- 17 Jan, 2018 40 commits
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Andi Kleen authored
commit 7614e913 upstream. Convert all indirect jumps in 32bit irq inline asm code to use non speculative sequences. Signed-off-by:
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by:
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-12-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.ukSigned-off-by:
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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David Woodhouse authored
commit 5096732f upstream. Convert all indirect jumps in 32bit checksum assembler code to use non-speculative sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. Signed-off-by:
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David Woodhouse authored
commit ea08816d upstream. Convert indirect call in Xen hypercall to use non-speculative sequence, when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. Signed-off-by:
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-10-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.ukSigned-off-by:
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David Woodhouse authored
commit e70e5892 upstream. Convert all indirect jumps in hyperv inline asm code to use non-speculative sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. Signed-off-by:
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David Woodhouse authored
commit 9351803b upstream. Convert all indirect jumps in ftrace assembler code to use non-speculative sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. Signed-off-by:
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David Woodhouse authored
commit 2641f08b upstream. Convert indirect jumps in core 32/64bit entry assembler code to use non-speculative sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. Don't use CALL_NOSPEC in entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath because the return address after the 'call' instruction must be *precisely* at the .Lentry_SYSCALL_64_after_fastpath label for stub_ptregs_64 to work, and the use of alternatives will mess that up unless we play horrid games to prepend with NOPs and make the variants the same length. It's not worth it; in the case where we ALTERNATIVE out the retpoline, the first instruction at __x86.indirect_thunk.rax is going to be a bare jmp *%rax anyway. Signed-off-by:
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David Woodhouse authored
commit 9697fa39 upstream. Convert all indirect jumps in crypto assembler code to use non-speculative sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. Signed-off-by:
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David Woodhouse authored
commit da285121 upstream. Add a spectre_v2= option to select the mitigation used for the indirect branch speculation vulnerability. Currently, the only option available is retpoline, in its various forms. This will be expanded to cover the new IBRS/IBPB microcode features. The RETPOLINE_AMD feature relies on a serializing LFENCE for speculation control. For AMD hardware, only set RETPOLINE_AMD if LFENCE is a serializing instruction, which is indicated by the LFENCE_RDTSC feature. [ tglx: Folded back the LFENCE/AMD fixes and reworked it so IBRS integration becomes simple ] Signed-off-by:
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David Woodhouse authored
commit 76b04384 upstream. Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler. This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the retpoline can be disabled. On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE. Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during alternative patching. [ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks] [ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to symbolic labels ] [ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ] Signed-off-by:
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Andrey Ryabinin authored
commit 196bd485 upstream. Currently we use current_stack_pointer() function to get the value of the stack pointer register. Since commit: f5caf621 ("x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang") ... we have a stack register variable declared. It can be used instead of current_stack_pointer() function which allows to optimize away some excessive "mov %rsp, %<dst>" instructions: -mov %rsp,%rdx -sub %rdx,%rax -cmp $0x3fff,%rax -ja ffffffff810722fd <ist_begin_non_atomic+0x2d> +sub %rsp,%rax +cmp $0x3fff,%rax +ja ffffffff810722fa <ist_begin_non_atomic+0x2a> Remove current_stack_pointer(), rename __asm_call_sp to current_stack_pointer and use it instead of the removed function. Signed-off-by:
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by:
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170929141537.29167-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.comSigned-off-by:
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.ku> Signed-off-by:
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Josh Poimboeuf authored
commit 258c7605 upstream. Getting objtool to understand retpolines is going to be a bit of a challenge. For now, take advantage of the fact that retpolines are patched in with alternatives. Just read the original (sane) non-alternative instruction, and ignore the patched-in retpoline. This allows objtool to understand the control flow *around* the retpoline, even if it can't yet follow what's inside. This means the ORC unwinder will fail to unwind from inside a retpoline, but will work fine otherwise. Signed-off-by:
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Josh Poimboeuf authored
commit 39b73533 upstream. A direct jump to a retpoline thunk is really an indirect jump in disguise. Change the objtool instruction type accordingly. Objtool needs to know where indirect branches are so it can detect switch statement jump tables. This fixes a bunch of warnings with CONFIG_RETPOLINE like: arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_nhmex.o: warning: objtool: nhmex_rbox_msr_enable_event()+0x44: sibling call from callable instruction with modified stack frame kernel/signal.o: warning: objtool: copy_siginfo_to_user()+0x91: sibling call from callable instruction with modified stack frame ... Signed-off-by:
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Josh Poimboeuf authored
commit e390f9a9 upstream. The '__unreachable' and '__func_stack_frame_non_standard' sections are only used at compile time. They're discarded for vmlinux but they should also be discarded for modules. Since this is a recurring pattern, prefix the section names with ".discard.". It's a nice convention and vmlinux.lds.h already discards such sections. Also remove the 'a' (allocatable) flag from the __unreachable section since it doesn't make sense for a discarded section. Suggested-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Andy Lutomirski authored
commit b8b7abae upstream. Otherwise we might have the PCID feature bit set during cpu_init(). This is just for robustness. I haven't seen any actual bugs here. Signed-off-by:
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fixes: cba4671a ("x86/mm: Disable PCID on 32-bit kernels") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b16dae9d6b0db5d9801ddbebbfd83384097c61f3.1505663533.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
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David Woodhouse authored
commit b9e705ef upstream. Where an ALTERNATIVE is used in the middle of an inline asm block, this would otherwise lead to the following instruction being appended directly to the trailing ".popsection", and a failed compile. Fixes: 9cebed42 ("x86, alternative: Use .pushsection/.popsection") Signed-off-by:
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Borislav Petkov authored
commit 612e8e93 upstream. The alternatives code checks only the first byte whether it is a NOP, but with NOPs in front of the payload and having actual instructions after it breaks the "optimized' test. Make sure to scan all bytes before deciding to optimize the NOPs in there. Reported-by:
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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David Woodhouse authored
commit 9ecccfaa upstream. Fixes: 87590ce6 ("sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder") Signed-off-by:
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Tom Lendacky authored
commit 9c6a73c7 upstream. With LFENCE now a serializing instruction, use LFENCE_RDTSC in preference to MFENCE_RDTSC. However, since the kernel could be running under a hypervisor that does not support writing that MSR, read the MSR back and verify that the bit has been set successfully. If the MSR can be read and the bit is set, then set the LFENCE_RDTSC feature, otherwise set the MFENCE_RDTSC feature. Signed-off-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
Razvan Ghitulete <rga@amazon.de> Signed-off-by:
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Tom Lendacky authored
commit e4d0e84e upstream. To aid in speculation control, make LFENCE a serializing instruction since it has less overhead than MFENCE. This is done by setting bit 1 of MSR 0xc0011029 (DE_CFG). Some families that support LFENCE do not have this MSR. For these families, the LFENCE instruction is already serializing. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit 61dc0f55 upstream. Implement the CPU vulnerabilty show functions for meltdown, spectre_v1 and spectre_v2. Signed-off-by:
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180107214913.177414879@linutronix.deSigned-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit 87590ce6 upstream. As the meltdown/spectre problem affects several CPU architectures, it makes sense to have common way to express whether a system is affected by a particular vulnerability or not. If affected the way to express the mitigation should be common as well. Create /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities folder and files for meltdown, spectre_v1 and spectre_v2. Allow architectures to override the show function. Signed-off-by:
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Borislav Petkov authored
commit 62a67e12 upstream. Should be easier when following boot paths. It probably is a left over from the x86 unification eons ago. No functionality change. Signed-off-by:
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David Woodhouse authored
commit 99c6fa25 upstream. Add the bug bits for spectre v1/2 and force them unconditionally for all cpus. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit de791821 upstream. Use the name associated with the particular attack which needs page table isolation for mitigation. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit a89f040f upstream. Many x86 CPUs leak information to user space due to missing isolation of user space and kernel space page tables. There are many well documented ways to exploit that. The upcoming software migitation of isolating the user and kernel space page tables needs a misfeature flag so code can be made runtime conditional. Add the BUG bits which indicates that the CPU is affected and add a feature bit which indicates that the software migitation is enabled. Assume for now that _ALL_ x86 CPUs are affected by this. Exceptions can be made later. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit 6cbd2171 upstream. There is currently no way to force CPU bug bits like CPU feature bits. That makes it impossible to set a bug bit once at boot and have it stick for all upcoming CPUs. Extend the force set/clear arrays to handle bug bits as well. Signed-off-by:
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Andy Lutomirski authored
commit 8bf1ebca upstream. There are multiple call sites that apply forced CPU caps. Factor them into a helper. Signed-off-by:
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Dave Hansen authored
commit 01c9b17b upstream. Add some details about how PTI works, what some of the downsides are, and how to debug it when things go wrong. Also document the kernel parameter: 'pti/nopti'. Signed-off-by:
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Reviewed-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Moritz Lipp <moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at> Cc: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at> Cc: Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at> Cc: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Andi Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180105174436.1BC6FA2B@viggo.jf.intel.comSigned-off-by:
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Benjamin Poirier authored
commit 4110e02e upstream. e1000e_check_for_copper_link() and e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan() are the two functions that may be assigned to mac.ops.check_for_link when phy.media_type == e1000_media_type_copper. Commit 19110cfb ("e1000e: Separate signaling for link check/link up") changed the meaning of the return value of check_for_link for copper media but only adjusted the first function. This patch adjusts the second function likewise. Reported-by:
Christian Hesse <list@eworm.de> Reported-by:
Gabriel C <nix.or.die@gmail.com> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198047 Fixes: 19110cfb ("e1000e: Separate signaling for link check/link up") Signed-off-by:
Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com> Tested-by:
Aaron Brown <aaron.f.brown@intel.com> Tested-by:
Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Icenowy Zheng authored
commit 928afc85 upstream. The UAS mode of Norelsys NS1068(X) is reported to fail to work on several platforms with the following error message: xhci-hcd xhci-hcd.0.auto: ERROR Transfer event for unknown stream ring slot 1 ep 8 xhci-hcd xhci-hcd.0.auto: @00000000bf04a400 00000000 00000000 1b000000 01098001 And when trying to mount a partition on the disk the disk will disconnect from the USB controller, then after re-connecting the device will be offlined and not working at all. Falling back to USB mass storage can solve this problem, so ignore UAS function of this chip. Signed-off-by:
Icenowy Zheng <icenowy@aosc.io> Acked-by:
Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Ben Seri authored
commit 06e7e776 upstream. In the function l2cap_parse_conf_rsp and in the function l2cap_parse_conf_req the following variable is declared without initialization: struct l2cap_conf_efs efs; In addition, when parsing input configuration parameters in both of these functions, the switch case for handling EFS elements may skip the memcpy call that will write to the efs variable: ... case L2CAP_CONF_EFS: if (olen == sizeof(efs)) memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen); ... The olen in the above if is attacker controlled, and regardless of that if, in both of these functions the efs variable would eventually be added to the outgoing configuration request that is being built: l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs), (unsigned long) &efs); So by sending a configuration request, or response, that contains an L2CAP_CONF_EFS element, but with an element length that is not sizeof(efs) - the memcpy to the uninitialized efs variable can be avoided, and the uninitialized variable would be returned to the attacker (16 bytes). This issue has been assigned CVE-2017-1000410 Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org> Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Ben Seri <ben@armis.com> Signed-off-by:
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Viktor Slavkovic authored
commit 443064cb upstream. A lock-unlock is missing in ASHMEM_SET_SIZE ioctl which can result in a race condition when mmap is called. After the !asma->file check, before setting asma->size, asma->file can be set in mmap. That would result in having different asma->size than the mapped memory size. Combined with ASHMEM_UNPIN ioctl and shrinker invocation, this can result in memory corruption. Signed-off-by:
Viktor Slavkovic <viktors@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Shuah Khan authored
commit 5fd77a3a upstream. v_send_ret_submit() handles urb with a null transfer_buffer, when it replays a packet with potential malicious data that could contain a null buffer. Add a check for the condition when actual_length > 0 and transfer_buffer is null. Signed-off-by:
Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by:
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Shuah Khan authored
commit b78d830f upstream. Harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input that could trigger large memory allocations. Add checks to validate transfer_buffer_length and number_of_packets to protect against bad input requesting for unbounded memory allocations. Signed-off-by:
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Shuah Khan authored
commit e1346fd8 upstream. usbip_dump_usb_device() and usbip_dump_urb() print kernel addresses. Remove kernel addresses from usb device and urb debug msgs and improve the message content. Instead of printing parent device and bus addresses, print parent device and bus names. Signed-off-by:
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Pete Zaitcev authored
commit 46eb14a6 upstream. Automated tests triggered this by opening usbmon and accessing the mmap while simultaneously resizing the buffers. This bug was with us since 2006, because typically applications only size the buffers once and thus avoid racing. Reported by Kirill A. Shutemov. Reported-by: <syzbot+f9831b881b3e849829fc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Pete Zaitcev <zaitcev@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Stefan Agner authored
commit b8626f1d upstream. When using a GPIO which is high by default, and initialize the driver in USB Hub mode, initialization fails with: [ 111.757794] usb3503 0-0008: SP_ILOCK failed (-5) The reason seems to be that the chip is not properly reset. Probe does initialize reset low, however some lines later the code already set it back high, which is not long enouth. Make sure reset is asserted for at least 100us by inserting a delay after initializing the reset pin during probe. Signed-off-by:
Stefan Agner <stefan@agner.ch> Signed-off-by:
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Christian Holl authored
commit d14ac576 upstream. This adds the ELV ALC 8xxx Battery Charging device to the list of USB IDs of drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c Signed-off-by:
Christian Holl <cyborgx1@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Diego Elio Pettenò authored
commit 43074132 upstream. Add IDs for the OneTouch Verio IQ that comes with an embedded USB-to-serial converter. Signed-off-by:
Diego Elio Pettenò <flameeyes@flameeyes.eu> Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Borkmann authored
commit bbeb6e43 upstream. syzkaller tried to alloc a map with 0xfffffffd entries out of a userns, and thus unprivileged. With the recently added logic in b2157399 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") we round this up to the next power of two value for max_entries for unprivileged such that we can apply proper masking into potentially zeroed out map slots. However, this will generate an index_mask of 0xffffffff, and therefore a + 1 will let this overflow into new max_entries of 0. This will pass allocation, etc, and later on map access we still enforce on the original attr->max_entries value which was 0xfffffffd, therefore triggering GPF all over the place. Thus bail out on overflow in such case. Moreover, on 32 bit archs roundup_pow_of_two() can also not be used, since fls_long(max_entries - 1) can result in 32 and 1UL << 32 in 32 bit space is undefined. Therefore, do this by hand in a 64 bit variable. This fixes all the issues triggered by syzkaller's reproducers. Fixes: b2157399 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") Reported-by: syzbot+b0efb8e572d01bce1ae0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+6c15e9744f75f2364773@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d2f5524fb46fd3b312ee@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+61d23c95395cc90dbc2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+0d363c942452cca68c01@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by:
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by:
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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