- 11 Oct, 2019 6 commits
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Paul Mackerras authored
commit d28eafc5 upstream. When we are running multiple vcores on the same physical core, they could be from different VMs and so it is possible that one of the VMs could have its arch.mmu_ready flag cleared (for example by a concurrent HPT resize) when we go to run it on a physical core. We currently check the arch.mmu_ready flag for the primary vcore but not the flags for the other vcores that will be run alongside it. This adds that check, and also a check when we select the secondary vcores from the preempted vcores list. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.14+ Fixes: 38c53af8 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix exclusion between HPT resizing and other HPT updates") Signed-off-by:
Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Paul Mackerras authored
commit 959c5d51 upstream. Escalation interrupts are interrupts sent to the host by the XIVE hardware when it has an interrupt to deliver to a guest VCPU but that VCPU is not running anywhere in the system. Hence we disable the escalation interrupt for the VCPU being run when we enter the guest and re-enable it when the guest does an H_CEDE hypercall indicating it is idle. It is possible that an escalation interrupt gets generated just as we are entering the guest. In that case the escalation interrupt may be using a queue entry in one of the interrupt queues, and that queue entry may not have been processed when the guest exits with an H_CEDE. The existing entry code detects this situation and does not clear the vcpu->arch.xive_esc_on flag as an indication that there is a pending queue entry (if the queue entry gets processed, xive_esc_irq() will clear the flag). There is a comment in the code saying that if the flag is still set on H_CEDE, we have to abort the cede rather than re-enabling the escalation interrupt, lest we end up with two occurrences of the escalation interrupt in the interrupt queue. However, the exit code doesn't do that; it aborts the cede in the sense that vcpu->arch.ceded gets cleared, but it still enables the escalation interrupt by setting the source's PQ bits to 00. Instead we need to set the PQ bits to 10, indicating that an interrupt has been triggered. We also need to avoid setting vcpu->arch.xive_esc_on in this case (i.e. vcpu->arch.xive_esc_on seen to be set on H_CEDE) because xive_esc_irq() will run at some point and clear it, and if we race with that we may end up with an incorrect result (i.e. xive_esc_on set when the escalation interrupt has just been handled). It is extremely unlikely that having two queue entries would cause observable problems; theoretically it could cause queue overflow, but the CPU would have to have thousands of interrupts targetted to it for that to be possible. However, this fix will also make it possible to determine accurately whether there is an unhandled escalation interrupt in the queue, which will be needed by the following patch. Fixes: 9b9b13a6 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Keep XIVE escalation interrupt masked unless ceded") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.16+ Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190813100349.GD9567@blackberrySigned-off-by:
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Vasily Gorbik authored
commit ab575884 upstream. ccw console is created early in start_kernel and used before css is initialized or ccw console subchannel is registered. Until then console subchannel does not have a parent. For that reason assume subchannels with no parent are not pseudo subchannels. This fixes the following kasan finding: BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in sch_is_pseudo_sch+0x8e/0x98 Read of size 8 at addr 00000000000005e8 by task swapper/0/0 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc8-07370-g6ac43dd12538 #2 Hardware name: IBM 2964 NC9 702 (z/VM 6.4.0) Call Trace: ([<000000000012cd76>] show_stack+0x14e/0x1e0) [<0000000001f7fb44>] dump_stack+0x1a4/0x1f8 [<00000000007d7afc>] print_address_description+0x64/0x3c8 [<00000000007d75f6>] __kasan_report+0x14e/0x180 [<00000000018a2986>] sch_is_pseudo_sch+0x8e/0x98 [<000000000189b950>] cio_enable_subchannel+0x1d0/0x510 [<00000000018cac7c>] ccw_device_recognition+0x12c/0x188 [<0000000002ceb1a8>] ccw_device_enable_console+0x138/0x340 [<0000000002cf1cbe>] con3215_init+0x25e/0x300 [<0000000002c8770a>] console_init+0x68a/0x9b8 [<0000000002c6a3d6>] start_kernel+0x4fe/0x728 [<0000000000100070>] startup_continue+0x70/0xd0 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
Sebastian Ott <sebott@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Vasily Gorbik authored
commit f3122a79 upstream. arch_update_cpu_topology is first called from: kernel_init_freeable->sched_init_smp->sched_init_domains even before cpus has been registered in: kernel_init_freeable->do_one_initcall->s390_smp_init Do not trigger kobject_uevent change events until cpu devices are actually created. Fixes the following kasan findings: BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in kobject_uevent_env+0xb40/0xee0 Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000020 by task swapper/0/1 BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in kobject_uevent_env+0xb36/0xee0 Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000018 by task swapper/0/1 CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G B Hardware name: IBM 3906 M04 704 (LPAR) Call Trace: ([<0000000143c6db7e>] show_stack+0x14e/0x1a8) [<0000000145956498>] dump_stack+0x1d0/0x218 [<000000014429fb4c>] print_address_description+0x64/0x380 [<000000014429f630>] __kasan_report+0x138/0x168 [<0000000145960b96>] kobject_uevent_env+0xb36/0xee0 [<0000000143c7c47c>] arch_update_cpu_topology+0x104/0x108 [<0000000143df9e22>] sched_init_domains+0x62/0xe8 [<000000014644c94a>] sched_init_smp+0x3a/0xc0 [<0000000146433a20>] kernel_init_freeable+0x558/0x958 [<000000014599002a>] kernel_init+0x22/0x160 [<00000001459a71d4>] ret_from_fork+0x28/0x30 [<00000001459a71dc>] kernel_thread_starter+0x0/0x10 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Huth authored
commit a13b03bb upstream. If the KVM_S390_MEM_OP ioctl is called with an access register >= 16, then there is certainly a bug in the calling userspace application. We check for wrong access registers, but only if the vCPU was already in the access register mode before (i.e. the SIE block has recorded it). The check is also buried somewhere deep in the calling chain (in the function ar_translation()), so this is somewhat hard to find. It's better to always report an error to the userspace in case this field is set wrong, and it's safer in the KVM code if we block wrong values here early instead of relying on a check somewhere deep down the calling chain, so let's add another check to kvm_s390_guest_mem_op() directly. We also should check that the "size" is non-zero here (thanks to Janosch Frank for the hint!). If we do not check the size, we could call vmalloc() with this 0 value, and this will cause a kernel warning. Signed-off-by:
Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190829122517.31042-1-thuth@redhat.comReviewed-by:
Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Vasily Gorbik authored
commit 8769f610 upstream. With THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK (which is selected on s390) task's stack usage is refcounted and should always be protected by get/put when touching other task's stack to avoid race conditions with task's destruction code. Fixes: d5c352cd ("s390: move thread_info into task_struct") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.10+ Acked-by:
Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 07 Oct, 2019 34 commits
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
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Bharath Vedartham authored
commit 962a991c upstream. v9fs_cache_session_get_cookie assigns a random cachetag to v9ses->cachetag, if the cachetag is not assigned previously. v9fs_random_cachetag allocates memory to v9ses->cachetag with kmalloc and uses scnprintf to fill it up with a cachetag. But if scnprintf fails, v9ses->cachetag is not freed in the current code causing a memory leak. Fix this by freeing v9ses->cachetag it v9fs_random_cachetag fails. This was reported by syzbot, the link to the report is below: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f012bdf297a7a4c860c38a88b44fbee43fd9bbf3 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190522194519.GA5313@bharath12345-Inspiron-5559 Reported-by: syzbot+3a030a73b6c1e9833815@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by:
Bharath Vedartham <linux.bhar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Dominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr> Signed-off-by:
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Tetsuo Handa authored
commit 7c3a6aed upstream. syzbot found that a thread can stall for minutes inside kexec_load() after that thread was killed by SIGKILL [1]. It turned out that the reproducer was trying to allocate 2408MB of memory using kimage_alloc_page() from kimage_load_normal_segment(). Let's check for SIGKILL before doing memory allocation. [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a0e3436829698d5824231251fad9d8e998f94f5e Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/993c9185-d324-2640-d061-bed2dd18b1f7@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jpSigned-off-by:
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reported-by:
syzbot <syzbot+8ab2d0f39fb79fe6ca40@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Reviewed-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Andrey Konovalov authored
commit 18917d51 upstream. nfc_genl_deactivate_target() relies on the NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX attribute being present, but doesn't check whether it is actually provided by the user. Same goes for nfc_genl_fw_download() and NFC_ATTR_FIRMWARE_NAME. This patch adds appropriate checks. Found with syzkaller. Signed-off-by:
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
commit e5bfad3d upstream. inode_smack::smk_lock is taken during smack_d_instantiate(), which is called during a filesystem transaction when creating a file on ext4. Therefore to avoid a deadlock, all code that takes this lock must use GFP_NOFS, to prevent memory reclaim from waiting for the filesystem transaction to complete. Reported-by: syzbot+0eefc1e06a77d327a056@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jann Horn authored
commit 3675f052 upstream. There is a logic bug in the current smack_bprm_set_creds(): If LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set, but the ptrace state is deemed to be acceptable (e.g. because the ptracer detached in the meantime), the other ->unsafe flags aren't checked. As far as I can tell, this means that something like the following could work (but I haven't tested it): - task A: create task B with fork() - task B: set NO_NEW_PRIVS - task B: install a seccomp filter that makes open() return 0 under some conditions - task B: replace fd 0 with a malicious library - task A: attach to task B with PTRACE_ATTACH - task B: execve() a file with an SMACK64EXEC extended attribute - task A: while task B is still in the middle of execve(), exit (which destroys the ptrace relationship) Make sure that if any flags other than LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE are set in bprm->unsafe, we reject the execve(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5663884c ("Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack") Signed-off-by:
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Pierre-Louis Bossart authored
[ Upstream commit 8676b3ca ] The existing code has a mixed select/depend usage which makes no sense. config SOUNDWIRE_BUS tristate select REGMAP_SOUNDWIRE config REGMAP_SOUNDWIRE tristate depends on SOUNDWIRE_BUS Let's remove one layer of Kconfig definitions and align with the solutions used by all other serial links. Signed-off-by:
Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190718230215.18675-1-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by:
Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Pierre-Louis Bossart authored
[ Upstream commit 9d7cd9d5 ] Move to the regular help format, --help-- is no longer recommended. Reviewed-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit e9789c7c ] syzbot reported a crash in cbq_normalize_quanta() caused by an out of range cl->priority. iproute2 enforces this check, but malicious users do not. kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 26447 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.3+ #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:cbq_normalize_quanta.part.0+0x1fd/0x430 net/sched/sch_cbq.c:902 RSP: 0018:ffff8801a5c333b0 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000020000003 RBX: 00000000fffffff8 RCX: ffffc9000712f000 RDX: 00000000000043bf RSI: ffffffff83be8962 RDI: 0000000100000018 RBP: ffff8801a5c33420 R08: 000000000000003a R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000000002ef R13: ffff88018da95188 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000000015 FS: 00007f37d26b1700(0000) GS:ffff8801dad00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000004c7cec CR3: 00000001bcd0a006 CR4: 00000000001626f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: [<ffffffff83be9d57>] cbq_normalize_quanta include/net/pkt_sched.h:27 [inline] [<ffffffff83be9d57>] cbq_addprio net/sched/sch_cbq.c:1097 [inline] [<ffffffff83be9d57>] cbq_set_wrr+0x2d7/0x450 net/sched/sch_cbq.c:1115 [<ffffffff83bee8a7>] cbq_change_class+0x987/0x225b net/sched/sch_cbq.c:1537 [<ffffffff83b96985>] tc_ctl_tclass+0x555/0xcd0 net/sched/sch_api.c:2329 [<ffffffff83a84655>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x485/0xc10 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5248 [<ffffffff83cadf0a>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x17a/0x460 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2510 [<ffffffff83a7db6d>] rtnetlink_rcv+0x1d/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5266 [<ffffffff83cac2c6>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1324 [inline] [<ffffffff83cac2c6>] netlink_unicast+0x536/0x720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1350 [<ffffffff83cacd4a>] netlink_sendmsg+0x89a/0xd50 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1939 [<ffffffff8399d46e>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:673 [inline] [<ffffffff8399d46e>] sock_sendmsg+0x12e/0x170 net/socket.c:684 [<ffffffff8399f1fd>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x81d/0x960 net/socket.c:2359 [<ffffffff839a2d05>] __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2397 [<ffffffff839a2df9>] SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2406 [inline] [<ffffffff839a2df9>] SyS_sendmsg+0x29/0x30 net/socket.c:2404 [<ffffffff8101ccc8>] do_syscall_64+0x528/0x770 arch/x86/entry/common.c:305 [<ffffffff84400091>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by:
syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by:
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Tuong Lien authored
[ Upstream commit e95584a8 ] We have identified a problem with the "oversubscription" policy in the link transmission code. When small messages are transmitted, and the sending link has reached the transmit window limit, those messages will be bundled and put into the link backlog queue. However, bundles of data messages are counted at the 'CRITICAL' level, so that the counter for that level, instead of the counter for the real, bundled message's level is the one being increased. Subsequent, to-be-bundled data messages at non-CRITICAL levels continue to be tested against the unchanged counter for their own level, while contributing to an unrestrained increase at the CRITICAL backlog level. This leaves a gap in congestion control algorithm for small messages that can result in starvation for other users or a "real" CRITICAL user. Even that eventually can lead to buffer exhaustion & link reset. We fix this by keeping a 'target_bskb' buffer pointer at each levels, then when bundling, we only bundle messages at the same importance level only. This way, we know exactly how many slots a certain level have occupied in the queue, so can manage level congestion accurately. By bundling messages at the same level, we even have more benefits. Let consider this: - One socket sends 64-byte messages at the 'CRITICAL' level; - Another sends 4096-byte messages at the 'LOW' level; When a 64-byte message comes and is bundled the first time, we put the overhead of message bundle to it (+ 40-byte header, data copy, etc.) for later use, but the next message can be a 4096-byte one that cannot be bundled to the previous one. This means the last bundle carries only one payload message which is totally inefficient, as for the receiver also! Later on, another 64-byte message comes, now we make a new bundle and the same story repeats... With the new bundling algorithm, this will not happen, the 64-byte messages will be bundled together even when the 4096-byte message(s) comes in between. However, if the 4096-byte messages are sent at the same level i.e. 'CRITICAL', the bundling algorithm will again cause the same overhead. Also, the same will happen even with only one socket sending small messages at a rate close to the link transmit's one, so that, when one message is bundled, it's transmitted shortly. Then, another message comes, a new bundle is created and so on... We will solve this issue radically by another patch. Fixes: 365ad353 ("tipc: reduce risk of user starvation during link congestion") Reported-by:
Hoang Le <hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au> Acked-by:
Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by:
Tuong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au> Signed-off-by:
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Dongli Zhang authored
[ Upstream commit a761129e ] xennet_fill_frags() uses ~0U as return value when the sk_buff is not able to cache extra fragments. This is incorrect because the return type of xennet_fill_frags() is RING_IDX and 0xffffffff is an expected value for ring buffer index. In the situation when the rsp_cons is approaching 0xffffffff, the return value of xennet_fill_frags() may become 0xffffffff which xennet_poll() (the caller) would regard as error. As a result, queue->rx.rsp_cons is set incorrectly because it is updated only when there is error. If there is no error, xennet_poll() would be responsible to update queue->rx.rsp_cons. Finally, queue->rx.rsp_cons would point to the rx ring buffer entries whose queue->rx_skbs[i] and queue->grant_rx_ref[i] are already cleared to NULL. This leads to NULL pointer access in the next iteration to process rx ring buffer entries. The symptom is similar to the one fixed in commit 00b36850 ("xen-netfront: do not assume sk_buff_head list is empty in error handling"). This patch changes the return type of xennet_fill_frags() to indicate whether it is successful or failed. The queue->rx.rsp_cons will be always updated inside this function. Fixes: ad4f15dc ("xen/netfront: don't bug in case of too many frags") Signed-off-by:
Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
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Dotan Barak authored
[ Upstream commit d64bf89a ] rds_ibdev:ipaddr_list and rds_ibdev:conn_list are initialized after allocation some resources such as protection domain. If allocation of such resources fail, then these uninitialized variables are accessed in rds_ib_dev_free() in failure path. This can potentially crash the system. The code has been updated to initialize these variables very early in the function. Signed-off-by:
Dotan Barak <dotanb@dev.mellanox.co.il> Signed-off-by:
Sudhakar Dindukurti <sudhakar.dindukurti@oracle.com> Acked-by:
Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Josh Hunt authored
[ Upstream commit 4094871d ] Prior to this change an application sending <= 1MSS worth of data and enabling UDP GSO would fail if the system had SW GSO enabled, but the same send would succeed if HW GSO offload is enabled. In addition to this inconsistency the error in the SW GSO case does not get back to the application if sending out of a real device so the user is unaware of this failure. With this change we only perform GSO if the # of segments is > 1 even if the application has enabled segmentation. I've also updated the relevant udpgso selftests. Fixes: bec1f6f6 ("udp: generate gso with UDP_SEGMENT") Signed-off-by:
Josh Hunt <johunt@akamai.com> Reviewed-by:
Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Reviewed-by:
Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Linus Walleij authored
[ Upstream commit e8521e53 ] There has been some confusion between the port number and the VLAN ID in this driver. What we need to check for validity is the VLAN ID, nothing else. The current confusion came from assigning a few default VLANs for default routing and we need to rewrite that properly. Instead of checking if the port number is a valid VLAN ID, check the actual VLAN IDs passed in to the callback one by one as expected. Fixes: d8652956 ("net: dsa: realtek-smi: Add Realtek SMI driver") Signed-off-by:
Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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Dexuan Cui authored
[ Upstream commit 0d9138ff ] Lockdep is unhappy if two locks from the same class are held. Fix the below warning for hyperv and virtio sockets (vmci socket code doesn't have the issue) by using lock_sock_nested() when __vsock_release() is called recursively: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 5.3.0+ #1 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- server/1795 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880c5158990 (sk_lock-AF_VSOCK){+.+.}, at: hvs_release+0x10/0x120 [hv_sock] but task is already holding lock: ffff8880c5158150 (sk_lock-AF_VSOCK){+.+.}, at: __vsock_release+0x2e/0xf0 [vsock] other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(sk_lock-AF_VSOCK); lock(sk_lock-AF_VSOCK); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 2 locks held by server/1795: #0: ffff8880c5d05ff8 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#10){+.+.}, at: __sock_release+0x2d/0xa0 #1: ffff8880c5158150 (sk_lock-AF_VSOCK){+.+.}, at: __vsock_release+0x2e/0xf0 [vsock] stack backtrace: CPU: 5 PID: 1795 Comm: server Not tainted 5.3.0+ #1 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x67/0x90 __lock_acquire.cold.67+0xd2/0x20b lock_acquire+0xb5/0x1c0 lock_sock_nested+0x6d/0x90 hvs_release+0x10/0x120 [hv_sock] __vsock_release+0x24/0xf0 [vsock] __vsock_release+0xa0/0xf0 [vsock] vsock_release+0x12/0x30 [vsock] __sock_release+0x37/0xa0 sock_close+0x14/0x20 __fput+0xc1/0x250 task_work_run+0x98/0xc0 do_exit+0x344/0xc60 do_group_exit+0x47/0xb0 get_signal+0x15c/0xc50 do_signal+0x30/0x720 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x50/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x24e/0x270 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x7f4184e85f31 Tested-by:
Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by:
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Josh Hunt authored
[ Upstream commit 44b321e5 ] Commit dfec0ee2 ("udp: Record gso_segs when supporting UDP segmentation offload") added gso_segs calculation, but incorrectly got sizeof() the pointer and not the underlying data type. In addition let's fix the v6 case. Fixes: bec1f6f6 ("udp: generate gso with UDP_SEGMENT") Fixes: dfec0ee2 ("udp: Record gso_segs when supporting UDP segmentation offload") Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 474f0813 ] Make sure TCA_DSMARK_INDICES was provided by the user. syzbot reported : kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 8799 Comm: syz-executor235 Not tainted 5.3.0+ #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:nla_get_u16 include/net/netlink.h:1501 [inline] RIP: 0010:dsmark_init net/sched/sch_dsmark.c:364 [inline] RIP: 0010:dsmark_init+0x193/0x640 net/sched/sch_dsmark.c:339 Code: 85 db 58 0f 88 7d 03 00 00 e8 e9 1a ac fb 48 8b 9d 70 ff ff ff 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d 7b 04 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 01 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 ca RSP: 0018:ffff88809426f3b8 EFLAGS: 00010247 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff85c6eb09 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff85c6eb17 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: ffff88809426f4b0 R08: ffff88808c4085c0 R09: ffffed1015d26159 R10: ffffed1015d26158 R11: ffff8880ae930ac7 R12: ffff8880a7e96940 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88809426f8c0 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000001292880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020000080 CR3: 000000008ca1b000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: qdisc_create+0x4ee/0x1210 net/sched/sch_api.c:1237 tc_modify_qdisc+0x524/0x1c50 net/sched/sch_api.c:1653 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x463/0xb00 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5223 netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477 rtnetlink_rcv+0x1d/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5241 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x531/0x710 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328 netlink_sendmsg+0x8a5/0xd60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:657 ___sys_sendmsg+0x803/0x920 net/socket.c:2311 __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2356 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2365 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2363 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2363 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x760 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x440369 Fixes: 758cc43c ("[PKT_SCHED]: Fix dsmark to apply changes consistent") Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
[ Upstream commit db9b2e0a ] Fix the rxrpc_recvmsg tracepoint to handle being called with a NULL call parameter. Fixes: a25e21f0 ("rxrpc, afs: Use debug_ids rather than pointers in traces") Signed-off-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Reinhard Speyerer authored
[ Upstream commit cf74ac6d ] Add support for Cinterion CLS8 devices. Use QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR as required for Qualcomm MDM9x07 chipsets. T: Bus=01 Lev=03 Prnt=05 Port=01 Cnt=02 Dev#= 25 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=1e2d ProdID=00b0 Rev= 3.18 S: Manufacturer=GEMALTO S: Product=USB Modem C:* #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=80 MxPwr=500mA I:* If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=42 Prot=01 Driver=(none) E: Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option E: Ad=83(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms E: Ad=82(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option E: Ad=85(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms E: Ad=84(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option E: Ad=87(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms E: Ad=86(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan E: Ad=89(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 8 Ivl=32ms E: Ad=88(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=05(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms Signed-off-by:
Reinhard Speyerer <rspmn@arcor.de> Acked-by:
Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit a0c2dc1f ] sysbot reported a memory leak after a bind() has failed. While we are at it, abort the operation if kmemdup() has failed. BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff888105d83ec0 (size 32): comm "syz-executor067", pid 7207, jiffies 4294956228 (age 19.430s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 69 6c 65 20 72 65 61 64 00 6e 65 74 3a 5b 34 .ile read.net:[4 30 32 36 35 33 33 30 39 37 5d 00 00 00 00 00 00 026533097]...... backtrace: [<0000000036bac473>] kmemleak_alloc_recursive /./include/linux/kmemleak.h:43 [inline] [<0000000036bac473>] slab_post_alloc_hook /mm/slab.h:522 [inline] [<0000000036bac473>] slab_alloc /mm/slab.c:3319 [inline] [<0000000036bac473>] __do_kmalloc /mm/slab.c:3653 [inline] [<0000000036bac473>] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x169/0x2d0 /mm/slab.c:3670 [<000000000cd39d07>] kmemdup+0x27/0x60 /mm/util.c:120 [<000000008e57e5fc>] kmemdup /./include/linux/string.h:432 [inline] [<000000008e57e5fc>] llcp_sock_bind+0x1b3/0x230 /net/nfc/llcp_sock.c:107 [<000000009cb0b5d3>] __sys_bind+0x11c/0x140 /net/socket.c:1647 [<00000000492c3bbc>] __do_sys_bind /net/socket.c:1658 [inline] [<00000000492c3bbc>] __se_sys_bind /net/socket.c:1656 [inline] [<00000000492c3bbc>] __x64_sys_bind+0x1e/0x30 /net/socket.c:1656 [<0000000008704b2a>] do_syscall_64+0x76/0x1a0 /arch/x86/entry/common.c:296 [<000000009f4c57a4>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Fixes: 30cc4587 ("NFC: Move LLCP code to the NFC top level diirectory") Signed-off-by:
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Martin KaFai Lau authored
[ Upstream commit 8c7138b3 ] The "reuse->sock[]" array is shared by multiple sockets. The going away sk must unpublish itself from "reuse->sock[]" before making call_rcu() call. However, this unpublish-action is currently done after a grace period and it may cause use-after-free. The fix is to move reuseport_detach_sock() to sk_destruct(). Due to the above reason, any socket with sk_reuseport_cb has to go through the rcu grace period before freeing it. It is a rather old bug (~3 yrs). The Fixes tag is not necessary the right commit but it is the one that introduced the SOCK_RCU_FREE logic and this fix is depending on it. Fixes: a4298e45 ("net: add SOCK_RCU_FREE socket flag") Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Suggested-by:
Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
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Navid Emamdoost authored
[ Upstream commit 1acb8f2a ] In ql_alloc_large_buffers, a new skb is allocated via netdev_alloc_skb. This skb should be released if pci_dma_mapping_error fails. Fixes: 0f8ab89e ("qla3xxx: Check return code from pci_map_single() in ql_release_to_lrg_buf_free_list(), ql_populate_free_queue(), ql_alloc_large_buffers(), and ql3xxx_send()") Signed-off-by:
Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Abeni authored
[ Upstream commit b406472b ] Since commit c09551c6 ("net: ipv4: use a dedicated counter for icmp_v4 redirect packets") we use 'n_redirects' to account for redirect packets, but we still use 'rate_tokens' to compute the redirect packets exponential backoff. If the device sent to the relevant peer any ICMP error packet after sending a redirect, it will also update 'rate_token' according to the leaking bucket schema; typically 'rate_token' will raise above BITS_PER_LONG and the redirect packets backoff algorithm will produce undefined behavior. Fix the issue using 'n_redirects' to compute the exponential backoff in ip_rt_send_redirect(). Note that we still clear rate_tokens after a redirect silence period, to avoid changing an established behaviour. The root cause predates git history; before the mentioned commit in the critical scenario, the kernel stopped sending redirects, after the mentioned commit the behavior more randomic. Reported-by:
Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhat.com> Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Fixes: c09551c6 ("net: ipv4: use a dedicated counter for icmp_v4 redirect packets") Signed-off-by:
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo.bianconi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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David Ahern authored
[ Upstream commit 2d819d25 ] Rajendra reported a kernel panic when a link was taken down: [ 6870.263084] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000a8 [ 6870.271856] IP: [<ffffffff8efc5764>] __ipv6_ifa_notify+0x154/0x290 <snip> [ 6870.570501] Call Trace: [ 6870.573238] [<ffffffff8efc58c6>] ? ipv6_ifa_notify+0x26/0x40 [ 6870.579665] [<ffffffff8efc98ec>] ? addrconf_dad_completed+0x4c/0x2c0 [ 6870.586869] [<ffffffff8efe70c6>] ? ipv6_dev_mc_inc+0x196/0x260 [ 6870.593491] [<ffffffff8efc9c6a>] ? addrconf_dad_work+0x10a/0x430 [ 6870.600305] [<ffffffff8f01ade4>] ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70 [ 6870.606732] [<ffffffff8ea93a7a>] ? process_one_work+0x18a/0x430 [ 6870.613449] [<ffffffff8ea93d6d>] ? worker_thread+0x4d/0x490 [ 6870.619778] [<ffffffff8ea93d20>] ? process_one_work+0x430/0x430 [ 6870.626495] [<ffffffff8ea99dd9>] ? kthread+0xd9/0xf0 [ 6870.632145] [<ffffffff8f01ade4>] ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70 [ 6870.638573] [<ffffffff8ea99d00>] ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60 [ 6870.644707] [<ffffffff8f01ae77>] ? ret_from_fork+0x57/0x70 [ 6870.650936] Code: 31 c0 31 d2 41 b9 20 00 08 02 b9 09 00 00 0 addrconf_dad_work is kicked to be scheduled when a device is brought up. There is a race between addrcond_dad_work getting scheduled and taking the rtnl lock and a process taking the link down (under rtnl). The latter removes the host route from the inet6_addr as part of addrconf_ifdown which is run for NETDEV_DOWN. The former attempts to use the host route in __ipv6_ifa_notify. If the down event removes the host route due to the race to the rtnl, then the BUG listed above occurs. Since the DAD sequence can not be aborted, add a check for the missing host route in __ipv6_ifa_notify. The only way this should happen is due to the previously mentioned race. The host route is created when the address is added to an interface; it is only removed on a down event where the address is kept. Add a warning if the host route is missing AND the device is up; this is a situation that should never happen. Fixes: f1705ec1 ("net: ipv6: Make address flushing on ifdown optional") Reported-by:
Rajendra Dendukuri <rajendra.dendukuri@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by:
David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 6af1799a ] This began with a syzbot report. syzkaller was injecting IPv6 TCP SYN packets having a v4mapped source address. After an unsuccessful 4-tuple lookup, TCP creates a request socket (SYN_RECV) and calls reqsk_queue_hash_req() reqsk_queue_hash_req() calls sk_ehashfn(sk) At this point we have AF_INET6 sockets, and the heuristic used by sk_ehashfn() to either hash the IPv4 or IPv6 addresses is to use ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sk->sk_v6_daddr) For the particular spoofed packet, we end up hashing V4 addresses which were not initialized by the TCP IPv6 stack, so KMSAN fired a warning. I first fixed sk_ehashfn() to test both source and destination addresses, but then faced various problems, including user-space programs like packetdrill that had similar assumptions. Instead of trying to fix the whole ecosystem, it is better to admit that we have a dual stack behavior, and that we can not build linux kernels without V4 stack anyway. The dual stack API automatically forces the traffic to be IPv4 if v4mapped addresses are used at bind() or connect(), so it makes no sense to allow IPv6 traffic to use the same v4mapped class. Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by:
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Johan Hovold authored
[ Upstream commit 8353da9f ] Fix NULL-pointer dereference on tty open due to a failure to handle a missing interrupt-in endpoint when probing modem ports: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000006 ... RIP: 0010:tiocmget_submit_urb+0x1c/0xe0 [hso] ... Call Trace: hso_start_serial_device+0xdc/0x140 [hso] hso_serial_open+0x118/0x1b0 [hso] tty_open+0xf1/0x490 Fixes: 542f5482 ("tty: Modem functions for the HSO driver") Signed-off-by:
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Haishuang Yan authored
[ Upstream commit 0e141f75 ] erspan driver calls ether_setup(), after commit 61e84623 ("net: centralize net_device min/max MTU checking"), the range of mtu is [min_mtu, max_mtu], which is [68, 1500] by default. It causes the dev mtu of the erspan device to not be greater than 1500, this limit value is not correct for ipgre tap device. Tested: Before patch: # ip link set erspan0 mtu 1600 Error: mtu greater than device maximum. After patch: # ip link set erspan0 mtu 1600 # ip -d link show erspan0 21: erspan0@NONE: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST> mtu 1600 qdisc noop state DOWN mode DEFAULT group default qlen 1000 link/ether 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff promiscuity 0 minmtu 68 maxmtu 0 Fixes: 61e84623 ("net: centralize net_device min/max MTU checking") Signed-off-by:
Haishuang Yan <yanhaishuang@cmss.chinamobile.com> Signed-off-by:
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Vishal Kulkarni authored
[ Upstream commit 6b517374 ] When fetching free MSI-X vectors for ULDs, check for the error code before accessing MSI-X info array. Otherwise, an out-of-bounds access is attempted, which results in kernel panic. Fixes: 94cdb8bb ("cxgb4: Add support for dynamic allocation of resources for ULD") Signed-off-by:
Shahjada Abul Husain <shahjada@chelsio.com> Signed-off-by:
Vishal Kulkarni <vishal@chelsio.com> Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Borkmann authored
commit c751798a upstream. syzkaller managed to trigger the warning in bpf_jit_free() which checks via bpf_prog_kallsyms_verify_off() for potentially unlinked JITed BPF progs in kallsyms, and subsequently trips over GPF when walking kallsyms entries: [...] 8021q: adding VLAN 0 to HW filter on device batadv0 8021q: adding VLAN 0 to HW filter on device batadv0 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9869 at kernel/bpf/core.c:810 bpf_jit_free+0x1e8/0x2a0 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 0 PID: 9869 Comm: kworker/0:7 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc8+ #1 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: events bpf_prog_free_deferred Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x113/0x167 lib/dump_stack.c:113 panic+0x212/0x40b kernel/panic.c:214 __warn.cold.8+0x1b/0x38 kernel/panic.c:571 report_bug+0x1a4/0x200 lib/bug.c:186 fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:178 [inline] do_error_trap+0x11b/0x200 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:271 do_invalid_op+0x36/0x40 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:290 invalid_op+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:973 RIP: 0010:bpf_jit_free+0x1e8/0x2a0 Code: 02 4c 89 e2 83 e2 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 86 00 00 00 48 ba 00 02 00 00 00 00 ad de 0f b6 43 02 49 39 d6 0f 84 5f fe ff ff <0f> 0b e9 58 fe ff ff 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 e2 48 c1 RSP: 0018:ffff888092f67cd8 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000007 RBX: ffffc90001947000 RCX: ffffffff816e9d88 RDX: dead000000000200 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88808769f7f0 RBP: ffff888092f67d00 R08: fffffbfff1394059 R09: fffffbfff1394058 R10: fffffbfff1394058 R11: ffffffff89ca02c7 R12: ffffc90001947002 R13: ffffc90001947020 R14: ffffffff881eca80 R15: ffff88808769f7e8 BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffbfff400d000 #PF error: [normal kernel read fault] PGD 21ffee067 P4D 21ffee067 PUD 21ffed067 PMD 9f942067 PTE 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 9869 Comm: kworker/0:7 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc8+ #1 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: events bpf_prog_free_deferred RIP: 0010:bpf_get_prog_addr_region kernel/bpf/core.c:495 [inline] RIP: 0010:bpf_tree_comp kernel/bpf/core.c:558 [inline] RIP: 0010:__lt_find include/linux/rbtree_latch.h:115 [inline] RIP: 0010:latch_tree_find include/linux/rbtree_latch.h:208 [inline] RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_kallsyms_find+0x107/0x2e0 kernel/bpf/core.c:632 Code: 00 f0 ff ff 44 38 c8 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 fa 00 00 00 41 f6 45 02 01 75 02 0f 0b 48 39 da 0f 82 92 00 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 30 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 45 01 00 00 8b 03 48 c1 e0 [...] Upon further debugging, it turns out that whenever we trigger this issue, the kallsyms removal in bpf_prog_ksym_node_del() was /skipped/ but yet bpf_jit_free() reported that the entry is /in use/. Problem is that symbol exposure via bpf_prog_kallsyms_add() but also perf_event_bpf_event() were done /after/ bpf_prog_new_fd(). Once the fd is exposed to the public, a parallel close request came in right before we attempted to do the bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(). Given at this time the prog reference count is one, we start to rip everything underneath us via bpf_prog_release() -> bpf_prog_put(). The memory is eventually released via deferred free, so we're seeing that bpf_jit_free() has a kallsym entry because we added it from bpf_prog_load() but /after/ bpf_prog_put() from the remote CPU. Therefore, move both notifications /before/ we install the fd. The issue was never seen between bpf_prog_alloc_id() and bpf_prog_new_fd() because upon bpf_prog_get_fd_by_id() we'll take another reference to the BPF prog, so we're still holding the original reference from the bpf_prog_load(). Fixes: 6ee52e2a ("perf, bpf: Introduce PERF_RECORD_BPF_EVENT") Fixes: 74451e66 ("bpf: make jited programs visible in traces") Reported-by: syzbot+bd3bba6ff3fcea7a6ec6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by:
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
Zubin Mithra <zsm@chromium.org> Signed-off-by:
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Damien Le Moal authored
[ Upstream commit cb8acabb ] Commit 7211aef8 ("block: mq-deadline: Fix write completion handling") added a call to blk_mq_sched_mark_restart_hctx() in dd_dispatch_request() to make sure that write request dispatching does not stall when all target zones are locked. This fix left a subtle race when a write completion happens during a dispatch execution on another CPU: CPU 0: Dispatch CPU1: write completion dd_dispatch_request() lock(&dd->lock); ... lock(&dd->zone_lock); dd_finish_request() rq = find request lock(&dd->zone_lock); unlock(&dd->zone_lock); zone write unlock unlock(&dd->zone_lock); ... __blk_mq_free_request check restart flag (not set) -> queue not run ... if (!rq && have writes) blk_mq_sched_mark_restart_hctx() unlock(&dd->lock) Since the dispatch context finishes after the write request completion handling, marking the queue as needing a restart is not seen from __blk_mq_free_request() and blk_mq_sched_restart() not executed leading to the dispatch stall under 100% write workloads. Fix this by moving the call to blk_mq_sched_mark_restart_hctx() from dd_dispatch_request() into dd_finish_request() under the zone lock to ensure full mutual exclusion between write request dispatch selection and zone unlock on write request completion. Fixes: 7211aef8 ("block: mq-deadline: Fix write completion handling") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by:
Hans Holmberg <Hans.Holmberg@wdc.com> Reviewed-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by:
Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@wdc.com> Signed-off-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by:
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Alexandre Ghiti authored
[ Upstream commit 86e568e9 ] mmap base address must be computed wrt stack top address, using TASK_SIZE is wrong since STACK_TOP and TASK_SIZE are not equivalent. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190730055113.23635-8-alex@ghiti.frSigned-off-by:
Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr> Acked-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by:
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Alexandre Ghiti authored
[ Upstream commit af0f4297 ] This commit takes care of stack randomization and stack guard gap when computing mmap base address and checks if the task asked for randomization. This fixes the problem uncovered and not fixed for arm here: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170622200033.25714-1-riel@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190730055113.23635-7-alex@ghiti.frSigned-off-by:
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Alexandre Ghiti authored
[ Upstream commit b1f61b5b ] This commit takes care of stack randomization and stack guard gap when computing mmap base address and checks if the task asked for randomization. This fixes the problem uncovered and not fixed for arm here: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170622200033.25714-1-riel@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190730055113.23635-10-alex@ghiti.frSigned-off-by:
Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Reviewed-by:
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Alexandre Ghiti authored
[ Upstream commit e8d54b62 ] Do not offset mmap base address because of stack randomization if current task does not want randomization. Note that x86 already implements this behaviour. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190730055113.23635-4-alex@ghiti.frSigned-off-by:
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Acked-by:
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