1. 01 Apr, 2019 19 commits
  2. 31 Mar, 2019 3 commits
  3. 28 Mar, 2019 4 commits
  4. 26 Mar, 2019 4 commits
  5. 14 Mar, 2019 10 commits
    • Stefan Bader's avatar
      UBUNTU: Ubuntu-4.4.0-144.170 · 6c32833f
      Stefan Bader authored
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
      6c32833f
    • Stefan Bader's avatar
    • Stefan Bader's avatar
    • Stefan Bader's avatar
    • Stefan Bader's avatar
    • Ignat Loskutov's avatar
      UBUNTU: [Packaging] fix a mistype · b104e6bf
      Ignat Loskutov authored
      BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1396654
      
      HAVE_CPLUS_DEMANGLE_SUPPORT=1 used to be spelled incorrectly, leading to
      missing C++ demangling support in perf.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarIgnat Loskutov <ignat.loskutov@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarKhalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarYou-Sheng Yang <vicamo.yang@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKhalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
      b104e6bf
    • Jann Horn's avatar
      mm: enforce min addr even if capable() in expand_downwards() · 0210a634
      Jann Horn authored
      security_mmap_addr() does a capability check with current_cred(), but
      we can reach this code from contexts like a VFS write handler where
      current_cred() must not be used.
      
      This can be abused on systems without SMAP to make NULL pointer
      dereferences exploitable again.
      
      Fixes: 8869477a ("security: protect from stack expansion into low vm addresses")
      Cc: stable@kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      
      CVE-2019-9213
      
      (cherry picked from commit 0a1d5299)
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
      Acked-By: default avatarYou-Sheng Yang <vicamo.yang@canonical.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarKleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
      0210a634
    • Marcel Holtmann's avatar
      Bluetooth: Check L2CAP option sizes returned from l2cap_get_conf_opt · dfcfffc1
      Marcel Holtmann authored
      When doing option parsing for standard type values of 1, 2 or 4 octets,
      the value is converted directly into a variable instead of a pointer. To
      avoid being tricked into being a pointer, check that for these option
      types that sizes actually match. In L2CAP every option is fixed size and
      thus it is prudent anyway to ensure that the remote side sends us the
      right option size along with option paramters.
      
      If the option size is not matching the option type, then that option is
      silently ignored. It is a protocol violation and instead of trying to
      give the remote attacker any further hints just pretend that option is
      not present and proceed with the default values. Implementation
      following the specification and its qualification procedures will always
      use the correct size and thus not being impacted here.
      
      To keep the code readable and consistent accross all options, a few
      cosmetic changes were also required.
      
      CVE-2019-3460
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
      (cherry picked from commit af3d5d1c)
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarSeth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
      dfcfffc1
    • Greg Kroah-Hartman's avatar
    • Eric Dumazet's avatar
      ax25: fix possible use-after-free · f8efc611
      Eric Dumazet authored
      BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1818815
      
      commit 63530aba upstream.
      
      syzbot found that ax25 routes where not properly protected
      against concurrent use [1].
      
      In this particular report the bug happened while
      copying ax25->digipeat.
      
      Fix this problem by making sure we call ax25_get_route()
      while ax25_route_lock is held, so that no modification
      could happen while using the route.
      
      The current two ax25_get_route() callers do not sleep,
      so this change should be fine.
      
      Once we do that, ax25_get_route() no longer needs to
      grab a reference on the found route.
      
      [1]
      ax25_connect(): syz-executor0 uses autobind, please contact jreuter@yaina.de
      BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in memcpy include/linux/string.h:352 [inline]
      BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kmemdup+0x42/0x60 mm/util.c:113
      Read of size 66 at addr ffff888066641a80 by task syz-executor2/531
      
      ax25_connect(): syz-executor0 uses autobind, please contact jreuter@yaina.de
      CPU: 1 PID: 531 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #10
      Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
      Call Trace:
       __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
       dump_stack+0x1db/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
       print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187
       kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317
       check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline]
       check_memory_region+0x123/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:191
       memcpy+0x24/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
       memcpy include/linux/string.h:352 [inline]
       kmemdup+0x42/0x60 mm/util.c:113
       kmemdup include/linux/string.h:425 [inline]
       ax25_rt_autobind+0x25d/0x750 net/ax25/ax25_route.c:424
       ax25_connect.cold+0x30/0xa4 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:1224
       __sys_connect+0x357/0x490 net/socket.c:1664
       __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1675 [inline]
       __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1672 [inline]
       __x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1672
       do_syscall_64+0x1a3/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
      RIP: 0033:0x458099
      Code: 6d b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 3b b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
      RSP: 002b:00007f870ee22c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
      RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000458099
      RDX: 0000000000000048 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000005
      RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
      ax25_connect(): syz-executor4 uses autobind, please contact jreuter@yaina.de
      R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f870ee236d4
      R13: 00000000004be48e R14: 00000000004ce9a8 R15: 00000000ffffffff
      
      Allocated by task 526:
       save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:73
       set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
       __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:496 [inline]
       __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:469
       kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:504
      ax25_connect(): syz-executor5 uses autobind, please contact jreuter@yaina.de
       kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x151/0x760 mm/slab.c:3609
       kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:545 [inline]
       ax25_rt_add net/ax25/ax25_route.c:95 [inline]
       ax25_rt_ioctl+0x3b9/0x1270 net/ax25/ax25_route.c:233
       ax25_ioctl+0x322/0x10b0 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:1763
       sock_do_ioctl+0xe2/0x400 net/socket.c:950
       sock_ioctl+0x32f/0x6c0 net/socket.c:1074
       vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline]
       file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:509 [inline]
       do_vfs_ioctl+0x107b/0x17d0 fs/ioctl.c:696
       ksys_ioctl+0xab/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:713
       __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:720 [inline]
       __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:718 [inline]
       __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:718
       do_syscall_64+0x1a3/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
      
      ax25_connect(): syz-executor5 uses autobind, please contact jreuter@yaina.de
      Freed by task 550:
       save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:73
       set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
       __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:458
       kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:466
       __cache_free mm/slab.c:3487 [inline]
       kfree+0xcf/0x230 mm/slab.c:3806
       ax25_rt_add net/ax25/ax25_route.c:92 [inline]
       ax25_rt_ioctl+0x304/0x1270 net/ax25/ax25_route.c:233
       ax25_ioctl+0x322/0x10b0 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:1763
       sock_do_ioctl+0xe2/0x400 net/socket.c:950
       sock_ioctl+0x32f/0x6c0 net/socket.c:1074
       vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline]
       file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:509 [inline]
       do_vfs_ioctl+0x107b/0x17d0 fs/ioctl.c:696
       ksys_ioctl+0xab/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:713
       __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:720 [inline]
       __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:718 [inline]
       __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:718
       do_syscall_64+0x1a3/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
      
      The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888066641a80
       which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96
      The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
       96-byte region [ffff888066641a80, ffff888066641ae0)
      The buggy address belongs to the page:
      page:ffffea0001999040 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88812c3f04c0 index:0x0
      flags: 0x1fffc0000000200(slab)
      ax25_connect(): syz-executor4 uses autobind, please contact jreuter@yaina.de
      raw: 01fffc0000000200 ffffea0001817948 ffffea0002341dc8 ffff88812c3f04c0
      raw: 0000000000000000 ffff888066641000 0000000100000020 0000000000000000
      page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
      
      Memory state around the buggy address:
       ffff888066641980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
       ffff888066641a00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
      >ffff888066641a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
                         ^
       ffff888066641b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
       ffff888066641b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
      Reported-by: default avatarsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJuerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKhalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
      f8efc611