- 30 Jun, 2020 40 commits
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/mmc/host/. Suggested-by:
Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Pierre Ossman <pierre@ossman.eu> cc: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> cc: linux-mmc@vger.kernel.org (cherry picked from commit dac562fc) Signed-off-by:
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/misc/. Suggested-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> (cherry picked from commit 4f1927dc) Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/media/. Suggested-by:
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com> cc: mjpeg-users@lists.sourceforge.net cc: linux-media@vger.kernel.org (backported from commit 5a8fc6a3) Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/isdn/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/input/. Suggested-by:
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> cc: linux-input@vger.kernel.org (cherry picked from commit f6b12d04) Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/i2c/. Suggested-by:
Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> Acked-by:
Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> cc: linux-i2c@vger.kernel.org (backported from commit c78babcc) Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/gpio/. Suggested-by:
William Breathitt Gray <vilhelm.gray@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> cc: Alexandre Courbot <gnurou@gmail.com> cc: linux-gpio@vger.kernel.org (backported from commit d759f906) Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/cpufreq/. Suggested-by:
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net> Acked-by:
Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org (cherry picked from commit 40059ec6) Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/clocksource/. [Note: With regard to cs5535-clockevt.c, Thomas Gleixner asked whether the timer_irq parameter is required for the driver to work on anything other than arbitrary hardware which has it mapped to 0. Jens Rottmann replied that the parameter defaults to 0, which means: 1. autodetect (=keep IRQ BIOS has set up) 2. if that fails use CONFIG_CS5535_MFGPT_DEFAULT_IRQ (see drivers/misc/cs5535-mfgpt.c: cs5535_mfgpt_set_irq()) Jens further noted that there may not be any systems that have CS5535/36 devices that support EFI and secure boot.] Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/char/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/char/mwave/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/char/ipmi/. Suggested-by:
Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com> cc: openipmi-developer@lists.sourceforge.net (cherry picked from commit 684497bf) Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in arch/x86/mm/. [Note: With respect to testmmiotrace, an additional patch will be added separately that makes the module refuse to load if the kernel is locked down.] Suggested-by:
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> cc: x86@kernel.org cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org cc: nouveau@lists.freedesktop.org (cherry picked from commit 3c2e2e68) Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 Provided an annotation for module parameters that specify hardware parameters (such as io ports, iomem addresses, irqs, dma channels, fixed dma buffers and other types). This will enable such parameters to be locked down in the core parameter parser for secure boot support. I've also included annotations as to what sort of hardware configuration each module is dealing with for future use. Some of these are straightforward (ioport, iomem, irq, dma), but there are also: (1) drivers that switch the semantics of a parameter between ioport and iomem depending on a second parameter, (2) drivers that appear to reserve a CPU memory buffer at a fixed address, (3) other parameters, such as bus types and irq selection bitmasks. For the moment, the hardware configuration type isn't actually stored, though its validity is checked. Signed-off-by:
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Matthew Garrett authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 Allowing users to read and write to core kernel memory makes it possible for the kernel to be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions, and also to steal cryptographic information. Disallow /dev/mem and /dev/kmem from being opened this when the kernel has been locked down to prevent this. Also disallow /dev/port from being opened to prevent raw ioport access and thus DMA from being used to accomplish the same thing. Signed-off-by:
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com> Signed-off-by:
"Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com> (backported from commit 2eada4c7af2d4e9522a47523d2a5106d96271cd9 git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jwboyer/fedora.git) Signed-off-by:
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Seth Forshee authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 This reverts commit cc223b88 to backport an updated version. Signed-off-by:
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Seth Forshee authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 This reverts commit 517d6c3a to backport an updated version. Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 The testmmiotrace module shouldn't be permitted when the kernel is locked down as it can be used to arbitrarily read and write MMIO space. Suggested-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> cc: x86@kernel.org (backported from commit 64ce4fc1ef16d4dd818eca47701f803e58444ab2 git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jwboyer/fedora.git) Signed-off-by:
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Linn Crosetto authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 >From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt): If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an instrumented, modified one. When lockdown is enabled, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if the kernel is locked down. Signed-off-by:
Linn Crosetto <lcrosetto@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> (backported from commit 6ea0e815) Signed-off-by:
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Kamal Mostafa authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1883918 Ignore: yes Signed-off-by:
Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1883918Signed-off-by:
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Oleg Nesterov authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1883918 commit 013b2deb upstream. uprobe_write_opcode() must not cross page boundary; prepare_uprobe() relies on arch_uprobe_analyze_insn() which should validate "vaddr" but some architectures (csky, s390, and sparc) don't do this. We can remove the BUG_ON() check in prepare_uprobe() and validate the offset early in __uprobe_register(). The new IS_ALIGNED() check matches the alignment check in arch_prepare_kprobe() on supported architectures, so I think that all insns must be aligned to UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE. Another problem is __update_ref_ctr() which was wrong from the very beginning, it can read/write outside of kmap'ed page unless "vaddr" is aligned to sizeof(short), __uprobe_register() should check this too. Reported-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Suggested-by:
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by:
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Tested-by:
Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Mathieu Othacehe authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1883918 [ Upstream commit 18dfb532 ] The bytes returned by the i2c reading need to be swapped unconditionally. Otherwise, on be16 platforms, an incorrect value will be returned. Taking the slow path via next merge window as its been around a while and we have a patch set dependent on this which would be held up. Fixes: 62a1efb9 ("iio: add vcnl4000 combined ALS and proximity sensor") Signed-off-by:
Mathieu Othacehe <m.othacehe@gmail.com> Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Josh Poimboeuf authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1883918 commit 3798cc4d upstream Make the docs match the code. Signed-off-by:
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Mark Gross authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1883918 commit 7222a1b5 upstream Add documentation for the SRBDS vulnerability and its mitigation. [ bp: Massage. jpoimboe: sysfs table strings. ] Signed-off-by:
Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by:
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by:
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Jia Zhang authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1883918 commit b399151c upstream. x86_mask is a confusing name which is hard to associate with the processor's stepping. Additionally, correct an indent issue in lib/cpu.c. [ Backport by Mark Gross to simplify the SRBDS backport ] Signed-off-by:
Jia Zhang <qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com> [ Updated it to more recent kernels. ] Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: tony.luck@intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1514771530-70829-1-git-send-email-qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.comSigned-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Pascal Terjan authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1883918 commit 15ea976a upstream. The value in shared headers was fixed 9 years ago in commit 8d661f1e ("ieee80211: correct IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK macro") and while looking at using shared headers for other duplicated constants I noticed this driver uses the old value. The macros are also defined twice in this file so I am deleting the second definition. Signed-off-by:
Pascal Terjan <pterjan@google.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200523211247.23262-1-pterjan@google.comSigned-off-by:
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Dmitry Torokhov authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1883918 commit b86dab05 upstream. When k_ascii is invoked several times in a row there is a potential for signed integer overflow: UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:888:19 signed integer overflow: 10 * 1111111111 cannot be represented in type 'int' CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.6.11 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0xce/0x128 lib/dump_stack.c:118 ubsan_epilogue+0xe/0x30 lib/ubsan.c:154 handle_overflow+0xdc/0xf0 lib/ubsan.c:184 __ubsan_handle_mul_overflow+0x2a/0x40 lib/ubsan.c:205 k_ascii+0xbf/0xd0 drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:888 kbd_keycode drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:1477 [inline] kbd_event+0x888/0x3be0 drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:1495 While it can be worked around by using check_mul_overflow()/ check_add_overflow(), it is better to introduce a separate flag to signal that number pad is being used to compose a symbol, and change type of the accumulator from signed to unsigned, thus avoiding undefined behavior when it overflows. Reported-by:
Kyungtae Kim <kt0755@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Daniele Palmas authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1883918 commit 399ad947 upstream. Add Telit LE910C1-EUX compositions: 0x1031: tty, tty, tty, rmnet 0x1033: tty, tty, tty, ecm Signed-off-by:
Daniele Palmas <dnlplm@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200525211106.27338-1-dnlplm@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Bin Liu authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1883918 commit 986c1748 upstream. usb_wwan_indat_callback() shouldn't resubmit rx urb if the previous urb status is a fatal error. Or the usb controller would keep processing the new urbs then run into interrupt storm, and has no chance to recover. Fixes: 6c1ee66a ("USB-Serial: Fix error handling of usb_wwan") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Bin Liu <b-liu@ti.com> Signed-off-by:
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Matt Jolly authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1883918 commit 3429444a upstream. Add support for Dell Wireless 5816e Download Mode (AKA boot & hold mode / QDL download mode) to drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c This is required to update device firmware. Signed-off-by:
Matt Jolly <Kangie@footclan.ninja> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1883918 [ Upstream commit 02c71b14 ] syzbot recently found a way to crash the kernel [1] Issue here is that inet_hash() & inet_unhash() are currently only meant to be used by TCP & DCCP, since only these protocols provide the needed hashinfo pointer. L2TP uses a single list (instead of a hash table) This old bug became an issue after commit 61023658 ("bpf: Add new cgroup attach type to enable sock modifications") since after this commit, sk_common_release() can be called while the L2TP socket is still considered 'hashed'. general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] CPU: 0 PID: 7063 Comm: syz-executor654 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:inet_unhash+0x11f/0x770 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:600 Code: 03 0f b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e dd 04 00 00 48 8d 7d 08 44 8b 73 08 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 55 05 00 00 48 8d 7d 14 4c 8b 6d 08 48 b8 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc90001777d30 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88809a6df940 RCX: ffffffff8697c242 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff8697c251 RDI: 0000000000000008 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff88809f3ae1c0 R09: fffffbfff1514cc1 R10: ffffffff8a8a6607 R11: fffffbfff1514cc0 R12: ffff88809a6df9b0 R13: 0000000000000007 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffff873a4d00 FS: 0000000001d2b880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000006cd090 CR3: 000000009403a000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: sk_common_release+0xba/0x370 net/core/sock.c:3210 inet_create net/ipv4/af_inet.c:390 [inline] inet_create+0x966/0xe00 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:248 __sock_create+0x3cb/0x730 net/socket.c:1428 sock_create net/socket.c:1479 [inline] __sys_socket+0xef/0x200 net/socket.c:1521 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1530 [inline] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1528 [inline] __x64_sys_socket+0x6f/0xb0 net/socket.c:1528 do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3 RIP: 0033:0x441e29 Code: e8 fc b3 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 eb 08 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffdce184148 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000029 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000441e29 RDX: 0000000000000073 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000402c30 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 23b6578228ce553e ]--- RIP: 0010:inet_unhash+0x11f/0x770 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:600 Code: 03 0f b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e dd 04 00 00 48 8d 7d 08 44 8b 73 08 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 55 05 00 00 48 8d 7d 14 4c 8b 6d 08 48 b8 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc90001777d30 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88809a6df940 RCX: ffffffff8697c242 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff8697c251 RDI: 0000000000000008 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff88809f3ae1c0 R09: fffffbfff1514cc1 R10: ffffffff8a8a6607 R11: fffffbfff1514cc0 R12: ffff88809a6df9b0 R13: 0000000000000007 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffff873a4d00 FS: 0000000001d2b880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000006cd090 CR3: 000000009403a000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Fixes: 0d76751f ("l2tp: Add L2TPv3 IP encapsulation (no UDP) support") Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com> Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Reported-by: syzbot+3610d489778b57cc8031@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1883918 [ Upstream commit d9a81a22 ] syzbot was able to trigger a crash after using an ISDN socket and fool l2tp. Fix this by making sure the UDP socket is of the proper family. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in setup_udp_tunnel_sock+0x465/0x540 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel.c:78 Write of size 1 at addr ffff88808ed0c590 by task syz-executor.5/3018 CPU: 0 PID: 3018 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x188/0x20d lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd3/0x413 mm/kasan/report.c:382 __kasan_report.cold+0x20/0x38 mm/kasan/report.c:511 kasan_report+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:625 setup_udp_tunnel_sock+0x465/0x540 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel.c:78 l2tp_tunnel_register+0xb15/0xdd0 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:1523 l2tp_nl_cmd_tunnel_create+0x4b2/0xa60 net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c:249 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:673 [inline] genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:718 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x627/0xdf0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:735 netlink_rcv_skb+0x15a/0x410 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2469 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:746 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1303 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x537/0x740 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1329 netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xe10 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1918 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:672 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e6/0x810 net/socket.c:2352 ___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2406 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2439 do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3 RIP: 0033:0x45ca29 Code: 0d b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 db b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007effe76edc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004fe1c0 RCX: 000000000045ca29 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 000000000078bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 000000000000094e R14: 00000000004d5d00 R15: 00007effe76ee6d4 Allocated by task 3018: save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:49 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:495 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xbf/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:468 __do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3656 [inline] __kmalloc+0x161/0x7a0 mm/slab.c:3665 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:560 [inline] sk_prot_alloc+0x223/0x2f0 net/core/sock.c:1612 sk_alloc+0x36/0x1100 net/core/sock.c:1666 data_sock_create drivers/isdn/mISDN/socket.c:600 [inline] mISDN_sock_create+0x272/0x400 drivers/isdn/mISDN/socket.c:796 __sock_create+0x3cb/0x730 net/socket.c:1428 sock_create net/socket.c:1479 [inline] __sys_socket+0xef/0x200 net/socket.c:1521 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1530 [inline] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1528 [inline] __x64_sys_socket+0x6f/0xb0 net/socket.c:1528 do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3 Freed by task 2484: save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:49 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline] kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:317 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0xf7/0x140 mm/kasan/common.c:456 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3426 [inline] kfree+0x109/0x2b0 mm/slab.c:3757 kvfree+0x42/0x50 mm/util.c:603 __free_fdtable+0x2d/0x70 fs/file.c:31 put_files_struct fs/file.c:420 [inline] put_files_struct+0x248/0x2e0 fs/file.c:413 exit_files+0x7e/0xa0 fs/file.c:445 do_exit+0xb04/0x2dd0 kernel/exit.c:791 do_group_exit+0x125/0x340 kernel/exit.c:894 get_signal+0x47b/0x24e0 kernel/signal.c:2739 do_signal+0x81/0x2240 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:784 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x26c/0x360 arch/x86/entry/common.c:161 prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:196 [inline] syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:279 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x6b1/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:305 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88808ed0c000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048 The buggy address is located 1424 bytes inside of 2048-byte region [ffff88808ed0c000, ffff88808ed0c800) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00023b4300 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 flags: 0xfffe0000000200(slab) raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea0002838208 ffffea00015ba288 ffff8880aa000e00 raw: 0000000000000000 ffff88808ed0c000 0000000100000001 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88808ed0c480: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff88808ed0c500: 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88808ed0c580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff88808ed0c600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88808ed0c680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc Fixes: 6b9f3423 ("l2tp: fix races in tunnel creation") Fixes: fd558d18 ("l2tp: Split pppol2tp patch into separate l2tp and ppp parts") Signed-off-by:
syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Acked-by:
Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
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Stefano Garzarella authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1883918 [ Upstream commit 7e0afbdf ] The accept(2) is an "input" socket interface, so we should use SO_RCVTIMEO instead of SO_SNDTIMEO to set the timeout. So this patch replace sock_sndtimeo() with sock_rcvtimeo() to use the right timeout in the vsock_accept(). Fixes: d021c344 ("VSOCK: Introduce VM Sockets") Signed-off-by:
Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
Jorgen Hansen <jhansen@vmware.com> Signed-off-by:
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Chuhong Yuan authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1883918 [ Upstream commit 3decabdc ] st21nfca_tm_send_atr_res() misses to call kfree_skb() in an error path. Add the missed function call to fix it. Fixes: 1892bf84 ("NFC: st21nfca: Adding P2P support to st21nfca in Initiator & Target mode") Signed-off-by:
Chuhong Yuan <hslester96@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Yang Yingliang authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1883918 [ Upstream commit 1b49cd71 ] When devinet_sysctl_register() failed, the memory allocated in neigh_parms_alloc() should be freed. Fixes: 20e61da7 ("ipv4: fail early when creating netdev named all or default") Signed-off-by:
Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Acked-by:
Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Can Guo authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1883918 commit 17c7d35f upstream. In queuecommand path, if DMA map fails, it bails out with clock held. In this case, release the clock to keep its usage paired. [mkp: applied by hand] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0101016ed3d66395-1b7e7fce-b74d-42ca-a88a-4db78b795d3b-000000@us-west-2.amazonses.comReviewed-by:
Bean Huo <beanhuo@micron.com> Signed-off-by:
Can Guo <cang@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by:
Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> [EB: resolved cherry-pick conflict caused by newer kernels not having the clear_bit_unlock() line] Signed-off-by:
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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yangerkun authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1883918 commit f596c870 upstream. As the description before netdev_run_todo, we cannot call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock, fix it by reorder the code. Signed-off-by:
yangerkun <yangerkun@huawei.com> Reviewed-by:
Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Ben Hutchings authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1883918 Commit 9ebd796e ("can: slcan: Fix use-after-free Read in slcan_open") was incorrectly backported to 4.4 and 4.9 stable branches. Since they do not have commit cf124db5 ("net: Fix inconsistent teardown and release of private netdev state."), the destructor function slc_free_netdev() is already responsible for calling free_netdev() and slcan_open() must not call both of them. yangerkun previously fixed the same bug in slip. Fixes: ce624b2089ea ("can: slcan: Fix use-after-free Read in slcan_open") # 4.4 Fixes: f59604a80fa4 ("slcan: not call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock ...") # 4.4 Fixes: 56635a1e ("can: slcan: Fix use-after-free Read in slcan_open") # 4.9 Fixes: a1c9b231 ("slcan: not call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock ...") # 4.9 Cc: yangerkun <yangerkun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jérôme Pouiller authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1883918 commit 83fc5dd5 upstream. The definitions of MMC_IOC_CMD and of MMC_IOC_MULTI_CMD rely on MMC_BLOCK_MAJOR: #define MMC_IOC_CMD _IOWR(MMC_BLOCK_MAJOR, 0, struct mmc_ioc_cmd) #define MMC_IOC_MULTI_CMD _IOWR(MMC_BLOCK_MAJOR, 1, struct mmc_ioc_multi_cmd) However, MMC_BLOCK_MAJOR is defined in linux/major.h and linux/mmc/ioctl.h did not include it. Signed-off-by:
Jérôme Pouiller <jerome.pouiller@silabs.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200511161902.191405-1-Jerome.Pouiller@silabs.comSigned-off-by:
Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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