- 21 Apr, 2021 19 commits
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Sean Christopherson authored
Drop the dedicated status_cmd_buf and instead use a local variable for PLATFORM_STATUS. Now that the low level helper uses an internal buffer for all commands, using the stack for the upper layers is safe even when running with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y. Signed-off-by:
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-7-seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by:
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Sean Christopherson authored
For commands with small input/output buffers, use the local stack to "allocate" the structures used to communicate with the PSP. Now that __sev_do_cmd_locked() gracefully handles vmalloc'd buffers, there's no reason to avoid using the stack, e.g. CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y will just work. Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Copy the incoming @data comman to an internal buffer so that callers can put SEV command buffers on the stack without running afoul of CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y, i.e. without bombing on vmalloc'd pointers. As of today, the largest supported command takes a 68 byte buffer, i.e. pretty much every command can be put on the stack. Because sev_cmd_mutex is held for the entirety of a transaction, only a single bounce buffer is required. Use the internal buffer unconditionally, as the majority of in-kernel users will soon switch to using the stack. At that point, checking virt_addr_valid() becomes (negligible) overhead in most cases, and supporting both paths slightly increases complexity. Since the commands are all quite small, the cost of the copies is insignificant compared to the latency of communicating with the PSP. Allocate a full page for the buffer as opportunistic preparation for SEV-SNP, which requires the command buffer to be in firmware state for commands that trigger memory writes from the PSP firmware. Using a full page now will allow SEV-SNP support to simply transition the page as needed. Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
WARN on and reject SEV commands that provide a valid data pointer, but do not have a known, non-zero length. And conversely, reject commands that take a command buffer but none is provided (data is null). Aside from sanity checking input, disallowing a non-null pointer without a non-zero size will allow a future patch to cleanly handle vmalloc'd data by copying the data to an internal __pa() friendly buffer. Note, this also effectively prevents callers from using commands that have a non-zero length and are not known to the kernel. This is not an explicit goal, but arguably the side effect is a good thing from the kernel's perspective. Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Explicitly reject using pointers that are not virt_to_phys() friendly as the source for SEV commands that are sent to the PSP. The PSP works with physical addresses, and __pa()/virt_to_phys() will not return the correct address in these cases, e.g. for a vmalloc'd pointer. At best, the bogus address will cause the command to fail, and at worst lead to system instability. While it's unlikely that callers will deliberately use a bad pointer for SEV buffers, a caller can easily use a vmalloc'd pointer unknowingly when running with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y as it's not obvious that putting the command buffers on the stack would be bad. The command buffers are relative small and easily fit on the stack, and the APIs to do not document that the incoming pointer must be a physically contiguous, __pa() friendly pointer. Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Fixes: 200664d5 ("crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) command support") Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Free the SEV device if later initialization fails. The memory isn't technically leaked as it's tracked in the top-level device's devres list, but unless the top-level device is removed, the memory won't be freed and is effectively leaked. Signed-off-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
The command finalize the guest receiving process and make the SEV guest ready for the execution. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> Message-Id: <d08914dc259644de94e29b51c3b68a13286fc5a3.1618498113.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
The command is used for copying the incoming buffer into the SEV guest memory space. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
The command is used to create the encryption context for an incoming SEV guest. The encryption context can be later used by the hypervisor to import the incoming data into the SEV guest memory space. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
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Steve Rutherford authored
After completion of SEND_START, but before SEND_FINISH, the source VMM can issue the SEND_CANCEL command to stop a migration. This is necessary so that a cancelled migration can restart with a new target later. Reviewed-by:
Nathan Tempelman <natet@google.com> Reviewed-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
The command is used to finailize the encryption context created with KVM_SEV_SEND_START command. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
The command is used for encrypting the guest memory region using the encryption context created with KVM_SEV_SEND_START. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by : Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
The command is used to create an outgoing SEV guest encryption context. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Wanpeng Li authored
Both lock holder vCPU and IPI receiver that has halted are condidate for boost. However, the PLE handler was originally designed to deal with the lock holder preemption problem. The Intel PLE occurs when the spinlock waiter is in kernel mode. This assumption doesn't hold for IPI receiver, they can be in either kernel or user mode. the vCPU candidate in user mode will not be boosted even if they should respond to IPIs. Some benchmarks like pbzip2, swaptions etc do the TLB shootdown in kernel mode and most of the time they are running in user mode. It can lead to a large number of continuous PLE events because the IPI sender causes PLE events repeatedly until the receiver is scheduled while the receiver is not candidate for a boost. This patch boosts the vCPU candidiate in user mode which is delivery interrupt. We can observe the speed of pbzip2 improves 10% in 96 vCPUs VM in over-subscribe scenario (The host machine is 2 socket, 48 cores, 96 HTs Intel CLX box). There is no performance regression for other benchmarks like Unixbench spawn (most of the time contend read/write lock in kernel mode), ebizzy (most of the time contend read/write sem and TLB shoodtdown in kernel mode). Signed-off-by:
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Message-Id: <1618542490-14756-1-git-send-email-wanpengli@tencent.com> Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
Signed-off-by: -
Paolo Bonzini authored
The main thread could start to send SIG_IPI at any time, even before signal blocked on vcpu thread. Therefore, start the vcpu thread with the signal blocked. Without this patch, on very busy cores the dirty_log_test could fail directly on receiving a SIGUSR1 without a handler (when vcpu runs far slower than main). Reported-by:
Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Peter Xu authored
This fixes a bug that can trigger with e.g. "taskset -c 0 ./dirty_log_test" or when the testing host is very busy. A similar previous attempt is done [1] but that is not enough, the reason is stated in the reply [2]. As a summary (partly quotting from [2]): The problem is I think one guest memory write operation (of this specific test) contains a few micro-steps when page is during kvm dirty tracking (here I'm only considering write-protect rather than pml but pml should be similar at least when the log buffer is full): (1) Guest read 'iteration' number into register, prepare to write, page fault (2) Set dirty bit in either dirty bitmap or dirty ring (3) Return to guest, data written When we verify the data, we assumed that all these steps are "atomic", say, when (1) happened for this page, we assume (2) & (3) must have happened. We had some trick to workaround "un-atomicity" of above three steps, as previous version of this patch wanted to fix atomicity of step (2)+(3) by explicitly letting the main thread wait for at least one vmenter of vcpu thread, which should work. However what I overlooked is probably that we still have race when (1) and (2) can be interrupted. One example calltrace when it could happen that we read an old interation, got interrupted before even setting the dirty bit and flushing data: __schedule+1742 __cond_resched+52 __get_user_pages+530 get_user_pages_unlocked+197 hva_to_pfn+206 try_async_pf+132 direct_page_fault+320 kvm_mmu_page_fault+103 vmx_handle_exit+288 vcpu_enter_guest+2460 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+325 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+526 __x64_sys_ioctl+131 do_syscall_64+51 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+68 It means iteration number cached in vcpu register can be very old when dirty bit set and data flushed. So far I don't see an easy way to guarantee all steps 1-3 atomicity but to sync at the GUEST_SYNC() point of guest code when we do verification of the dirty bits as what this patch does. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210413213641.23742-1-peterx@redhat.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210417140956.GV4440@xz-x1/ Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Cc: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: -
Nathan Tempelman authored
Add a capability for userspace to mirror SEV encryption context from one vm to another. On our side, this is intended to support a Migration Helper vCPU, but it can also be used generically to support other in-guest workloads scheduled by the host. The intention is for the primary guest and the mirror to have nearly identical memslots. The primary benefits of this are that: 1) The VMs do not share KVM contexts (think APIC/MSRs/etc), so they can't accidentally clobber each other. 2) The VMs can have different memory-views, which is necessary for post-copy migration (the migration vCPUs on the target need to read and write to pages, when the primary guest would VMEXIT). This does not change the threat model for AMD SEV. Any memory involved is still owned by the primary guest and its initial state is still attested to through the normal SEV_LAUNCH_* flows. If userspace wanted to circumvent SEV, they could achieve the same effect by simply attaching a vCPU to the primary VM. This patch deliberately leaves userspace in charge of the memslots for the mirror, as it already has the power to mess with them in the primary guest. This patch does not support SEV-ES (much less SNP), as it does not handle handing off attested VMSAs to the mirror. For additional context, we need a Migration Helper because SEV PSP migration is far too slow for our live migration on its own. Using an in-guest migrator lets us speed this up significantly. Signed-off-by:
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Krish Sadhukhan authored
According to section "Canonicalization and Consistency Checks" in APM vol 2, the following guest state is illegal: "The MSR or IOIO intercept tables extend to a physical address that is greater than or equal to the maximum supported physical address." Suggested-by:Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Message-Id: <20210412215611.110095-5-krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 20 Apr, 2021 21 commits
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Krish Sadhukhan authored
Define the actual size of the IOPM and MSRPM tables so that the actual size can be used when initializing them and when checking the consistency of their physical address. These #defines are placed in svm.h so that they can be shared. Suggested-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Add a capability, KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE, that can be used by userspace to grant a VM access to a priveleged attribute, with args[0] holding a file handle to a valid SGX attribute file. The SGX subsystem restricts access to a subset of enclave attributes to provide additional security for an uncompromised kernel, e.g. to prevent malware from using the PROVISIONKEY to ensure its nodes are running inside a geniune SGX enclave and/or to obtain a stable fingerprint. To prevent userspace from circumventing such restrictions by running an enclave in a VM, KVM restricts guest access to privileged attributes by default. Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by:
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Message-Id: <0b099d65e933e068e3ea934b0523bab070cb8cea.1618196135.git.kai.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Enable SGX virtualization now that KVM has the VM-Exit handlers needed to trap-and-execute ENCLS to ensure correctness and/or enforce the CPU model exposed to the guest. Add a KVM module param, "sgx", to allow an admin to disable SGX virtualization independent of the kernel. When supported in hardware and the kernel, advertise SGX1, SGX2 and SGX LC to userspace via CPUID and wire up the ENCLS_EXITING bitmap based on the guest's SGX capabilities, i.e. to allow ENCLS to be executed in an SGX-enabled guest. With the exception of the provision key, all SGX attribute bits may be exposed to the guest. Guest access to the provision key, which is controlled via securityfs, will be added in a future patch. Note, KVM does not yet support exposing ENCLS_C leafs or ENCLV leafs. Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Add a VM-Exit handler to trap-and-execute EINIT when SGX LC is enabled in the host. When SGX LC is enabled, the host kernel may rewrite the hardware values at will, e.g. to launch enclaves with different signers, thus KVM needs to intercept EINIT to ensure it is executed with the correct LE hash (even if the guest sees a hardwired hash). Switching the LE hash MSRs on VM-Enter/VM-Exit is not a viable option as writing the MSRs is prohibitively expensive, e.g. on SKL hardware each WRMSR is ~400 cycles. And because EINIT takes tens of thousands of cycles to execute, the ~1500 cycle overhead to trap-and-execute EINIT is unlikely to be noticed by the guest, let alone impact its overall SGX performance. Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Emulate the four Launch Enclave public key hash MSRs (LE hash MSRs) that exist on CPUs that support SGX Launch Control (LC). SGX LC modifies the behavior of ENCLS[EINIT] to use the LE hash MSRs when verifying the key used to sign an enclave. On CPUs without LC support, the LE hash is hardwired into the CPU to an Intel controlled key (the Intel key is also the reset value of the LE hash MSRs). Track the guest's desired hash so that a future patch can stuff the hash into the hardware MSRs when executing EINIT on behalf of the guest, when those MSRs are writable in host. Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Add an ECREATE handler that will be used to intercept ECREATE for the purpose of enforcing and enclave's MISCSELECT, ATTRIBUTES and XFRM, i.e. to allow userspace to restrict SGX features via CPUID. ECREATE will be intercepted when any of the aforementioned masks diverges from hardware in order to enforce the desired CPUID model, i.e. inject #GP if the guest attempts to set a bit that hasn't been enumerated as allowed-1 in CPUID. Note, access to the PROVISIONKEY is not yet supported. Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Introduce sgx.c and sgx.h, along with the framework for handling ENCLS VM-Exits. Add a bool, enable_sgx, that will eventually be wired up to a module param to control whether or not SGX virtualization is enabled at runtime. Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Add support for handling VM-Exits that originate from a guest SGX enclave. In SGX, an "enclave" is a new CPL3-only execution environment, wherein the CPU and memory state is protected by hardware to make the state inaccesible to code running outside of the enclave. When exiting an enclave due to an asynchronous event (from the perspective of the enclave), e.g. exceptions, interrupts, and VM-Exits, the enclave's state is automatically saved and scrubbed (the CPU loads synthetic state), and then reloaded when re-entering the enclave. E.g. after an instruction based VM-Exit from an enclave, vmcs.GUEST_RIP will not contain the RIP of the enclave instruction that trigered VM-Exit, but will instead point to a RIP in the enclave's untrusted runtime (the guest userspace code that coordinates entry/exit to/from the enclave). To help a VMM recognize and handle exits from enclaves, SGX adds bits to existing VMCS fields, VM_EXIT_REASON.VMX_EXIT_REASON_FROM_ENCLAVE and GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO.GUEST_INTR_STATE_ENCLAVE_INTR. Define the new architectural bits, and add a boolean to struct vcpu_vmx to cache VMX_EXIT_REASON_FROM_ENCLAVE. Clear the bit in exit_reason so that checks against exit_reason do not need to account for SGX, e.g. "if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI)" continues to work. KVM is a largely a passive observer of the new bits, e.g. KVM needs to account for the bits when propagating information to a nested VMM, but otherwise doesn't need to act differently for the majority of VM-Exits from enclaves. The one scenario that is directly impacted is emulation, which is for all intents and purposes impossible[1] since KVM does not have access to the RIP or instruction stream that triggered the VM-Exit. The inability to emulate is a non-issue for KVM, as most instructions that might trigger VM-Exit unconditionally #UD in an enclave (before the VM-Exit check. For the few instruction that conditionally #UD, KVM either never sets the exiting control, e.g. PAUSE_EXITING[2], or sets it if and only if the feature is not exposed to the guest in order to inject a #UD, e.g. RDRAND_EXITING. But, because it is still possible for a guest to trigger emulation, e.g. MMIO, inject a #UD if KVM ever attempts emulation after a VM-Exit from an enclave. This is architecturally accurate for instruction VM-Exits, and for MMIO it's the least bad choice, e.g. it's preferable to killing the VM. In practice, only broken or particularly stupid guests should ever encounter this behavior. Add a WARN in skip_emulated_instruction to detect any attempt to modify the guest's RIP during an SGX enclave VM-Exit as all such flows should either be unreachable or must handle exits from enclaves before getting to skip_emulated_instruction. [1] Impossible for all practical purposes. Not truly impossible since KVM could implement some form of para-virtualization scheme. [2] PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING only affects CPL0 and enclaves exist only at CPL3, so we also don't need to worry about that interaction. Signed-off-by: -
Sean Christopherson authored
Define a new KVM-only feature word for advertising and querying SGX sub-features in CPUID.0x12.0x0.EAX. Because SGX1 and SGX2 are scattered in the kernel's feature word, they need to be translated so that the bit numbers match those of hardware. Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Introduce a scheme that allows KVM's CPUID magic to support features that are scattered in the kernel's feature words. To advertise and/or query guest support for CPUID-based features, KVM requires the bit number of an X86_FEATURE_* to match the bit number in its associated CPUID entry. For scattered features, this does not hold true. Add a framework to allow defining KVM-only words, stored in kvm_cpu_caps after the shared kernel caps, that can be used to gather the scattered feature bits by translating X86_FEATURE_* flags into their KVM-defined feature. Note, because reverse_cpuid_check() effectively forces kvm_cpu_caps lookups to be resolved at compile time, there is no runtime cost for translating from kernel-defined to kvm-defined features. More details here: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/X/jxCOLG+HUO4QlZ@google.comSigned-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Page faults that are signaled by the SGX Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM), as opposed to the traditional IA32/EPT page tables, set an SGX bit in the error code to indicate that the #PF was induced by SGX. KVM will need to emulate this behavior as part of its trap-and-execute scheme for virtualizing SGX Launch Control, e.g. to inject SGX-induced #PFs if EINIT faults in the host, and to support live migration. Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Export the gva_to_gpa() helpers for use by SGX virtualization when executing ENCLS[ECREATE] and ENCLS[EINIT] on behalf of the guest. To execute ECREATE and EINIT, KVM must obtain the GPA of the target Secure Enclave Control Structure (SECS) in order to get its corresponding HVA. Because the SECS must reside in the Enclave Page Cache (EPC), copying the SECS's data to a host-controlled buffer via existing exported helpers is not a viable option as the EPC is not readable or writable by the kernel. SGX virtualization will also use gva_to_gpa() to obtain HVAs for non-EPC pages in order to pass user pointers directly to ECREATE and EINIT, which avoids having to copy pages worth of data into the kernel. Signed-off-by:
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Yanan Wang authored
This test serves as a performance tester and a bug reproducer for kvm page table code (GPA->HPA mappings), so it gives guidance for people trying to make some improvement for kvm. The function guest_code() can cover the conditions where a single vcpu or multiple vcpus access guest pages within the same memory region, in three VM stages(before dirty logging, during dirty logging, after dirty logging). Besides, the backing src memory type(ANONYMOUS/THP/HUGETLB) of the tested memory region can be specified by users, which means normal page mappings or block mappings can be chosen by users to be created in the test. If ANONYMOUS memory is specified, kvm will create normal page mappings for the tested memory region before dirty logging, and update attributes of the page mappings from RO to RW during dirty logging. If THP/HUGETLB memory is specified, kvm will create block mappings for the tested memory region before dirty logging, and split the blcok mappings into normal page mappings during dirty logging, and coalesce the page mappings back into block mappings after dirty logging is stopped. So in summary, as a performance tester, this test can present the performance of kvm creating/updating normal page mappings, or the performance of kvm creating/splitting/recovering block mappings, through execution time. When we need to coalesce the page mappings back to block mappings after dirty logging is stopped, we have to firstly invalidate *all* the TLB entries for the page mappings right before installation of the block entry, because a TLB conflict abort error could occur if we can't invalidate the TLB entries fully. We have hit this TLB conflict twice on aarch64 software implementation and fixed it. As this test can imulate process from dirty logging enabled to dirty logging stopped of a VM with block mappings, so it can also reproduce this TLB conflict abort due to inadequate TLB invalidation when coalescing tables. Signed-off-by:
Yanan Wang <wangyanan55@huawei.com> Reviewed-by:
Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com> Reviewed-by:
Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210330080856.14940-11-wangyanan55@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
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Yanan Wang authored
With VM_MEM_SRC_ANONYMOUS_THP specified in vm_userspace_mem_region_add(), we have to get the transparent hugepage size for HVA alignment. With the new helpers, we can use get_backing_src_pagesz() to check whether THP is configured and then get the exact configured hugepage size. As different architectures may have different THP page sizes configured, this can get the accurate THP page sizes on any platform. Signed-off-by:
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Yanan Wang authored
With VM_MEM_SRC_ANONYMOUS_HUGETLB, we currently can only use system default hugetlb pages to back the testing guest memory. In order to add flexibility, now list all the known hugetlb backing src types with different page sizes, so that we can specify use of hugetlb pages of the exact granularity that we want. And as all the known hugetlb page sizes are listed, it's appropriate for all architectures. Besides, the helper get_backing_src_pagesz() is added to get the granularity of different backing src types(anonumous, thp, hugetlb). Suggested-by:
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Yanan Wang authored
If HUGETLB is configured in the host kernel, then we can know the system default hugetlb page size through *cat /proc/meminfo*. Otherwise, we will not see the information of hugetlb pages in file /proc/meminfo if it's not configured. So add a helper to determine whether HUGETLB is configured and then get the default page size by reading /proc/meminfo. This helper can be useful when a program wants to use the default hugetlb pages of the system and doesn't know the default page size. Signed-off-by:
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Yanan Wang authored
If we want to have some tests about transparent hugepages, the system configured THP hugepage size should better be known by the tests, which can be used for kinds of alignment or guest memory accessing of vcpus... So it makes sense to add a helper to get the transparent hugepage size. With VM_MEM_SRC_ANONYMOUS_THP specified in vm_userspace_mem_region_add(), we now stat /sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage to check whether THP is configured in the host kernel before madvise(). Based on this, we can also read file /sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/hpage_pmd_size to get THP hugepage size. Signed-off-by:
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Yanan Wang authored
For generality and conciseness, make an API which can be used in all kvm libs and selftests to get vm guest mode strings. And the index i is checked in the API in case of possiable faults. Suggested-by:
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Yanan Wang authored
Print the errno besides error-string in TEST_ASSERT in the format of "errno=%d - %s" will explicitly indicate that the string is an error information. Besides, the errno is easier to be used for debugging than the error-string. Suggested-by:
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Yanan Wang authored
This patch syncs contents of tools/include/asm-generic/hugetlb_encode.h and include/uapi/asm-generic/hugetlb_encode.h. Arch powerpc supports 16KB hugepages and ARM64 supports 32MB/512MB hugepages. The corresponding mmap flags have already been added in include/uapi/asm-generic/hugetlb_encode.h, but not tools/include/asm-generic/hugetlb_encode.h. Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Haiwei Li authored
Add compile-time assertions in vmcs_check32() to disallow accesses to 64-bit and 64-bit high fields via vmcs_{read,write}32(). Upper level KVM code should never do partial accesses to VMCS fields. KVM handles the split accesses automatically in vmcs_{read,write}64() when running as a 32-bit kernel. Reviewed-and-tested-by:Haiwei Li <lihaiwei@tencent.com> Message-Id: <20210409022456.23528-1-lihaiwei.kernel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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