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  1. 05 Aug, 2019 5 commits
  3. 01 Aug, 2019 8 commits
    • Kleber Sacilotto de Souza's avatar
      UBUNTU: Ubuntu-4.4.0-159.187 · 32341028
      Kleber Sacilotto de Souza authored 
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
      32341028
    • Thomas Gleixner's avatar
      x86/speculation/swapgs: Exclude ATOMs from speculation through SWAPGS · ef502875
      Thomas Gleixner authored 
      Intel provided the following information:

 On all current Atom processors, instructions that use a segment register
 value (e.g. a load or store) will not speculatively execute before the
 last writer of that segment retires. Thus they will not use a
 speculatively written segment value.

That means on ATOMs there is no speculation through SWAPGS, so the SWAPGS
entry paths can be excluded from the extra LFENCE if PTI is disabled.

Create a separate bug flag for the through SWAPGS speculation and mark all
out-of-order ATOMs and AMD/HYGON CPUs as not affected. The in-order ATOMs
are excluded from the whole mitigation mess anyway.
Reported-by: default avatarAndrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>

CVE-2019-1125

(backported from commit f36cf386)
[tyhicks: Backport to Xenial:
 - Dropped VULNWL_HYGON() change since this kernel version doesn't know
   about Hygon processors
 - Rename X86_FEATURE_PTI to X86_FEATURE_KAISER]
Signed-off-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
      ef502875
    • Josh Poimboeuf's avatar
      x86/entry/64: Use JMP instead of JMPQ · db89140f
      Josh Poimboeuf authored 
      Somehow the swapgs mitigation entry code patch ended up with a JMPQ
instruction instead of JMP, where only the short jump is needed.  Some
assembler versions apparently fail to optimize JMPQ into a two-byte JMP
when possible, instead always using a 7-byte JMP with relocation.  For
some reason that makes the entry code explode with a #GP during boot.

Change it back to "JMP" as originally intended.

Fixes: 18ec54fd ("x86/speculation: Prepare entry code for Spectre v1 swapgs mitigations")
Signed-off-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

CVE-2019-1125

(backported from commit 64dbc122)
[tyhicks: Adjust context in entry_64.S]
Signed-off-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
      db89140f
    • Josh Poimboeuf's avatar
      x86/speculation: Enable Spectre v1 swapgs mitigations · 66537e88
      Josh Poimboeuf authored 
      The previous commit added macro calls in the entry code which mitigate the
Spectre v1 swapgs issue if the X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_* features are
enabled.  Enable those features where applicable.

The mitigations may be disabled with "nospectre_v1" or "mitigations=off".

There are different features which can affect the risk of attack:

- When FSGSBASE is enabled, unprivileged users are able to place any
  value in GS, using the wrgsbase instruction.  This means they can
  write a GS value which points to any value in kernel space, which can
  be useful with the following gadget in an interrupt/exception/NMI
  handler:

	if (coming from user space)
		swapgs
	mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg1
	// dependent load or store based on the value of %reg
	// for example: mov %(reg1), %reg2

  If an interrupt is coming from user space, and the entry code
  speculatively skips the swapgs (due to user branch mistraining), it
  may speculatively execute the GS-based load and a subsequent dependent
  load or store, exposing the kernel data to an L1 side channel leak.

  Note that, on Intel, a similar attack exists in the above gadget when
  coming from kernel space, if the swapgs gets speculatively executed to
  switch back to the user GS.  On AMD, this variant isn't possible
  because swapgs is serializing with respect to future GS-based
  accesses.

  NOTE: The FSGSBASE patch set hasn't been merged yet, so the above case
	doesn't exist quite yet.

- When FSGSBASE is disabled, the issue is mitigated somewhat because
  unprivileged users must use prctl(ARCH_SET_GS) to set GS, which
  restricts GS values to user space addresses only.  That means the
  gadget would need an additional step, since the target kernel address
  needs to be read from user space first.  Something like:

	if (coming from user space)
		swapgs
	mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg1
	mov (%reg1), %reg2
	// dependent load or store based on the value of %reg2
	// for example: mov %(reg2), %reg3

  It's difficult to audit for this gadget in all the handlers, so while
  there are no known instances of it, it's entirely possible that it
  exists somewhere (or could be introduced in the future).  Without
  tooling to analyze all such code paths, consider it vulnerable.

  Effects of SMAP on the !FSGSBASE case:

  - If SMAP is enabled, and the CPU reports RDCL_NO (i.e., not
    susceptible to Meltdown), the kernel is prevented from speculatively
    reading user space memory, even L1 cached values.  This effectively
    disables the !FSGSBASE attack vector.

  - If SMAP is enabled, but the CPU *is* susceptible to Meltdown, SMAP
    still prevents the kernel from speculatively reading user space
    memory.  But it does *not* prevent the kernel from reading the
    user value from L1, if it has already been cached.  This is probably
    only a small hurdle for an attacker to overcome.

Thanks to Dave Hansen for contributing the speculative_smap() function.

Thanks to Andrew Cooper for providing the inside scoop on whether swapgs
is serializing on AMD.

[ tglx: Fixed the USER fence decision and polished the comment as suggested
  	by Dave Hansen ]
Signed-off-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: default avatarDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>

CVE-2019-1125

(backported from commit a2059825)
[tyhicks: Backport to Xenial:
 - Adjust the file path to and context in kernel-parameters.txt
 - Rename X86_FEATURE_PTI to X86_FEATURE_KAISER]
Signed-off-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
      66537e88
    • Josh Poimboeuf's avatar
      x86/speculation: Prepare entry code for Spectre v1 swapgs mitigations · 4b0c9c8a
      Josh Poimboeuf authored 
      Spectre v1 isn't only about array bounds checks.  It can affect any
conditional checks.  The kernel entry code interrupt, exception, and NMI
handlers all have conditional swapgs checks.  Those may be problematic in
the context of Spectre v1, as kernel code can speculatively run with a user
GS.

For example:

	if (coming from user space)
		swapgs
	mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg
	mov (%reg), %reg1

When coming from user space, the CPU can speculatively skip the swapgs, and
then do a speculative percpu load using the user GS value.  So the user can
speculatively force a read of any kernel value.  If a gadget exists which
uses the percpu value as an address in another load/store, then the
contents of the kernel value may become visible via an L1 side channel
attack.

A similar attack exists when coming from kernel space.  The CPU can
speculatively do the swapgs, causing the user GS to get used for the rest
of the speculative window.

The mitigation is similar to a traditional Spectre v1 mitigation, except:

  a) index masking isn't possible; because the index (percpu offset)
     isn't user-controlled; and

  b) an lfence is needed in both the "from user" swapgs path and the
     "from kernel" non-swapgs path (because of the two attacks described
     above).

The user entry swapgs paths already have SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3, which has a
CR3 write when PTI is enabled.  Since CR3 writes are serializing, the
lfences can be skipped in those cases.

On the other hand, the kernel entry swapgs paths don't depend on PTI.

To avoid unnecessary lfences for the user entry case, create two separate
features for alternative patching:

  X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER
  X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL

Use these features in entry code to patch in lfences where needed.

The features aren't enabled yet, so there's no functional change.
Signed-off-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: default avatarDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>

CVE-2019-1125

(backported from commit 18ec54fd)
[tyhicks: Backport to Xenial:
 - Adjust context in calling.h
 - Minor rework of fencing in entry_64.S due to differences in entry points
 - Add a FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY to a swapgs, in NMI entry path, that
   wasn't present in newer kernels
 - Indent macros in calling.h to match the rest of the file's style
 - Move include of calling.h later in entry_64.S to fix build failure]
Signed-off-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
      4b0c9c8a
    • Fenghua Yu's avatar
      x86/cpufeatures: Combine word 11 and 12 into a new scattered features word · 1dc11691
      Fenghua Yu authored 
      It's a waste for the four X86_FEATURE_CQM_* feature bits to occupy two
whole feature bits words. To better utilize feature words, re-define
word 11 to host scattered features and move the four X86_FEATURE_CQM_*
features into Linux defined word 11. More scattered features can be
added in word 11 in the future.

Rename leaf 11 in cpuid_leafs to CPUID_LNX_4 to reflect it's a
Linux-defined leaf.

Rename leaf 12 as CPUID_DUMMY which will be replaced by a meaningful
name in the next patch when CPUID.7.1:EAX occupies world 12.

Maximum number of RMID and cache occupancy scale are retrieved from
CPUID.0xf.1 after scattered CQM features are enumerated. Carve out the
code into a separate function.

KVM doesn't support resctrl now. So it's safe to move the
X86_FEATURE_CQM_* features to scattered features word 11 for KVM.
Signed-off-by: default avatarFenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: "Sean J Christopherson" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: kvm ML <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Ravi V Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Sherry Hurwitz <sherry.hurwitz@amd.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86 <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1560794416-217638-2-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com

CVE-2019-1125

(backported from commit acec0ce0)
[tyhicks: Backport to Xenial:
 - Adjust context in cpufeatures.h
 - No need to modify cpuid.h since we're missing commit d6321d49
   ("KVM: x86: generalize guest_cpuid_has_ helpers")
 - No need to modify cpuid-deps.c since we're missing commit
   0b00de85 ("x86/cpuid: Add generic table for CPUID dependencies")
 - Change CPUID_EDX to CR_EDX since we're missing commit 47f10a36
   ("x86/cpuid: Cleanup cpuid_regs definitions")]
Signed-off-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
      1dc11691
    • Borislav Petkov's avatar
      x86/cpufeatures: Carve out CQM features retrieval · 3e663426
      Borislav Petkov authored 
      ... into a separate function for better readability. Split out from a
patch from Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> to keep the mechanical,
sole code movement separate for easy review.

No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org

CVE-2019-1125

(cherry picked from commit 45fc56e6)
Signed-off-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
      3e663426
    • Kleber Sacilotto de Souza's avatar
      UBUNTU: Start new release · 76fe6a2b
      Kleber Sacilotto de Souza authored 
      Ignore: yes
Signed-off-by: default avatarKleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
      76fe6a2b
  5. 29 Jul, 2019 9 commits
  7. 23 Jul, 2019 18 commits
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