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  1. 03 Jan, 2006 8 commits
    • Eric Dumazet's avatar
      [NETFILTER] ip_tables: NUMA-aware allocation · 31836064
      Eric Dumazet authored 
      Part of a performance problem with ip_tables is that memory allocation
is not NUMA aware, but 'only' SMP aware (ie each CPU normally touch
separate cache lines)

Even with small iptables rules, the cost of this misplacement can be
high on common workloads.  Instead of using one vmalloc() area
(located in the node of the iptables process), we now allocate an area
for each possible CPU, using vmalloc_node() so that memory should be
allocated in the CPU's node if possible.

Port to arp_tables and ip6_tables by Harald Welte.
Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      31836064
    • Stephen Hemminger's avatar
      [TCP] BIC: CUBIC window growth (2.0) · df3271f3
      Stephen Hemminger authored 
      Replace existing BIC version 1.1 with new version 2.0.
The main change is to replace the window growth function
with a cubic function as described in:
  http://www.csc.ncsu.edu/faculty/rhee/export/bitcp/cubic-paper.pdfSigned-off-by: default avatarStephen Hemminger <shemminger@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      df3271f3
    • Stephen Hemminger's avatar
      [TCP] BIC: spelling and whitespace · 05d05450
      Stephen Hemminger authored 
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Hemminger <shemminger@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      05d05450
    • Stephen Hemminger's avatar
      [TCP] BIC: remove low utilization code. · 018da8f4
      Stephen Hemminger authored 
      The latest BICTCP patch at:
http://www.csc.ncsu.edu:8080/faculty/rhee/export/bitcp/index_files/Page546.htm

disables the low_utilization feature of BICTCP because it doesn't work
in some cases. This patch removes it.
Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Hemminger <shemminger@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      018da8f4
    • Trent Jaeger's avatar
      [LSM-IPSec]: Per-packet access control. · d28d1e08
      Trent Jaeger authored 
      This patch series implements per packet access control via the
extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in
the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security
associations to label packets.  Extensions to the SELinux LSM are
included that leverage the patch for this purpose.

This patch implements the changes necessary to the SELinux LSM to
create, deallocate, and use security contexts for policies
(xfrm_policy) and security associations (xfrm_state) that enable
control of a socket's ability to send and receive packets.

Patch purpose:

The patch is designed to enable the SELinux LSM to implement access
control on individual packets based on the strongly authenticated
IPSec security association.  Such access controls augment the existing
ones in SELinux based on network interface and IP address.  The former
are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed.  By using
IPSec, the SELinux can control access to remote hosts based on
cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism.  This enables
access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote
machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the
access control policy.

Patch design approach:

The patch's main function is to authorize a socket's access to a IPSec
policy based on their security contexts.  Since the communication is
implemented by a security association, the patch ensures that the
security association's negotiated and used have the same security
context.  The patch enables allocation and deallocation of such
security contexts for policies and security associations.  It also
enables copying of the security context when policies are cloned.
Lastly, the patch ensures that packets that are sent without using a
IPSec security assocation with a security context are allowed to be
sent in that manner.

A presentation available at
www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf
from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.

Patch implementation details:

The function which authorizes a socket to perform a requested
operation (send/receive) on a IPSec policy (xfrm_policy) is
selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup.  The Netfilter and rcv_skb hooks ensure
that if a IPSec SA with a securit y association has not been used,
then the socket is allowed to send or receive the packet,
respectively.

The patch implements SELinux function for allocating security contexts
when policies (xfrm_policy) are created via the pfkey or xfrm_user
interfaces via selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc.  When a security association
is built, SELinux allocates the security context designated by the
XFRM subsystem which is based on that of the authorized policy via
selinux_xfrm_state_alloc.

When a xfrm_policy is cloned, the security context of that policy, if
any, is copied to the clone via selinux_xfrm_policy_clone.

When a xfrm_policy or xfrm_state is freed, its security context, if
any is also freed at selinux_xfrm_policy_free or
selinux_xfrm_state_free.

Testing:

The SELinux authorization function is tested using ipsec-tools.  We
created policies and security associations with particular security
contexts and added SELinux access control policy entries to verify the
authorization decision.  We also made sure that packets for which no
security context was supplied (which either did or did not use
security associations) were authorized using an unlabelled context.
Signed-off-by: default avatarTrent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      d28d1e08
    • Trent Jaeger's avatar
      [LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. · df71837d
      Trent Jaeger authored 
      This patch series implements per packet access control via the
extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in
the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security
associations to label packets.  Extensions to the SELinux LSM are
included that leverage the patch for this purpose.

This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem,
pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a
socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security
association) to send/receive network packets.

Patch purpose:

The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on
the strongly authenticated IPSec security association.  Such access
controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP
address.  The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be
spoofed.  By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote
hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism.
This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application
if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to
enforce the access control policy.

Patch design approach:

The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by
user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a
security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM
subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via
security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those
policies.

A presentation available at
www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf
from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.

Patch implementation details:

On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or
xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of
the socket and the same security context is required for resultant
security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in
ipsec-tools).  This is enforced in xfrm_state_find.

On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket
(at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must
also match the security association being used.

The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec.
The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as
before.

Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is
minimal.  The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the
combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec
processing proceeds as in the original case.

Testing:

The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools.  ipsec-tools have
been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version
0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security
associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation
using the security contexts via racoon.

The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set
security contexts.  These programs are also available from me, and
contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing
this interface.  Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel
behavior.
Signed-off-by: default avatarTrent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      df71837d
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Linux v2.6.15 · 88026842
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      Hey, it's fifteen years today since I bought the machine that got Linux
started.  January 2nd is a good date.
      88026842
    • Andi Kleen's avatar
      [PATCH] Make sure interleave masks have at least one node set · 8f493d79
      Andi Kleen authored 
      Otherwise a bad mem policy system call can confuse the interleaving
code into referencing undefined nodes.

Originally reported by Doug Chapman

I was told it's CVE-2005-3358
(one has to love these security people - they make everything sound important)
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
      8f493d79
  3. 02 Jan, 2006 2 commits
    • Dag-Erling Smrgrav's avatar
      [PATCH] Avoid namespace pollution in <asm/param.h> · abe842eb
      Dag-Erling Smrgrav authored 
      In commit 3D59121003721a8fad11ee72e646fd9d3076b5679c, the x86 and x86-64
<asm/param.h> was changed to include <linux/config.h> for the
configurable timer frequency.

However, asm/param.h is sometimes used in userland (it is included
indirectly from <sys/param.h>), so your commit pollutes the userland
namespace with tons of CONFIG_FOO macros.  This greatly confuses
software packages (such as BusyBox) which use CONFIG_FOO macros
themselves to control the inclusion of optional features.

After a short exchange, Christoph approved this patch
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
      abe842eb
    • Benjamin Herrenschmidt's avatar
      [PATCH] powerpc: more g5 overtemp problem fix · f12f4d90
      Benjamin Herrenschmidt authored 
      Some G5s still occasionally experience shutdowns due to overtemp
conditions despite the recent fix. After analyzing logs from such
machines, it appears that the overtemp code is a bit too quick at
shutting the machine down when reaching the critical temperature (tmax +
8) and doesn't leave the fan enough time to actually cool it down. This
happens if the temperature of a CPU suddenly rises too high in a very
short period of time, or occasionally on boot (that is the CPUs are
already overtemp by the time the driver loads).

This patches makes the code a bit more relaxed, leaving a few seconds to
the fans to do their job before kicking the machine shutown.
Signed-off-by: default avatarBenjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
      f12f4d90
  5. 01 Jan, 2006 2 commits
  7. 31 Dec, 2005 3 commits
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge master.kernel.org:/home/rmk/linux-2.6-serial · 35f349ee
      Linus Torvalds authored
      35f349ee
    • Yi Yang's avatar
      [PATCH] Fix false old value return of sysctl · 82c9df82
      Yi Yang authored 
      For the sysctl syscall, if the user wants to get the old value of a
sysctl entry and set a new value for it in the same syscall, the old
value is always overwritten by the new value if the sysctl entry is of
string type and if the user sets its strategy to sysctl_string.  This
issue lies in the strategy being run twice if the strategy is set to
sysctl_string, the general strategy sysctl_string always returns 0 if
success.

Such strategy routines as sysctl_jiffies and sysctl_jiffies_ms return 1
because they do read and write for the sysctl entry.

The strategy routine sysctl_string return 0 although it actually read
and write the sysctl entry.

According to my analysis, if a strategy routine do read and write, it
should return 1, if it just does some necessary check but not read and
write, it should return 0, for example sysctl_intvec.
Signed-off-by: default avatarYi Yang <yang.y.yi@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
      82c9df82
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      sysctl: don't overflow the user-supplied buffer with '\0' · 8febdd85
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      If the string was too long to fit in the user-supplied buffer,
the sysctl layer would zero-terminate it by writing past the
end of the buffer. Don't do that.

Noticed by Yi Yang <yang.y.yi@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
      8febdd85
  9. 30 Dec, 2005 5 commits
  11. 29 Dec, 2005 14 commits
  13. 28 Dec, 2005 6 commits
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