- 18 Apr, 2020 3 commits
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Adrian Hunter authored
In preparation for adding support for leader sampling with AUX area events. Signed-off-by:
Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200401101613.6201-15-adrian.hunter@intel.comSigned-off-by:
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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Adrian Hunter authored
Move leader-sampling configuration in preparation for adding support for leader sampling with AUX area events. Committer notes: It only makes sense when configuring an evsel that is part of an evlist, so the only case where it is called outside perf_evlist__config(), in some 'perf test' entry, is safe, and even there we should just use perf_evlist__config(), but since in that case we have just one evsel in the evlist, it is equivalent. Also fixed up this problem: util/record.c: In function ‘perf_evlist__config’: util/record.c:223:3: error: too many arguments to function ‘perf_evsel__config_leader_sampling’ 223 | perf_evsel__config_leader_sampling(evsel, evlist); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ util/record.c:170:13: note: declared here 170 | static void perf_evsel__config_leader_sampling(struct evsel *evsel) | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Signed-off-by: -
Adrian Hunter authored
Move and globalize 2 functions from the auxtrace specific sources so that they can be reused. Signed-off-by:
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- 16 Apr, 2020 37 commits
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Adrian Hunter authored
Currently, callchains can be synthesized only for synthesized events. Support also synthesizing callchains for regular events. Example: # perf record --kcore --aux-sample -e '{intel_pt//,cycles}' -c 10000 uname Linux [ perf record: Woken up 3 times to write data ] [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.532 MB perf.data ] # perf script --itrace=Ge | head -20 uname 4864 2419025.358181: 10000 cycles: ffffffffbba56965 apparmor_bprm_committing_creds+0x35 ([kernel.kallsyms]) ffffffffbc400cd5 __indirect_thunk_start+0x5 ([kernel.kallsyms]) ffffffffbba07422 security_bprm_committing_creds+0x22 ([kernel.kallsyms]) ffffffffbb89805d install_exec_creds+0xd ([kernel.kallsyms]) ffffffffbb90d9ac load_elf_binary+0x3ac ([kernel.kallsyms]) uname 4864 2419025.358185: 10000 cycles: ffffffffbba56db0 apparmor_bprm_committed_creds+0x20 ([kernel.kallsyms]) ffffffffbc400cd5 __indirect_thunk_start+0x5 ([kernel.kallsyms]) ffffffffbba07452 security_bprm_committed_creds+0x22 ([kernel.kallsyms]) ffffffffbb89809a install_exec_creds+0x4a ([kernel.kallsyms]) ffffffffbb90d9ac load_elf_binary+0x3ac ([kernel.kallsyms]) uname 4864 2419025.358189: 10000 cycles: ffffffffbb86fdf6 vma_adjust_trans_huge+0x6 ([kernel.kallsyms]) ffffffffbb821660 __vma_adjust+0x160 ([kernel.kallsyms]) ffffffffbb897be7 shift_arg_pages+0x97 ([kernel.kallsyms]) ffffffffbb897ed9 setup_arg_pages+0x1e9 ([kernel.kallsyms]) ffffffffbb90d9f2 load_elf_binary+0x3f2 ([kernel.kallsyms]) Committer testing: # perf record --kcore --aux-sample -e '{intel_pt//,cycles}' -c 10000 uname Linux [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.233 MB perf.data ] # Then, before this patch: # perf script --itrace=Ge | head -20 uname 28642 168664.856384: 10000 cycles: ffffffff9810aeaa commit_creds+0x2a ([kernel.kallsyms]) uname 28642 168664.856388: 10000 cycles: ffffffff982a24f1 mprotect_fixup+0x151 ([kernel.kallsyms]) uname 28642 168664.856392: 10000 cycles: ffffffff982a385b move_page_tables+0xbcb ([kernel.kallsyms]) uname 28642 168664.856396: 10000 cycles: ffffffff982fd4ec __mod_memcg_state+0x1c ([kernel.kallsyms]) uname 28642 168664.856400: 10000 cycles: ffffffff9829fddd do_mmap+0xfd ([kernel.kallsyms]) uname 28642 168664.856404: 10000 cycles: ffffffff9829c879 __vma_adjust+0x479 ([kernel.kallsyms]) uname 28642 168664.856408: 10000 cycles: ffffffff98238e94 __perf_addr_filters_adjust+0x34 ([kernel.kallsyms]) uname 28642 168664.856412: 10000 cycles: ffffffff98a38e0b down_write+0x1b ([kernel.kallsyms]) uname 28642 168664.856416: 10000 cycles: ffffffff983006a0 memcg_kmem_get_cache+0x0 ([kernel.kallsyms]) uname 28642 168664.856421: 10000 cycles: ffffffff98396eaf load_elf_binary+0x92f ([kernel.kallsyms]) uname 28642 168664.856425: 10000 cycles: ffffffff982e0222 kfree+0x62 ([kernel.kallsyms]) uname 28642 168664.856428: 10000 cycles: ffffffff9846dfd4 file_has_perm+0x54 ([kernel.kallsyms]) uname 28642 168664.856433: 10000 cycles: ffffffff98288911 vma_interval_tree_insert+0x51 ([kernel.kallsyms]) uname 28642 168664.856437: 10000 cycles: ffffffff9823e577 perf_event_mmap_output+0x27 ([kernel.kallsyms]) uname 28642 168664.856441: 10000 cycles: ffffffff98a26fa0 xas_load+0x40 ([kernel.kallsyms]) uname 28642 168664.856445: 10000 cycles: ffffffff98004f30 arch_setup_additional_pages+0x0 ([kernel.kallsyms]) uname 28642 168664.856448: 10000 cycles: ffffffff98a297c0 copy_user_generic_unrolled+0xa0 ([kernel.kallsyms]) uname 28642 168664.856452: 10000 cycles: ffffffff9853a87a strnlen_user+0x10a ([kernel.kallsyms]) uname 28642 168664.856456: 10000 cycles: ffffffff986638a7 randomize_page+0x27 ([kernel.kallsyms]) uname 28642 168664.856460: 10000 cycles: ffffffff98a3b645 _raw_spin_lock+0x5 ([kernel.kallsyms]) # And after: # perf script --itrace=Ge | head -20 uname 28642 168664.856384: 10000 cycles: ffffffff9810aeaa commit_creds+0x2a ([kernel.kallsyms]) ffffffff9831fe87 install_exec_creds+0x17 ([kernel.kallsyms]) ffffffff983968d9 load_elf_binary+0x359 ([kernel.kallsyms]) ffffffff98e00c45 __x86_indirect_thunk_rax+0x5 ([kernel.kallsyms]) ffffffff98e00c45 __x86_indirect_thunk_rax+0x5 ([kernel.kallsyms]) uname 28642 168664.856388: 10000 cycles: ffffffff982a24f1 mprotect_fixup+0x151 ([kernel.kallsyms]) ffffffff9831fa83 setup_arg_pages+0x123 ([kernel.kallsyms]) ffffffff9839691f load_elf_binary+0x39f ([kernel.kallsyms]) ffffffff98e00c45 __x86_indirect_thunk_rax+0x5 ([kernel.kallsyms]) ffffffff98e00c45 __x86_indirect_thunk_rax+0x5 ([kernel.kallsyms]) uname 28642 168664.856392: 10000 cycles: ffffffff982a385b move_page_tables+0xbcb ([kernel.kallsyms]) ffffffff9831f889 shift_arg_pages+0xa9 ([kernel.kallsyms]) ffffffff9831fb4f setup_arg_pages+0x1ef ([kernel.kallsyms]) ffffffff9839691f load_elf_binary+0x39f ([kernel.kallsyms]) ffffffff98e00c45 __x86_indirect_thunk_rax+0x5 ([kernel.kallsyms]) # Signed-off-by: -
Adrian Hunter authored
For reporting purposes, an evsel sample can have a callchain synthesized from AUX area data. Add support for keeping track of synthesized sample types. Note, the recorded sample_type cannot be changed because it is needed to continue to parse events. Signed-off-by:
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Adrian Hunter authored
Using 'type' variable for checking for callchains is equivalent to using evsel__has_callchain(evsel) and is how the other PERF_SAMPLE_ bits are checked in this function, so use it to be consistent. Signed-off-by:
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Adrian Hunter authored
Add a thread stack function to create a call chain for hardware events where the sample records get created some time after the event occurred. Signed-off-by:
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Adrian Hunter authored
Currently, callchains can be synthesized only for synthesized events. Add an itrace option to synthesize callchains for regular events. Signed-off-by:
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Adrian Hunter authored
An AUX area event must be the group leader when recording traces in sample mode, but that does not produce the expected results from 'perf report' because it expects the leader to provide samples. Rather than teach 'perf report' about AUX area sampling, un-group the AUX area event during processing, making the 2nd event the leader. Example: $ perf record -e '{intel_pt//u,branch-misses:u}' -c 1 uname Linux [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.080 MB perf.data ] Before: $ perf report Samples: 800 of events 'anon group { intel_pt//u, branch-misses:u }', Event count (approx.): 800 Children Self Command Shared Object Symbol 0.00% 47.50% 0.00% 47.50% uname libc-2.28.so [.] _dl_addr 0.00% 16.38% 0.00% 16.38% uname ld-2.28.so [.] __GI___tunables_init 0.00% 54.75% 0.00% 4.75% uname ld-2.28.so [.] dl_main 0.00% 3.12% 0.00% 3.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_map_object_from_fd 0.00% 2.38% 0.00% 2.38% uname ld-2.28.so [.] strcmp 0.00% 2.25% 0.00% 2.25% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_check_map_versions 0.00% 2.00% 0.00% 2.00% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_important_hwcaps 0.00% 2.00% 0.00% 2.00% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_map_object_deps 0.00% 51.50% 0.00% 1.50% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_sysdep_start 0.00% 1.25% 0.00% 1.25% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_load_cache_lookup 0.00% 51.12% 0.00% 1.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_start 0.00% 50.88% 0.00% 1.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] do_lookup_x 0.00% 50.62% 0.00% 1.00% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_lookup_symbol_x 0.00% 1.00% 0.00% 1.00% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_map_object 0.00% 1.00% 0.00% 1.00% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_next_ld_env_entry 0.00% 0.88% 0.00% 0.88% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_cache_libcmp 0.00% 0.88% 0.00% 0.88% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_new_object 0.00% 50.88% 0.00% 0.88% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_relocate_object 0.00% 0.62% 0.00% 0.62% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_init_paths 0.00% 0.62% 0.00% 0.62% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_name_match_p 0.00% 0.50% 0.00% 0.50% uname ld-2.28.so [.] get_common_indeces.constprop.1 0.00% 0.50% 0.00% 0.50% uname ld-2.28.so [.] memmove 0.00% 0.50% 0.00% 0.50% uname ld-2.28.so [.] memset 0.00% 0.50% 0.00% 0.50% uname ld-2.28.so [.] open_verify.constprop.11 0.00% 0.38% 0.00% 0.38% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_check_all_versions 0.00% 0.38% 0.00% 0.38% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_find_dso_for_object 0.00% 0.38% 0.00% 0.38% uname ld-2.28.so [.] init_tls 0.00% 0.25% 0.00% 0.25% uname ld-2.28.so [.] __tunable_get_val 0.00% 0.25% 0.00% 0.25% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_add_to_namespace_list 0.00% 0.25% 0.00% 0.25% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_determine_tlsoffset 0.00% 0.25% 0.00% 0.25% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_discover_osversion 0.00% 0.25% 0.00% 0.25% uname ld-2.28.so [.] calloc@plt 0.00% 0.25% 0.00% 0.25% uname ld-2.28.so [.] malloc 0.00% 0.25% 0.00% 0.25% uname ld-2.28.so [.] malloc@plt 0.00% 0.25% 0.00% 0.25% uname libc-2.28.so [.] _nl_load_locale_from_archive 0.00% 0.25% 0.00% 0.25% uname [unknown] [k] 0xffffffffa3a00010 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] __libc_scratch_buffer_set_array_size 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_allocate_tls_storage 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_catch_exception 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_setup_hash 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_sort_maps 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_sysdep_read_whole_file 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] access 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] calloc 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] mmap64 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] openaux 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] rtld_lock_default_lock_recursive 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] rtld_lock_default_unlock_recursive 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] strchr 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] strlen 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] 0x0000000000001080 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 0.12% uname libc-2.28.so [.] __strchrnul_avx2 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 0.12% uname libc-2.28.so [.] _nl_normalize_codeset 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 0.12% uname libc-2.28.so [.] malloc 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 0.12% uname [unknown] [k] 0xffffffffa3a011f0 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 0.00% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_start_user 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 0.00% uname [unknown] [.] 0000000000000000 After: Samples: 800 of event 'branch-misses:u', Event count (approx.): 800 Children Self Command Shared Object Symbol 54.75% 4.75% uname ld-2.28.so [.] dl_main 51.50% 1.50% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_sysdep_start 51.12% 1.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_start 50.88% 0.88% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_relocate_object 50.88% 1.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] do_lookup_x 50.62% 1.00% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_lookup_symbol_x 50.00% 0.00% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_start_user 50.00% 0.00% uname [unknown] [.] 0000000000000000 47.50% 47.50% uname libc-2.28.so [.] _dl_addr 16.38% 16.38% uname ld-2.28.so [.] __GI___tunables_init 3.12% 3.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_map_object_from_fd 2.38% 2.38% uname ld-2.28.so [.] strcmp 2.25% 2.25% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_check_map_versions 2.00% 2.00% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_important_hwcaps 2.00% 2.00% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_map_object_deps 1.25% 1.25% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_load_cache_lookup 1.00% 1.00% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_map_object 1.00% 1.00% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_next_ld_env_entry 0.88% 0.88% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_cache_libcmp 0.88% 0.88% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_new_object 0.62% 0.62% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_init_paths 0.62% 0.62% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_name_match_p 0.50% 0.50% uname ld-2.28.so [.] get_common_indeces.constprop.1 0.50% 0.50% uname ld-2.28.so [.] memmove 0.50% 0.50% uname ld-2.28.so [.] memset 0.50% 0.50% uname ld-2.28.so [.] open_verify.constprop.11 0.38% 0.38% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_check_all_versions 0.38% 0.38% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_find_dso_for_object 0.38% 0.38% uname ld-2.28.so [.] init_tls 0.25% 0.25% uname ld-2.28.so [.] __tunable_get_val 0.25% 0.25% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_add_to_namespace_list 0.25% 0.25% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_determine_tlsoffset 0.25% 0.25% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_discover_osversion 0.25% 0.25% uname ld-2.28.so [.] calloc@plt 0.25% 0.25% uname ld-2.28.so [.] malloc 0.25% 0.25% uname ld-2.28.so [.] malloc@plt 0.25% 0.25% uname libc-2.28.so [.] _nl_load_locale_from_archive 0.25% 0.25% uname [unknown] [k] 0xffffffffa3a00010 0.12% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] __libc_scratch_buffer_set_array_size 0.12% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_allocate_tls_storage 0.12% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_catch_exception 0.12% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_setup_hash 0.12% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_sort_maps 0.12% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] _dl_sysdep_read_whole_file 0.12% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] access 0.12% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] calloc 0.12% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] mmap64 0.12% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] openaux 0.12% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] rtld_lock_default_lock_recursive 0.12% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] rtld_lock_default_unlock_recursive 0.12% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] strchr 0.12% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] strlen 0.12% 0.12% uname ld-2.28.so [.] 0x0000000000001080 0.12% 0.12% uname libc-2.28.so [.] __strchrnul_avx2 0.12% 0.12% uname libc-2.28.so [.] _nl_normalize_codeset 0.12% 0.12% uname libc-2.28.so [.] malloc 0.12% 0.12% uname [unknown] [k] 0xffffffffa3a011f0 Signed-off-by: -
Adrian Hunter authored
Implement ->evsel_is_auxtrace() callback. Signed-off-by:
Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200401101613.6201-7-adrian.hunter@intel.comSigned-off-by:
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Adrian Hunter authored
Implement ->evsel_is_auxtrace() callback. Signed-off-by:
Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200401101613.6201-6-adrian.hunter@intel.comSigned-off-by:
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Adrian Hunter authored
Implement ->evsel_is_auxtrace() callback. Signed-off-by:
Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@arm.com> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200401101613.6201-5-adrian.hunter@intel.comSigned-off-by:
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Adrian Hunter authored
Implement ->evsel_is_auxtrace() callback. Signed-off-by:
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Adrian Hunter authored
Implement ->evsel_is_auxtrace() callback. Signed-off-by:
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Adrian Hunter authored
Add ->evsel_is_auxtrace() callback to identify if a selected event is an AUX area event. Signed-off-by:
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Andreas Gerstmayr authored
This script works in tandem with d3-flame-graph to generate flame graphs from perf. It supports two output formats: JSON and HTML (the default). The HTML format will look for a standalone d3-flame-graph template file in /usr/share/d3-flame-graph/d3-flamegraph-base.html and fill in the collected stacks. Usage: perf record -a -g -F 99 sleep 60 perf script report flamegraph Combined: perf script flamegraph -a -F 99 sleep 60 Committer testing: Tested both with "PYTHON=python3" and with the default, that uses python2-devel: Complete set of instructions: $ mkdir /tmp/build/perf $ make PYTHON=python3 -C tools/perf O=/tmp/build/perf install-bin $ export PATH=~/bin:$PATH $ perf record -a -g -F 99 sleep 60 $ perf script report flamegraph Now go and open the generated flamegraph.html file in a browser. At first this required building with PYTHON=python3, but after I reported this Andreas was kind enough to send a patch making it work with both python and python3. Signed-off-by:Andreas Gerstmayr <agerstmayr@redhat.com> Tested-by:
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Kajol Jain authored
This patch refactors metricgroup__add_metric function where some part of it move to function metricgroup__add_metric_param. No logic change. Signed-off-by:
Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by:
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Anju T Sudhakar <anju@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jin Yao <yao.jin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Joe Mario <jmario@redhat.com> Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Mamatha Inamdar <mamatha4@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200401203340.31402-4-kjain@linux.ibm.comSigned-off-by:
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Jiri Olsa authored
Add the expr_scanner_ctx object to hold user data for the expr scanner. Currently it holds only start_token, Kajol Jain will use it to hold 24x7 runtime param. Signed-off-by:
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Anju T Sudhakar <anju@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jin Yao <yao.jin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Joe Mario <jmario@redhat.com> Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Mamatha Inamdar <mamatha4@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200401203340.31402-3-kjain@linux.ibm.comSigned-off-by:
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Jiri Olsa authored
Adding expr_ prefix for parse_ctx and parse_id, to straighten out the expr* namespace. There's no functional change. Signed-off-by:
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Ian Rogers authored
Reuse an existing char buffer to avoid two PATH_MAX sized char buffers. Reduces stack frame sizes by 4kb. perf_event__synthesize_mmap_events before 'sub $0x45b8,%rsp' after 'sub $0x35b8,%rsp'. perf_event__get_comm_ids before 'sub $0x2028,%rsp' after 'sub $0x1028,%rsp'. The performance impact of this change is negligible. Signed-off-by:
Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrey Zhizhikin <andrey.z@gmail.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200402154357.107873-4-irogers@google.comSigned-off-by:
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Stephane Eranian authored
The xxx_mountpoint() interface provided by fs.c finds mount points for common pseudo filesystems. The first time xxx_mountpoint() is invoked, it scans the mount table (/proc/mounts) looking for a match. If found, it is cached. The price to scan /proc/mounts is paid once if the mount is found. When the mount point is not found, subsequent calls to xxx_mountpoint() scan /proc/mounts over and over again. There is no caching. This causes a scaling issue in perf record with hugeltbfs__mountpoint(). The function is called for each process found in synthesize__mmap_events(). If the machine has thousands of processes and if the /proc/mounts has many entries this could cause major overhead in perf record. We have observed multi-second slowdowns on some configurations. As an example on a laptop: Before: $ sudo umount /dev/hugepages $ strace -e trace=openat -o /tmp/tt perf record -a ls $ fgrep mounts /tmp/tt 285 After: $ sudo umount /dev/hugepages $ strace -e trace=openat -o /tmp/tt perf record -a ls $ fgrep mounts /tmp/tt 1 One could argue that the non-caching in case the moint point is not found is intentional. That way subsequent calls may discover a moint point if the sysadmin mounts the filesystem. But the same argument could be made against caching the mount point. It could be unmounted causing errors. It all depends on the intent of the interface. This patch assumes it is expected to scan /proc/mounts once. The patch documents the caching behavior in the fs.h header file. An alternative would be to just fix perf record. But it would solve the problem with hugetlbs__mountpoint() but there could be similar issues (possibly down the line) with other xxx_mountpoint() calls in perf or other tools. Signed-off-by:
Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Reviewed-by:
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Ian Rogers authored
Event synthesis may occur at the start or end (tail) of a perf command. In system-wide mode it can scan every process in /proc, which may add seconds of latency before event recording. Add a new benchmark that times how long event synthesis takes with and without data synthesis. An example execution looks like: $ perf bench internals synthesize # Running 'internals/synthesize' benchmark: Average synthesis took: 168.253800 usec Average data synthesis took: 208.104700 usec Signed-off-by:
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Adrian Hunter authored
This simplifies the print functions for the following perf script options: --show-task-events --show-namespace-events --show-cgroup-events --show-mmap-events --show-switch-events --show-lost-events --show-bpf-events Example: # perf record --switch-events -a -e cycles -c 10000 sleep 1 Before: # perf script --show-task-events --show-namespace-events --show-cgroup-events --show-mmap-events --show-switch-events --show-lost-events --show-bpf-events > out-before.txt After: # perf script --show-task-events --show-namespace-events --show-cgroup-events --show-mmap-events --show-switch-events --show-lost-events --show-bpf-events > out-after.txt # diff -s out-before.txt out-after.txt Files out-before.txt and out-after.tx are identical Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Budankov authored
Update the kernel.rst documentation file with the information related to usage of CAP_PERFMON capability to secure performance monitoring and observability operations in system. Signed-off-by:
Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/84c32383-14a2-fa35-16b6-f9e59bd37240@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by:
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Alexey Budankov authored
Update perf-security.rst documentation file with the information related to usage of CAP_PERFMON capability to secure performance monitoring and observability operations in system. Committer notes: While testing 'perf top' under cap_perfmon I noticed that it needs some more capability and Alexey pointed out cap_ipc_lock, as needed by this kernel chunk: kernel/events/core.c: 6101 if ((locked > lock_limit) && perf_is_paranoid() && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) { ret = -EPERM; goto unlock; } So I added it to the documentation, and also mentioned that if the libcap version doesn't yet supports 'cap_perfmon', its numeric value can be used instead, i.e. if: # setcap "cap_perfmon,cap_ipc_lock,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf Fails, try: # setcap "38,cap_ipc_lock,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf I also added a paragraph stating that using an unpatched libcap will fail the check for CAP_PERFMON, as it checks the cap number against a maximum to see if it is valid, which makes it use as the default the 'cycles:u' event, even tho a cap_perfmon capable perf binary can get kernel samples, to workaround that just use, e.g.: # perf top -e cycles # perf record -e cycles And it will sample kernel and user modes. Signed-off-by: -
Alexey Budankov authored
Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure. CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. Signed-off-by:
James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/691f1096-b15f-9b12-50a0-c2b93918149e@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by:
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Alexey Budankov authored
Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure. CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. Signed-off-by:
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/4ec1d6f7-548c-8d1c-f84a-cebeb9674e4e@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by:
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Alexey Budankov authored
Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure. CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. Signed-off-by:
Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/8cc98809-d35b-de0f-de02-4cf554f3cf62@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by:
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Alexey Budankov authored
Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure. CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. Signed-off-by:
Anju T Sudhakar <anju@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ac98cd9f-b59e-673c-c70d-180b3e7695d2@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by:
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Alexey Budankov authored
Open access to bpf_trace monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure. CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) For backward compatibility reasons access to bpf_trace monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure bpf_trace monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. Signed-off-by:
Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/c0a0ae47-8b6e-ff3e-416b-3cd1faaf71c0@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by:
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Alexey Budankov authored
Open access to i915_perf monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure. CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) For backward compatibility reasons access to i915_events subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure i915_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. Signed-off-by:
Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin@intel.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/e3e3292f-f765-ea98-e59c-fbe2db93fd34@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by:
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Alexey Budankov authored
Extend error messages to mention CAP_PERFMON capability as an option to substitute CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations. Make perf_event_paranoid_check() and __cmd_ftrace() to be aware of CAP_PERFMON capability. CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. Committer testing: Using a libcap with this patch: diff --git a/libcap/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/capability.h index 78b2fd4c8a95..89b5b0279b60 100644 --- a/libcap/include/uapi/linux/capability.h +++ b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/capability.h @@ -366,8 +366,9 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data { #define CAP_AUDIT_READ 37 +#define CAP_PERFMON 38 -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_AUDIT_READ +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_PERFMON #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP) Note that using '38' in place of 'cap_perfmon' works to some degree with an old libcap, its only when cap_get_flag() is called that libcap performs an error check based on the maximum value known for capabilities that it will fail. This makes determining the default of perf_event_attr.exclude_kernel to fail, as it can't determine if CAP_PERFMON is in place. Using 'perf top -e cycles' avoids the default check and sets perf_event_attr.exclude_kernel to 1. As root, with a libcap supporting CAP_PERFMON: # groupadd perf_users # adduser perf -g perf_users # mkdir ~perf/bin # cp ~acme/bin/perf ~perf/bin/ # chgrp perf_users ~perf/bin/perf # setcap "cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" ~perf/bin/perf # getcap ~perf/bin/perf /home/perf/bin/perf = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog,cap_perfmon+ep # ls -la ~perf/bin/perf -rwxr-xr-x. 1 root perf_users 16968552 Apr 9 13:10 /home/perf/bin/perf As the 'perf' user in the 'perf_users' group: $ perf top -a --stdio Error: Failed to mmap with 1 (Operation not permitted) $ Either add the cap_ipc_lock capability to the perf binary or reduce the ring buffer size to some smaller value: $ perf top -m10 -a --stdio rounding mmap pages size to 64K (16 pages) Error: Failed to mmap with 1 (Operation not permitted) $ perf top -m4 -a --stdio Error: Failed to mmap with 1 (Operation not permitted) $ perf top -m2 -a --stdio PerfTop: 762 irqs/sec kernel:49.7% exact: 100.0% lost: 0/0 drop: 0/0 [4000Hz cycles], (all, 4 CPUs) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 9.83% perf [.] __symbols__insert 8.58% perf [.] rb_next 5.91% [kernel] [k] module_get_kallsym 5.66% [kernel] [k] kallsyms_expand_symbol.constprop.0 3.98% libc-2.29.so [.] __GI_____strtoull_l_internal 3.66% perf [.] rb_insert_color 2.34% [kernel] [k] vsnprintf 2.30% [kernel] [k] string_nocheck 2.16% libc-2.29.so [.] _IO_getdelim 2.15% [kernel] [k] number 2.13% [kernel] [k] format_decode 1.58% libc-2.29.so [.] _IO_feof 1.52% libc-2.29.so [.] __strcmp_avx2 1.50% perf [.] rb_set_parent_color 1.47% libc-2.29.so [.] __libc_calloc 1.24% [kernel] [k] do_syscall_64 1.17% [kernel] [k] __x86_indirect_thunk_rax $ perf record -a sleep 1 [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.552 MB perf.data (74 samples) ] $ perf evlist cycles $ perf evlist -v cycles: size: 120, { sample_period, sample_freq }: 4000, sample_type: IP|TID|TIME|CPU|PERIOD, read_format: ID, disabled: 1, inherit: 1, mmap: 1, comm: 1, freq: 1, task: 1, precise_ip: 3, sample_id_all: 1, exclude_guest: 1, mmap2: 1, comm_exec: 1, ksymbol: 1, bpf_event: 1 $ perf report | head -20 # To display the perf.data header info, please use --header/--header-only options. # # # Total Lost Samples: 0 # # Samples: 74 of event 'cycles' # Event count (approx.): 15694834 # # Overhead Command Shared Object Symbol # ........ ............... .......................... ...................................... # 19.62% perf [kernel.vmlinux] [k] strnlen_user 13.88% swapper [kernel.vmlinux] [k] intel_idle 13.83% ksoftirqd/0 [kernel.vmlinux] [k] pfifo_fast_dequeue 13.51% swapper [kernel.vmlinux] [k] kmem_cache_free 6.31% gnome-shell [kernel.vmlinux] [k] kmem_cache_free 5.66% kworker/u8:3+ix [kernel.vmlinux] [k] delay_tsc 4.42% perf [kernel.vmlinux] [k] __set_cpus_allowed_ptr 3.45% kworker/2:1-eve [kernel.vmlinux] [k] shmem_truncate_range 2.29% gnome-shell libgobject-2.0.so.0.6000.7 [.] g_closure_ref $ Signed-off-by:Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Tested-by:
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Alexey Budankov authored
Open access to monitoring via kprobes and uprobes and eBPF tracing for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure. perf kprobes and uprobes are used by ftrace and eBPF. perf probe uses ftrace to define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as tracepoint events. eBPF defines new probes via perf_event_open interface and then the probes are used in eBPF tracing. CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Budankov authored
Open access to monitoring of kernel code, CPUs, tracepoints and namespaces data for a CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure. CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) For backward compatibility reasons the access to perf_events subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Budankov authored
Introduce the CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_PERFMON can assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for performance monitoring and observability subsystems. CAP_PERFMON hardens system security and integrity during performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that is available to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process [2]. Providing the access to system performance monitoring and observability operations under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes the operation more secure. Thus, CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e: 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) CAP_PERFMON meets the demand to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations for adoption in security sensitive, restricted, multiuser production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute environments), where root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials are not available to mass users of a system, and securely unblocks applicability and scalability of system performance monitoring and observability operations beyond root and CAP_SYS_ADMIN use cases. CAP_PERFMON takes over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to system performance monitoring and observability operations and balances amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man page [1] for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below." For backward compatibility reasons access to system performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability usage for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations is discouraged with respect to the designed CAP_PERFMON capability. Although the software running under CAP_PERFMON can not ensure avoidance of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate these issues following the official hardware issues mitigation procedure [2]. The bugs in the software itself can be fixed following the standard kernel development process [3] to maintain and harden security of system performance monitoring and observability operations. [1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html [2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html [3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.htmlSigned-off-by:
Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Tested-by:
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Jiri Olsa authored
Add the DSO_BINARY_TYPE__BPF_IMAGE dso binary type to recognize BPF images that carry trampoline or dispatcher. Upcoming patches will add support to read the image data, store it within the BPF feature in perf.data and display it for annotation purposes. Currently we only display following message: # ./perf annotate bpf_trampoline_24456 --stdio Percent | Source code & Disassembly of . for cycles (504 ... --------------------------------------------------------------- ... : to be implemented Signed-off-by: -
Jiri Olsa authored
There's no special load action for ksymbol data on map__load/dso__load action, where the kernel is getting loaded. It only gets confused with kernel kallsyms/vmlinux load for bpf object, which fails and could mess up with the map. Disabling any further load of the map for ksymbol related dso/map. Signed-off-by:
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Jiri Olsa authored
Synthesize bpf images (trampolines/dispatchers) on start, as ksymbol events from /proc/kallsyms. Having this perf can recognize samples from those images and perf report and top shows them correctly. The rest of the ksymbol handling is already in place from for the bpf programs monitoring, so only the initial state was needed. perf report output: # Overhead Command Shared Object Symbol 12.37% test_progs [kernel.vmlinux] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64 11.80% test_progs [kernel.vmlinux] [k] syscall_return_via_sysret 9.63% test_progs bpf_prog_bcf7977d3b93787c_prog2 [k] bpf_prog_bcf7977d3b93787c_prog2 6.90% test_progs bpf_trampoline_24456 [k] bpf_trampoline_24456 6.36% test_progs [kernel.vmlinux] [k] memcpy_erms Committer notes: Use scnprintf() instead of strncpy() to overcome this on fedora:32, rawhide and OpenMandriva Cooker: CC /tmp/build/perf/util/bpf-event.o In file included from /usr/include/string.h:495, from /git/linux/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_common.h:12, from /git/linux/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.h:31, from util/bpf-event.c:4: In function 'strncpy', inlined from 'process_bpf_image' at util/bpf-event.c:323:2, inlined from 'kallsyms_process_symbol' at util/bpf-event.c:358:9: /usr/include/bits/string_fortified.h:106:10: error: '__builtin_strncpy' specified bound 256 equals destination size [-Werror=stringop-truncation] 106 | return __builtin___strncpy_chk (__dest, __src, __len, __bos (__dest)); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ cc1: all warnings being treated as errors Signed-off-by: -
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo authored
When --timeout is used and a workload is specified to be started by 'perf stat', i.e. $ perf stat --timeout 1000 sleep 1h The --timeout wasn't being honoured, i.e. the workload, 'sleep 1h' in the above example, should be terminated after 1000ms, but it wasn't, 'perf stat' was waiting for it to finish. Fix it by sending a SIGTERM when the timeout expires. Now it works: # perf stat -e cycles --timeout 1234 sleep 1h sleep: Terminated Performance counter stats for 'sleep 1h': 1,066,692 cycles 1.234314838 seconds time elapsed 0.000750000 seconds user 0.000000000 seconds sys # Fixes: f1f8ad52 ("perf stat: Add support to print counts after a period of time") Reported-by:Konstantin Kharlamov <hi-angel@yandex.ru> Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=207243Tested-by:
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Ingo Molnar authored
Merge tag 'perf-urgent-for-mingo-5.7-20200414' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/linux into perf/urgent Pull perf/urgent fixes from Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo: perf stat: Jin Yao: - Fix no metric header if --per-socket and --metric-only set build system: - Fix python building when built with clang, that was failing if the clang version doesn't support -fno-semantic-interposition. tools UAPI headers: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo: - Update various copies of kernel headers, some ended up automatically updating build-time generated tables to enable tools such as 'perf trace' to decode syscalls and tracepoints arguments. Now the tools/perf build is free of UAPI drift warnings. Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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