- 11 Jul, 2014 7 commits
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Kees Cook authored
commit 1b15d2e5 upstream. Some drivers use the first HID report in the list instead of using an index. In these cases, validation uses ID 0, which was supposed to mean "first known report". This fixes the problem, which was causing at least the lgff family of devices to stop working since hid_validate_values was being called with ID 0, but the devices used single numbered IDs for their reports: 0x05, 0x01, /* Usage Page (Desktop), */ 0x09, 0x05, /* Usage (Gamepad), */ 0xA1, 0x01, /* Collection (Application), */ 0xA1, 0x02, /* Collection (Logical), */ 0x85, 0x01, /* Report ID (1), */ ... Reported-by:
Simon Wood <simon@mungewell.org> Signed-off-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by:
Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Lv Zheng authored
commit 73577d1d upstream. This patch fixes the following issue: If DSDT is customized, no local DSDT copy is needed. References: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=69711Signed-off-by:
Enrico Etxe Arte <goitizena.generoa@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com> [rjw: Subject] Signed-off-by:
Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Hans de Goede authored
commit 0b5fe736 upstream. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1096436 Tested-and-reported-by: ajayr@bigfoot.com Signed-off-by:
Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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hujianyang authored
commit 691a7c6f upstream. There is a race condition in UBIFS: Thread A (mmap) Thread B (fsync) ->__do_fault ->write_cache_pages -> ubifs_vm_page_mkwrite -> budget_space -> lock_page -> release/convert_page_budget -> SetPagePrivate -> TestSetPageDirty -> unlock_page -> lock_page -> TestClearPageDirty -> ubifs_writepage -> do_writepage -> release_budget -> ClearPagePrivate -> unlock_page -> !(ret & VM_FAULT_LOCKED) -> lock_page -> set_page_dirty -> ubifs_set_page_dirty -> TestSetPageDirty (set page dirty without budgeting) -> unlock_page This leads to situation where we have a diry page but no budget allocated for this page, so further write-back may fail with -ENOSPC. In this fix we return from page_mkwrite without performing unlock_page. We return VM_FAULT_LOCKED instead. After doing this, the race above will not happen. Signed-off-by:
hujianyang <hujianyang@huawei.com> Tested-by:
Laurence Withers <lwithers@guralp.com> Signed-off-by:
Artem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit 1e77d0a1 upstream. Till reported that the spurious interrupt detection of threaded interrupts is broken in two ways: - note_interrupt() is called for each action thread of a shared interrupt line. That's wrong as we are only interested whether none of the device drivers felt responsible for the interrupt, but by calling multiple times for a single interrupt line we account IRQ_NONE even if one of the drivers felt responsible. - note_interrupt() when called from the thread handler is not serialized. That leaves the members of irq_desc which are used for the spurious detection unprotected. To solve this we need to defer the spurious detection of a threaded interrupt to the next hardware interrupt context where we have implicit serialization. If note_interrupt is called with action_ret == IRQ_WAKE_THREAD, we check whether the previous interrupt requested a deferred check. If not, we request a deferred check for the next hardware interrupt and return. If set, we check whether one of the interrupt threads signaled success. Depending on this information we feed the result into the spurious detector. If one primary handler of a shared interrupt returns IRQ_HANDLED we disable the deferred check of irq threads on the same line, as we have found at least one device driver who cared. Reported-by:
Till Straumann <strauman@slac.stanford.edu> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by:
Austin Schuh <austin@peloton-tech.com> Cc: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Cc: Wolfgang Grandegger <wg@grandegger.com> Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz> Cc: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Cc: linux-can@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LFD.2.02.1303071450130.22263@ionos [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context, indentation] Signed-off-by:
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Felipe Balbi authored
commit da64c27d upstream. LDISCs shouldn't call tty->ops->write() from within ->write_wakeup(). ->write_wakeup() is called with port lock taken and IRQs disabled, tty->ops->write() will try to acquire the same port lock and we will deadlock. Acked-by:
Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by:
Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com> Reported-by:
Huang Shijie <b32955@freescale.com> Signed-off-by:
Felipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com> Tested-by:
Andreas Bießmann <andreas@biessmann.de> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context, indentation] Signed-off-by:
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Will Deacon authored
commit 498c2280 upstream. kmap_to_page returns the corresponding struct page for a virtual address of an arbitrary mapping. This works by checking whether the address falls in the pkmap region and using the pkmap page tables instead of the linear mapping if appropriate. Unfortunately, the bounds checking means that PKMAP_ADDR(LAST_PKMAP) is incorrectly treated as a highmem address and we can end up walking off the end of pkmap_page_table and subsequently passing junk to pte_page. This patch fixes the bound check to stay within the pkmap tables. Signed-off-by:
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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- 09 Jun, 2014 33 commits
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Ben Hutchings authored
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit 54a21788 upstream. The current implementation of lookup_pi_state has ambigous handling of the TID value 0 in the user space futex. We can get into the kernel even if the TID value is 0, because either there is a stale waiters bit or the owner died bit is set or we are called from the requeue_pi path or from user space just for fun. The current code avoids an explicit sanity check for pid = 0 in case that kernel internal state (waiters) are found for the user space address. This can lead to state leakage and worse under some circumstances. Handle the cases explicit: Waiter | pi_state | pi->owner | uTID | uODIED | ? [1] NULL | --- | --- | 0 | 0/1 | Valid [2] NULL | --- | --- | >0 | 0/1 | Valid [3] Found | NULL | -- | Any | 0/1 | Invalid [4] Found | Found | NULL | 0 | 1 | Valid [5] Found | Found | NULL | >0 | 1 | Invalid [6] Found | Found | task | 0 | 1 | Valid [7] Found | Found | NULL | Any | 0 | Invalid [8] Found | Found | task | ==taskTID | 0/1 | Valid [9] Found | Found | task | 0 | 0 | Invalid [10] Found | Found | task | !=taskTID | 0/1 | Invalid [1] Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We came came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. [2] Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died. [3] Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex [4] Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED. [5] The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list() and exit_pi_state_list() [6] Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in the pi_state but cannot access the user space value. [7] pi_state->owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set. [8] Owner and user space value match [9] There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0 except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4] [10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space TID out of sync. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit 13fbca4c upstream. If the owner died bit is set at futex_unlock_pi, we currently do not cleanup the user space futex. So the owner TID of the current owner (the unlocker) persists. That's observable inconsistant state, especially when the ownership of the pi state got transferred. Clean it up unconditionally. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit b3eaa9fc upstream. We need to protect the atomic acquisition in the kernel against rogue user space which sets the user space futex to 0, so the kernel side acquisition succeeds while there is existing state in the kernel associated to the real owner. Verify whether the futex has waiters associated with kernel state. If it has, return -EINVAL. The state is corrupted already, so no point in cleaning it up. Subsequent calls will fail as well. Not our problem. [ tglx: Use futex_top_waiter() and explain why we do not need to try restoring the already corrupted user space state. ] Signed-off-by:
Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1) commit e9c243a5 upstream. If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this, then dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable condition. This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi() which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a ("futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()") [ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be different depending on the mapping ] Fixes CVE-2014-3153. Reported-by: Pinkie Pie Signed-off-by:
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit f0d71b3d upstream. We happily allow userspace to declare a random kernel thread to be the owner of a user space PI futex. Found while analysing the fallout of Dave Jones syscall fuzzer. We also should validate the thread group for private futexes and find some fast way to validate whether the "alleged" owner has RW access on the file which backs the SHM, but that's a separate issue. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit 866293ee upstream. Dave Jones trinity syscall fuzzer exposed an issue in the deadlock detection code of rtmutex: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140429151655.GA14277@redhat.com That underlying issue has been fixed with a patch to the rtmutex code, but the futex code must not call into rtmutex in that case because - it can detect that issue early - it avoids a different and more complex fixup for backing out If the user space variable got manipulated to 0x80000000 which means no lock holder, but the waiters bit set and an active pi_state in the kernel is found we can figure out the recursive locking issue by looking at the pi_state owner. If that is the current task, then we can safely return -EDEADLK. The check should have been added in commit 59fa6245 (futex: Handle futex_pi OWNER_DIED take over correctly) already, but I did not see the above issue caused by user space manipulation back then. Signed-off-by:
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Naoya Horiguchi authored
commit 3e030ecc upstream. When a memory error happens on an in-use page or (free and in-use) hugepage, the victim page is isolated with its refcount set to one. When you try to unpoison it later, unpoison_memory() calls put_page() for it twice in order to bring the page back to free page pool (buddy or free hugepage list). However, if another memory error occurs on the page which we are unpoisoning, memory_failure() returns without releasing the refcount which was incremented in the same call at first, which results in memory leak and unconsistent num_poisoned_pages statistics. This patch fixes it. Signed-off-by:
Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Signed-off-by:
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Chen Yucong authored
commit b985194c upstream. For handling a free hugepage in memory failure, the race will happen if another thread hwpoisoned this hugepage concurrently. So we need to check PageHWPoison instead of !PageHWPoison. If hwpoison_filter(p) returns true or a race happens, then we need to unlock_page(hpage). Signed-off-by:
Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Ezequiel Garcia authored
commit 5a9a55bf upstream. We need to use writel() instead of writel_relaxed() when starting a channel, to ensure all the descriptors have been flushed before the activation. While at it, remove the unneeded read-modify-write and make the code simpler. Signed-off-by:
Lior Amsalem <alior@marvell.com> Signed-off-by:
Ezequiel Garcia <ezequiel.garcia@free-electrons.com> Signed-off-by:
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: it was using __raw_readl() and __raw_writel() which are just as wrong] Signed-off-by:
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J. Bruce Fields authored
commit 27b11428 upstream. The current code assumes a one-to-one lockowner<->lock stateid correspondance. Signed-off-by:
J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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J. Bruce Fields authored
commit a1b8ff4c upstream. The nfsv4 state code has always assumed a one-to-one correspondance between lock stateid's and lockowners even if it appears not to in some places. We may actually change that, but for now when FREE_STATEID releases a lock stateid it also needs to release the parent lockowner. Symptoms were a subsequent LOCK crashing in find_lockowner_str when it calls same_lockowner_ino on a lockowner that unexpectedly has an empty so_stateids list. Signed-off-by:
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Stephane Grosjean authored
commit 0b5a958c upstream. As remarked by Christopher R. Baker in his post at http://marc.info/?l=linux-can&m=139707295706465&w=2 there's a possibility for an use after free condition at device removal. This simplified patch introduces an additional variable to prevent the issue. Thanks for catching this. Reported-by:
Christopher R. Baker <cbaker@rec.ri.cmu.edu> Signed-off-by:
Stephane Grosjean <s.grosjean@peak-system.com> Signed-off-by:
Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by:
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Stephane Grosjean authored
commit 29830406 upstream. Change the way channels objects are linked together by peak_pci_probe() avoiding any kernel oops when driver is removed. Side effect is that the list is now browsed from last to first channel. Signed-off-by:
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Alex Deucher authored
commit d8ade352 upstream. Newer PX systems have non-VGA pci class dGPUs. Update the ATRM fetch method to handle those cases. bug: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=75401Signed-off-by:
Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: s/ACPI_HANDLE()/DEVICE_ACPI_HANDLE()/] Signed-off-by:
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Christian König authored
commit 54409259 upstream. Placing them exclusively into VRAM might not work all the time. Fixes: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=78297Signed-off-by:
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Jiri Olsa authored
commit 39af6b16 upstream. The perf cpu offline callback takes down all cpu context events and releases swhash->swevent_hlist. This could race with task context software event being just scheduled on this cpu via perf_swevent_add while cpu hotplug code already cleaned up event's data. The race happens in the gap between the cpu notifier code and the cpu being actually taken down. Note that only cpu ctx events are terminated in the perf cpu hotplug code. It's easily reproduced with: $ perf record -e faults perf bench sched pipe while putting one of the cpus offline: # echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online Console emits following warning: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2845 at kernel/events/core.c:5672 perf_swevent_add+0x18d/0x1a0() Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 2845 Comm: sched-pipe Tainted: G W 3.14.0+ #256 Hardware name: Intel Corporation Montevina platform/To be filled by O.E.M., BIOS AMVACRB1.86C.0066.B00.0805070703 05/07/2008 0000000000000009 ffff880077233ab8 ffffffff81665a23 0000000000200005 0000000000000000 ffff880077233af8 ffffffff8104732c 0000000000000046 ffff88007467c800 0000000000000002 ffff88007a9cf2a0 0000000000000001 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81665a23>] dump_stack+0x4f/0x7c [<ffffffff8104732c>] warn_slowpath_common+0x8c/0xc0 [<ffffffff8104737a>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20 [<ffffffff8110fb3d>] perf_swevent_add+0x18d/0x1a0 [<ffffffff811162ae>] event_sched_in.isra.75+0x9e/0x1f0 [<ffffffff8111646a>] group_sched_in+0x6a/0x1f0 [<ffffffff81083dd5>] ? sched_clock_local+0x25/0xa0 [<ffffffff811167e6>] ctx_sched_in+0x1f6/0x450 [<ffffffff8111757b>] perf_event_sched_in+0x6b/0xa0 [<ffffffff81117a4b>] perf_event_context_sched_in+0x7b/0xc0 [<ffffffff81117ece>] __perf_event_task_sched_in+0x43e/0x460 [<ffffffff81096f1e>] ? put_lock_stats.isra.18+0xe/0x30 [<ffffffff8107b3c8>] finish_task_switch+0xb8/0x100 [<ffffffff8166a7de>] __schedule+0x30e/0xad0 [<ffffffff81172dd2>] ? pipe_read+0x3e2/0x560 [<ffffffff8166b45e>] ? preempt_schedule_irq+0x3e/0x70 [<ffffffff8166b45e>] ? preempt_schedule_irq+0x3e/0x70 [<ffffffff8166b464>] preempt_schedule_irq+0x44/0x70 [<ffffffff816707f0>] retint_kernel+0x20/0x30 [<ffffffff8109e60a>] ? lockdep_sys_exit+0x1a/0x90 [<ffffffff812a4234>] lockdep_sys_exit_thunk+0x35/0x67 [<ffffffff81679321>] ? sysret_check+0x5/0x56 Fixing this by tracking the cpu hotplug state and displaying the WARN only if current cpu is initialized properly. Cc: Corey Ashford <cjashfor@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Reported-by:
Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1396861448-10097-1-git-send-email-jolsa@redhat.comSigned-off-by:
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Peter Zijlstra authored
commit 0819b2e3 upstream. Vince reported that using a large sample_period (one with bit 63 set) results in wreckage since while the sample_period is fundamentally unsigned (negative periods don't make sense) the way we implement things very much rely on signed logic. So limit sample_period to 63 bits to avoid tripping over this. Reported-by:
Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Signed-off-by:
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Chunwei Chen authored
commit 178eda29 upstream. It has been reported that using ZFSonLinux on rbd will result in memory corruption. The bug report can be found here: https://github.com/zfsonlinux/spl/issues/241 http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/7790 The reason is that ZFS will send pages with page_count 0 into rbd, which in turns send them to tcp_sendpage. However, tcp_sendpage cannot deal with page_count 0, as it will do get_page and put_page, and erroneously free the page. This type of issue has been noted before, and handled in iscsi, drbd, etc. So, rbd should also handle this. This fix address this issue by fall back to slower sendmsg when page_count 0 detected. Cc: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Cc: Yehuda Sadeh <yehuda@inktank.com> Signed-off-by:
Chunwei Chen <tuxoko@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com> Signed-off-by:
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Alex Elder authored
commit e36b13cc upstream. Make ceph_tcp_sendpage() be the only place kernel_sendpage() is used, by using this helper in write_partial_msg_pages(). Signed-off-by:
Alex Elder <elder@dreamhost.com> Reviewed-by:
Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: - Add ceph_tcp_sendpage(), from commit 31739139 ('libceph: use kernel_sendpage() for sending zeroes'), the rest of which is not applicable - Adjust context] Signed-off-by:
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Marcel Apfelbaum authored
commit 93fa9d32 upstream. When a new device is added below a hotplug bridge, the bridge's secondary bus speed and the device's bus speed must match. The shpchp driver previously checked the bridge's *primary* bus speed, not the secondary bus speed. This caused hot-add errors like: shpchp 0000:00:03.0: Speed of bus ff and adapter 0 mismatch Check the secondary bus speed instead. [bhelgaas: changelog] Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=75251 Fixes: 3749c51a ("PCI: Make current and maximum bus speeds part of the PCI core") Signed-off-by:
Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.a@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Acked-by:
Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Linus Torvalds authored
commit fa81511b upstream. Checkin: b3b42ac2 x86-64, modify_ldt: Ban 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels disabled 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels due to an information leak. However, it does seem that people are genuinely using Wine to run old 16-bit Windows programs on Linux. A proper fix for this ("espfix64") is coming in the upcoming merge window, but as a temporary fix, create a sysctl to allow the administrator to re-enable support for 16-bit segments. It adds a "/proc/sys/abi/ldt16" sysctl that defaults to zero (off). If you hit this issue and care about your old Windows program more than you care about a kernel stack address information leak, you can do echo 1 > /proc/sys/abi/ldt16 as root (add it to your startup scripts), and you should be ok. The sysctl table is only added if you have COMPAT support enabled on x86-64, but I assume anybody who runs old windows binaries very much does that ;) Signed-off-by:
H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA%2B55aFw9BPoD10U1LfHbOMpHWZkvJTkMcfCs9s3urPr1YyWBxw@mail.gmail.comSigned-off-by:
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Olof Johansson authored
commit ce78cc07 upstream. Don't unmark the device as suspended until after it's been re-setup. The main race would be w.r.t. an i2c driver that gets resumed at the same time (asyncronously), that is allowed to do a transfer since suspended is set to 0 before reinit, but really should have seen the -EIO return instead. Signed-off-by:
Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Signed-off-by:
Doug Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Acked-by:
Kukjin Kim <kgene.kim@samsung.com> Signed-off-by:
Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by:
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Du, Wenkai authored
commit 47bb27e7 upstream. There have been "i2c_designware 80860F41:00: controller timed out" errors on a number of Baytrail platforms. The issue is caused by incorrect value in Interrupt Mask Register (DW_IC_INTR_MASK) when i2c core is being enabled. This causes call to __i2c_dw_enable() to immediately start the transfer which leads to timeout. There are 3 failure modes observed: 1. Failure in S0 to S3 resume path The default value after reset for DW_IC_INTR_MASK is 0x8ff. When we start the first transaction after resuming from system sleep, TX_EMPTY interrupt is already unmasked because of the hardware default. 2. Failure in normal operational path This failure happens rarely and is hard to reproduce. Debug trace showed that DW_IC_INTR_MASK had value of 0x254 when failure occurred, which meant TX_EMPTY was unmasked. 3. Failure in S3 to S0 suspend path This failure also happens rarely and is hard to reproduce. Adding debug trace that read DW_IC_INTR_MASK made this failure not reproducible. But from ISR call trace we could conclude TX_EMPTY was unmasked when problem occurred. The patch masks all interrupts before the controller is enabled to resolve the faulty DW_IC_INTR_MASK conditions. Signed-off-by:
Wenkai Du <wenkai.du@intel.com> Acked-by:
Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> [wsa: improved the comment and removed typo in commit msg] Signed-off-by:
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Anthony Iliopoulos authored
commit 9844f546 upstream. The invalidation is required in order to maintain proper semantics under CoW conditions. In scenarios where a process clones several threads, a thread operating on a core whose DTLB entry for a particular hugepage has not been invalidated, will be reading from the hugepage that belongs to the forked child process, even after hugetlb_cow(). The thread will not see the updated page as long as the stale DTLB entry remains cached, the thread attempts to write into the page, the child process exits, or the thread gets migrated to a different processor. Signed-off-by:
Anthony Iliopoulos <anthony.iliopoulos@huawei.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140514092948.GA17391@server-36.huawei.corpSuggested-by:
Shay Goikhman <shay.goikhman@huawei.com> Acked-by:
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Guennadi Liakhovetski authored
commit 97d9d23d upstream. If a struct contains 64-bit fields, it is aligned on 64-bit boundaries within containing structs in 64-bit compilations. This is the case with struct v4l2_window, which contains pointers and is embedded into struct v4l2_format, and that one is embedded into struct v4l2_create_buffers. Unlike some other structs, used as a part of the kernel ABI as ioctl() arguments, that are packed, these structs aren't packed. This isn't a problem per se, but the ioctl-compat code for VIDIOC_CREATE_BUFS contains a bug, that triggers in such 64-bit builds. That code wrongly assumes, that in struct v4l2_create_buffers, struct v4l2_format immediately follows the __u32 memory field, which in fact isn't the case. This bug wasn't visible until now, because until recently hardly any applications used this ioctl() and mostly embedded 32-bit only drivers implemented it. This is changing now with addition of this ioctl() to some USB drivers, e.g. UVC. This patch fixes the bug by copying parts of struct v4l2_create_buffers separately. Signed-off-by:
Guennadi Liakhovetski <g.liakhovetski@gmx.de> Acked-by:
Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com> Signed-off-by:
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <m.chehab@samsung.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename] Signed-off-by:
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Guennadi Liakhovetski authored
commit cfece585 upstream. Commit 75e2bdad "ov7670: allow configuration of image size, clock speed, and I/O method" uses a wrong index to iterate an array. Apart from being wrong, it also uses an unchecked value from user-space, which can cause access to unmapped memory in the kernel, triggered by a normal desktop user with rights to use V4L2 devices. Signed-off-by:
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by:
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Josef Gajdusek authored
commit 3a18e139 upstream. The datasheet for EMC1413/EMC1414, which is fully compatible to EMC1403/1404 and uses the same chip identification, references revision numbers 0x01, 0x03, and 0x04. Accept the full range of revision numbers from 0x01 to 0x04 to make sure none are missed. Signed-off-by:
Josef Gajdusek <atx@atx.name> [Guenter Roeck: Updated headline and description] Signed-off-by:
Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by:
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Josef Gajdusek authored
commit 17c048fc upstream. Attempts to set the hysteresis value to a temperature below the target limit fails with "write error: Numerical result out of range" due to an inverted comparison. Signed-off-by:
Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> [Guenter Roeck: Updated headline and description] Signed-off-by:
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Viresh Kumar authored
commit 84ea7fe3 upstream. switch_hrtimer_base() calls hrtimer_check_target() which ensures that we do not migrate a timer to a remote cpu if the timer expires before the current programmed expiry time on that remote cpu. But __hrtimer_start_range_ns() calls switch_hrtimer_base() before the new expiry time is set. So the sanity check in hrtimer_check_target() is operating on stale or even uninitialized data. Update expiry time before calling switch_hrtimer_base(). [ tglx: Rewrote changelog once again ] Signed-off-by:
Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> Cc: linaro-kernel@lists.linaro.org Cc: linaro-networking@linaro.org Cc: fweisbec@gmail.com Cc: arvind.chauhan@arm.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/81999e148745fc51bbcd0615823fbab9b2e87e23.1399882253.git.viresh.kumar@linaro.orgSigned-off-by:
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Kinglong Mee authored
commit aa07c713 upstream. After setting ACL for directory, I got two problems that caused by the cached zero-length default posix acl. This patch make sure nfsd4_set_nfs4_acl calls ->set_acl with a NULL ACL structure if there are no entries. Thanks for Christoph Hellwig's advice. First problem: ............ hang ........... Second problem: [ 1610.167668] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 1610.168320] kernel BUG at /root/nfs/linux/fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c:239! [ 1610.168320] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC [ 1610.168320] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) nfsd(OE) rpcsec_gss_krb5 fscache ip6t_rpfilter ip6t_REJECT cfg80211 xt_conntrack rfkill ebtable_nat ebtable_broute bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_nat nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_nat_ipv6 ip6table_mangle ip6table_security ip6table_raw ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack iptable_mangle iptable_security iptable_raw auth_rpcgss nfs_acl snd_intel8x0 ppdev lockd snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_pcm snd_timer e1000 pcspkr parport_pc snd parport serio_raw joydev i2c_piix4 sunrpc(OE) microcode soundcore i2c_core ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd] [ 1610.168320] CPU: 0 PID: 27397 Comm: nfsd Tainted: G OE 3.15.0-rc1+ #15 [ 1610.168320] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 1610.168320] task: ffff88005ab653d0 ti: ffff88005a944000 task.ti: ffff88005a944000 [ 1610.168320] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa034d5ed>] [<ffffffffa034d5ed>] _posix_to_nfsv4_one+0x3cd/0x3d0 [nfsd] [ 1610.168320] RSP: 0018:ffff88005a945b00 EFLAGS: 00010293 [ 1610.168320] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88006700bac0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1610.168320] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880067c83f00 RDI: ffff880068233300 [ 1610.168320] RBP: ffff88005a945b48 R08: ffffffff81c64830 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 1610.168320] R10: ffff88004ea85be0 R11: 000000000000f475 R12: ffff880068233300 [ 1610.168320] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880068233300 [ 1610.168320] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880077800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1610.168320] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 1610.168320] CR2: 00007f5bcbd3b0b9 CR3: 0000000001c0f000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 1610.168320] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 1610.168320] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 1610.168320] Stack: [ 1610.168320] ffffffff00000000 0000000b67c83500 000000076700bac0 0000000000000000 [ 1610.168320] ffff88006700bac0 ffff880068233300 ffff88005a945c08 0000000000000002 [ 1610.168320] 0000000000000000 ffff88005a945b88 ffffffffa034e2d5 000000065a945b68 [ 1610.168320] Call Trace: [ 1610.168320] [<ffffffffa034e2d5>] nfsd4_get_nfs4_acl+0x95/0x150 [nfsd] [ 1610.168320] [<ffffffffa03400d6>] nfsd4_encode_fattr+0x646/0x1e70 [nfsd] [ 1610.168320] [<ffffffff816a6e6e>] ? kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0 [ 1610.168320] [<ffffffffa0327962>] ? nfsd_setuser_and_check_port+0x52/0x80 [nfsd] [ 1610.168320] [<ffffffff812cd4bb>] ? selinux_cred_prepare+0x1b/0x30 [ 1610.168320] [<ffffffffa0341caa>] nfsd4_encode_getattr+0x5a/0x60 [nfsd] [ 1610.168320] [<ffffffffa0341e07>] nfsd4_encode_operation+0x67/0x110 [nfsd] [ 1610.168320] [<ffffffffa033844d>] nfsd4_proc_compound+0x21d/0x810 [nfsd] [ 1610.168320] [<ffffffffa0324d9b>] nfsd_dispatch+0xbb/0x200 [nfsd] [ 1610.168320] [<ffffffffa00850cd>] svc_process_common+0x46d/0x6d0 [sunrpc] [ 1610.168320] [<ffffffffa0085433>] svc_process+0x103/0x170 [sunrpc] [ 1610.168320] [<ffffffffa032472f>] nfsd+0xbf/0x130 [nfsd] [ 1610.168320] [<ffffffffa0324670>] ? nfsd_destroy+0x80/0x80 [nfsd] [ 1610.168320] [<ffffffff810a5202>] kthread+0xd2/0xf0 [ 1610.168320] [<ffffffff810a5130>] ? insert_kthread_work+0x40/0x40 [ 1610.168320] [<ffffffff816c1ebc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 [ 1610.168320] [<ffffffff810a5130>] ? insert_kthread_work+0x40/0x40 [ 1610.168320] Code: 78 02 e9 e7 fc ff ff 31 c0 31 d2 31 c9 66 89 45 ce 41 8b 04 24 66 89 55 d0 66 89 4d d2 48 8d 04 80 49 8d 5c 84 04 e9 37 fd ff ff <0f> 0b 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 8b 56 08 c7 07 00 00 00 00 8b 46 0c [ 1610.168320] RIP [<ffffffffa034d5ed>] _posix_to_nfsv4_one+0x3cd/0x3d0 [nfsd] [ 1610.168320] RSP <ffff88005a945b00> [ 1610.257313] ---[ end trace 838254e3e352285b ]--- Signed-off-by:
Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Romain Izard authored
commit 098507ae upstream. The replacement of the 'count' variable by two variables 'incs' and 'decs' to resolve some race conditions during module unloading was done in parallel with some cleanup in the trace subsystem, and was integrated as a merge. Unfortunately, the formula for this replacement was wrong in the tracing code, and the refcount in the traces was not usable as a result. Use 'count = incs - decs' to compute the user count. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/1393924179-9147-1-git-send-email-romain.izard.pro@gmail.comAcked-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Fixes: c1ab9cab "merge conflict resolution" Signed-off-by:
Romain Izard <romain.izard.pro@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by:
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Steven Rostedt (Red Hat) authored
commit 6227cb00 upstream. The check at the beginning of cpupri_find() makes sure that the task_pri variable does not exceed the cp->pri_to_cpu array length. But that length is CPUPRI_NR_PRIORITIES not MAX_RT_PRIO, where it will miss the last two priorities in that array. As task_pri is computed from convert_prio() which should never be bigger than CPUPRI_NR_PRIORITIES, if the check should cause a panic if it is hit. Reported-by:
Mike Galbraith <umgwanakikbuti@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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