- 22 Jun, 2019 26 commits
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Georg Hofmann authored
[ Upstream commit b07e228e ] The documentated behavior is: if max_hw_heartbeat_ms is implemented, the minimum of the set_timeout argument and max_hw_heartbeat_ms should be used. This patch implements this behavior. Previously only the first 7bits were used and the input argument was returned. Signed-off-by:
Georg Hofmann <georg@hofmannsweb.com> Reviewed-by:
Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by:
Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by:
Wim Van Sebroeck <wim@linux-watchdog.org> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Maciej Żenczykowski authored
[ Upstream commit 689a5860 ] Memory: 509108K/542612K available (3835K kernel code, 919K rwdata, 1028K rodata, 129K init, 211K bss, 33504K reserved, 0K cma-reserved) NR_IRQS: 15 clocksource: timer: mask: 0xffffffffffffffff max_cycles: 0x1cd42e205, max_idle_ns: 881590404426 ns ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at kernel/time/clockevents.c:458 clockevents_register_device+0x72/0x140 posix-timer cpumask == cpu_all_mask, using cpu_possible_mask instead Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.1.0-rc4-00048-ged79cc87 #4 Stack: 604ebda0 603c5370 604ebe20 6046fd17 00000000 6006fcbb 604ebdb0 603c53b5 604ebe10 6003bfc4 604ebdd0 9000001ca Call Trace: [<6006fcbb>] ? printk+0x0/0x94 [<60083160>] ? clockevents_register_device+0x72/0x140 [<6001f16e>] show_stack+0x13b/0x155 [<603c5370>] ? dump_stack_print_info+0xe2/0xeb [<6006fcbb>] ? printk+0x0/0x94 [<603c53b5>] dump_stack+0x2a/0x2c [<6003bfc4>] __warn+0x10e/0x13e [<60070320>] ? vprintk_func+0xc8/0xcf [<60030fd6>] ? block_signals+0x0/0x16 [<6006fcbb>] ? printk+0x0/0x94 [<6003c08b>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x97/0x99 [<600311a1>] ? set_signals+0x0/0x3f [<6003bff4>] ? warn_slowpath_fmt+0x0/0x99 [<600842cb>] ? tick_oneshot_mode_active+0x44/0x4f [<60030fd6>] ? block_signals+0x0/0x16 [<6006fcbb>] ? printk+0x0/0x94 [<6007d2d5>] ? __clocksource_select+0x20/0x1b1 [<60030fd6>] ? block_signals+0x0/0x16 [<6006fcbb>] ? printk+0x0/0x94 [<60083160>] clockevents_register_device+0x72/0x140 [<60031192>] ? get_signals+0x0/0xf [<60030fd6>] ? block_signals+0x0/0x16 [<6006fcbb>] ? printk+0x0/0x94 [<60002eec>] um_timer_setup+0xc8/0xca [<60001b59>] start_kernel+0x47f/0x57e [<600035bc>] start_kernel_proc+0x49/0x4d [<6006c483>] ? kmsg_dump_register+0x82/0x8a [<6001de62>] new_thread_handler+0x81/0xb2 [<60003571>] ? kmsg_dumper_stdout_init+0x1a/0x1c [<60020c75>] uml_finishsetup+0x54/0x59 random: get_random_bytes called from init_oops_id+0x27/0x34 with crng_init=0 ---[ end trace 00173d0117a88acb ]--- Calibrating delay loop... 6941.90 BogoMIPS (lpj=34709504) Signed-off-by:
Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com> Cc: linux-um@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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YueHaibing authored
[ Upstream commit 35399f87 ] In configfs_register_group(), if create_default_group() failed, we forget to unlink the group. It will left a invalid item in the parent list, which may trigger the use-after-free issue seen below: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_add_valid+0xd4/0xe0 lib/list_debug.c:26 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881ef61ae20 by task syz-executor.0/5996 CPU: 1 PID: 5996 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.0.0+ #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0xa9/0x10e lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description+0x65/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:187 kasan_report+0x149/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:317 __list_add_valid+0xd4/0xe0 lib/list_debug.c:26 __list_add include/linux/list.h:60 [inline] list_add_tail include/linux/list.h:93 [inline] link_obj+0xb0/0x190 fs/configfs/dir.c:759 link_group+0x1c/0x130 fs/configfs/dir.c:784 configfs_register_group+0x56/0x1e0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1751 configfs_register_default_group+0x72/0xc0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1834 ? 0xffffffffc1be0000 iio_sw_trigger_init+0x23/0x1000 [industrialio_sw_trigger] do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:887 do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456 load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804 __do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898 do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x462e99 Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f494ecbcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f494ecbcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f494ecbd6bc R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004 Allocated by task 5987: set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.3+0xa0/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:497 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:545 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:740 [inline] configfs_register_default_group+0x4c/0xc0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1829 0xffffffffc1bd0023 do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:887 do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456 load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804 __do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898 do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 5987: set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:459 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1429 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1456 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:3003 [inline] kfree+0xe1/0x270 mm/slub.c:3955 configfs_register_default_group+0x9a/0xc0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1836 0xffffffffc1bd0023 do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:887 do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456 load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804 __do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898 do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881ef61ae00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192 The buggy address is located 32 bytes inside of 192-byte region [ffff8881ef61ae00, ffff8881ef61aec0) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0007bd8680 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881f6c03000 index:0xffff8881ef61a700 flags: 0x2fffc0000000200(slab) raw: 02fffc0000000200 ffffea0007ca4740 0000000500000005 ffff8881f6c03000 raw: ffff8881ef61a700 000000008010000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8881ef61ad00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8881ef61ad80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff8881ef61ae00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff8881ef61ae80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff8881ef61af00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Fixes: 5cf6a51e ("configfs: allow dynamic group creation") Reported-by:
Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Chao Yu authored
[ Upstream commit e95bcdb2 ] As Jungyeon reported in bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203233 - Overview When mounting the attached crafted image and running program, following errors are reported. Additionally, it hangs on sync after running program. The image is intentionally fuzzed from a normal f2fs image for testing. Compile options for F2FS are as follows. CONFIG_F2FS_FS=y CONFIG_F2FS_STAT_FS=y CONFIG_F2FS_FS_XATTR=y CONFIG_F2FS_FS_POSIX_ACL=y CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS=y - Reproduces cc poc_13.c mkdir test mount -t f2fs tmp.img test cp a.out test cd test sudo ./a.out sync - Kernel messages F2FS-fs (sdb): Bitmap was wrongly set, blk:4608 kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2102! RIP: 0010:update_sit_entry+0x394/0x410 Call Trace: f2fs_allocate_data_block+0x16f/0x660 do_write_page+0x62/0x170 f2fs_do_write_node_page+0x33/0xa0 __write_node_page+0x270/0x4e0 f2fs_sync_node_pages+0x5df/0x670 f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x372/0x1400 f2fs_sync_fs+0xa3/0x130 f2fs_do_sync_file+0x1a6/0x810 do_fsync+0x33/0x60 __x64_sys_fsync+0xb/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x43/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 sit.vblocks and sum valid block count in sit.valid_map may be inconsistent, segment w/ zero vblocks will be treated as free segment, while allocating in free segment, we may allocate a free block, if its bitmap is valid previously, it can cause kernel crash due to bitmap verification failure. Anyway, to avoid further serious metadata inconsistence and corruption, it is necessary and worth to detect SIT inconsistence. So let's enable check_block_count() to verify vblocks and valid_map all the time rather than do it only CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS is enabled. Signed-off-by:
Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Chao Yu authored
[ Upstream commit 546d22f0 ] As Jungyeon reported in bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203217 - Overview When mounting the attached crafted image and running program, I got this error. Additionally, it hangs on sync after running the program. The image is intentionally fuzzed from a normal f2fs image for testing and I enabled option CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS on. - Reproduces cc poc_test_05.c mkdir test mount -t f2fs tmp.img test sudo ./a.out sync - Messages kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:707! RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x33f/0x3a0 Call Trace: evict+0xba/0x180 f2fs_iget+0x598/0xdf0 f2fs_lookup+0x136/0x320 __lookup_slow+0x92/0x140 lookup_slow+0x30/0x50 walk_component+0x1c1/0x350 path_lookupat+0x62/0x200 filename_lookup+0xb3/0x1a0 do_readlinkat+0x56/0x110 __x64_sys_readlink+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x43/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 During inode loading, __recover_inline_status() can recovery inode status and set inode dirty, once we failed in following process, it will fail the check in f2fs_evict_inode, result in trigger BUG_ON(). Let's clear dirty inode in error path of f2fs_iget() to avoid panic. Signed-off-by:
Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Chao Yu authored
[ Upstream commit 22d61e28 ] As Jungyeon reported in bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203227 - Overview When mounting the attached crafted image, following errors are reported. Additionally, it hangs on sync after trying to mount it. The image is intentionally fuzzed from a normal f2fs image for testing. Compile options for F2FS are as follows. CONFIG_F2FS_FS=y CONFIG_F2FS_STAT_FS=y CONFIG_F2FS_FS_XATTR=y CONFIG_F2FS_FS_POSIX_ACL=y CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS=y - Reproduces mkdir test mount -t f2fs tmp.img test sync - Messages kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/recovery.c:549! RIP: 0010:recover_data+0x167a/0x1780 Call Trace: f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0x613/0x710 f2fs_fill_super+0x1043/0x1aa0 mount_bdev+0x16d/0x1a0 mount_fs+0x4a/0x170 vfs_kern_mount+0x5d/0x100 do_mount+0x200/0xcf0 ksys_mount+0x79/0xc0 __x64_sys_mount+0x1c/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x43/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 During recovery, if ofs_of_node is inconsistent in between recovered node page and original checkpointed node page, let's just fail recovery instead of making kernel panic. Signed-off-by:
Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Miroslav Lichvar authored
[ Upstream commit fdc6bae9 ] The ADJ_TAI adjtimex mode sets the TAI-UTC offset of the system clock. It is typically set by NTP/PTP implementations and it is automatically updated by the kernel on leap seconds. The initial value is zero (which applications may interpret as unknown), but this value cannot be set by adjtimex. This limitation seems to go back to the original "nanokernel" implementation by David Mills. Change the ADJ_TAI check to accept zero as a valid TAI-UTC offset in order to allow setting it back to the initial value. Fixes: 153b5d05 ("ntp: support for TAI") Suggested-by:
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Miroslav Lichvar <mlichvar@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190417084833.7401-1-mlichvar@redhat.comSigned-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Martin Blumenstingl authored
[ Upstream commit f173747f ] Holding the spin-lock for all of the code in meson_pwm_apply() can result in a "BUG: scheduling while atomic". This can happen because clk_get_rate() (which is called from meson_pwm_calc()) may sleep. Only hold the spin-lock when modifying registers to solve this. The reason why we need a spin-lock in the driver is because the REG_MISC_AB register is shared between the two channels provided by one PWM controller. The only functions where REG_MISC_AB is modified are meson_pwm_enable() and meson_pwm_disable() so the register reads/writes in there need to be protected by the spin-lock. The original code also used the spin-lock to protect the values in struct meson_pwm_channel. This could be necessary if two consumers can use the same PWM channel. However, PWM core doesn't allow this so we don't need to protect the values in struct meson_pwm_channel with a lock. Fixes: 211ed630 ("pwm: Add support for Meson PWM Controller") Signed-off-by:
Martin Blumenstingl <martin.blumenstingl@googlemail.com> Reviewed-by:
Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Neil Armstrong <narmstrong@baylibre.com> Signed-off-by:
Thierry Reding <thierry.reding@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Josh Poimboeuf authored
[ Upstream commit e6da9567 ] The ignore flag is set on fake jumps in order to keep add_jump_destinations() from setting their jump_dest, since it already got set when the fake jump was created. But using the ignore flag is a bit of a hack. It's normally used to skip validation of an instruction, which doesn't really make sense for fake jumps. Also, after the next patch, using the ignore flag for fake jumps can trigger a false "why am I validating an ignored function?" warning. Instead just add an explicit check in add_jump_destinations() to skip fake jumps. Signed-off-by:
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/71abc072ff48b2feccc197723a9c52859476c068.1557766718.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Matt Redfearn authored
[ Upstream commit 67793bd3 ] The driver currently sets register 0xfb (Low Refresh Rate) based on the value of mode->vrefresh. Firstly, this field is specified to be in Hz, but the magic numbers used by the code are Hz * 1000. This essentially leads to the low refresh rate always being set to 0x01, since the vrefresh value will always be less than 24000. Fix the magic numbers to be in Hz. Secondly, according to the comment in drm_modes.h, the field is not supposed to be used in a functional way anyway. Instead, use the helper function drm_mode_vrefresh(). Fixes: 9c8af882 ("drm: Add adv7511 encoder driver") Reviewed-by:
Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com> Signed-off-by:
Matt Redfearn <matt.redfearn@thinci.com> Signed-off-by:
Sean Paul <seanpaul@chromium.org> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190424132210.26338-1-matt.redfearn@thinci.comSigned-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Stephane Eranian authored
[ Upstream commit c7a28657 ] This patch fixes a restriction/bug introduced by: 583feb08 ("perf/x86/intel: Fix handling of wakeup_events for multi-entry PEBS") The original patch prevented using multi-entry PEBS when wakeup_events != 0. However given that wakeup_events is part of a union with wakeup_watermark, it means that in watermark mode, PEBS multi-entry is also disabled which is not the intent. This patch fixes this by checking is watermark mode is enabled. Signed-off-by:
Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: jolsa@redhat.com Cc: kan.liang@intel.com Cc: vincent.weaver@maine.edu Fixes: 583feb08 ("perf/x86/intel: Fix handling of wakeup_events for multi-entry PEBS") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190514003400.224340-1-eranian@google.comSigned-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Tony Lindgren authored
[ Upstream commit 48171d0e ] I noticed that we can get a -EREMOTEIO errors on at least omap4 duovero: twl6040 0-004b: Failed to write 2d = 19: -121 And then any following register access will produce errors. There 2d offset above is register ACCCTL that gets written on twl6040 powerup. With error checking added to the related regcache_sync() call, the -EREMOTEIO error is reproducable on twl6040 powerup at least duovero. To fix the error, we need to wait until twl6040 is accessible after the powerup. Based on tests on omap4 duovero, we need to wait over 8ms after powerup before register write will complete without failures. Let's also make sure we warn about possible errors too. Note that we have twl6040_patch[] reg_sequence with the ACCCTL register configuration and regcache_sync() will write the new value to ACCCTL. Signed-off-by:
Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Acked-by:
Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@ti.com> Signed-off-by:
Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Binbin Wu authored
[ Upstream commit dad06532 ] In virtualized setup, when system reboots due to warm reset interrupt storm is seen. Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack+0x70/0xa5 __report_bad_irq+0x2e/0xc0 note_interrupt+0x248/0x290 ? add_interrupt_randomness+0x30/0x220 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x54/0x80 handle_irq_event+0x39/0x60 handle_fasteoi_irq+0x91/0x150 handle_irq+0x108/0x180 do_IRQ+0x52/0xf0 common_interrupt+0xf/0xf </IRQ> RIP: 0033:0x76fc2cfabc1d Code: 24 28 bf 03 00 00 00 31 c0 48 8d 35 63 77 0e 00 48 8d 15 2e 94 0e 00 4c 89 f9 49 89 d9 4c 89 d3 e8 b8 e2 01 00 48 8b 54 24 18 <48> 89 ef 48 89 de 4c 89 e1 e8 d5 97 01 00 84 c0 74 2d 48 8b 04 24 RSP: 002b:00007ffd247c1fc0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffda RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007ffd247c1ff0 RCX: 000000000003d3ce RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffd247c1ff0 RDI: 000076fc2cbb6010 RBP: 000076fc2cded010 R08: 00007ffd247c2210 R09: 00007ffd247c22a0 R10: 000076fc29465470 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00007ffd247c1fc0 R13: 000076fc2ce8e470 R14: 000076fc27ec9960 R15: 0000000000000414 handlers: [<000000000d3fa913>] idma64_irq Disabling IRQ #27 To avoid interrupt storm, set the device in reset state before bringing out the device from reset state. Changelog v2: - correct the subject line by adding "mfd: " Signed-off-by:
Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@intel.com> Acked-by:
Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by:
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Daniel Gomez authored
[ Upstream commit 9e364e87 ] MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, <of_match_table> should be called to complete DT OF mathing mechanism and register it. Before this patch: modinfo drivers/mfd/tps65912-spi.ko | grep alias alias: spi:tps65912 After this patch: modinfo drivers/mfd/tps65912-spi.ko | grep alias alias: of:N*T*Cti,tps65912C* alias: of:N*T*Cti,tps65912 alias: spi:tps65912 Reported-by:
Javier Martinez Canillas <javier@dowhile0.org> Signed-off-by:
Daniel Gomez <dagmcr@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Amit Kucheria authored
[ Upstream commit fc7d18cf ] We print a calibration failure message on -EPROBE_DEFER from nvmem/qfprom as follows: [ 3.003090] qcom-tsens 4a9000.thermal-sensor: version: 1.4 [ 3.005376] qcom-tsens 4a9000.thermal-sensor: tsens calibration failed [ 3.113248] qcom-tsens 4a9000.thermal-sensor: version: 1.4 This confuses people when, in fact, calibration succeeds later when nvmem/qfprom device is available. Don't print this message on a -EPROBE_DEFER. Signed-off-by:
Amit Kucheria <amit.kucheria@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
Eduardo Valentin <edubezval@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Cyrill Gorcunov authored
[ Upstream commit a9e73998 ] While validating new map we require the @start_data to be strictly less than @end_data, which is fine for regular applications (this is why this nit didn't trigger for that long). These members are set from executable loaders such as elf handers, still it is pretty valid to have a loadable data section with zero size in file, in such case the start_data is equal to end_data once kernel loader finishes. As a result when we're trying to restore such programs the procedure fails and the kernel returns -EINVAL. From the image dump of a program: | "mm_start_code": "0x400000", | "mm_end_code": "0x8f5fb4", | "mm_start_data": "0xf1bfb0", | "mm_end_data": "0xf1bfb0", Thus we need to change validate_prctl_map from strictly less to less or equal operator use. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190408143554.GY1421@uranus.lan Fixes: f606b77f ("prctl: PR_SET_MM -- introduce PR_SET_MM_MAP operation") Signed-off-by:
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Qian Cai authored
[ Upstream commit 745e1014 ] "cat /proc/slab_allocators" could hang forever on SMP machines with kmemleak or object debugging enabled due to other CPUs running do_drain() will keep making kmemleak_object or debug_objects_cache dirty and unable to escape the first loop in leaks_show(), do { set_store_user_clean(cachep); drain_cpu_caches(cachep); ... } while (!is_store_user_clean(cachep)); For example, do_drain slabs_destroy slab_destroy kmem_cache_free __cache_free ___cache_free kmemleak_free_recursive delete_object_full __delete_object put_object free_object_rcu kmem_cache_free cache_free_debugcheck --> dirty kmemleak_object One approach is to check cachep->name and skip both kmemleak_object and debug_objects_cache in leaks_show(). The other is to set store_user_clean after drain_cpu_caches() which leaves a small window between drain_cpu_caches() and set_store_user_clean() where per-CPU caches could be dirty again lead to slightly wrong information has been stored but could also speed up things significantly which sounds like a good compromise. For example, # cat /proc/slab_allocators 0m42.778s # 1st approach 0m0.737s # 2nd approach [akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190411032635.10325-1-cai@lca.pw Fixes: d31676df ("mm/slab: alternative implementation for DEBUG_SLAB_LEAK") Signed-off-by:
Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Reviewed-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Yue Hu authored
[ Upstream commit f0fd5050 ] If not find zero bit in find_next_zero_bit(), it will return the size parameter passed in, so the start bit should be compared with bitmap_maxno rather than cma->count. Although getting maxchunk is working fine due to zero value of order_per_bit currently, the operation will be stuck if order_per_bit is set as non-zero. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190319092734.276-1-zbestahu@gmail.comSigned-off-by:
Yue Hu <huyue2@yulong.com> Reviewed-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <d.safonov@partner.samsung.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Yue Hu authored
[ Upstream commit 1df3a339 ] f022d8cb ("mm: cma: Don't crash on allocation if CMA area can't be activated") fixes the crash issue when activation fails via setting cma->count as 0, same logic exists if bitmap allocation fails. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325081309.6004-1-zbestahu@gmail.comSigned-off-by:
Yue Hu <huyue2@yulong.com> Reviewed-by:
Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Linxu Fang authored
[ Upstream commit 299c83dc ] 342332e6 ("mm/page_alloc.c: introduce kernelcore=mirror option") and later patches rewrote the calculation of node spanned pages. e506b996 ("mem-hotplug: fix node spanned pages when we have a movable node"), but the current code still has problems, When we have a node with only zone_movable and the node id is not zero, the size of node spanned pages is double added. That's because we have an empty normal zone, and zone_start_pfn or zone_end_pfn is not between arch_zone_lowest_possible_pfn and arch_zone_highest_possible_pfn, so we need to use clamp to constrain the range just like the commit <96e907d1> (bootmem: Reimplement __absent_pages_in_range() using for_each_mem_pfn_range()). e.g. Zone ranges: DMA [mem 0x0000000000001000-0x0000000000ffffff] DMA32 [mem 0x0000000001000000-0x00000000ffffffff] Normal [mem 0x0000000100000000-0x000000023fffffff] Movable zone start for each node Node 0: 0x0000000100000000 Node 1: 0x0000000140000000 Early memory node ranges node 0: [mem 0x0000000000001000-0x000000000009efff] node 0: [mem 0x0000000000100000-0x00000000bffdffff] node 0: [mem 0x0000000100000000-0x000000013fffffff] node 1: [mem 0x0000000140000000-0x000000023fffffff] node 0 DMA spanned:0xfff present:0xf9e absent:0x61 node 0 DMA32 spanned:0xff000 present:0xbefe0 absent:0x40020 node 0 Normal spanned:0 present:0 absent:0 node 0 Movable spanned:0x40000 present:0x40000 absent:0 On node 0 totalpages(node_present_pages): 1048446 node_spanned_pages:1310719 node 1 DMA spanned:0 present:0 absent:0 node 1 DMA32 spanned:0 present:0 absent:0 node 1 Normal spanned:0x100000 present:0x100000 absent:0 node 1 Movable spanned:0x100000 present:0x100000 absent:0 On node 1 totalpages(node_present_pages): 2097152 node_spanned_pages:2097152 Memory: 6967796K/12582392K available (16388K kernel code, 3686K rwdata, 4468K rodata, 2160K init, 10444K bss, 5614596K reserved, 0K cma-reserved) It shows that the current memory of node 1 is double added. After this patch, the problem is fixed. node 0 DMA spanned:0xfff present:0xf9e absent:0x61 node 0 DMA32 spanned:0xff000 present:0xbefe0 absent:0x40020 node 0 Normal spanned:0 present:0 absent:0 node 0 Movable spanned:0x40000 present:0x40000 absent:0 On node 0 totalpages(node_present_pages): 1048446 node_spanned_pages:1310719 node 1 DMA spanned:0 present:0 absent:0 node 1 DMA32 spanned:0 present:0 absent:0 node 1 Normal spanned:0 present:0 absent:0 node 1 Movable spanned:0x100000 present:0x100000 absent:0 On node 1 totalpages(node_present_pages): 1048576 node_spanned_pages:1048576 memory: 6967796K/8388088K available (16388K kernel code, 3686K rwdata, 4468K rodata, 2160K init, 10444K bss, 1420292K reserved, 0K cma-reserved) Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1554178276-10372-1-git-send-email-fanglinxu@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Linxu Fang <fanglinxu@huawei.com> Cc: Taku Izumi <izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pavel.tatashin@microsoft.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Mike Kravetz authored
[ Upstream commit 0919e1b6 ] When a huge page is allocated, PagePrivate() is set if the allocation consumed a reservation. When freeing a huge page, PagePrivate is checked. If set, it indicates the reservation should be restored. PagePrivate being set at free huge page time mostly happens on error paths. When huge page reservations are created, a check is made to determine if the mapping is associated with an explicitly mounted filesystem. If so, pages are also reserved within the filesystem. The default action when freeing a huge page is to decrement the usage count in any associated explicitly mounted filesystem. However, if the reservation is to be restored the reservation/use count within the filesystem should not be decrementd. Otherwise, a subsequent page allocation and free for the same mapping location will cause the file filesystem usage to go 'negative'. Filesystem Size Used Avail Use% Mounted on nodev 4.0G -4.0M 4.1G - /opt/hugepool To fix, when freeing a huge page do not adjust filesystem usage if PagePrivate() is set to indicate the reservation should be restored. I did not cc stable as the problem has been around since reserves were added to hugetlbfs and nobody has noticed. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190328234704.27083-2-mike.kravetz@oracle.comSigned-off-by:
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Arnd Bergmann authored
[ Upstream commit be167862 ] Patch series "compiler: allow all arches to enable CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING", v3. This patch (of 11): When function tracing for IPIs is enabled, we get a warning for an overflow of the ipi_types array with the IPI_CPU_BACKTRACE type as triggered by raise_nmi(): arch/arm/kernel/smp.c: In function 'raise_nmi': arch/arm/kernel/smp.c:489:2: error: array subscript is above array bounds [-Werror=array-bounds] trace_ipi_raise(target, ipi_types[ipinr]); This is a correct warning as we actually overflow the array here. This patch raise_nmi() to call __smp_cross_call() instead of smp_cross_call(), to avoid calling into ftrace. For clarification, I'm also adding a two new code comments describing how this one is special. The warning appears to have shown up after commit e7273ff4 ("ARM: 8488/1: Make IPI_CPU_BACKTRACE a "non-secure" SGI"), which changed the number assignment from '15' to '8', but as far as I can tell has existed since the IPI tracepoints were first introduced. If we decide to backport this patch to stable kernels, we probably need to backport e7273ff4 as well. [yamada.masahiro@socionext.com: rebase on v5.1-rc1] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190423034959.13525-2-yamada.masahiro@socionext.com Fixes: e7273ff4 ("ARM: 8488/1: Make IPI_CPU_BACKTRACE a "non-secure" SGI") Fixes: 365ec7b1 ("ARM: add IPI tracepoints") # v3.17 Signed-off-by:
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by:
Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Cc: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Stefan Agner <stefan@agner.ch> Cc: Boris Brezillon <bbrezillon@kernel.org> Cc: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Brian Norris <computersforpeace@gmail.com> Cc: Marek Vasut <marek.vasut@gmail.com> Cc: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Li Rongqing authored
[ Upstream commit d6a2946a ] msgctl10 of ltp triggers the following lockup When CONFIG_KASAN is enabled on large memory SMP systems, the pages initialization can take a long time, if msgctl10 requests a huge block memory, and it will block rcu scheduler, so release cpu actively. After adding schedule() in free_msg, free_msg can not be called when holding spinlock, so adding msg to a tmp list, and free it out of spinlock rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: rcu: Tasks blocked on level-1 rcu_node (CPUs 16-31): P32505 rcu: Tasks blocked on level-1 rcu_node (CPUs 48-63): P34978 rcu: (detected by 11, t=35024 jiffies, g=44237529, q=16542267) msgctl10 R running task 21608 32505 2794 0x00000082 Call Trace: preempt_schedule_irq+0x4c/0xb0 retint_kernel+0x1b/0x2d RIP: 0010:__is_insn_slot_addr+0xfb/0x250 Code: 82 1d 00 48 8b 9b 90 00 00 00 4c 89 f7 49 c1 ee 03 e8 59 83 1d 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 39 eb 48 89 9d 58 ff ff ff <41> c6 04 06 f8 74 66 4c 8d 75 98 4c 89 f1 48 c1 e9 03 48 01 c8 48 RSP: 0018:ffff88bce041f758 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffff8471bc50 RCX: ffffffff828a2a57 RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff88bce041f780 RBP: ffff88bce041f828 R08: ffffed15f3f4c5b3 R09: ffffed15f3f4c5b3 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed15f3f4c5b2 R12: 000000318aee9b73 R13: ffffffff8471bc50 R14: 1ffff1179c083ef0 R15: 1ffff1179c083eec kernel_text_address+0xc1/0x100 __kernel_text_address+0xe/0x30 unwind_get_return_address+0x2f/0x50 __save_stack_trace+0x92/0x100 create_object+0x380/0x650 __kmalloc+0x14c/0x2b0 load_msg+0x38/0x1a0 do_msgsnd+0x19e/0xcf0 do_syscall_64+0x117/0x400 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: rcu: Tasks blocked on level-1 rcu_node (CPUs 0-15): P32170 rcu: (detected by 14, t=35016 jiffies, g=44237525, q=12423063) msgctl10 R running task 21608 32170 32155 0x00000082 Call Trace: preempt_schedule_irq+0x4c/0xb0 retint_kernel+0x1b/0x2d RIP: 0010:lock_acquire+0x4d/0x340 Code: 48 81 ec c0 00 00 00 45 89 c6 4d 89 cf 48 8d 6c 24 20 48 89 3c 24 48 8d bb e4 0c 00 00 89 74 24 0c 48 c7 44 24 20 b3 8a b5 41 <48> c1 ed 03 48 c7 44 24 28 b4 25 18 84 48 c7 44 24 30 d0 54 7a 82 RSP: 0018:ffff88af83417738 EFLAGS: 00000282 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88bd335f3080 RCX: 0000000000000002 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88bd335f3d64 RBP: ffff88af83417758 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed13f3f745b2 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 is_bpf_text_address+0x32/0xe0 kernel_text_address+0xec/0x100 __kernel_text_address+0xe/0x30 unwind_get_return_address+0x2f/0x50 __save_stack_trace+0x92/0x100 save_stack+0x32/0xb0 __kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 kfree+0xfa/0x2d0 free_msg+0x24/0x50 do_msgrcv+0x508/0xe60 do_syscall_64+0x117/0x400 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Davidlohr said: "So after releasing the lock, the msg rbtree/list is empty and new calls will not see those in the newly populated tmp_msg list, and therefore they cannot access the delayed msg freeing pointers, which is good. Also the fact that the node_cache is now freed before the actual messages seems to be harmless as this is wanted for msg_insert() avoiding GFP_ATOMIC allocations, and after releasing the info->lock the thing is freed anyway so it should not change things" Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1552029161-4957-1-git-send-email-lirongqing@baidu.comSigned-off-by:
Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com> Signed-off-by:
Zhang Yu <zhangyu31@baidu.com> Reviewed-by:
Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Christian Brauner authored
[ Upstream commit e260ad01 ] Currently when userspace gives us a values that overflow e.g. file-max and other callers of __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax() we simply ignore the new value and leave the current value untouched. This can be problematic as it gives the illusion that the limit has indeed be bumped when in fact it failed. This commit makes sure to return EINVAL when an overflow is detected. Please note that this is a userspace facing change. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190210203943.8227-4-christian@brauner.ioSigned-off-by:
Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by:
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Hou Tao authored
[ Upstream commit bd8309de ] fsync() needs to make sure the data & meta-data of file are persistent after the return of fsync(), even when a power-failure occurs later. In the case of fat-fs, the FAT belongs to the meta-data of file, so we need to issue a flush after the writeback of FAT instead before. Also bail out early when any stage of fsync fails. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190409030158.136316-1-houtao1@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Acked-by:
OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Kangjie Lu authored
[ Upstream commit 23015b22 ] In case create_workqueue fails, the fix releases resources and returns -ENOMEM to avoid NULL pointer dereference. Signed-off-by:
Kangjie Lu <kjlu@umn.edu> Acked-by:
Alexandre Bounine <alex.bou9@gmail.com> Cc: Matt Porter <mporter@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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- 17 Jun, 2019 6 commits
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
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Eric Dumazet authored
commit 967c05ae upstream. If mtu probing is enabled tcp_mtu_probing() could very well end up with a too small MSS. Use the new sysctl tcp_min_snd_mss to make sure MSS search is performed in an acceptable range. CVE-2019-11479 -- tcp mss hardcoded to 48 Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by:
Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com> Cc: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com> Acked-by:
Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Eric Dumazet authored
commit 5f3e2bf0 upstream. Some TCP peers announce a very small MSS option in their SYN and/or SYN/ACK messages. This forces the stack to send packets with a very high network/cpu overhead. Linux has enforced a minimal value of 48. Since this value includes the size of TCP options, and that the options can consume up to 40 bytes, this means that each segment can include only 8 bytes of payload. In some cases, it can be useful to increase the minimal value to a saner value. We still let the default to 48 (TCP_MIN_SND_MSS), for compatibility reasons. Note that TCP_MAXSEG socket option enforces a minimal value of (TCP_MIN_MSS). David Miller increased this minimal value in commit c39508d6 ("tcp: Make TCP_MAXSEG minimum more correct.") from 64 to 88. We might in the future merge TCP_MIN_SND_MSS and TCP_MIN_MSS. CVE-2019-11479 -- tcp mss hardcoded to 48 Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Suggested-by:
Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com> Acked-by:
Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com> Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Eric Dumazet authored
commit f070ef2a upstream. Jonathan Looney reported that a malicious peer can force a sender to fragment its retransmit queue into tiny skbs, inflating memory usage and/or overflow 32bit counters. TCP allows an application to queue up to sk_sndbuf bytes, so we need to give some allowance for non malicious splitting of retransmit queue. A new SNMP counter is added to monitor how many times TCP did not allow to split an skb if the allowance was exceeded. Note that this counter might increase in the case applications use SO_SNDBUF socket option to lower sk_sndbuf. CVE-2019-11478 : tcp_fragment, prevent fragmenting a packet when the socket is already using more than half the allowed space Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by:
Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com> Acked-by:
Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Acked-by:
Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Reviewed-by:
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com> Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Eric Dumazet authored
commit 3b4929f6 upstream. Jonathan Looney reported that TCP can trigger the following crash in tcp_shifted_skb() : BUG_ON(tcp_skb_pcount(skb) < pcount); This can happen if the remote peer has advertized the smallest MSS that linux TCP accepts : 48 An skb can hold 17 fragments, and each fragment can hold 32KB on x86, or 64KB on PowerPC. This means that the 16bit witdh of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs can overflow. Note that tcp_sendmsg() builds skbs with less than 64KB of payload, so this problem needs SACK to be enabled. SACK blocks allow TCP to coalesce multiple skbs in the retransmit queue, thus filling the 17 fragments to maximal capacity. CVE-2019-11477 -- u16 overflow of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs Backport notes, provided by Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com> v4.15 or since commit 737ff314 ("tcp: use sequence distance to detect reordering") had switched from the packet-based FACK tracking and switched to sequence-based. v4.14 and older still have the old logic and hence on tcp_skb_shift_data() needs to retain its original logic and have @fack_count in sync. In other words, we keep the increment of pcount with tcp_skb_pcount(skb) to later used that to update fack_count. To make it more explicit we track the new skb that gets incremented to pcount in @next_pcount, and we get to avoid the constant invocation of tcp_skb_pcount(skb) all together. Fixes: 832d11c5 ("tcp: Try to restore large SKBs while SACK processing") Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by:
Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com> Acked-by:
Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Reviewed-by:
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com> Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Eric Dumazet authored
commit 8ba6ddaa upstream. With upcoming rb-tree implementation, the checks will trigger more often, and this is expected. Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Amit Shah <amit@infradead.org> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 11 Jun, 2019 8 commits
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
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Yunsheng Lin authored
commit f9fc54d3 upstream. The return type for get_regs_len in struct ethtool_ops is int, the hns3 driver may return error when failing to get the regs len by sending cmd to firmware. Signed-off-by:
Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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David Ahern authored
commit 9b3040a6 upstream. Define __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref to return NULL when CONFIG_INET is disabled. Fixes: 4b2a2bfe ("neighbor: Call __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref in neigh_xmit") Reported-by:
kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu <nobuhiro1.iwamatsu@toshiba.co.jp> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Kirill Smelkov authored
commit bbd84f33 upstream. Starting from commit 9c225f26 ("vfs: atomic f_pos accesses as per POSIX") files opened even via nonseekable_open gate read and write via lock and do not allow them to be run simultaneously. This can create read vs write deadlock if a filesystem is trying to implement a socket-like file which is intended to be simultaneously used for both read and write from filesystem client. See commit 10dce8af ("fs: stream_open - opener for stream-like files so that read and write can run simultaneously without deadlock") for details and e.g. commit 581d21a2 ("xenbus: fix deadlock on writes to /proc/xen/xenbus") for a similar deadlock example on /proc/xen/xenbus. To avoid such deadlock it was tempting to adjust fuse_finish_open to use stream_open instead of nonseekable_open on just FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flags, but grepping through Debian codesearch shows users of FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE, and in particular GVFS which actually uses offset in its read and write handlers https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=-%3Enonseekable+%3D https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1080 https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1247-1346 https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1399-1481 so if we would do such a change it will break a real user. Add another flag (FOPEN_STREAM) for filesystem servers to indicate that the opened handler is having stream-like semantics; does not use file position and thus the kernel is free to issue simultaneous read and write request on opened file handle. This patch together with stream_open() should be added to stable kernels starting from v3.14+. This will allow to patch OSSPD and other FUSE filesystems that provide stream-like files to return FOPEN_STREAM | FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE in open handler and this way avoid the deadlock on all kernel versions. This should work because fuse_finish_open ignores unknown open flags returned from a filesystem and so passing FOPEN_STREAM to a kernel that is not aware of this flag cannot hurt. In turn the kernel that is not aware of FOPEN_STREAM will be < v3.14 where just FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE is sufficient to implement streams without read vs write deadlock. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.14+ Signed-off-by:
Kirill Smelkov <kirr@nexedi.com> Signed-off-by:
Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Kirill Smelkov authored
fs: stream_open - opener for stream-like files so that read and write can run simultaneously without deadlock commit 10dce8af upstream. Commit 9c225f26 ("vfs: atomic f_pos accesses as per POSIX") added locking for file.f_pos access and in particular made concurrent read and write not possible - now both those functions take f_pos lock for the whole run, and so if e.g. a read is blocked waiting for data, write will deadlock waiting for that read to complete. This caused regression for stream-like files where previously read and write could run simultaneously, but after that patch could not do so anymore. See e.g. commit 581d21a2 ("xenbus: fix deadlock on writes to /proc/xen/xenbus") which fixes such regression for particular case of /proc/xen/xenbus. The patch that added f_pos lock in 2014 did so to guarantee POSIX thread safety for read/write/lseek and added the locking to file descriptors of all regular files. In 2014 that thread-safety problem was not new as it was already discussed earlier in 2006. However even though 2006'th version of Linus's patch was adding f_pos locking "only for files that are marked seekable with FMODE_LSEEK (thus avoiding the stream-like objects like pipes and sockets)", the 2014 version - the one that actually made it into the tree as 9c225f26 - is doing so irregardless of whether a file is seekable or not. See https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/53022DB1.4070805@gmail.com/ https://lwn.net/Articles/180387 https://lwn.net/Articles/180396 for historic context. The reason that it did so is, probably, that there are many files that are marked non-seekable, but e.g. their read implementation actually depends on knowing current position to correctly handle the read. Some examples: kernel/power/user.c snapshot_read fs/debugfs/file.c u32_array_read fs/fuse/control.c fuse_conn_waiting_read + ... drivers/hwmon/asus_atk0110.c atk_debugfs_ggrp_read arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c hypfs_read_iter ... Despite that, many nonseekable_open users implement read and write with pure stream semantics - they don't depend on passed ppos at all. And for those cases where read could wait for something inside, it creates a situation similar to xenbus - the write could be never made to go until read is done, and read is waiting for some, potentially external, event, for potentially unbounded time -> deadlock. Besides xenbus, there are 14 such places in the kernel that I've found with semantic patch (see below): drivers/xen/evtchn.c:667:8-24: ERROR: evtchn_fops: .read() can deadlock .write() drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:963:8-24: ERROR: capi_fops: .read() can deadlock .write() drivers/input/evdev.c:527:1-17: ERROR: evdev_fops: .read() can deadlock .write() drivers/char/pcmcia/cm4000_cs.c:1685:7-23: ERROR: cm4000_fops: .read() can deadlock .write() net/rfkill/core.c:1146:8-24: ERROR: rfkill_fops: .read() can deadlock .write() drivers/s390/char/fs3270.c:488:1-17: ERROR: fs3270_fops: .read() can deadlock .write() drivers/usb/misc/ldusb.c:310:1-17: ERROR: ld_usb_fops: .read() can deadlock .write() drivers/hid/uhid.c:635:1-17: ERROR: uhid_fops: .read() can deadlock .write() net/batman-adv/icmp_socket.c:80:1-17: ERROR: batadv_fops: .read() can deadlock .write() drivers/media/rc/lirc_dev.c:198:1-17: ERROR: lirc_fops: .read() can deadlock .write() drivers/leds/uleds.c:77:1-17: ERROR: uleds_fops: .read() can deadlock .write() drivers/input/misc/uinput.c:400:1-17: ERROR: uinput_fops: .read() can deadlock .write() drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:985:7-23: ERROR: umad_fops: .read() can deadlock .write() drivers/gnss/core.c:45:1-17: ERROR: gnss_fops: .read() can deadlock .write() In addition to the cases above another regression caused by f_pos locking is that now FUSE filesystems that implement open with FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flag, can no longer implement bidirectional stream-like files - for the same reason as above e.g. read can deadlock write locking on file.f_pos in the kernel. FUSE's FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE was added in 2008 in a7c1b990 ("fuse: implement nonseekable open") to support OSSPD. OSSPD implements /dev/dsp in userspace with FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flag, with corresponding read and write routines not depending on current position at all, and with both read and write being potentially blocking operations: See https://github.com/libfuse/osspd https://lwn.net/Articles/308445 https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1406 https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1438-L1477 https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1479-L1510 Corresponding libfuse example/test also describes FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE as "somewhat pipe-like files ..." with read handler not using offset. However that test implements only read without write and cannot exercise the deadlock scenario: https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L124-L131 https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L146-L163 https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L209-L216 I've actually hit the read vs write deadlock for real while implementing my FUSE filesystem where there is /head/watch file, for which open creates separate bidirectional socket-like stream in between filesystem and its user with both read and write being later performed simultaneously. And there it is semantically not easy to split the stream into two separate read-only and write-only channels: https://lab.nexedi.com/kirr/wendelin.core/blob/f13aa600/wcfs/wcfs.go#L88-169 Let's fix this regression. The plan is: 1. We can't change nonseekable_open to include &~FMODE_ATOMIC_POS - doing so would break many in-kernel nonseekable_open users which actually use ppos in read/write handlers. 2. Add stream_open() to kernel to open stream-like non-seekable file descriptors. Read and write on such file descriptors would never use nor change ppos. And with that property on stream-like files read and write will be running without taking f_pos lock - i.e. read and write could be running simultaneously. 3. With semantic patch search and convert to stream_open all in-kernel nonseekable_open users for which read and write actually do not depend on ppos and where there is no other methods in file_operations which assume @offset access. 4. Add FOPEN_STREAM to fs/fuse/ and open in-kernel file-descriptors via steam_open if that bit is present in filesystem open reply. It was tempting to change fs/fuse/ open handler to use stream_open instead of nonseekable_open on just FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flags, but grepping through Debian codesearch shows users of FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE, and in particular GVFS which actually uses offset in its read and write handlers https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=-%3Enonseekable+%3D https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1080 https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1247-1346 https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1399-1481 so if we would do such a change it will break a real user. 5. Add stream_open and FOPEN_STREAM handling to stable kernels starting from v3.14+ (the kernel where 9c225f26 first appeared). This will allow to patch OSSPD and other FUSE filesystems that provide stream-like files to return FOPEN_STREAM | FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE in their open handler and this way avoid the deadlock on all kernel versions. This should work because fs/fuse/ ignores unknown open flags returned from a filesystem and so passing FOPEN_STREAM to a kernel that is not aware of this flag cannot hurt. In turn the kernel that is not aware of FOPEN_STREAM will be < v3.14 where just FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE is sufficient to implement streams without read vs write deadlock. This patch adds stream_open, converts /proc/xen/xenbus to it and adds semantic patch to automatically locate in-kernel places that are either required to be converted due to read vs write deadlock, or that are just safe to be converted because read and write do not use ppos and there are no other funky methods in file_operations. Regarding semantic patch I've verified each generated change manually - that it is correct to convert - and each other nonseekable_open instance left - that it is either not correct to convert there, or that it is not converted due to current stream_open.cocci limitations. The script also does not convert files that should be valid to convert, but that currently have .llseek = noop_llseek or generic_file_llseek for unknown reason despite file being opened with nonseekable_open (e.g. drivers/input/mousedev.c) Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Yongzhi Pan <panyongzhi@gmail.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr> Cc: Nikolaus Rath <Nikolaus@rath.org> Cc: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Kirill Smelkov <kirr@nexedi.com> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Jiri Slaby authored
commit 4cdd17ba upstream. We need to compute the uart state only on the first open. This is usually what is done in the ->install hook. serial_core used to do this in ->open on every open. So move it to ->install. As a side effect, it ensures the state is set properly in the window after tty_init_dev is called, but before uart_open. This fixes a bunch of races between tty_open and flush_to_ldisc we were dealing with recently. One of such bugs was attempted to fix in commit fedb5760 (serial: fix race between flush_to_ldisc and tty_open), but it only took care of a couple of functions (uart_start and uart_unthrottle). I was able to reproduce the crash on a SLE system, but in uart_write_room which is also called from flush_to_ldisc via process_echoes. I was *unable* to reproduce the bug locally. It is due to having this patch in my queue since 2012! general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 1 PID: 5 Comm: kworker/u4:0 Tainted: G L 4.12.14-396-default #1 SLE15-SP1 (unreleased) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-0-ga698c89-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events_unbound flush_to_ldisc task: ffff8800427d8040 task.stack: ffff8800427f0000 RIP: 0010:uart_write_room+0xc4/0x590 RSP: 0018:ffff8800427f7088 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000002f RSI: 00000000000000ee RDI: ffff88003888bd90 RBP: ffffffffb9545850 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000400 R10: ffff8800427d825c R11: 000000000000006e R12: 1ffff100084fee12 R13: ffffc900004c5000 R14: ffff88003888bb28 R15: 0000000000000178 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880043300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000561da0794148 CR3: 000000000ebf4000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Call Trace: tty_write_room+0x6d/0xc0 __process_echoes+0x55/0x870 n_tty_receive_buf_common+0x105e/0x26d0 tty_ldisc_receive_buf+0xb7/0x1c0 tty_port_default_receive_buf+0x107/0x180 flush_to_ldisc+0x35d/0x5c0 ... 0 in rbx means tty->driver_data is NULL in uart_write_room. 0x178 is tried to be dereferenced (0x178 >> 3 is 0x2f in rdx) at uart_write_room+0xc4. 0x178 is exactly (struct uart_state *)NULL->refcount used in uart_port_lock from uart_write_room. So revert the upstream commit here as my local patch should fix the whole family. Signed-off-by:
Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com> Cc: Wang Li <wangli39@baidu.com> Cc: Zhang Yu <zhangyu31@baidu.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Chris Wilson authored
commit d90c06d5 upstream. This was supposed to be a mask of all known rings, but it is being used by execbuffer to filter out invalid rings, and so is instead mapping high unused values onto valid rings. Instead of a mask of all known rings, we need it to be the mask of all possible rings. Fixes: 549f7365 ("drm/i915: Enable SandyBridge blitter ring") Fixes: de1add36 ("drm/i915: Decouple execbuf uAPI from internal implementation") Signed-off-by:
Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+ Reviewed-by:
Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190301140404.26690-21-chris@chris-wilson.co.ukSigned-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Christian König authored
commit 2e26ccb1 upstream. Instead of the closest reference divider prefer the lowest, this fixes flickering issues on HP Compaq nx9420. Bugs: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=108514Suggested-by:
Paul Dufresne <dufresnep@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Acked-by:
Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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