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- 14 Sep, 2008 1 commit
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Jeremy Fitzhardinge authored
PFN_PHYS() can truncate large addresses unless its passed a suitable large type. This is fixed more generally in the patch series introducing phys_addr_t, but we need a short-term fix to solve a Xen regression reported by Roberto De Ioris. Reported-by:
Roberto De Ioris <roberto@unbit.it> Signed-off-by:
Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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- 16 Jul, 2008 7 commits
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Jeremy Fitzhardinge authored
Now that the vdso32 code can cope with both syscall and sysenter missing for 32-bit compat processes, just disable the features without disabling vdso altogether. Signed-off-by:
Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by:
H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
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Jeremy Fitzhardinge authored
AMD only supports "syscall" from 32-bit compat usermode. Intel and Centaur(?) only support "sysenter" from 32-bit compat usermode. Set the X86 feature bits accordingly, and set up the vdso in accordance with those bits. On the offchance we run on in a 64-bit environment which supports neither syscall nor sysenter from 32-bit mode, then fall back to the int $0x80 vdso. Signed-off-by:
Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by:
H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
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Ingo Molnar authored
fix: arch/x86/xen/built-in.o: In function `xen_enable_syscall': (.cpuinit.text+0xdb): undefined reference to `sysctl_vsyscall32' Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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Jeremy Fitzhardinge authored
Old versions of Xen (3.1 and before) don't support sysenter or syscall from 32-bit compat userspaces. If we can't set the appropriate syscall callback, then disable the corresponding feature bit, which will cause the vdso32 setup to fall back appropriately. Linux assumes that syscall is always available to 32-bit userspace, and installs it by default if sysenter isn't available. In that case, we just disable vdso altogether, forcing userspace libc to fall back to int $0x80. Signed-off-by:
Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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Jeremy Fitzhardinge authored
We set up entrypoints for syscall and sysenter. sysenter is only used for 32-bit compat processes, whereas syscall can be used in by both 32 and 64-bit processes. Signed-off-by:
Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stephen Tweedie <sct@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Cc: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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Jeremy Fitzhardinge authored
Use callback_op hypercall to register callbacks in a 32/64-bit independent way (64-bit doesn't need a code segment, but that detail is hidden in XEN_CALLBACK). Signed-off-by:
Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stephen Tweedie <sct@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Cc: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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Jeremy Fitzhardinge authored
A number of random changes to make xen/smp.c compile in 64-bit mode. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>a Cc: Stephen Tweedie <sct@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Cc: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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- 08 Jul, 2008 3 commits
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Jeremy Fitzhardinge authored
[ TODO: release the underlying memory back to Xen. ] Signed-off-by:
Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yhlu.kernel@gmail.com> Cc: the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yhlu.kernel@gmail.com> Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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Jeremy Fitzhardinge authored
Signed-off-by:
Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yhlu.kernel@gmail.com> Cc: the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yhlu.kernel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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Yinghai Lu authored
rename update_memory_range to e820_update_range rename add_memory_region to e820_add_region to make it more clear that they are about e820 map operations. Signed-off-by:
Yinghai Lu <yhlu.kernel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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- 27 May, 2008 2 commits
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Jeremy Fitzhardinge authored
Add a config option to set the max size of a Xen domain. This is used to scale the size of the physical-to-machine array; it ends up using around 1 page/GByte, so there's no reason to be very restrictive. For a 32-bit guest, the default value of 8GB is probably sufficient; there's not much point in giving a 32-bit machine much more memory than that. Signed-off-by:
Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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Jeremy Fitzhardinge authored
We now support the use of memory hotplug, so the physical to machine page mapping structure must be dynamic. This is implemented as a two-level radix tree structure, which allows us to efficiently incrementally allocate memory for the p2m table as new pages are added. Signed-off-by:
Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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- 24 Apr, 2008 1 commit
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Jeremy Fitzhardinge authored
64-bit Xen supports sysenter for 32-bit guests, so support its use. (sysenter is faster than int $0x80 in 32-on-64.) sysexit is still not supported, so we fake it up using iret. Signed-off-by:
Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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- 04 Mar, 2008 1 commit
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Ian Campbell authored
Construct Xen guest e820 map with a hole between 640K-1M. It's pure luck that Xen kernels have gotten away with it in the past. The patch below seems like the right thing to do. It certainly boots in a domU without the DMI problem (without any of the other related patches such as Alexander's). Signed-off-by:
Ian Campbell <ijc@hellion.org.uk> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> Tested-by:
Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Acked-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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- 30 Jan, 2008 3 commits
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Sam Ravnborg authored
additional section for .init.text appending a number. A side effect of this was a section mismatch warning because modpost did not recognize a .init.text section named .init.text.1: WARNING: vmlinux.o(.text.head+0x247): Section mismatch: reference to .init.text.1:start_kernel (between 'is386' and 'check_x87') Fix this by hardcoding the "ax" in the pushsection. Thanks to Torlaf for reporting this. Alan Modra provided the hint that made me able to locate the root cause of this warning. And Mike Frysinger told me how to properly fix it using __INIT/__FINIT. Fix following Section mismatch warning in addition: WARNING: vmlinux.o(.text+0x14c8): Section mismatch: reference to .init.data:vsyscall_int80_start (between 'fiddle_vdso' and 'xen_setup_features') fiddle_vdso was only used from a __init function - so declare it __init. Signed-off-by:
Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Cc: Toralf Förster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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Roland McGrath authored
This makes x86_64's ia32 emulation support share the sources used in the 32-bit kernel for the 32-bit vDSO and much of its setup code. The 32-bit vDSO mapping now behaves the same on x86_64 as on native 32-bit. The abi.syscall32 sysctl on x86_64 now takes the same values that vm.vdso_enabled takes on the 32-bit kernel. That is, 1 means a randomized vDSO location, 2 means the fixed old address. The CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO option is now available to make this the default setting, the same meaning it has for the 32-bit kernel. (This does not affect the 64-bit vDSO.) The argument vdso32=[012] can be used on both 32-bit and 64-bit kernels to set this paramter at boot time. The vdso=[012] argument still does this same thing on the 32-bit kernel. Signed-off-by:
Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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Roland McGrath authored
This makes the i386 kernel use the new vDSO build in arch/x86/vdso/vdso32/ to replace the old one from arch/x86/kernel/. Signed-off-by:
Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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- 11 Oct, 2007 1 commit
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Thomas Gleixner authored
Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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- 20 Jul, 2007 1 commit
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Roland McGrath authored
One of the nice ideas behind paravirt is that CONFIG_XEN=y can be included in a standard configuration and be no worse for native booting than as a Xen guest. The glibc feature that supports the vDSO "nosegneg" note is designed specifically to make this easy. You just have to flip one bit at boot time. This patch makes Xen flip the bit, so a CONFIG_XEN=y kernel on bare hardware does not make glibc use the less-optimized library builds. Signed-off-by:
Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 18 Jul, 2007 4 commits
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Jeremy Fitzhardinge authored
A domU Xen environment has no non-virtual drivers, so make sure they're all disabled at once. Signed-off-by:
Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
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Jeremy Fitzhardinge authored
An experimental patch for Xen allows guests to place their vcpu_info structs anywhere. We try to use this to place the vcpu_info into the PDA, which allows direct access. If this works, then switch to using direct access operations for irq_enable, disable, save_fl and restore_fl. Signed-off-by:
Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Keir Fraser <keir@xensource.com>
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Jeremy Fitzhardinge authored
This is a fairly straightforward Xen implementation of smp_ops. Xen has its own IPI mechanisms, and has no dependency on any APIC-based IPI. The smp_ops hooks and the flush_tlb_others pv_op allow a Xen guest to avoid all APIC code in arch/i386 (the only apic operation is a single apic_read for the apic version number). One subtle point which needs to be addressed is unpinning pagetables when another cpu may have a lazy tlb reference to the pagetable. Xen will not allow an in-use pagetable to be unpinned, so we must find any other cpus with a reference to the pagetable and get them to shoot down their references. Signed-off-by:
Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by:
Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
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Jeremy Fitzhardinge authored
This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by:
Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by:
Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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