Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

atomic_t variables are currently used to implement reference
counters with the following properties:
 - counter is initialized to 1 using atomic_set()
 - a resource is freed upon counter reaching zero
 - once counter reaches zero, its further
   increments aren't allowed
 - counter schema uses basic atomic operations
   (set, inc, inc_not_zero, dec_and_test, etc.)

Such atomic variables should be converted to a newly provided
refcount_t type and API that prevents accidental counter overflows
and underflows. This is important since overflows and underflows
can lead to use-after-free situation and be exploitable.

The variable posix_acl.a_refcount is used as pure reference counter.
Convert it to refcount_t and fix up the operations.

**Important note for maintainers:

Some functions from refcount_t API defined in lib/refcount.c
have different memory ordering guarantees than their atomic
counterparts.
The full comparison can be seen in
https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/15/57 and it is hopefully soon
in state to be merged to the documentation tree.
Normally the differences should not matter since refcount_t provides
enough guarantees to satisfy the refcounting use cases, but in
some rare cases it might matter.
Please double check that you don't have some undocumented
memory guarantees for this variable usage.

For the posix_acl.a_refcount it might make a difference
in following places:
 - get_cached_acl(): increment in refcount_inc_not_zero() only
   guarantees control dependency on success vs. fully ordered
   atomic counterpart. However this operation is performed under
   rcu_read_lock(), so this should be fine.
 - posix_acl_release(): decrement in refcount_dec_and_test() only
   provides RELEASE ordering and control dependency on success
   vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

f2fs: remove repeated f2fs_bug_on which has already existed
      in function invalidate_blocks.
Signed-off-by: Zhikang Zhang <zhangzhikang1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

Remove the variable page_idx which no one would miss.
Signed-off-by: Fan li <fanofcode.li@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

test/generic/208 reports a potential deadlock as below:

Chain exists of:
  &mm->mmap_sem --> &fi->i_mmap_sem --> &fi->dio_rwsem[WRITE]

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&fi->dio_rwsem[WRITE]);
                               lock(&fi->i_mmap_sem);
                               lock(&fi->dio_rwsem[WRITE]);
  lock(&mm->mmap_sem);

This patch changes the lock dependency as below in fallocate() to
fix this issue:
- dio_rwsem
 - i_mmap_sem

Fixes: bb06664a ("f2fs: avoid race in between GC and block exchange")
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

Commit d260081c ("f2fs: change recovery policy of xattr node block")
removes the use of blkaddr, which is no longer used. So remove the
parameter.
Signed-off-by: Sheng Yong <shengyong1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

If there is not enough space left, f2fs_preallocate_blocks may only
preallocte partial blocks. As a result, the write operation fails
but i_blocks is not 0.  To avoid this, f2fs should write data in
non-preallocation way and write as many data as the size of i_blocks.
Signed-off-by: Sheng Yong <shengyong1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

This patch introduces a sysfs interface readdir_ra to enable/disable
readaheading inode block in f2fs_readdir. When readdir_ra is enabled,
it improves the performance of "readdir + stat".

For 300,000 files:
	time find /data/test > /dev/null
disable readdir_ra: 1m25.69s real  0m01.94s user  0m50.80s system
enable  readdir_ra: 0m18.55s real  0m00.44s user  0m15.39s system
Signed-off-by: Sheng Yong <shengyong1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

alloc_nid_failed and scan_nat_page can be called at the same time,
and we haven't protected add_free_nid and update_free_nid_bitmap
with the same nid_list_lock. That could lead to

Thread A				Thread B
- __build_free_nids
 - scan_nat_page
  - add_free_nid
					- alloc_nid_failed
					 - update_free_nid_bitmap
  - update_free_nid_bitmap

scan_nat_page will clear the free bitmap since the nid is PREALLOC_NID,
but alloc_nid_failed needs to set the free bitmap. This results in
free nid with free bitmap cleared.
This patch update the bitmap under the same nid_list_lock in add_free_nid.
And use __GFP_NOFAIL to make sure to update status of free nid correctly.
Signed-off-by: Fan li <fanofcode.li@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

We forgot to remov memory footprint accounting of per-cpu type
variables, fix it.

Fixes: 35782b23 ("f2fs: remove percpu_count due to performance regression")
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

No need to read nat block if nat_block_bitmap is set.
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

During mkfs, quota sysfiles have already occupied nid resource,
it needs to adjust remaining available nid count in kernel side.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

Pull MTD fixes from Richard Weinberger:
 "This contains the following regression fixes:

   - fix bitflip handling in brcmnand and gpmi nand drivers

   - revert a bad device tree binding for spi-nor

   - fix a copy&paste error in gpio-nand driver

   - fix a too strict length check in mtd core"

* tag 'for-linus-20171218' of git://git.infradead.org/linux-mtd:
  mtd: Fix mtd_check_oob_ops()
  mtd: nand: gpio: Fix ALE gpio configuration
  mtd: nand: brcmnand: Zero bitflip is not an error
  mtd: nand: gpmi: Fix failure when a erased page has a bitflip at BBM
  Revert "dt-bindings: mtd: add sst25wf040b and en25s64 to sip-nor list"

Pull parisc fixes from Helge Deller:
 "There are two important fixes here:

   - Add PCI quirks to disable built-in a serial AUX and a graphics
     cards from specific GSP (management board) PCI cards. This fixes
     boot via serial console on rp3410 and rp3440 machines.

   - Revert the "Re-enable interrups early" patch which was added to
     kernel v4.10. It can trigger stack overflows and thus silent data
     corruption. With this patch reverted we can lower our thread stack
     back to 16kb again.

  The other patches are minor cleanups: avoid duplicate includes,
  indenting fixes, correctly align variable in asm code"

* 'parisc-4.15-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/deller/parisc-linux:
  parisc: Reduce thread stack to 16 kb
  Revert "parisc: Re-enable interrupts early"
  parisc: remove duplicate includes
  parisc: Hide Diva-built-in serial aux and graphics card
  parisc: Align os_hpmc_size on word boundary
  parisc: Fix indenting in puts()

Pull x86 syscall entry code changes for PTI from Ingo Molnar:
 "The main changes here are Andy Lutomirski's changes to switch the
  x86-64 entry code to use the 'per CPU entry trampoline stack'. This,
  besides helping fix KASLR leaks (the pending Page Table Isolation
  (PTI) work), also robustifies the x86 entry code"

* 'WIP.x86-pti.entry-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (26 commits)
  x86/cpufeatures: Make CPU bugs sticky
  x86/paravirt: Provide a way to check for hypervisors
  x86/paravirt: Dont patch flush_tlb_single
  x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only
  x86/entry: Clean up the SYSENTER_stack code
  x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSENTER stack canary
  x86/entry/64: Move the IST stacks into struct cpu_entry_area
  x86/entry/64: Create a per-CPU SYSCALL entry trampoline
  x86/entry/64: Return to userspace from the trampoline stack
  x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries
  x86/espfix/64: Stop assuming that pt_regs is on the entry stack
  x86/entry/64: Separate cpu_current_top_of_stack from TSS.sp0
  x86/entry: Remap the TSS into the CPU entry area
  x86/entry: Move SYSENTER_stack to the beginning of struct tss_struct
  x86/dumpstack: Handle stack overflow on all stacks
  x86/entry: Fix assumptions that the HW TSS is at the beginning of cpu_tss
  x86/kasan/64: Teach KASAN about the cpu_entry_area
  x86/mm/fixmap: Generalize the GDT fixmap mechanism, introduce struct cpu_entry_area
  x86/entry/gdt: Put per-CPU GDT remaps in ascending order
  x86/dumpstack: Add get_stack_info() support for the SYSENTER stack
  ...

The mtd_check_oob_ops() helper verifies if the operation defined by the
user is correct.

Fix the check that verifies if the entire requested area exists. This
check is too restrictive and will fail anytime the last data byte of the
very last page is included in an operation.

Fixes: 5cdd929d ("mtd: Add sanity checks in mtd_write/read_oob()")
Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@free-electrons.com>
Acked-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>

This reverts commit 04e35f44.

SELinux runs with secureexec for all non-"noatsecure" domain transitions,
which means lots of processes end up hitting the stack hard-limit change
that was introduced in order to fix a race with prlimit(). That race fix
will need to be redesigned.
Reported-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Tomáš Trnka <trnka@scm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Pull Page Table Isolation (PTI) v4.14 backporting base tree from Ingo Molnar:
 "This tree contains the v4.14 PTI backport preparatory tree, which
  consists of four merges of upstream trees and 7 cherry-picked commits,
  which the upcoming PTI work depends on"

NOTE! The resulting tree is exactly the same as the original base tree
(ie the diff between this commit and its immediate first parent is
empty).

The only reason for this merge is literally to have a common point for
the actual PTI changes so that the commits can be shared in both the
4.15 and 4.14 trees.

* 'WIP.x86-pti.base-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/mm/kasan: Don't use vmemmap_populate() to initialize shadow
  locking/barriers: Convert users of lockless_dereference() to READ_ONCE()
  locking/barriers: Add implicit smp_read_barrier_depends() to READ_ONCE()
  bpf: fix build issues on um due to mising bpf_perf_event.h
  perf/x86: Enable free running PEBS for REGS_USER/INTR
  x86: Make X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK detectable in CPUID on AMD
  x86/cpufeature: Add User-Mode Instruction Prevention definitions

Merge branch 'WIP.x86-pti.base.prep-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull Page Table Isolation (PTI) preparatory tree from Ingo Molnar:
 "This does a rename to free up linux/pti.h to be used by the upcoming
  page table isolation feature"

* 'WIP.x86-pti.base.prep-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  drivers/misc/intel/pti: Rename the header file to free up the namespace

Pull timer fix from Thomas Gleixner:
 "A single bugfix which prevents arbitrary sigev_notify values in
  posix-timers"

* 'timers-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  posix-timer: Properly check sigevent->sigev_notify

Pull dmaengine fixes from Vinod Koul:
 "This time consisting of fixes in a bunch of drivers and the dmatest
  module:

   - Fix for disable clk on error path in fsl-edma driver
   - Disable clk fail fix in jz4740 driver
   - Fix long pending bug in dmatest driver for dangling pointer
   - Fix potential NULL pointer dereference in at_hdmac driver
   - Error handling path in ioat driver"

* tag 'dmaengine-fix-4.15-rc4' of git://git.infradead.org/users/vkoul/slave-dma:
  dmaengine: fsl-edma: disable clks on all error paths
  dmaengine: jz4740: disable/unprepare clk if probe fails
  dmaengine: dmatest: move callback wait queue to thread context
  dmaengine: at_hdmac: fix potential NULL pointer dereference in atc_prep_dma_interleaved
  dmaengine: ioat: Fix error handling path

With CONFIG_MTD=m and CONFIG_CRAMFS=y, we now get a link failure:

  fs/cramfs/inode.o: In function `cramfs_mount': inode.c:(.text+0x220): undefined reference to `mount_mtd'
  fs/cramfs/inode.o: In function `cramfs_mtd_fill_super':
  inode.c:(.text+0x6d8): undefined reference to `mtd_point'
  inode.c:(.text+0xae4): undefined reference to `mtd_unpoint'

This adds a more specific Kconfig dependency to avoid the broken
configuration.

Alternatively we could make CRAMFS itself depend on "MTD || !MTD" with a
similar result.

Fixes: 99c18ce5 ("cramfs: direct memory access support")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Pull vfs fixes from Al Viro:
 "The alloc_super() one is a regression in this merge window, lazytime
  thing is older..."

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  VFS: Handle lazytime in do_mount()
  alloc_super(): do ->s_umount initialization earlier

Pull ext4 fixes from Ted Ts'o:
 "Fix a regression which caused us to fail to interpret symlinks in very
  ancient ext3 file system images.

  Also fix two xfstests failures, one of which could cause an OOPS, plus
  an additional bug fix caught by fuzz testing"

* tag 'ext4_for_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4:
  ext4: fix crash when a directory's i_size is too small
  ext4: add missing error check in __ext4_new_inode()
  ext4: fix fdatasync(2) after fallocate(2) operation
  ext4: support fast symlinks from ext3 file systems

In testing, I found that the thread stack can be 16 kB when using an irq
stack.  Without it, the thread stack needs to be 32 kB. Currently, the irq
stack is 32 kB. While it probably could be 16 kB, I would prefer to leave it
as is for safety.
Signed-off-by: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>

This reverts commit 5c38602d.

Interrupts can't be enabled early because the register saves are done on
the thread stack prior to switching to the IRQ stack.  This caused stack
overflows and the thread stack needed increasing to 32k.  Even then,
stack overflows still occasionally occurred.

Background:
Even with a 32 kB thread stack, I have seen instances where the thread
stack overflowed on the mx3210 buildd.  Detection of stack overflow only
occurs when we have an external interrupt.  When an external interrupt
occurs, we switch to the thread stack if we are not already on a kernel
stack.  Then, registers and specials are saved to the kernel stack.

The bug occurs in intr_return where interrupts are reenabled prior to
returning from the interrupt.  This was done incase we need to schedule
or deliver signals.  However, it introduces the possibility that
multiple external interrupts may occur on the thread stack and cause a
stack overflow.  These might not be detected and cause the kernel to
misbehave in random ways.

This patch changes the code back to only reenable interrupts when we are
going to schedule or deliver signals.  As a result, we generally return
from an interrupt before reenabling interrupts.  This minimizes the
growth of the thread stack.

Fixes: 5c38602d ("parisc: Re-enable interrupts early")
Signed-off-by: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10+
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>

These duplicate includes have been found with scripts/checkincludes.pl
but they have been removed manually to avoid removing false positives.
Signed-off-by: Pravin Shedge <pravin.shedge4linux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>

Diva GSP card has built-in serial AUX port and ATI graphic card which simply
don't work and which both don't have external connectors.  User Guides even
mention that those devices shouldn't be used.
So, prevent that Linux drivers try to enable those devices.
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.0+

The os_hpmc_size variable sometimes wasn't aligned at word boundary and thus
triggered the unaligned fault handler at startup.
Fix it by aligning it properly.
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+

Static analysis tools complain that we intended to have curly braces
around this indent block. In this case this assumption is wrong, so fix
the indenting.

Fixes: 2f3c7b81 ("parisc: Add core code for self-extracting kernel")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+

There is currently no way to force CPU bug bits like CPU feature bits. That
makes it impossible to set a bug bit once at boot and have it stick for all
upcoming CPUs.

Extend the force set/clear arrays to handle bug bits as well.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.992156574@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

There is no generic way to test whether a kernel is running on a specific
hypervisor. But that's required to prevent the upcoming user address space
separation feature in certain guest modes.

Make the hypervisor type enum unconditionally available and provide a
helper function which allows to test for a specific type.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.912938129@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

native_flush_tlb_single() will be changed with the upcoming
PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION feature. This requires to have more code in
there than INVLPG.

Remove the paravirt patching for it.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.828111617@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

The TSS is a fairly juicy target for exploits, and, now that the TSS
is in the cpu_entry_area, it's no longer protected by kASLR.  Make it
read-only on x86_64.

On x86_32, it can't be RO because it's written by the CPU during task
switches, and we use a task gate for double faults.  I'd also be
nervous about errata if we tried to make it RO even on configurations
without double fault handling.

[ tglx: AMD confirmed that there is no problem on 64-bit with TSS RO.  So
  	it's probably safe to assume that it's a non issue, though Intel
  	might have been creative in that area. Still waiting for
  	confirmation. ]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.733700132@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

The existing code was a mess, mainly because C arrays are nasty.  Turn
SYSENTER_stack into a struct, add a helper to find it, and do all the
obvious cleanups this enables.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.653244723@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Now that the SYSENTER stack has a guard page, there's no need for a canary
to detect overflow after the fact.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.572577316@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

The IST stacks are needed when an IST exception occurs and are accessed
before any kernel code at all runs.  Move them into struct cpu_entry_area.

The IST stacks are unlike the rest of cpu_entry_area: they're used even for
entries from kernel mode.  This means that they should be set up before we
load the final IDT.  Move cpu_entry_area setup to trap_init() for the boot
CPU and set it up for all possible CPUs at once in native_smp_prepare_cpus().
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.480598743@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>