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  1. 29 Jun, 2017 33 commits
  3. 24 Jun, 2017 7 commits
    • Greg Kroah-Hartman's avatar
      Linux 4.9.34 · 493ecd5c
      Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
      493ecd5c
    • Hugh Dickins's avatar
      mm: fix new crash in unmapped_area_topdown() · ce7fe859
      Hugh Dickins authored 
      commit f4cb767d upstream.

Trinity gets kernel BUG at mm/mmap.c:1963! in about 3 minutes of
mmap testing.  That's the VM_BUG_ON(gap_end < gap_start) at the
end of unmapped_area_topdown().  Linus points out how MAP_FIXED
(which does not have to respect our stack guard gap intentions)
could result in gap_end below gap_start there.  Fix that, and
the similar case in its alternative, unmapped_area().

Fixes: 1be7107f ("mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas")
Reported-by: default avatarDave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Debugged-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarHugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: default avatarMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      ce7fe859
    • Helge Deller's avatar
      Allow stack to grow up to address space limit · 5d10ad62
      Helge Deller authored 
      commit bd726c90 upstream.

Fix expand_upwards() on architectures with an upward-growing stack (parisc,
metag and partly IA-64) to allow the stack to reliably grow exactly up to
the address space limit given by TASK_SIZE.
Signed-off-by: default avatarHelge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Acked-by: default avatarHugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      5d10ad62
    • Hugh Dickins's avatar
      mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas · cfc0eb40
      Hugh Dickins authored 
      commit 1be7107f upstream.

Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.

This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.

Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.

One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications.  For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).

Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.

Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.
Original-patch-by: default avatarOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Original-patch-by: default avatarMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarHugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: default avatarMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[wt: backport to 4.11: adjust context]
[wt: backport to 4.9: adjust context ; kernel doc was not in admin-guide]
Signed-off-by: default avatarWilly Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      cfc0eb40
    • Thomas Gleixner's avatar
      alarmtimer: Rate limit periodic intervals · 04651048
      Thomas Gleixner authored 
      commit ff86bf0c upstream.

The alarmtimer code has another source of potentially rearming itself too
fast. Interval timers with a very samll interval have a similar CPU hog
effect as the previously fixed overflow issue.

The reason is that alarmtimers do not implement the normal protection
against this kind of problem which the other posix timer use:

  timer expires -> queue signal -> deliver signal -> rearm timer

This scheme brings the rearming under scheduler control and prevents
permanently firing timers which hog the CPU.

Bringing this scheme to the alarm timer code is a major overhaul because it
lacks all the necessary mechanisms completely.

So for a quick fix limit the interval to one jiffie. This is not
problematic in practice as alarmtimers are usually backed by an RTC for
suspend which have 1 second resolution. It could be therefor argued that
the resolution of this clock should be set to 1 second in general, but
that's outside the scope of this fix.
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170530211655.896767100@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      04651048
    • David Miller's avatar
      crypto: Work around deallocated stack frame reference gcc bug on sparc. · b355b899
      David Miller authored 
      commit d41519a6 upstream.

On sparc, if we have an alloca() like situation, as is the case with
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(), we can end up referencing deallocated stack
memory.  The result can be that the value is clobbered if a trap
or interrupt arrives at just the right instruction.

It only occurs if the function ends returning a value from that
alloca() area and that value can be placed into the return value
register using a single instruction.

For example, in lib/libcrc32c.c:crc32c() we end up with a return
sequence like:

        return  %i7+8
         lduw   [%o5+16], %o0   ! MEM[(u32 *)__shash_desc.1_10 + 16B],

%o5 holds the base of the on-stack area allocated for the shash
descriptor.  But the return released the stack frame and the
register window.

So if an intererupt arrives between 'return' and 'lduw', then
the value read at %o5+16 can be corrupted.

Add a data compiler barrier to work around this problem.  This is
exactly what the gcc fix will end up doing as well, and it absolutely
should not change the code generated for other cpus (unless gcc
on them has the same bug :-)

With crucial insight from Eric Sandeen.
Reported-by: default avatarAnatoly Pugachev <matorola@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      b355b899
    • Hon Ching \(Vicky) Lo's avatar
      vTPM: Fix missing NULL check · 7dfe7ca9
      Hon Ching \(Vicky) Lo authored 
      commit 31574d32 upstream.

The current code passes the address of tpm_chip as the argument to
dev_get_drvdata() without prior NULL check in
tpm_ibmvtpm_get_desired_dma.  This resulted an oops during kernel
boot when vTPM is enabled in Power partition configured in active
memory sharing mode.

The vio_driver's get_desired_dma() is called before the probe(), which
for vtpm is tpm_ibmvtpm_probe, and it's this latter function that
initializes the driver and set data.  Attempting to get data before
the probe() caused the problem.

This patch adds a NULL check to the tpm_ibmvtpm_get_desired_dma.

fixes: 9e0d39d8 ("tpm: Remove useless priv field in struct tpm_vendor_specific")
Signed-off-by: default avatarHon Ching(Vicky) Lo <honclo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJarkko Sakkine <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      7dfe7ca9
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