When the userspace process servicing fuse requests is running in
a pid namespace then pids passed via the fuse fd are not being
translated into that process' namespace. Translation is necessary
for the pid to be useful to that process.

Since no use case currently exists for changing namespaces all
translations can be done relative to the pid namespace in use
when fuse_conn_init() is called. For fuse this translates to
mount time, and for cuse this is when /dev/cuse is opened. IO for
this connection from another namespace will return errors.

Requests from processes whose pid cannot be translated into the
target namespace are not permitted, except for requests
allocated via fuse_get_req_nofail_nopages. For no-fail requests
in.h.pid will be 0 if the pid translation fails.

File locking changes based on previous work done by Eric
Biederman.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>

A privileged user in s_user_ns will generally have the ability to
manipulate the backing store and insert security.* xattrs into
the filesystem directly. Therefore the kernel must be prepared to
handle these xattrs from unprivileged mounts, and it makes little
sense for commoncap to prevent writing these xattrs to the
filesystem. The capability and LSM code have already been updated
to appropriately handle xattrs from unprivileged mounts, so it
is safe to loosen this restriction on setting xattrs.

The exception to this logic is that writing xattrs to a mounted
filesystem may also cause the LSM inode_post_setxattr or
inode_setsecurity callbacks to be invoked. SELinux will deny the
xattr update by virtue of applying mountpoint labeling to
unprivileged userns mounts, and Smack will deny the writes for
any user without global CAP_MAC_ADMIN, so loosening the
capability check in commoncap is safe in this respect as well.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

Superblock level remounts are currently restricted to global
CAP_SYS_ADMIN, as is the path for changing the root mount to
read only on umount. Loosen both of these permission checks to
also allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN in any namespace which is privileged
towards the userns which originally mounted the filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

Expand the check in should_remove_suid() to keep privileges for
CAP_FSETID in s_user_ns rather than init_user_ns.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

In a userns mount some on-disk inodes may have ids which do not
map into s_user_ns, in which case the in-kernel inodes are owned
by invalid users. The superblock owner should be able to change
attributes of these inodes but cannot. However it is unsafe to
grant the superblock owner privileged access to all inodes in the
superblock since proc, sysfs, etc. use DAC to protect files which
may not belong to s_user_ns. The problem is restricted to only
inodes where the owner or group is an invalid user.

We can work around this by allowing users with CAP_CHOWN in
s_user_ns to change an invalid owner or group id, so long as the
other id is either invalid or mappable in s_user_ns. After
changing ownership the user will be privileged towards the inode
and thus able to change other attributes.

As an precaution, checks for invalid ids are added to the proc
and kernfs setattr interfaces. These filesystems are not expected
to have inodes with invalid ids, but if it does happen any
setattr operations will return -EPERM.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>

ids in on-disk ACLs should be converted to s_user_ns instead of
init_user_ns as is done now. This introduces the possibility for
id mappings to fail, and when this happens syscalls will return
EOVERFLOW.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

Add checks to inode_change_ok to verify that uid and gid changes
will map into the superblock's user namespace. If they do not
fail with -EOVERFLOW. This cannot be overriden with ATTR_FORCE.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

Using INVALID_[UG]ID for the LSM file creation context doesn't
make sense, so return an error if the inode passed to
set_create_file_as() has an invalid id.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

Filesystem uids which don't map into a user namespace may result
in inode->i_uid being INVALID_UID. A symlink and its parent
could have different owners in the filesystem can both get
mapped to INVALID_UID, which may result in following a symlink
when this would not have otherwise been permitted when protected
symlinks are enabled.

Add a new helper function, uid_valid_eq(), and use this to
validate that the ids in may_follow_link() are both equal and
valid. Also add an equivalent helper for gids, which is
currently unused.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

The SMACK64, SMACK64EXEC, and SMACK64MMAP labels are all handled
differently in untrusted mounts. This is confusing and
potentically problematic. Change this to handle them all the same
way that SMACK64 is currently handled; that is, read the label
from disk and check it at use time. For SMACK64 and SMACK64MMAP
access is denied if the label does not match smk_root. To be
consistent with suid, a SMACK64EXEC label which does not match
smk_root will still allow execution of the file but will not run
with the label supplied in the xattr.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

All current callers of in_userns pass current_user_ns as the
first argument. Simplify by replacing in_userns with
current_in_userns which checks whether current_user_ns is in the
namespace supplied as an argument.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

Security labels from unprivileged mounts in user namespaces must
be ignored. Force superblocks from user namespaces whose labeling
behavior is to use xattrs to use mountpoint labeling instead.
For the mountpoint label, default to converting the current task
context into a form suitable for file objects, but also allow the
policy writer to specify a different label through policy
transition rules.

Pieced together from code snippets provided by Stephen Smalley.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

If a process gets access to a mount from a different user
namespace, that process should not be able to take advantage of
setuid files or selinux entrypoints from that filesystem.  Prevent
this by treating mounts from other mount namespaces and those not
owned by current_user_ns() or an ancestor as nosuid.

This will make it safer to allow more complex filesystems to be
mounted in non-root user namespaces.

This does not remove the need for MNT_LOCK_NOSUID.  The setuid,
setgid, and file capability bits can no longer be abused if code in
a user namespace were to clear nosuid on an untrusted filesystem,
but this patch, by itself, is insufficient to protect the system
from abuse of files that, when execed, would increase MAC privilege.

As a more concrete explanation, any task that can manipulate a
vfsmount associated with a given user namespace already has
capabilities in that namespace and all of its descendents.  If they
can cause a malicious setuid, setgid, or file-caps executable to
appear in that mount, then that executable will only allow them to
elevate privileges in exactly the set of namespaces in which they
are already privileges.

On the other hand, if they can cause a malicious executable to
appear with a dangerous MAC label, running it could change the
caller's security context in a way that should not have been
possible, even inside the namespace in which the task is confined.

As a hardening measure, this would have made CVE-2014-5207 much
more difficult to exploit.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

Unprivileged users should not be able to mount block devices when
they lack sufficient privileges towards the block device inode.
Update blkdev_get_by_path() to validate that the user has the
required access to the inode at the specified path. The check
will be skipped for CAP_SYS_ADMIN, so privileged mounts will
continue working as before.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

When looking up a block device by path no permission check is
done to verify that the user has access to the block device inode
at the specified path. In some cases it may be necessary to
check permissions towards the inode, such as allowing
unprivileged users to mount block devices in user namespaces.

Add an argument to lookup_bdev() to optionally perform this
permission check. A value of 0 skips the permission check and
behaves the same as before. A non-zero value specifies the mask
of access rights required towards the inode at the specified
path. The check is always skipped if the user has CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

All callers of lookup_bdev() currently pass a mask of 0, so this
patch results in no functional change. Subsequent patches will
add permission checks where appropriate.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

Both of these filesystems already have use cases for mounting the
same super block from multiple user namespaces. For sysfs this
happens when using criu for snapshotting a container, where sysfs
is mounted in the containers network ns but the hosts user ns.
The cgroup filesystem shares the same super block for all mounts
of the same hierarchy regardless of the namespace.

As a result, the restriction on mounting a super block from a
single user namespace creates regressions for existing uses of
these filesystems. For these specific filesystems this
restriction isn't really necessary since the backing store is
objects in kernel memory and thus the ids assigned from inodes
is not subject to translation relative to s_user_ns.

Add a new filesystem flag, FS_USERNS_SHARE_SB, which when set
causes sget_userns() to skip the check of s_user_ns. Set this
flag for the sysfs and cgroup filesystems to fix the
regressions.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>

fs_fully_visible() ignores MNT_LOCK_NODEV when FS_USERS_DEV_MOUNT
is not set for the filesystem, but there is a bug in the logic
that may cause mounting to fail. It is doing this only when the
existing mount is not in init_user_ns but should check the new
mount instead. But the new mount is always in a non-init
namespace when fs_fully_visible() is called, so that condition
can simply be removed.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>

We probably need to fix superblock leak in patch (v4 "fs: Add user
namesapace member to struct super_block"):

Imagine posible code path in sget_userns: we iterate through
type->fs_supers and do not find suitable sb, we drop sb_lock to
allocate s and go to retry. After we dropped sb_lock some other
task from different userns takes sb_lock, it is already in retry
stage and has s allocated, so it puts its s in type->fs_supers
list. So in retry we will find these sb in list and check it has
a different userns, and finally we will return without freeing s.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>

Security labels from unprivileged mounts cannot be trusted.
Ideally for these mounts we would assign the objects in the
filesystem the same label as the inode for the backing device
passed to mount. Unfortunately it's currently impossible to
determine which inode this is from the LSM mount hooks, so we
settle for the label of the process doing the mount.

This label is assigned to s_root, and also to smk_default to
ensure that new inodes receive this label. The transmute property
is also set on s_root to make this behavior more explicit, even
though it is technically not necessary.

If a filesystem has existing security labels, access to inodes is
permitted if the label is the same as smk_root, otherwise access
is denied. The SMACK64EXEC xattr is completely ignored.

Explicit setting of security labels continues to require
CAP_MAC_ADMIN in init_user_ns.

Altogether, this ensures that filesystem objects are not
accessible to subjects which cannot already access the backing
store, that MAC is not violated for any objects in the fileystem
which are already labeled, and that a user cannot use an
unprivileged mount to gain elevated MAC privileges.

sysfs, tmpfs, and ramfs are already mountable from user
namespaces and support security labels. We can't rule out the
possibility that these filesystems may already be used in mounts
from user namespaces with security lables set from the init
namespace, so failing to trust lables in these filesystems may
introduce regressions. It is safe to trust labels from these
filesystems, since the unprivileged user does not control the
backing store and thus cannot supply security labels, so an
explicit exception is made to trust labels from these
filesystems.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Capability sets attached to files must be ignored except in the
user namespaces where the mounter is privileged, i.e. s_user_ns
and its descendants. Otherwise a vector exists for gaining
privileges in namespaces where a user is not already privileged.

Add a new helper function, in_user_ns(), to test whether a user
namespace is the same as or a descendant of another namespace.
Use this helper to determine whether a file's capability set
should be applied to the caps constructed during exec.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

- Consolidate the testing if a device node may be opened in a new
  function may_open_dev.

- Move the check for allowing access to device nodes on filesystems
  not mounted in the initial user namespace from mount time to open
  time and include it in may_open_dev.

This set of changes removes the implicit adding of MNT_NODEV which
simplifies the logic in fs/namespace.c and removes a potentially
problematic difference in how normal and unprivileged mount
namespaces work.  This is a user visible change in behavior for
remount in unpriviliged mount namespaces but is unlikely to cause
problems for existing software.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Initially this will be used to eliminate the implicit MNT_NODEV
flag for mounts from user namespaces. In the future it will also
be used for translating ids and checking capabilities for
filesystems mounted from user namespaces.

s_user_ns is initialized in alloc_super() and is generally set to
current_user_ns(). To avoid security and corruption issues, two
additional mount checks are also added:

 - do_new_mount() gains a check that the user has CAP_SYS_ADMIN
   in current_user_ns().

 - sget() will fail with EBUSY when the filesystem it's looking
   for is already mounted from another user namespace.

proc requires some special handling. The user namespace of
current isn't appropriate when forking as a result of clone (2)
with CLONE_NEWPID|CLONE_NEWUSER, as it will set s_user_ns to the
namespace of the parent and make proc unmountable in the new user
namespace. Instead, the user namespace which owns the new pid
namespace is used. sget_userns() is allowed to allow passing in
a namespace other than that of current, and sget becomes a
wrapper around sget_userns() which passes current_user_ns().

Changes to original version of this patch
  * Documented @user_ns in sget_userns, alloc_super and fs.h
  * Kept an blank line in fs.h
  * Removed unncessary include of user_namespace.h from fs.h
  * Tweaked the location of get_user_ns and put_user_ns so
    the security modules can (if they wish) depend on it.
  -- EWB
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Pull device mapper fix from Mike Snitzer:
 "Fix for earlier 4.6-rc4 stable@ commit that introduced improper use of
  write lock in cmd_read_lock() -- due to cut-n-paste gone awry (and
  sparse didn't catch it)"

* tag 'dm-4.6-fix-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm:
  dm cache metadata: fix cmd_read_lock() acquiring write lock

Commit 9567366f ("dm cache metadata: fix READ_LOCK macros and
cleanup WRITE_LOCK macros") uses down_write() instead of down_read() in
cmd_read_lock(), yet up_read() is used to release the lock in
READ_UNLOCK().  Fix it.

Fixes: 9567366f ("dm cache metadata: fix READ_LOCK macros and cleanup WRITE_LOCK macros")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ahmed Samy <f.fallen45@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>

Pull char/misc fixes from Greg KH:
 "Here are some small char/misc driver fixes for 4.6-rc4.  Full details
  are in the shortlog, nothing major here.

  These have all been in linux-next for a while with no reported issues"

* tag 'char-misc-4.6-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc:
  lkdtm: do not leak free page on kmalloc failure
  lkdtm: fix memory leak of base
  lkdtm: fix memory leak of val
  extcon: palmas: Drop stray IRQF_EARLY_RESUME flag

Pull misc fixes from Greg KH:
 "Here are three small fixes for 4.6-rc4.

  Two fix up some lz4 issues with big endian systems, and the remaining
  one resolves a minor debugfs issue that was reported.

  All have been in linux-next with no reported issues"

* tag 'driver-core-4.6-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core:
  lib: lz4: cleanup unaligned access efficiency detection
  lib: lz4: fixed zram with lz4 on big endian machines
  debugfs: Make automount point inodes permanently empty

Pull USB driver fixes from Greg KH:
 "Here are some small USB fixes for 4.6-rc4.

  Mostly xhci fixes for reported issues, a UAS bug that has hit a number
  of people, including stable tree users, and a few other minor things.

  All have been in linux-next for a while with no reported issues"

* tag 'usb-4.6-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb:
  usb: hcd: out of bounds access in for_each_companion
  USB: uas: Add a new NO_REPORT_LUNS quirk
  USB: uas: Limit qdepth at the scsi-host level
  doc: usb: Fix typo in gadget_multi documentation
  usb: host: xhci-plat: Make enum xhci_plat_type start at a non zero value
  xhci: fix 10 second timeout on removal of PCI hotpluggable xhci controllers
  usb: xhci: fix wild pointers in xhci_mem_cleanup
  usb: host: xhci-plat: fix cannot work if R-Car Gen2/3 run on above 4GB phys
  usb: host: xhci: add a new quirk XHCI_NO_64BIT_SUPPORT
  xhci: resume USB 3 roothub first
  usb: xhci: applying XHCI_PME_STUCK_QUIRK to Intel BXT B0 host
  cdc-acm: fix crash if flushed with nothing buffered

Pull dmaengine fixes from Vinod Koul:
 "This time we have some odd fixes in hsu, edma, omap and xilinx.

  Usual fixes and nothing special"

* tag 'dmaengine-fix-4.6-rc4' of git://git.infradead.org/users/vkoul/slave-dma:
  dmaengine: dw: fix master selection
  dmaengine: edma: special case slot limit workaround
  dmaengine: edma: Remove dynamic TPTC power management feature
  dmaengine: vdma: don't crash when bad channel is requested
  dmaengine: omap-dma: Do not suppress interrupts for memcpy
  dmaengine: omap-dma: Fix polled channel completion detection and handling
  dmaengine: hsu: correct use of channel status register
  dmaengine: hsu: correct residue calculation of active descriptor
  dmaengine: hsu: set HSU_CH_MTSR to memory width

Pull locking fixlet from Ingo Molnar:
 "Fixes a build warning on certain Kconfig combinations"

* 'locking-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  locking/lockdep: Fix print_collision() unused warning

Pull EFI fix from Ingo Molnar:
 "An arm64 boot crash fix"

* 'efi-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  efi/arm64: Don't apply MEMBLOCK_NOMAP to UEFI memory map mapping

Pull block fixes from Jens Axboe:
 "A few fixes for the current series. This contains:

   - Two fixes for NVMe:

     One fixes a reset race that can be triggered by repeated
     insert/removal of the module.

     The other fixes an issue on some platforms, where we get probe
     timeouts since legacy interrupts isn't working.  This used not to
     be a problem since we had the worker thread poll for completions,
     but since that was killed off, it means those poor souls can't
     successfully probe their NVMe device.  Use a proper IRQ check and
     probe (msi-x -> msi ->legacy), like most other drivers to work
     around this.  Both from Keith.

   - A loop corruption issue with offset in iters, from Ming Lei.

   - A fix for not having the partition stat per cpu ref count
     initialized before sending out the KOBJ_ADD, which could cause user
     space to access the counter prior to initialization.  Also from
     Ming Lei.

   - A fix for using the wrong congestion state, from Kaixu Xia"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
  block: loop: fix filesystem corruption in case of aio/dio
  NVMe: Always use MSI/MSI-x interrupts
  NVMe: Fix reset/remove race
  writeback: fix the wrong congested state variable definition
  block: partition: initialize percpuref before sending out KOBJ_ADD

Pull libnvdimm fixes from Ross Zwisler:
 "Two fixes:

   - Fix memcpy_from_pmem() to fallback to memcpy() for architectures
     where CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API=n.

   - Add a comment explaining why we write data twice when clearing
     poison in pmem_do_bvec().

  This has passed a boot test on an X86_32 config, which was the
  architecture where issue #1 above was first noticed"

Dan Williams adds:
 "We're giving this multi-maintainer setup a shot, so expect libnvdimm
  pull requests from either Ross or I going forward"

* 'libnvdimm-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm:
  libnvdimm, pmem: clarify the write+clear_poison+write flow
  pmem: fix BUG() error in pmem.h:48 on X86_32

Pull MTD fix from Brian Norris:
 "One MTD fix for v4.6-rc4:

  In the v4.4 cycle, we relaxed the requirement for assigning
  mtd->owner, but we didn't remove this error case.  It's hit only
  by drivers that are both:

   (a) using nand_scan() directly
  and
   (b) built as modules

  We haven't seen explicit complaints about this (most use cases don't
  fit one or both of the above), but we should definitely not be
  BUG()'ing here"

* tag 'for-linus-20160415' of git://git.infradead.org/linux-mtd:
  mtd: nand: Drop mtd.owner requirement in nand_scan

Pull MMC fixes from Ulf Hansson:
 "Here are a couple of mmc fixes intended for v4.6 rc4.

  Regarding the fix for the regression about mmcblk device indexes.  The
  approach taken to solve the problem seems to be good enough.  There
  were some discussions around the solution, but it seems like people
  were happy about it in the end.

  MMC core:
   - Restore similar old behaviour when assigning mmcblk device indexes

  MMC host:
   - tegra: Disable UHS-I modes for Tegra124 to fix regression"

* tag 'mmc-v4.6-rc3' of git://git.linaro.org/people/ulf.hansson/mmc:
  mmc: tegra: Disable UHS-I modes for Tegra124
  mmc: block: Use the mmc host device index as the mmcblk device index

Pull drm fixes from Dave Airlie:
 "This contains fixes for exynos, amdgpu, radeon, i915 and qxl.

  It also contains some fixes to the core drm edid parser.

  qxl:
   - fix for a cursor hotspot issue

  radeon:
   - some MST fixes that I've been running locally and make my monitor a
     bit happier

  exynos:
   - fix some regressions and build fixes

  amdgpu:
   - a couple of small fixes

  i915:
   - two DP MST fixes and a couple of other regression fixes

  Nothing too out of the ordinary or surprising at this point"

* 'drm-fixes' of git://people.freedesktop.org/~airlied/linux:
  drm/exynos: Use VIDEO_SAMSUNG_S5P_G2D=n as G2D Kconfig dependency
  drm/exynos: fix a warning message
  drm/exynos: mic: fix an error code
  drm/exynos: fimd: fix broken dp_clock control
  drm/exynos: build fbdev code conditionally
  drm/exynos: fix adjusted_mode pointer in exynos_plane_mode_set
  drm/exynos: fix error handling in exynos_drm_subdrv_open
  drm/amd/amdgpu: fix irq domain remove for tonga ih
  drm/i915: fix deadlock on lid open
  drm/radeon: use helper for mst connector dpms.
  drm/radeon/mst: port some MST setup code from DAL.
  drm/amdgpu: add invisible pin size statistic
  drm/edid: Fix DMT 1024x768@43Hz (interlaced) timings
  drm/i915: Exit cherryview_irq_handler() after one pass
  drm/i915: Call intel_dp_mst_resume() before resuming displays
  drm/i915: Fix race condition in intel_dp_destroy_mst_connector()
  drm/edid: Fix parsing of EDID 1.4 Established Timings III descriptor
  drm/edid: Fix EDID Established Timings I and II
  drm/qxl: fix cursor position with non-zero hotspot