- 15 Dec, 2023 1 commit
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Aneesh Kumar K.V authored
No functional change in this patch. A helper is added to find if vcpu is dispatched by hypervisor. Use that instead of opencoding. Also clarify some of the comments. Signed-off-by:
"Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20231114071219.198222-1-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
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- 13 Dec, 2023 28 commits
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Aditya Gupta authored
CPU features can be determined in makedumpfile, using 'cur_cpu_spec.cpu_features'. This provides more data to makedumpfile about the crashed system, and can help in filtering the vmcore accordingly. Signed-off-by:
Aditya Gupta <adityag@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Kunwu Chan authored
kasprintf() returns a pointer to dynamically allocated memory which can be NULL upon failure. Fixes: 885dcd70 ("powerpc/perf: Add nest IMC PMU support") Signed-off-by:
Kunwu Chan <chentao@kylinos.cn> Signed-off-by:
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Kunwu Chan authored
kasprintf() returns a pointer to dynamically allocated memory which can be NULL upon failure. Fixes: b9ef7b4b ("powerpc: Convert to using %pOFn instead of device_node.name") Signed-off-by:
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Kunwu Chan authored
kasprintf() returns a pointer to dynamically allocated memory which can be NULL upon failure. Fixes: 2717a33d ("powerpc/opal-irqchip: Use interrupt names if present") Signed-off-by:
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Kunwu Chan authored
kasprintf() returns a pointer to dynamically allocated memory which can be NULL upon failure. Add a null pointer check, and release 'ent' to avoid memory leaks. Fixes: bfd2f0d4 ("powerpc/powernv: Get rid of old scom_controller abstraction") Signed-off-by:
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Kunwu Chan authored
kasprintf() returns a pointer to dynamically allocated memory which can be NULL upon failure. Ensure the allocation was successful by checking the pointer validity. Suggested-by:
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Suggested-by:
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Sathvika Vasireddy authored
Commit d49a0626 ("arch: Introduce CONFIG_FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT") introduced a generic function-alignment infrastructure. Move to using FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_4B on powerpc, to use the same alignment as that of the existing _GLOBAL macro. Signed-off-by:
Sathvika Vasireddy <sv@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Naveen N Rao authored
ftrace_stub is within the same CU, so there is no need for a subsequent nop instruction. Signed-off-by:
Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Naveen N Rao authored
Replace seven spaces with a tab character to fix an indentation issue reported by the kernel test robot. Reported-by:
kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202311221731.alUwTDIm-lkp@intel.com/Signed-off-by:
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Nathan Lynch authored
Consistently testing system parameter access is a bit difficult by nature -- the set of parameters available depends on the model and system configuration, and updating a parameter should be considered a destructive operation reserved for the admin. So we validate some of the error paths and retrieve the SPLPAR characteristics string, but not much else. Signed-off-by:
Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Nathan Lynch authored
Add selftests for /dev/papr-vpd, exercising the common expected use cases: * Retrieve all VPD by passing an empty location code. * Retrieve the "system VPD" by passing a location code derived from DT root node properties, as done by the vpdupdate command. The tests also verify that certain intended properties of the driver hold: * Passing an unterminated location code to PAPR_VPD_CREATE_HANDLE gets EINVAL. * Passing a NULL location code pointer to PAPR_VPD_CREATE_HANDLE gets EFAULT. * Closing the device node without first issuing a PAPR_VPD_CREATE_HANDLE command to it succeeds. * Releasing a handle without first consuming any data from it succeeds. * Re-reading the contents of a handle returns the same data as the first time. Some minimal validation of the returned data is performed. The tests are skipped on systems where the papr-vpd driver does not initialize, making this useful only on PowerVM LPARs at this point. Signed-off-by:
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Nathan Lynch authored
Until now the papr_sysparm APIs have been kernel-internal. But user space needs access to PAPR system parameters too. The only method available to user space today to get or set system parameters is using sys_rtas() and /dev/mem to pass RTAS-addressable buffers between user space and firmware. This is incompatible with lockdown and should be deprecated. So provide an alternative ABI to user space in the form of a /dev/papr-sysparm character device with just two ioctl commands (get and set). The data payloads involved are small enough to fit in the ioctl argument buffer, making the code relatively simple. Exposing the system parameters through sysfs has been considered but it would be too awkward: * The kernel currently does not have to contain an exhaustive list of defined system parameters. This is a convenient property to maintain because we don't have to update the kernel whenever a new parameter is added to PAPR. Exporting a named attribute in sysfs for each parameter would negate this. * Some system parameters are text-based and some are not. * Retrieval of at least one system parameter requires input data, which a simple read-oriented interface can't support. Signed-off-by:
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Nathan Lynch authored
The ability to get and set system parameters will be exposed to user space, so let's get a little more strict about malformed papr_sysparm_buf objects. * Create accessors for the length field of struct papr_sysparm_buf. The length is always stored in MSB order and this is better than spreading the necessary conversions all over. * Reject attempts to submit invalid buffers to RTAS. * Warn if RTAS returns a buffer with an invalid length, clamping the returned length to a safe value that won't overrun the buffer. These are meant as precautionary measures to mitigate both firmware and kernel bugs in this area, should they arise, but I am not aware of any. Signed-off-by:
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Nathan Lynch authored
PowerVM LPARs may retrieve Vital Product Data (VPD) for system components using the ibm,get-vpd RTAS function. We can expose this to user space with a /dev/papr-vpd character device, where the programming model is: struct papr_location_code plc = { .str = "", }; /* obtain all VPD */ int devfd = open("/dev/papr-vpd", O_RDONLY); int vpdfd = ioctl(devfd, PAPR_VPD_CREATE_HANDLE, &plc); size_t size = lseek(vpdfd, 0, SEEK_END); char *buf = malloc(size); pread(devfd, buf, size, 0); When a file descriptor is obtained from ioctl(PAPR_VPD_CREATE_HANDLE), the file contains the result of a complete ibm,get-vpd sequence. The file contents are immutable from the POV of user space. To get a new view of the VPD, the client must create a new handle. This design choice insulates user space from most of the complexities that ibm,get-vpd brings: * ibm,get-vpd must be called more than once to obtain complete results. * Only one ibm,get-vpd call sequence should be in progress at a time; interleaved sequences will disrupt each other. Callers must have a protocol for serializing their use of the function. * A call sequence in progress may receive a "VPD changed, try again" status, requiring the client to abandon the sequence and start over. The memory required for the VPD buffers seems acceptable, around 20KB for all VPD on one of my systems. And the value of the /rtas/ibm,vpd-size DT property (the estimated maximum size of VPD) is consistently 300KB across various systems I've checked. I've implemented support for this new ABI in the rtas_get_vpd() function in librtas, which the vpdupdate command currently uses to populate its VPD database. I've verified that an unmodified vpdupdate binary generates an identical database when using a librtas.so that prefers the new ABI. Along with the papr-vpd.h header exposed to user space, this introduces a common papr-miscdev.h uapi header to share a base ioctl ID with similar drivers to come. Tested-by:Michal Suchánek <msuchanek@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Nathan Lynch authored
If the function descriptor has a populated lock member, then callers are required to hold it across calls. Now that the firmware activation sequence is appropriately guarded, we can warn when the requirement isn't satisfied. __do_enter_rtas_trace() gets reorganized a bit as a result of performing the function descriptor lookup unconditionally now. Reviewed-by:
"Aneesh Kumar K.V (IBM)" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Nathan Lynch authored
Use rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock to prevent interleaving call sequences of the ibm,activate-firmware RTAS function, which typically requires multiple calls to complete the update. While the spec does not specifically prohibit interleaved sequences, there's almost certainly no advantage to allowing them. Reviewed-by:
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Nathan Lynch authored
On RTAS platforms there is a general restriction that the OS must not enter RTAS on more than one CPU at a time. This low-level serialization requirement is satisfied by holding a spin lock (rtas_lock) across most RTAS function invocations. However, some pseries RTAS functions require multiple successive calls to complete a logical operation. Beginning a new call sequence for such a function may disrupt any other sequences of that function already in progress. Safe and reliable use of these functions effectively requires higher-level serialization beyond what is already done at the level of RTAS entry and exit. Where a sequence-based RTAS function is invoked only through sys_rtas(), with no in-kernel users, there is no issue as far as the kernel is concerned. User space is responsible for appropriately serializing its call sequences. (Whether user space code actually takes measures to prevent sequence interleaving is another matter.) Examples of such functions currently include ibm,platform-dump and ibm,get-vpd. But where a sequence-based RTAS function has both user space and in-kernel uesrs, there is a hazard. Even if the in-kernel call sites of such a function serialize their sequences correctly, a user of sys_rtas() can invoke the same function at any time, potentially disrupting a sequence in progress. So in order to prevent disruption of kernel-based RTAS call sequences, they must serialize not only with themselves but also with sys_rtas() users, somehow. Preferably without adding more function-specific hacks to sys_rtas(). This is a prerequisite for adding an in-kernel call sequence of ibm,get-vpd, which is in a change to follow. Note that it has never been feasible for the kernel to prevent sys_rtas()-based sequences from being disrupted because control returns to user space on every call. sys_rtas()-based users of these functions have always been, and continue to be, responsible for coordinating their call sequences with other users, even those which may invoke the RTAS functions through less direct means than sys_rtas(). This is an unavoidable consequence of exposing sequence-based RTAS functions through sys_rtas(). * Add an optional mutex member to struct rtas_function. * Statically define a mutex for each RTAS function with known call sequence serialization requirements, and assign its address to the .lock member of the corresponding function table entry, along with justifying commentary. * In sys_rtas(), if the table entry for the RTAS function being called has a populated lock member, acquire it before taking rtas_lock and entering RTAS. * Kernel-based RTAS call sequences are expected to access the appropriate mutex explicitly by name. For example, a user of the ibm,activate-firmware RTAS function would do: int token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_IBM_ACTIVATE_FIRMWARE); int fwrc; mutex_lock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); do { fwrc = rtas_call(token, 0, 1, NULL); } while (rtas_busy_delay(fwrc)); mutex_unlock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); There should be no perceivable change introduced here except that concurrent callers of the same RTAS function via sys_rtas() may block on a mutex instead of spinning on rtas_lock. Signed-off-by: -
Nathan Lynch authored
The rtas system call handler sys_rtas() delegates certain input validation steps to a helper function: block_rtas_call(). One of these steps ensures that the user-supplied token value maps to a known RTAS function. This is done by performing a "reverse" token-to-function lookup via rtas_token_to_function_untrusted() to obtain an rtas_function object. In changes to come, sys_rtas() itself will need the function descriptor for the token. To prepare: * Move the lookup and validation up into sys_rtas() and pass the resulting rtas_function pointer to block_rtas_call(), which is otherwise unconcerned with the token value. * Change block_rtas_call() to report the RTAS function name instead of the token value on validation failures, since it can now rely on having a valid function descriptor. One behavior change is that sys_rtas() now silently errors out when passed a bad token, before calling block_rtas_call(). So we will no longer log "RTAS call blocked - exploit attempt?" on invalid tokens. This is consistent with how sys_rtas() currently handles other "metadata" (nargs and nret), while block_rtas_call() is primarily concerned with validating the arguments to be passed to specific RTAS functions. Signed-off-by:
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Nathan Lynch authored
Not all of the generic RTAS function statuses specified in PAPR have symbolic constants and descriptions in rtas.h. Fix this, providing a little more background, slightly updating the existing wording, and improving the formatting. Reviewed-by:
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Nathan Lynch authored
Enabling any of the powerpc:rtas_* tracepoints at boot is likely to result in an oops on RTAS platforms. For example, booting a QEMU pseries model with 'trace_event=powerpc:rtas_input' in the command line leads to: BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000008 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 7 [#1] NIP [c00000000004231c] do_enter_rtas+0x1bc/0x460 LR [c00000000004231c] do_enter_rtas+0x1bc/0x460 Call Trace: do_enter_rtas+0x1bc/0x460 (unreliable) rtas_call+0x22c/0x4a0 rtas_get_boot_time+0x80/0x14c read_persistent_clock64+0x124/0x150 read_persistent_wall_and_boot_offset+0x28/0x58 timekeeping_init+0x70/0x348 start_kernel+0xa0c/0xc1c start_here_common+0x1c/0x20 (This is preceded by a warning for the failed lookup in rtas_token_to_function().) This happens when __do_enter_rtas_trace() attempts a token to function descriptor lookup before the xarray containing the mappings has been set up. Fall back to linear scan of the table if rtas_token_to_function_xarray is empty. Fixes: 24098f58 ("powerpc/rtas: add tracepoints around RTAS entry") Reviewed-by: -
Nathan Lynch authored
Add a convenience macro for iterating over every element of the internal function table and convert the one site that can use it. An additional user of the macro is anticipated in changes to follow. Reviewed-by:
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Nathan Lynch authored
rtas_token_to_function() WARNs when passed an invalid token; it's meant to catch bugs in kernel-based users of RTAS functions. However, user space controls the token value passed to rtas_token_to_function() by block_rtas_call(), so user space with sufficient privilege to use sys_rtas() can trigger the warnings at will: unexpected failed lookup for token 2048 WARNING: CPU: 20 PID: 2247 at arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:556 rtas_token_to_function+0xfc/0x110 ... NIP rtas_token_to_function+0xfc/0x110 LR rtas_token_to_function+0xf8/0x110 Call Trace: rtas_token_to_function+0xf8/0x110 (unreliable) sys_rtas+0x188/0x880 system_call_exception+0x268/0x530 system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 It's desirable to continue warning on bogus tokens in rtas_token_to_function(). Currently it is used to look up RTAS function descriptors when tracing, where we know there has to have been a successful descriptor lookup by different means already, and it would be a serious inconsistency for the reverse lookup to fail. So instead of weakening rtas_token_to_function()'s contract by removing the warnings, introduce rtas_token_to_function_untrusted(), which has no opinion on failed lookups. Convert block_rtas_call() and rtas_token_to_function() to use it. Fixes: 8252b882 ("powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups") Signed-off-by: -
Kajol Jain authored
To access hv-gpci kernel interface files data, the "Enable Performance Information Collection" option has to be set in hmc. Incase that option is not set and user try to read the interface files, it should give error message as operation not permitted. Result of accessing added interface files with disabled performance collection option: [command]# cat processor_bus_topology cat: processor_bus_topology: Operation not permitted [command]# cat processor_config cat: processor_config: Operation not permitted [command]# cat affinity_domain_via_domain cat: affinity_domain_via_domain: Operation not permitted [command]# cat affinity_domain_via_virtual_processor cat: affinity_domain_via_virtual_processor: Operation not permitted [command]# cat affinity_domain_via_partition Based on above result there is no error message when reading affinity_domain_via_partition file because of missing check for failed hcall. Fix this issue by adding a check in the start of affinity_domain_via_partition_show function, to return error incase hcall fails, with error type other then H_PARAMETER. Fixes: a15e0d6a ("powerpc/hv_gpci: Add sysfs file inside hv_gpci device to show affinity domain via partition information") Reported-by:
Disha Goel <disgoel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Michael Ellerman authored
There is a selftest that checks if FPRs are corrupted across a fork, aka clone. It was added as part of the series that optimised the clone path to save the parent's FP state without "giving up" (turning off FP). See commit 8792468d ("powerpc: Add the ability to save FPU without giving it up"). The test encodes the assumption that FPRs 0-13 are volatile across the syscall, by only checking the volatile FPRs are not changed by the fork. There was also a comment in the fpu_preempt test alluding to that: The check_fpu function in asm only checks the non volatile registers as it is reused from the syscall test It is true that the function call ABI treats f0-f13 as volatile, however the syscall ABI has since been documented as *not* treating those registers as volatile. See commit 7b8845a2 ("powerpc/64: Document the syscall ABI"). So change the test to check all FPRs are not corrupted by the syscall. Note that this currently fails, because save_fpu() etc. do not restore f0/vsr0. Signed-off-by:
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Michael Ellerman authored
The FPU preempt test only runs for 20 seconds, which is not particularly long. Run it for 60 seconds to increase the chance of detecting corruption. Signed-off-by:
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Michael Ellerman authored
The fpu_preempt test randomly initialises an array of doubles to try and detect FPU register corruption. However the values it generates do not occupy the full range of values possible in the 64-bit double, meaning some partial register corruption could go undetected. Without getting too carried away, add some better initialisation to generate values that occupy more bits. Sample values before: f0 902677510 (raw 0x41cae6e203000000) f1 325217596 (raw 0x41b3626d3c000000) f2 1856578300 (raw 0x41dbaa48bf000000) f3 1247189984 (raw 0x41d295a6f8000000) And after: f0 1.1078153481413311e-09 (raw 0x3e13083932805cc2) f1 1.0576648474801922e+17 (raw 0x43777c20eb88c261) f2 -6.6245033413594075e-10 (raw 0xbe06c2f989facae9) f3 3.0085988827156291e+18 (raw 0x43c4e0585f2df37b) Signed-off-by:
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Michael Ellerman authored
There's a selftest that checks FPRs aren't corrupted by preemption, or just process scheduling. However it only checks the non-volatile FPRs, meaning corruption of the volatile FPRs could go undetected. The check_fpu function it calls is used by several other tests, so for now add a new routine to check all the FPRs. Increase the size of the array of FPRs to 32, and initialise them all with random values. Signed-off-by:
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Michael Ellerman authored
The FPU & VMX preemption tests do not check for errors returned by the low-level asm routines, preempt_fpu() / preempt_vsx() respectively. That means any register corruption detected by the asm routines does not result in a test failure. Fix it by returning the return value of the asm routines from the pthread child routines. Fixes: e5ab8be6 ("selftests/powerpc: Test preservation of FPU and VMX regs across preemption") Signed-off-by:
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- 07 Dec, 2023 7 commits
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Michael Ellerman authored
If no cross compiler is specified, try to auto detect one. Look for various combinations, matching: powerpc(64(le)?)?(-unknown)?-linux(-gnu)?- There are more possibilities, but the above is known to find a compiler on Fedora and Ubuntu (which use linux-gnu-), and also detects the kernel.org cross compilers (which use linux-). This allows cross compiling with simply: # Ubuntu $ sudo apt install gcc-powerpc-linux-gnu # Fedora $ sudo dnf install gcc-powerpc64-linux-gnu $ make ARCH=powerpc defconfig $ make ARCH=powerpc -j 4 Inspired by arch/parisc/Makefile. Acked-by:
Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by:
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Michael Ellerman authored
If the kernel is being cross compiled, there is no information from uname on which defconfig is most appropriate, so the Makefile defaults to ppc64. However these days almost all distros that support powerpc are little endian, so it's more likely that defaulting to ppc64le_defconfig will produce something useful for a user. Signed-off-by:
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Michael Ellerman authored
The vdso Makefile adds -U$(ARCH) to CPPFLAGS for the vdso64.lds linker script. ARCH is always powerpc, so it becomes -Upowerpc, which means undefine the "powerpc" symbol. But the 64-bit compiler doesn't define powerpc in the first place, compare: $ gcc-5.1.0-nolibc/powerpc64-linux/bin/powerpc64-linux-gcc -m32 -E -dM - </dev/null | grep -w powerpc #define powerpc 1 $ gcc-5.1.0-nolibc/powerpc64-linux/bin/powerpc64-linux-gcc -m64 -E -dM - </dev/null | grep -w powerpc $ So there's no need to undefine it for the 64-bit linker script. Signed-off-by:
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Michael Ellerman authored
There's no need to use $(ARCH) for references to the arch directory in the source tree, it is always arch/powerpc. Signed-off-by:
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Michael Ellerman authored
Christophe volunteered[1] to maintain PPC83XX. 1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/7b1bf4dc-d09d-35b8-f4df-16bf00429b6d@csgroup.eu/Acked-by:
Crystal Wood <oss@buserror.net> Signed-off-by:
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Aneesh Kumar K.V (IBM) authored
This reverts commit 1abce058 ("powerpc/64s: Fix __pte_needs_flush() false positive warning") The previous patch dropped the usage of _PAGE_PRIVILEGED with PAGE_NONE. Hence this check can be dropped. Signed-off-by:
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Aneesh Kumar K.V (IBM) authored
There used to be a dependency on _PAGE_PRIVILEGED with pte_savedwrite. But that got dropped by commit 6a56ccbc ("mm/autonuma: use can_change_(pte|pmd)_writable() to replace savedwrite") With the change in this patch numa fault pte (pte_protnone()) gets mapped as regular user pte with RWX cleared (no-access) whereas earlier it used to be mapped _PAGE_PRIVILEGED. Hash fault handling code gets some WARN_ON added in this patch because those functions are not expected to get called with _PAGE_READ cleared. commit 18061c17 ("powerpc/mm: Update PROTFAULT handling in the page fault path") explains the details. Signed-off-by:
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- 01 Dec, 2023 4 commits
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Nathan Lynch authored
When an add operation for multiple LMBs fails, there is currently little indication from the kernel of what went wrong. Be a little more verbose about error conditions in the add paths. Signed-off-by:
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Nathan Lynch authored
dlpar_memory_remove_by_index() may access beyond the bounds of the drmem lmb array when the LMB lookup fails to match an entry with the given DRC index. When the search fails, the cursor is left pointing to &drmem_info->lmbs[drmem_info->n_lmbs], which is one element past the last valid entry in the array. The debug message at the end of the function then dereferences this pointer: pr_debug("Failed to hot-remove memory at %llx\n", lmb->base_addr); This was found by inspection and confirmed with KASAN: pseries-hotplug-mem: Attempting to hot-remove LMB, drc index 1234 ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dlpar_memory+0x298/0x1658 Read of size 8 at addr c000000364e97fd0 by task bash/949 dump_stack_lvl+0xa4/0xfc (unreliable) print_report+0x214/0x63c kasan_report+0x140/0x2e0 __asan_load8+0xa8/0xe0 dlpar_memory+0x298/0x1658 handle_dlpar_errorlog+0x130/0x1d0 dlpar_store+0x18c/0x3e0 kobj_attr_store+0x68/0xa0 sysfs_kf_write+0xc4/0x110 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x390 vfs_write+0x2d4/0x4e0 ksys_write+0xac/0x1a0 system_call_exception+0x268/0x530 system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec Allocated by task 1: kasan_save_stack+0x48/0x80 kasan_set_track+0x34/0x50 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x34/0x50 __kasan_kmalloc+0xd0/0x120 __kmalloc+0x8c/0x320 kmalloc_array.constprop.0+0x48/0x5c drmem_init+0x2a0/0x41c do_one_initcall+0xe0/0x5c0 kernel_init_freeable+0x4ec/0x5a0 kernel_init+0x30/0x1e0 ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c The buggy address belongs to the object at c000000364e80000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128k of size 131072 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 98256-byte region [c000000364e80000, c000000364e97fd0) ================================================================== pseries-hotplug-mem: Failed to hot-remove memory at 0 Log failed lookups with a separate message and dereference the cursor only when it points to a valid entry. Signed-off-by: -
Randy Dunlap authored
Fix build errors when CURRITUCK=y and I2C is not builtin (=m or is not set). Fixes these build errors: powerpc-linux-ld: arch/powerpc/platforms/44x/ppc476.o: in function `avr_halt_system': ppc476.c:(.text+0x58): undefined reference to `i2c_smbus_write_byte_data' powerpc-linux-ld: arch/powerpc/platforms/44x/ppc476.o: in function `ppc47x_device_probe': ppc476.c:(.init.text+0x18): undefined reference to `i2c_register_driver' Fixes: 2a2c74b2 ("IBM Akebono: Add the Akebono platform") Signed-off-by:
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Reported-by:
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Dario Binacchi authored
s/singals/signals/ Signed-off-by:
Dario Binacchi <dario.binacchi@amarulasolutions.com> Signed-off-by:
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