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  1. 04 Apr, 2018 6 commits
    • Paolo Bonzini's avatar
      KVM: vmx: unify adjacent #ifdefs · 4fde8d57
      Paolo Bonzini authored 
      vmx_save_host_state has multiple ifdefs for CONFIG_X86_64 that have
no other code between them.  Simplify by reducing them to a single
conditional.
Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      4fde8d57
    • Arnd Bergmann's avatar
      x86: kvm: hide the unused 'cpu' variable · 51e8a8cc
      Arnd Bergmann authored 
      The local variable was newly introduced but is only accessed in one
place on x86_64, but not on 32-bit:

arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c: In function 'vmx_save_host_state':
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:2175:6: error: unused variable 'cpu' [-Werror=unused-variable]

This puts it into another #ifdef.

Fixes: 35060ed6 ("x86/kvm/vmx: avoid expensive rdmsr for MSR_GS_BASE")
Signed-off-by: default avatarArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      51e8a8cc
    • Sean Christopherson's avatar
      KVM: VMX: remove bogus WARN_ON in handle_ept_misconfig · c75d0edc
      Sean Christopherson authored 
      Remove the WARN_ON in handle_ept_misconfig() as it is unnecessary
and causes false positives.  Return the unmodified result of
kvm_mmu_page_fault() instead of converting a system error code to
KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN so that userspace sees the error code of the
actual failure, not a generic "we don't know what went wrong".

  * kvm_mmu_page_fault() will WARN if reserved bits are set in the
    SPTEs, i.e. it covers the case where an EPT misconfig occurred
    because of a KVM bug.

  * The WARN_ON will fire on any system error code that is hit while
    handling the fault, e.g. -ENOMEM from mmu_topup_memory_caches()
    while handling a legitmate MMIO EPT misconfig or -EFAULT from
    kvm_handle_bad_page() if the corresponding HVA is invalid.  In
    either case, userspace should receive the original error code
    and firing a warning is incorrect behavior as KVM is operating
    as designed.
Signed-off-by: default avatarSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      c75d0edc
    • Sean Christopherson's avatar
      Revert "KVM: X86: Fix SMRAM accessing even if VM is shutdown" · 2c151b25
      Sean Christopherson authored 
      The bug that led to commit 95e057e2
was a benign warning (no adverse affects other than the warning
itself) that was detected by syzkaller.  Further inspection shows
that the WARN_ON in question, in handle_ept_misconfig(), is
unnecessary and flawed (this was also briefly discussed in the
original patch: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10204649).

  * The WARN_ON is unnecessary as kvm_mmu_page_fault() will WARN
    if reserved bits are set in the SPTEs, i.e. it covers the case
    where an EPT misconfig occurred because of a KVM bug.

  * The WARN_ON is flawed because it will fire on any system error
    code that is hit while handling the fault, e.g. -ENOMEM can be
    returned by mmu_topup_memory_caches() while handling a legitmate
    MMIO EPT misconfig.

The original behavior of returning -EFAULT when userspace munmaps
an HVA without first removing the memslot is correct and desirable,
i.e. KVM is letting userspace know it has generated a bad address.
Returning RET_PF_EMULATE masks the WARN_ON in the EPT misconfig path,
but does not fix the underlying bug, i.e. the WARN_ON is bogus.

Furthermore, returning RET_PF_EMULATE has the unwanted side effect of
causing KVM to attempt to emulate an instruction on any page fault
with an invalid HVA translation, e.g. a not-present EPT violation
on a VM_PFNMAP VMA whose fault handler failed to insert a PFN.

  * There is no guarantee that the fault is directly related to the
    instruction, i.e. the fault could have been triggered by a side
    effect memory access in the guest, e.g. while vectoring a #DB or
    writing a tracing record.  This could cause KVM to effectively
    mask the fault if KVM doesn't model the behavior leading to the
    fault, i.e. emulation could succeed and resume the guest.

  * If emulation does fail, KVM will return EMULATION_FAILED instead
    of -EFAULT, which is a red herring as the user will either debug
    a bogus emulation attempt or scratch their head wondering why we
    were attempting emulation in the first place.

TL;DR: revert to returning -EFAULT and remove the bogus WARN_ON in
handle_ept_misconfig in a future patch.

This reverts commit 95e057e2.
Signed-off-by: default avatarSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      2c151b25
    • Stefan Fritsch's avatar
      kvm: Add emulation for movups/movupd · 29916968
      Stefan Fritsch authored 
      This is very similar to the aligned versions movaps/movapd.

We have seen the corresponding emulation failures with openbsd as guest
and with Windows 10 with intel HD graphics pass through.
Signed-off-by: default avatarChristian Ehrhardt <christian_ehrhardt@genua.de>
Signed-off-by: default avatarStefan Fritsch <sf@sfritsch.de>
Reviewed-by: default avatarRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      29916968
    • Sean Christopherson's avatar
      KVM: VMX: raise internal error for exception during invalid protected mode state · add5ff7a
      Sean Christopherson authored 
      Exit to userspace with KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION if we encounter
an exception in Protected Mode while emulating guest due to invalid
guest state.  Unlike Big RM, KVM doesn't support emulating exceptions
in PM, i.e. PM exceptions are always injected via the VMCS.  Because
we will never do VMRESUME due to emulation_required, the exception is
never realized and we'll keep emulating the faulting instruction over
and over until we receive a signal.

Exit to userspace iff there is a pending exception, i.e. don't exit
simply on a requested event. The purpose of this check and exit is to
aid in debugging a guest that is in all likelihood already doomed.
Invalid guest state in PM is extremely limited in normal operation,
e.g. it generally only occurs for a few instructions early in BIOS,
and any exception at this time is all but guaranteed to be fatal.
Non-vectored interrupts, e.g. INIT, SIPI and SMI, can be cleanly
handled/emulated, while checking for vectored interrupts, e.g. INTR
and NMI, without hitting false positives would add a fair amount of
complexity for almost no benefit (getting hit by lightning seems
more likely than encountering this specific scenario).

Add a WARN_ON_ONCE to vmx_queue_exception() if we try to inject an
exception via the VMCS and emulation_required is true.
Signed-off-by: default avatarSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      add5ff7a
  3. 29 Mar, 2018 1 commit
  5. 28 Mar, 2018 26 commits
  7. 27 Mar, 2018 1 commit
    • Paul Mackerras's avatar
      KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Use __gfn_to_pfn_memslot() in page fault handler · 31c8b0d0
      Paul Mackerras authored 
      This changes the hypervisor page fault handler for radix guests to use
the generic KVM __gfn_to_pfn_memslot() function instead of using
get_user_pages_fast() and then handling the case of VM_PFNMAP vmas
specially.  The old code missed the case of VM_IO vmas; with this
change, VM_IO vmas will now be handled correctly by code within
__gfn_to_pfn_memslot.

Currently, __gfn_to_pfn_memslot calls hva_to_pfn, which only uses
__get_user_pages_fast for the initial lookup in the cases where
either atomic or async is set.  Since we are not setting either
atomic or async, we do our own __get_user_pages_fast first, for now.

This also adds code to check for the KVM_MEM_READONLY flag on the
memslot.  If it is set and this is a write access, we synthesize a
data storage interrupt for the guest.

In the case where the page is not normal RAM (i.e. page == NULL in
kvmppc_book3s_radix_page_fault(), we read the PTE from the Linux page
tables because we need the mapping attribute bits as well as the PFN.
(The mapping attribute bits indicate whether accesses have to be
non-cacheable and/or guarded.)
Signed-off-by: default avatarPaul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
      31c8b0d0
  9. 26 Mar, 2018 2 commits
    • Marc Zyngier's avatar
      KVM: arm/arm64: vgic-its: Fix potential overrun in vgic_copy_lpi_list · 7d8b44c5
      Marc Zyngier authored 
      vgic_copy_lpi_list() parses the LPI list and picks LPIs targeting
a given vcpu. We allocate the array containing the intids before taking
the lpi_list_lock, which means we can have an array size that is not
equal to the number of LPIs.

This is particularly obvious when looking at the path coming from
vgic_enable_lpis, which is not a command, and thus can run in parallel
with commands:

vcpu 0:                                        vcpu 1:
vgic_enable_lpis
  its_sync_lpi_pending_table
    vgic_copy_lpi_list
      intids = kmalloc_array(irq_count)
                                               MAPI(lpi targeting vcpu 0)
      list_for_each_entry(lpi_list_head)
        intids[i++] = irq->intid;

At that stage, we will happily overrun the intids array. Boo. An easy
fix is is to break once the array is full. The MAPI command will update
the config anyway, and we won't miss a thing. We also make sure that
lpi_list_count is read exactly once, so that further updates of that
value will not affect the array bound check.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ccb1d791 ("KVM: arm64: vgic-its: Fix pending table sync")
Reviewed-by: default avatarAndre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarEric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
      7d8b44c5
    • Marc Zyngier's avatar
      KVM: arm/arm64: vgic: Disallow Active+Pending for level interrupts · 67b5b673
      Marc Zyngier authored 
      It was recently reported that VFIO mediated devices, and anything
that VFIO exposes as level interrupts, do no strictly follow the
expected logic of such interrupts as it only lowers the input
line when the guest has EOId the interrupt at the GIC level, rather
than when it Acked the interrupt at the device level.

THe GIC's Active+Pending state is fundamentally incompatible with
this behaviour, as it prevents KVM from observing the EOI, and in
turn results in VFIO never dropping the line. This results in an
interrupt storm in the guest, which it really never expected.

As we cannot really change VFIO to follow the strict rules of level
signalling, let's forbid the A+P state altogether, as it is in the
end only an optimization. It ensures that we will transition via
an invalid state, which we can use to notify VFIO of the EOI.
Reviewed-by: default avatarEric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Tested-by: default avatarEric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Tested-by: default avatarShunyong Yang <shunyong.yang@hxt-semitech.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
      67b5b673
  11. 23 Mar, 2018 4 commits
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