- 13 Jan, 2019 40 commits
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Lukas Wunner authored
commit dbc94411 upstream. If submission of a DMA TX transfer succeeds but submission of the corresponding RX transfer does not, the BCM2835 SPI driver terminates the TX transfer but neglects to reset the dma_pending flag to false. Thus, if the next transfer uses interrupt mode (because it is shorter than BCM2835_SPI_DMA_MIN_LENGTH) and runs into a timeout, dmaengine_terminate_all() will be called both for TX (once more) and for RX (which was never started in the first place). Fix it. Signed-off-by:
Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Fixes: 3ecd37ed ("spi: bcm2835: enable dma modes for transfers meeting certain conditions") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+ Cc: Mathias Duckeck <m.duckeck@kunbus.de> Cc: Frank Pavlic <f.pavlic@kunbus.de> Cc: Martin Sperl <kernel@martin.sperl.org> Cc: Noralf Trønnes <noralf@tronnes.org> Signed-off-by:
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Lukas Wunner authored
commit e82b0b38 upstream. If a DMA transfer finishes orderly right when spi_transfer_one_message() determines that it has timed out, the callbacks bcm2835_spi_dma_done() and bcm2835_spi_handle_err() race to call dmaengine_terminate_all(), potentially leading to double termination. Prevent by atomically changing the dma_pending flag before calling dmaengine_terminate_all(). Signed-off-by:
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Theodore Ts'o authored
commit fde87268 upstream. Some time back, nfsd switched from calling vfs_fsync() to using a new commit_metadata() hook in export_operations(). If the file system did not provide a commit_metadata() hook, it fell back to using sync_inode_metadata(). Unfortunately doesn't work on all file systems. In particular, it doesn't work on ext4 due to how the inode gets journalled --- the VFS writeback code will not always call ext4_write_inode(). So we need to provide our own ext4_nfs_commit_metdata() method which calls ext4_write_inode() directly. Google-Bug-Id: 121195940 Signed-off-by:
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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ruippan (潘睿) authored
commit e647e291 upstream. Commit e2b911c5 ("ext4: clean up feature test macros with predicate functions") broke the EXT4_IOC_GROUP_ADD ioctl. This was not noticed since only very old versions of resize2fs (before e2fsprogs 1.42) use this ioctl. However, using a new kernel with an enterprise Linux userspace will cause attempts to use online resize to fail with "No reserved GDT blocks". Fixes: e2b911c5 ("ext4: clean up feature test macros with predicate...") Cc: stable@kernel.org # v4.4 Signed-off-by:
ruippan (潘睿) <ruippan@tencent.com> Signed-off-by:
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Maurizio Lombardi authored
commit 132d00be upstream. In case of error, ext4_try_to_write_inline_data() should unlock and release the page it holds. Fixes: f19d5870 ("ext4: add normal write support for inline data") Cc: stable@kernel.org # 3.8 Signed-off-by:
Maurizio Lombardi <mlombard@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Pan Bian authored
commit 61157b24 upstream. The function frees qf_inode via iput but then pass qf_inode to lockdep_set_quota_inode on the failure path. This may result in a use-after-free bug. The patch frees df_inode only when it is never used. Fixes: daf647d2 ("ext4: add lockdep annotations for i_data_sem") Cc: stable@kernel.org # 4.6 Reviewed-by:
Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com> Signed-off-by:
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Ben Hutchings authored
commit 11a64a05 upstream. Depending on which functions are inlined in util/pmu.c, the snprintf() calls in perf_pmu__parse_{scale,unit,per_pkg,snapshot}() might trigger a warning: util/pmu.c: In function 'pmu_aliases': util/pmu.c:178:31: error: '%s' directive output may be truncated writing up to 255 bytes into a region of size between 0 and 4095 [-Werror=format-truncation=] snprintf(path, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s.unit", dir, name); ^~ I found this when trying to build perf from Linux 3.16 with gcc 8. However I can reproduce the problem in mainline if I force __perf_pmu__new_alias() to be inlined. Suppress this by using scnprintf() as has been done elsewhere in perf. Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181111184524.fux4taownc6ndbx6@decadent.org.ukSigned-off-by:
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
commit e8143499 upstream. ____kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot() provides a generic exception fixup handler that is used to cleanly handle faults on VMX/SVM instructions during reboot (or at least try to). If there isn't a reboot in progress, ____kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot() treats any exception as fatal to KVM and invokes kvm_spurious_fault(), which in turn generates a BUG() to get a stack trace and die. When it was originally added by commit 4ecac3fd ("KVM: Handle virtualization instruction #UD faults during reboot"), the "call" to kvm_spurious_fault() was handcoded as PUSH+JMP, where the PUSH'd value is the RIP of the faulting instructing. The PUSH+JMP trickery is necessary because the exception fixup handler code lies outside of its associated function, e.g. right after the function. An actual CALL from the .fixup code would show a slightly bogus stack trace, e.g. an extra "random" function would be inserted into the trace, as the return RIP on the stack would point to no known function (and the unwinder will likely try to guess who owns the RIP). Unfortunately, the JMP was replaced with a CALL when the macro was reworked to not spin indefinitely during reboot (commit b7c4145b "KVM: Don't spin on virt instruction faults during reboot"). This causes the aforementioned behavior where a bogus function is inserted into the stack trace, e.g. my builds like to blame free_kvm_area(). Revert the CALL back to a JMP. The changelog for commit b7c4145b ("KVM: Don't spin on virt instruction faults during reboot") contains nothing that indicates the switch to CALL was deliberate. This is backed up by the fact that the PUSH <insn RIP> was left intact. Note that an alternative to the PUSH+JMP magic would be to JMP back to the "real" code and CALL from there, but that would require adding a JMP in the non-faulting path to avoid calling kvm_spurious_fault() and would add no value, i.e. the stack trace would be the same. Using CALL: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at /home/sean/go/src/kernel.org/linux/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:356! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 4 PID: 1057 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc6+ #75 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:kvm_spurious_fault+0x5/0x10 [kvm] Code: <0f> 0b 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 55 49 89 fd 41 RSP: 0018:ffffc900004bbcc8 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffffffffff RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff888273fd8000 R08: 00000000000003e8 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000784 R12: ffffc90000371fb0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000026d763cf4 R15: ffff888273fd8000 FS: 00007f3d69691700(0000) GS:ffff888277800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055f89bc56fe0 CR3: 0000000271a5a001 CR4: 0000000000362ee0 Call Trace: free_kvm_area+0x1044/0x43ea [kvm_intel] ? vmx_vcpu_run+0x156/0x630 [kvm_intel] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x447/0x1a40 [kvm] ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x368/0x5c0 [kvm] ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x368/0x5c0 [kvm] ? __set_task_blocked+0x38/0x90 ? __set_current_blocked+0x50/0x60 ? __fpu__restore_sig+0x97/0x490 ? do_vfs_ioctl+0xa1/0x620 ? __x64_sys_futex+0x89/0x180 ? ksys_ioctl+0x66/0x70 ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 ? do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x100 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Modules linked in: vhost_net vhost tap kvm_intel kvm irqbypass bridge stp llc ---[ end trace 9775b14b123b1713 ]--- Using JMP: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at /home/sean/go/src/kernel.org/linux/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:356! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 6 PID: 1067 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc6+ #75 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:kvm_spurious_fault+0x5/0x10 [kvm] Code: <0f> 0b 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 55 49 89 fd 41 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000497cd0 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffffffffff RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff88827058bd40 R08: 00000000000003e8 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000784 R12: ffffc90000369fb0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000003c8fc6642 R15: ffff88827058bd40 FS: 00007f3d7219e700(0000) GS:ffff888277900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f3d64001000 CR3: 0000000271c6b004 CR4: 0000000000362ee0 Call Trace: vmx_vcpu_run+0x156/0x630 [kvm_intel] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x447/0x1a40 [kvm] ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x368/0x5c0 [kvm] ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x368/0x5c0 [kvm] ? __set_task_blocked+0x38/0x90 ? __set_current_blocked+0x50/0x60 ? __fpu__restore_sig+0x97/0x490 ? do_vfs_ioctl+0xa1/0x620 ? __x64_sys_futex+0x89/0x180 ? ksys_ioctl+0x66/0x70 ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 ? do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x100 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Modules linked in: vhost_net vhost tap kvm_intel kvm irqbypass bridge stp llc ---[ end trace f9daedb85ab3ddba ]--- Fixes: b7c4145b ("KVM: Don't spin on virt instruction faults during reboot") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Patrick Dreyer authored
commit 7db54c89 upstream. This adds ELAN0501 to the ACPI table to support Elan touchpad found in ASUS Aspire F5-573G. Signed-off-by:
Patrick Dreyer <Patrick.Dreyer@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jia-Ju Bai authored
commit c85400f8 upstream. The function r8a66597_endpoint_disable() and r8a66597_urb_enqueue() may be concurrently executed. The two functions both access a possible shared variable "hep->hcpriv". This shared variable is freed by r8a66597_endpoint_disable() via the call path: r8a66597_endpoint_disable kfree(hep->hcpriv) (line 1995 in Linux-4.19) This variable is read by r8a66597_urb_enqueue() via the call path: r8a66597_urb_enqueue spin_lock_irqsave(&r8a66597->lock) init_pipe_info enable_r8a66597_pipe pipe = hep->hcpriv (line 802 in Linux-4.19) The read operation is protected by a spinlock, but the free operation is not protected by this spinlock, thus a concurrency use-after-free bug may occur. To fix this bug, the spin-lock and spin-unlock function calls in r8a66597_endpoint_disable() are moved to protect the free operation. Signed-off-by:
Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Jörgen Storvist authored
commit 4b2c01ad upstream. Added USB serial option driver support for Fibocom NL678 series cellular module: VID 2cb7 and PIDs 0x0104 and 0x0105. Reserved network and ADB interfaces. T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=00 Cnt=01 Dev#= 2 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=2cb7 ProdID=0104 Rev=03.10 S: Manufacturer=Fibocom S: Product=Fibocom NL678-E Modem S: SerialNumber=12345678 C: #Ifs= 6 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan I: If#= 5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=42 Prot=01 Driver=(none) T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=00 Cnt=01 Dev#= 3 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=2cb7 ProdID=0105 Rev=03.10 S: Manufacturer=Fibocom S: Product=Fibocom NL678-E Modem S: SerialNumber=12345678 C: #Ifs= 7 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(commc) Sub=06 Prot=00 Driver=cdc_ether I: If#= 5 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=cdc_ether I: If#= 6 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=42 Prot=01 Driver=(none) Signed-off-by:
Jörgen Storvist <jorgen.storvist@gmail.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Acked-by:
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Scott Chen authored
commit 8d503f20 upstream. Add device ids to pl2303 for the HP POS pole displays: LM920: 03f0:026b TD620: 03f0:0956 LD960TA: 03f0:4439 LD220TA: 03f0:4349 LM940: 03f0:5039 Signed-off-by:
Scott Chen <scott@labau.com.tw> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Sameer Pujar authored
commit 63d2a9ec upstream. Even after disabling interrupts on the module, it could be possible that irq handlers are still running. System hang is seen during suspend path. It was found that, there were pending writes on the HDA bus and clock was disabled by that time. Above mentioned issue is fixed by clearing any pending irq handlers before disabling clocks and returning from hda suspend. Suggested-by:
Mohan Kumar <mkumard@nvidia.com> Suggested-by:
Dara Ramesh <dramesh@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by:
Sameer Pujar <spujar@nvidia.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Mantas Mikulėnas authored
commit 40906ebe upstream. Tested with 4.19.9. v2: Changed from CXT_FIXUP_MUTE_LED_GPIO to CXT_FIXUP_HP_DOCK because that's what the existing fixups for EliteBooks use. Signed-off-by:
Mantas Mikulėnas <grawity@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
commit 4aea96f4 upstream. info.mode and info.port are indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. These issues were detected with the help of Smatch: sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:72 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls' [w] (local cap) sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:75 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs' [w] (local cap) sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:75 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls' [w] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing both info.mode and info.port before using them to index emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls, emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls and emu->portptrs. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2Signed-off-by:
Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
commit 94ffb030 upstream. stream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: sound/core/pcm.c:140 snd_pcm_control_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'pcm->streams' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing stream before using it to index pcm->streams Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2Signed-off-by:
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
commit 5ae4f61f upstream. ipcm->substream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1031 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_poke() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap) sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1075 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_peek() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing ipcm->substream before using it to index emu->fx8010.pcm Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
commit 0b84304e upstream. info->channel is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: sound/pci/rme9652/hdsp.c:4100 snd_hdsp_channel_info() warn: potential spectre issue 'hdsp->channel_map' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing info->channel before using it to index hdsp->channel_map Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. Also, notice that I refactored the code a bit in order to get rid of the following checkpatch warning: ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition FILE: sound/pci/rme9652/hdsp.c:4103: if ((mapped_channel = hdsp->channel_map[info->channel]) < 0) [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Deepa Dinamani authored
[ Upstream commit 3a0ed3e9 ] Al Viro mentioned (Message-ID <20170626041334.GZ10672@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>) that there is probably a race condition lurking in accesses of sk_stamp on 32-bit machines. sock->sk_stamp is of type ktime_t which is always an s64. On a 32 bit architecture, we might run into situations of unsafe access as the access to the field becomes non atomic. Use seqlocks for synchronization. This allows us to avoid using spinlocks for readers as readers do not need mutual exclusion. Another approach to solve this is to require sk_lock for all modifications of the timestamps. The current approach allows for timestamps to have their own lock: sk_stamp_lock. This allows for the patch to not compete with already existing critical sections, and side effects are limited to the paths in the patch. The addition of the new field maintains the data locality optimizations from commit 9115e8cd ("net: reorganize struct sock for better data locality") Note that all the instances of the sk_stamp accesses are either through the ioctl or the syscall recvmsg. Signed-off-by:
Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
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Lorenzo Bianconi authored
[ Upstream commit 8e1da73a ] Add napi_disable routine in gro_cells_destroy since starting from commit c42858ea ("gro_cells: remove spinlock protecting receive queues") gro_cell_poll and gro_cells_destroy can run concurrently on napi_skbs list producing a kernel Oops if the tunnel interface is removed while gro_cell_poll is running. The following Oops has been triggered removing a vxlan device while the interface is receiving traffic [ 5628.948853] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008 [ 5628.949981] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 5628.950308] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI [ 5628.950748] CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc6+ #41 [ 5628.952940] RIP: 0010:gro_cell_poll+0x49/0x80 [ 5628.955615] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000004fdd8 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 5628.956250] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffe8ffffc08150 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.957102] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88802356bf00 RDI: ffffe8ffffc08150 [ 5628.957940] RBP: 0000000000000026 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.958803] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.959661] R13: ffffe8ffffc08100 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.960682] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 5628.961616] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 5628.962359] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000000221c000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 [ 5628.963188] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.964034] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 5628.964871] Call Trace: [ 5628.965179] net_rx_action+0xf0/0x380 [ 5628.965637] __do_softirq+0xc7/0x431 [ 5628.966510] run_ksoftirqd+0x24/0x30 [ 5628.966957] smpboot_thread_fn+0xc5/0x160 [ 5628.967436] kthread+0x113/0x130 [ 5628.968283] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 5628.968721] Modules linked in: [ 5628.969099] CR2: 0000000000000008 [ 5628.969510] ---[ end trace 9d9dedc7181661fe ]--- [ 5628.970073] RIP: 0010:gro_cell_poll+0x49/0x80 [ 5628.972965] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000004fdd8 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 5628.973611] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffe8ffffc08150 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.974504] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88802356bf00 RDI: ffffe8ffffc08150 [ 5628.975462] RBP: 0000000000000026 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.976413] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.977375] R13: ffffe8ffffc08100 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.978296] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 5628.979327] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 5628.980044] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000000221c000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 [ 5628.980929] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.981736] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 5628.982409] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt [ 5628.983307] Kernel Offset: disabled Fixes: c42858ea ("gro_cells: remove spinlock protecting receive queues") Signed-off-by:
Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo.bianconi@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Juergen Gross authored
[ Upstream commit d81c5054 ] At least old Xen net backends seem to send frags with no real data sometimes. In case such a fragment happens to occur with the frag limit already reached the frontend will BUG currently even if this situation is easily recoverable. Modify the BUG_ON() condition accordingly. Tested-by:
Dietmar Hahn <dietmar.hahn@ts.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by:
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jorgen Hansen authored
[ Upstream commit a915b982 ] If a server side socket is bound to an address, but not in the listening state yet, incoming connection requests should receive a reset control packet in response. However, the function used to send the reset silently drops the reset packet if the sending socket isn't bound to a remote address (as is the case for a bound socket not yet in the listening state). This change fixes this by using the src of the incoming packet as destination for the reset packet in this case. Fixes: d021c344 ("VSOCK: Introduce VM Sockets") Reviewed-by:
Adit Ranadive <aditr@vmware.com> Reviewed-by:
Vishnu Dasa <vdasa@vmware.com> Signed-off-by:
Jorgen Hansen <jhansen@vmware.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jason Wang authored
[ Upstream commit 841df922 ] We miss a write barrier that guarantees used idx is updated and seen before log. This will let userspace sync and copy used ring before used idx is update. Fix this by adding a barrier before log_write(). Fixes: 8dd014ad ("vhost-net: mergeable buffers support") Acked-by:
Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Xin Long authored
[ Upstream commit 4a2eb0c3 ] syzbot reported a kernel-infoleak, which is caused by an uninitialized field(sin6_flowinfo) of addr->a.v6 in sctp_inet6addr_event(). The call trace is as below: BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0x19a/0x230 lib/usercopy.c:33 CPU: 1 PID: 8164 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc3+ #95 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x32d/0x480 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x12c/0x290 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:683 kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x32a/0xa50 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:743 kmsan_copy_to_user+0x78/0xd0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:634 _copy_to_user+0x19a/0x230 lib/usercopy.c:33 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:183 [inline] sctp_getsockopt_local_addrs net/sctp/socket.c:5998 [inline] sctp_getsockopt+0x15248/0x186f0 net/sctp/socket.c:7477 sock_common_getsockopt+0x13f/0x180 net/core/sock.c:2937 __sys_getsockopt+0x489/0x550 net/socket.c:1939 __do_sys_getsockopt net/socket.c:1950 [inline] __se_sys_getsockopt+0xe1/0x100 net/socket.c:1947 __x64_sys_getsockopt+0x62/0x80 net/socket.c:1947 do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 sin6_flowinfo is not really used by SCTP, so it will be fixed by simply setting it to 0. The issue exists since very beginning. Thanks Alexander for the reproducer provided. Reported-by: syzbot+ad5d327e6936a2e284be@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by:
Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by:
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Willem de Bruijn authored
[ Upstream commit 6b8d95f1 ] Validate packet socket address length if a length is given. Zero length is equivalent to not setting an address. Fixes: 99137b78 ("packet: validate address length") Reported-by:
Ido Schimmel <idosch@idosch.org> Signed-off-by:
Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Willem de Bruijn authored
[ Upstream commit 99137b78 ] Packet sockets with SOCK_DGRAM may pass an address for use in dev_hard_header. Ensure that it is of sufficient length. Reported-by:
syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by:
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Cong Wang authored
[ Upstream commit 7314f548 ] nr_find_socket(), nr_find_peer() and nr_find_listener() lock the sock after finding it in the global list. However, the call path requires BH disabled for the sock lock consistently. Actually the locking is unnecessary at this point, we can just hold the sock refcnt to make sure it is not gone after we unlock the global list, and lock it later only when needed. Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+f621cda8b7e598908efa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by:
Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit d63967e4 ] Since capi_ioctl() copies 64 bytes after calling capi20_get_manufacturer() we need to ensure to not leak information to user. BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0x16b/0x1f0 lib/usercopy.c:32 CPU: 0 PID: 11245 Comm: syz-executor633 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #2 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613 kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x9d4/0xb00 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:704 kmsan_copy_to_user+0xab/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:601 _copy_to_user+0x16b/0x1f0 lib/usercopy.c:32 capi_ioctl include/linux/uaccess.h:177 [inline] capi_unlocked_ioctl+0x1a0b/0x1bf0 drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:939 do_vfs_ioctl+0xebd/0x2bf0 fs/ioctl.c:46 ksys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:713 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:720 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0x1da/0x270 fs/ioctl.c:718 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x4a/0x70 fs/ioctl.c:718 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 RIP: 0033:0x440019 Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fb 13 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffdd4659fb8 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 0000000000440019 RDX: 0000000020000080 RSI: 00000000c0044306 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000004002c8 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 00000000004018a0 R13: 0000000000401930 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Local variable description: ----data.i@capi_unlocked_ioctl Variable was created at: capi_ioctl drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:747 [inline] capi_unlocked_ioctl+0x82/0x1bf0 drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:939 do_vfs_ioctl+0xebd/0x2bf0 fs/ioctl.c:46 Bytes 12-63 of 64 are uninitialized Memory access of size 64 starts at ffff88807ac5fce8 Data copied to user address 0000000020000080 Signed-off-by:
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Cong Wang authored
[ Upstream commit fb242745 ] syzbot reported the use of uninitialized udp6_addr::sin6_scope_id. We can just set ::sin6_scope_id to zero, as tunnels are unlikely to use an IPv6 address that needs a scope id and there is no interface to bind in this context. For net-next, it looks different as we have cfg->bind_ifindex there so we can probably call ipv6_iface_scope_id(). Same for ::sin6_flowinfo, tunnels don't use it. Fixes: 8024e028 ("udp: Add udp_sock_create for UDP tunnels to open listener socket") Reported-by: syzbot+c56449ed3652e6720f30@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by:
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Willem de Bruijn authored
[ Upstream commit 40c3ff6d ] Packet sockets may call dev_header_parse with NULL daddr. Make lowpan_header_ops.create fail. Fixes: 87a93e4e ("ieee802154: change needed headroom/tailroom") Signed-off-by:
Alexander Aring <aring@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by:
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Tyrel Datwyler authored
[ Upstream commit 756af9c6 ] Commit 33a48ab1 ("ibmveth: Fix DMA unmap error") fixed an issue in the normal code path of ibmveth_xmit_start() that was originally introduced by Commit 6e8ab30e ("ibmveth: Add scatter-gather support"). This original fix missed the error path where dma_unmap_page is wrongly called on the header portion in descs[0] which was mapped with dma_map_single. As a result a failure to DMA map any of the frags results in a dmesg warning when CONFIG_DMA_API_DEBUG is enabled. ------------[ cut here ]------------ DMA-API: ibmveth 30000002: device driver frees DMA memory with wrong function [device address=0x000000000a430000] [size=172 bytes] [mapped as page] [unmapped as single] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 8426 at kernel/dma/debug.c:1085 check_unmap+0x4fc/0xe10 ... <snip> ... DMA-API: Mapped at: ibmveth_start_xmit+0x30c/0xb60 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x100/0x450 sch_direct_xmit+0x224/0x490 __qdisc_run+0x20c/0x980 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1bc/0xf20 This fixes the API misuse by unampping descs[0] with dma_unmap_single. Fixes: 6e8ab30e ("ibmveth: Add scatter-gather support") Signed-off-by:
Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Cong Wang authored
[ Upstream commit c4335704 ] There are multiple issues here: 1. After freeing dev->ax25_ptr, we need to set it to NULL otherwise we may use a dangling pointer. 2. There is a race between ax25_setsockopt() and device notifier as reported by syzbot. Close it by holding RTNL lock. 3. We need to test if dev->ax25_ptr is NULL before using it. Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+ae6bb869cbed29b29040@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by:
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
[ Upstream commit 5648451e ] vr.vifi is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: net/ipv4/ipmr.c:1616 ipmr_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap) net/ipv4/ipmr.c:1690 ipmr_compat_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing vr.vifi before using it to index mrt->vif_table' Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2Signed-off-by:
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
[ Upstream commit 69d2c867 ] vr.mifi is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1845 ip6mr_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap) net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1919 ip6mr_compat_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing vr.mifi before using it to index mrt->vif_table' Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2Signed-off-by:
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
commit 505b5240 upstream. nr is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:805 drm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev->driver->ioctls' [r] drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:810 drm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'drm_ioctls' [r] (local cap) drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:892 drm_ioctl_flags() warn: potential spectre issue 'drm_ioctls' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing nr before using it to index dev->driver->ioctls and drm_ioctls. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20181220000015.GA18973@embeddedorSigned-off-by:
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Colin Ian King authored
commit 32043fa0 upstream. Currently the copy_to_user of data in the gentry struct is copying uninitiaized data in field _pad from the stack to userspace. Fix this by explicitly memset'ing gentry to zero, this also will zero any compiler added padding fields that may be in struct (currently there are none). Detected by CoverityScan, CID#200783 ("Uninitialized scalar variable") Fixes: b263b31e ("x86, mtrr: Use explicit sizing and padding for the 64-bit ioctls") Signed-off-by:
Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: security@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181218172956.1440-1-colin.king@canonical.comSigned-off-by:
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Dexuan Cui authored
commit fc96df16 upstream. Before 98f4c651, we returned zeros for unopened channels. With 98f4c651, we started to return random on-stack values. We'd better return -EINVAL instead. Fixes: 98f4c651 ("hv: move ringbuffer bus attributes to dev_groups") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by:
Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Christophe Leroy authored
commit abf221d2 upstream. spi_read() and spi_write() require DMA-safe memory. When CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is selected, those functions cannot be used with buffers on stack. This patch replaces calls to spi_read() and spi_write() by spi_write_then_read() which doesn't require DMA-safe buffers. Fixes: 0c36ec31 ("gpio: gpio driver for max7301 SPI GPIO expander") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by:
Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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Russell King authored
commit 0b479790 upstream. While booting with rootfs on MMC, the following warning is encountered on OMAP4430: omap-dma-engine 4a056000.dma-controller: DMA-API: mapping sg segment longer than device claims to support [len=69632] [max=65536] This is because the DMA engine has a default maximum segment size of 64K but HSMMC sets: mmc->max_blk_size = 512; /* Block Length at max can be 1024 */ mmc->max_blk_count = 0xFFFF; /* No. of Blocks is 16 bits */ mmc->max_req_size = mmc->max_blk_size * mmc->max_blk_count; mmc->max_seg_size = mmc->max_req_size; which ends up telling the block layer that we support a maximum segment size of 65535*512, which exceeds the advertised DMA engine capabilities. Fix this by clamping the maximum segment size to the lower of the maximum request size and of the DMA engine device used for either DMA channel. Signed-off-by:
Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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Ulf Hansson authored
commit a0741ba4 upstream. During a re-initialization of the eMMC card, we may fail to re-enable HPI. In these cases, that isn't properly reflected in the card->ext_csd.hpi_en bit, as it keeps being set. This may cause following attempts to use HPI, even if's not enabled. Let's fix this! Fixes: eb0d8f13 ("mmc: core: support HPI send command") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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