1. 22 Oct, 2013 16 commits
  2. 26 Sep, 2013 2 commits
    • Paul Moore's avatar
      selinux: correct locking in selinux_netlbl_socket_connect) · 42d64e1a
      Paul Moore authored
      The SELinux/NetLabel glue code has a locking bug that affects systems
      with NetLabel enabled, see the kernel error message below.  This patch
      corrects this problem by converting the bottom half socket lock to a
      more conventional, and correct for this call-path, lock_sock() call.
      
       ===============================
       [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
       3.11.0-rc3+ #19 Not tainted
       -------------------------------
       net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c:1928 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
      
       other info that might help us debug this:
      
       rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
       2 locks held by ping/731:
        #0:  (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-...}, at: [...] selinux_netlbl_socket_connect
        #1:  (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<...>] netlbl_conn_setattr
      
       stack backtrace:
       CPU: 1 PID: 731 Comm: ping Not tainted 3.11.0-rc3+ #19
       Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
        0000000000000001 ffff88006f659d28 ffffffff81726b6a ffff88003732c500
        ffff88006f659d58 ffffffff810e4457 ffff88006b845a00 0000000000000000
        000000000000000c ffff880075aa2f50 ffff88006f659d90 ffffffff8169bec7
       Call Trace:
        [<ffffffff81726b6a>] dump_stack+0x54/0x74
        [<ffffffff810e4457>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xe7/0x120
        [<ffffffff8169bec7>] cipso_v4_sock_setattr+0x187/0x1a0
        [<ffffffff8170f317>] netlbl_conn_setattr+0x187/0x190
        [<ffffffff8170f195>] ? netlbl_conn_setattr+0x5/0x190
        [<ffffffff8131ac9e>] selinux_netlbl_socket_connect+0xae/0xc0
        [<ffffffff81303025>] selinux_socket_connect+0x135/0x170
        [<ffffffff8119d127>] ? might_fault+0x57/0xb0
        [<ffffffff812fb146>] security_socket_connect+0x16/0x20
        [<ffffffff815d3ad3>] SYSC_connect+0x73/0x130
        [<ffffffff81739a85>] ? sysret_check+0x22/0x5d
        [<ffffffff810e5e2d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xfd/0x1c0
        [<ffffffff81373d4e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
        [<ffffffff815d52be>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
        [<ffffffff81739a59>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
      
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: default avatarPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
      42d64e1a
    • Duan Jiong's avatar
      7d1db4b2
  3. 25 Sep, 2013 21 commits
  4. 24 Sep, 2013 1 commit
    • David Howells's avatar
      KEYS: Add per-user_namespace registers for persistent per-UID kerberos caches · f36f8c75
      David Howells authored
      Add support for per-user_namespace registers of persistent per-UID kerberos
      caches held within the kernel.
      
      This allows the kerberos cache to be retained beyond the life of all a user's
      processes so that the user's cron jobs can work.
      
      The kerberos cache is envisioned as a keyring/key tree looking something like:
      
      	struct user_namespace
      	  \___ .krb_cache keyring		- The register
      		\___ _krb.0 keyring		- Root's Kerberos cache
      		\___ _krb.5000 keyring		- User 5000's Kerberos cache
      		\___ _krb.5001 keyring		- User 5001's Kerberos cache
      			\___ tkt785 big_key	- A ccache blob
      			\___ tkt12345 big_key	- Another ccache blob
      
      Or possibly:
      
      	struct user_namespace
      	  \___ .krb_cache keyring		- The register
      		\___ _krb.0 keyring		- Root's Kerberos cache
      		\___ _krb.5000 keyring		- User 5000's Kerberos cache
      		\___ _krb.5001 keyring		- User 5001's Kerberos cache
      			\___ tkt785 keyring	- A ccache
      				\___ krbtgt/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM big_key
      				\___ http/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user
      				\___ afs/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user
      				\___ nfs/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user
      				\___ krbtgt/KERNEL.ORG@KERNEL.ORG big_key
      				\___ http/KERNEL.ORG@KERNEL.ORG big_key
      
      What goes into a particular Kerberos cache is entirely up to userspace.  Kernel
      support is limited to giving you the Kerberos cache keyring that you want.
      
      The user asks for their Kerberos cache by:
      
      	krb_cache = keyctl_get_krbcache(uid, dest_keyring);
      
      The uid is -1 or the user's own UID for the user's own cache or the uid of some
      other user's cache (requires CAP_SETUID).  This permits rpc.gssd or whatever to
      mess with the cache.
      
      The cache returned is a keyring named "_krb.<uid>" that the possessor can read,
      search, clear, invalidate, unlink from and add links to.  Active LSMs get a
      chance to rule on whether the caller is permitted to make a link.
      
      Each uid's cache keyring is created when it first accessed and is given a
      timeout that is extended each time this function is called so that the keyring
      goes away after a while.  The timeout is configurable by sysctl but defaults to
      three days.
      
      Each user_namespace struct gets a lazily-created keyring that serves as the
      register.  The cache keyrings are added to it.  This means that standard key
      search and garbage collection facilities are available.
      
      The user_namespace struct's register goes away when it does and anything left
      in it is then automatically gc'd.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Tested-by: default avatarSimo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
      cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
      cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      f36f8c75