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  1. 25 Oct, 2018 2 commits
  3. 22 Oct, 2018 8 commits
  5. 21 Oct, 2018 3 commits
  7. 20 Oct, 2018 11 commits
  9. 19 Oct, 2018 13 commits
  11. 18 Oct, 2018 3 commits
    • Stefano Brivio's avatar
      ip6_tunnel: Fix encapsulation layout · d4d576f5
      Stefano Brivio authored 
      Commit 058214a4 ("ip6_tun: Add infrastructure for doing
encapsulation") added the ip6_tnl_encap() call in ip6_tnl_xmit(), before
the call to ipv6_push_frag_opts() to append the IPv6 Tunnel Encapsulation
Limit option (option 4, RFC 2473, par. 5.1) to the outer IPv6 header.

As long as the option didn't actually end up in generated packets, this
wasn't an issue. Then commit 89a23c8b ("ip6_tunnel: Fix missing tunnel
encapsulation limit option") fixed sending of this option, and the
resulting layout, e.g. for FoU, is:

.-------------------.------------.----------.-------------------.----- - -
| Outer IPv6 Header | UDP header | Option 4 | Inner IPv6 Header | Payload
'-------------------'------------'----------'-------------------'----- - -

Needless to say, FoU and GUE (at least) won't work over IPv6. The option
is appended by default, and I couldn't find a way to disable it with the
current iproute2.

Turn this into a more reasonable:

.-------------------.----------.------------.-------------------.----- - -
| Outer IPv6 Header | Option 4 | UDP header | Inner IPv6 Header | Payload
'-------------------'----------'------------'-------------------'----- - -

With this, and with 84dad559 ("udp6: fix encap return code for
resubmitting"), FoU and GUE work again over IPv6.

Fixes: 058214a4 ("ip6_tun: Add infrastructure for doing encapsulation")
Signed-off-by: default avatarStefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      d4d576f5
    • Jon Maloy's avatar
      tipc: fix info leak from kernel tipc_event · b06f9d9f
      Jon Maloy authored 
      We initialize a struct tipc_event allocated on the kernel stack to
zero to avert info leak to user space.

Reported-by: syzbot+057458894bc8cada4dee@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: default avatarJon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      b06f9d9f
    • Wenwen Wang's avatar
      net: socket: fix a missing-check bug · b6168562
      Wenwen Wang authored 
      In ethtool_ioctl(), the ioctl command 'ethcmd' is checked through a switch
statement to see whether it is necessary to pre-process the ethtool
structure, because, as mentioned in the comment, the structure
ethtool_rxnfc is defined with padding. If yes, a user-space buffer 'rxnfc'
is allocated through compat_alloc_user_space(). One thing to note here is
that, if 'ethcmd' is ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL, the size of the buffer 'rxnfc' is
partially determined by 'rule_cnt', which is actually acquired from the
user-space buffer 'compat_rxnfc', i.e., 'compat_rxnfc->rule_cnt', through
get_user(). After 'rxnfc' is allocated, the data in the original user-space
buffer 'compat_rxnfc' is then copied to 'rxnfc' through copy_in_user(),
including the 'rule_cnt' field. However, after this copy, no check is
re-enforced on 'rxnfc->rule_cnt'. So it is possible that a malicious user
race to change the value in the 'compat_rxnfc->rule_cnt' between these two
copies. Through this way, the attacker can bypass the previous check on
'rule_cnt' and inject malicious data. This can cause undefined behavior of
the kernel and introduce potential security risk.

This patch avoids the above issue via copying the value acquired by
get_user() to 'rxnfc->rule_cn', if 'ethcmd' is ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL.
Signed-off-by: default avatarWenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      b6168562
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