: yes Signed-off-by:
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- 12 Jun, 2018 1 commit
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Khalid Elmously authored
Signed-off-by:
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- 08 Jun, 2018 8 commits
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1775771Signed-off-by:
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Martin Schwidefsky authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1775771 commit 23a4d7fd upstream. The return from the ftrace_stub, _mcount, ftrace_caller and return_to_handler functions is done with "br %r14" and "br %r1". These are indirect branches as well and need to use execute trampolines for CONFIG_EXPOLINE=y. The ftrace_caller function is a special case as it returns to the start of a function and may only use %r0 and %r1. For a pre z10 machine the standard execute trampoline uses a LARL + EX to do this, but this requires *two* registers in the range %r1..%r15. To get around this the 'br %r1' located in the lowcore is used, then the EX instruction does not need an address register. But the lowcore trick may only be used for pre z14 machines, with noexec=on the mapping for the first page may not contain instructions. The solution for that is an ALTERNATIVE in the expoline THUNK generated by 'GEN_BR_THUNK %r1' to switch to EXRL, this relies on the fact that a machine that supports noexec=on has EXRL as well. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16 Fixes: f19fbd5e ("s390: introduce execute-trampolines for branches") Signed-off-by:
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Randy Dunlap authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1775771 [ Upstream commit 1e0ce03b ] The "mdr" command should repeat (continue) when only Enter/Return is pressed, so make it do so. Signed-off-by:
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com> Cc: kgdb-bugreport@lists.sourceforge.net Signed-off-by:
Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by:
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Larry Finger authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1775771 [ Upstream commit fed03fe7 ] The Asus Z370-I contains a Realtek RTL8822BE device with an associated BT chip using a USB ID of 0b05:185c. This device is added to the driver. Signed-off-by:
Hon Weng Chong <honwchong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net> Signed-off-by:
Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by:
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Sylwester Nawrocki authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1775771 [ Upstream commit 647d04f8 ] If the RCLK mux clock configuration is specified in DT and no set_sysclk() callback is used in the sound card driver the sclk_srcrate field will remain set to 0, leading to an incorrect PSR divider setting. To fix this the frequency value is retrieved from the CLK_I2S_RCLK_SRC clock, so the actual RCLK mux selection is taken into account. Signed-off-by:
Sylwester Nawrocki <s.nawrocki@samsung.com> Acked-by:
Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Christophe JAILLET authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1775771 [ Upstream commit 30966861 ] If an unlikely failure in 'of_get_regulator_init_data()' occurs, we must release the reference on the current 'child' node before returning. Signed-off-by:
Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr> Signed-off-by:
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James Smart authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1775771 [ Upstream commit 04673e38 ] The driver controls when the hardware sends completions that communicate consumption of elements from the WQ. This is done by setting a WQEC bit on a WQE. The current driver sets it on every Nth WQE posting. However, the driver isn't clearing the bit if the WQE is reused. Thus, if the queue depth isn't evenly divisible by N, with enough time, it can be set on every element, creating a lot of overhead and risking CQ full conditions. Correct by clearing the bit when not setting it on an Nth element. Signed-off-by:
Dick Kennedy <dick.kennedy@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by:
James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com> Reviewed-by:
Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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James Smart authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1775771 [ Upstream commit 161df4f0 ] During link bounce testing in a point-to-point topology, the host may enter a soft lockup on the lpfc_worker thread: Call Trace: lpfc_work_done+0x1f3/0x1390 [lpfc] lpfc_do_work+0x16f/0x180 [lpfc] kthread+0xc7/0xe0 ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 The driver was simultaneously setting a combination of flags that caused lpfc_do_work()to effectively spin between slow path work and new event data, causing the lockup. Ensure in the typical wq completions, that new event data flags are set if the slow path flag is running. The slow path will eventually reschedule the wq handling. Signed-off-by:
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