1. 22 Apr, 2016 2 commits
    • Eric W. Biederman's avatar
      userns: Simpilify MNT_NODEV handling. · 57a3711a
      Eric W. Biederman authored
      - Consolidate the testing if a device node may be opened in a new
        function may_open_dev.
      
      - Move the check for allowing access to device nodes on filesystems
        not mounted in the initial user namespace from mount time to open
        time and include it in may_open_dev.
      
      This set of changes removes the implicit adding of MNT_NODEV which
      simplifies the logic in fs/namespace.c and removes a potentially
      problematic difference in how normal and unprivileged mount
      namespaces work.  This is a user visible change in behavior for
      remount in unpriviliged mount namespaces but is unlikely to cause
      problems for existing software.
      Signed-off-by: default avatar"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      57a3711a
    • Seth Forshee's avatar
      fs: Add user namesapace member to struct super_block · dafbc5d7
      Seth Forshee authored
      Initially this will be used to eliminate the implicit MNT_NODEV
      flag for mounts from user namespaces. In the future it will also
      be used for translating ids and checking capabilities for
      filesystems mounted from user namespaces.
      
      s_user_ns is initialized in alloc_super() and is generally set to
      current_user_ns(). To avoid security and corruption issues, two
      additional mount checks are also added:
      
       - do_new_mount() gains a check that the user has CAP_SYS_ADMIN
         in current_user_ns().
      
       - sget() will fail with EBUSY when the filesystem it's looking
         for is already mounted from another user namespace.
      
      proc requires some special handling. The user namespace of
      current isn't appropriate when forking as a result of clone (2)
      with CLONE_NEWPID|CLONE_NEWUSER, as it will set s_user_ns to the
      namespace of the parent and make proc unmountable in the new user
      namespace. Instead, the user namespace which owns the new pid
      namespace is used. sget_userns() is allowed to allow passing in
      a namespace other than that of current, and sget becomes a
      wrapper around sget_userns() which passes current_user_ns().
      
      Changes to original version of this patch
        * Documented @user_ns in sget_userns, alloc_super and fs.h
        * Kept an blank line in fs.h
        * Removed unncessary include of user_namespace.h from fs.h
        * Tweaked the location of get_user_ns and put_user_ns so
          the security modules can (if they wish) depend on it.
        -- EWB
      Signed-off-by: default avatarSeth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      dafbc5d7
  2. 18 Apr, 2016 1 commit
  3. 17 Apr, 2016 5 commits
  4. 16 Apr, 2016 7 commits
  5. 15 Apr, 2016 17 commits
  6. 14 Apr, 2016 8 commits
    • Mike Snitzer's avatar
      dm cache metadata: fix READ_LOCK macros and cleanup WRITE_LOCK macros · 9567366f
      Mike Snitzer authored
      The READ_LOCK macro was incorrectly returning -EINVAL if
      dm_bm_is_read_only() was true -- it will always be true once the cache
      metadata transitions to read-only by dm_cache_metadata_set_read_only().
      
      Wrap READ_LOCK and WRITE_LOCK multi-statement macros in do {} while(0).
      Also, all accesses of the 'cmd' argument passed to these related macros
      are now encapsulated in parenthesis.
      
      A follow-up patch can be developed to eliminate the use of macros in
      favor of pure C code.  Avoiding that now given that this needs to apply
      to stable@.
      Reported-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
      Fixes: d14fcf3d ("dm cache: make sure every metadata function checks fail_io")
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      9567366f
    • Keith Busch's avatar
      NVMe: Always use MSI/MSI-x interrupts · a5229050
      Keith Busch authored
      Multiple users have reported device initialization failure due the driver
      not receiving legacy PCI interrupts. This is not unique to any particular
      controller, but has been observed on multiple platforms.
      
      There have been no issues reported or observed when with message signaled
      interrupts, so this patch attempts to use MSI-x during initialization,
      falling back to MSI. If that fails, legacy would become the default.
      
      The setup_io_queues error handling had to change as a result: the admin
      queue's msix_entry used to be initialized to the legacy IRQ. The case
      where nr_io_queues is 0 would fail request_irq when setting up the admin
      queue's interrupt since re-enabling MSI-x fails with 0 vectors, leaving
      the admin queue's msix_entry invalid. Instead, return success immediately.
      Reported-by: default avatarTim Muhlemmer <muhlemmer@gmail.com>
      Reported-by: default avatarJon Derrick <jonathan.derrick@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKeith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
      a5229050
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      /proc/iomem: only expose physical resource addresses to privileged users · 51d7b120
      Linus Torvalds authored
      In commit c4004b02 ("x86: remove the kernel code/data/bss resources
      from /proc/iomem") I was hoping to remove the phyiscal kernel address
      data from /proc/iomem entirely, but that had to be reverted because some
      system programs actually use it.
      
      This limits all the detailed resource information to properly
      credentialed users instead.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      51d7b120
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      pci-sysfs: use proper file capability helper function · ab0fa82b
      Linus Torvalds authored
      The PCI config access checked the file capabilities correctly, but used
      the itnernal security capability check rather than the helper function
      that is actually meant for that.
      
      The security_capable() has unusual return values and is not meant to be
      used elsewhere (the only other use is in the capability checking
      functions that we actually intend people to use, and this odd PCI usage
      really stood out when looking around the capability code.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      ab0fa82b
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Make file credentials available to the seqfile interfaces · 34dbbcdb
      Linus Torvalds authored
      A lot of seqfile users seem to be using things like %pK that uses the
      credentials of the current process, but that is actually completely
      wrong for filesystem interfaces.
      
      The unix semantics for permission checking files is to check permissions
      at _open_ time, not at read or write time, and that is not just a small
      detail: passing off stdin/stdout/stderr to a suid application and making
      the actual IO happen in privileged context is a classic exploit
      technique.
      
      So if we want to be able to look at permissions at read time, we need to
      use the file open credentials, not the current ones.  Normal file
      accesses can just use "f_cred" (or any of the helper functions that do
      that, like file_ns_capable()), but the seqfile interfaces do not have
      any such options.
      
      It turns out that seq_file _does_ save away the user_ns information of
      the file, though.  Since user_ns is just part of the full credential
      information, replace that special case with saving off the cred pointer
      instead, and suddenly seq_file has all the permission information it
      needs.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      34dbbcdb
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Revert "x86: remove the kernel code/data/bss resources from /proc/iomem" · 4046d6e8
      Linus Torvalds authored
      This reverts commit c4004b02.
      
      Sadly, my hope that nobody would actually use the special kernel entries
      in /proc/iomem were dashed by kexec.  Which reads /proc/iomem explicitly
      to find the kernel base address.  Nasty.
      
      Anyway, that means we can't do the sane and simple thing and just remove
      the entries, and we'll instead have to mask them out based on permissions.
      Reported-by: default avatarZhengyu Zhang <zhezhang@redhat.com>
      Reported-by: default avatarDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Reported-by: default avatarFreeman Zhang <freeman.zhang1992@gmail.com>
      Reported-by: default avatarEmrah Demir <ed@abdsec.com>
      Reported-by: default avatarBaoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      4046d6e8
    • Helge Deller's avatar
      parisc: Fix ftrace function tracer · 366dd4ea
      Helge Deller authored
      Fix the FTRACE function tracer for 32- and 64-bit kernel.
      The former code was horribly broken.
      
      Reimplement most coding in assembly and utilize optimizations, e.g. put
      mcount() and ftrace_stub() into one L1 cacheline.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHelge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
      366dd4ea
    • Toshi Kani's avatar
      pmem: fix BUG() error in pmem.h:48 on X86_32 · cba2e47a
      Toshi Kani authored
      After 'commit fc0c2028 ("x86, pmem: use memcpy_mcsafe()
      for memcpy_from_pmem()")', probing a PMEM device hits the BUG()
      error below on X86_32 kernel.
      
       kernel BUG at include/linux/pmem.h:48!
      
      memcpy_from_pmem() calls arch_memcpy_from_pmem(), which is
      unimplemented since CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API is undefined on
      X86_32.
      
      Fix the BUG() error by adding default_memcpy_from_pmem().
      Acked-by: default avatarDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarToshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarRoss Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
      Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
      cba2e47a