- 07 Nov, 2014 40 commits
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Daniel Borkmann authored
commit 26b87c78 upstream. This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes in the form of ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------> [...] ---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------> ... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton, since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of chunks which it eats up one by one. We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may then turn it into a response flood when flushing the queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF serial numbers and could see the server side consuming excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more]. The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit 2e3216cd ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set, but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling. In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the side-effect interpreter run. One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible. I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to look good now. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: 2e3216cd ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet") Signed-off-by:
Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Reference: CVE-2014-3688 Signed-off-by:
Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
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Daniel Borkmann authored
commit b69040d8 upstream. When receiving a e.g. semi-good formed connection scan in the form of ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ---------------- ASCONF_a; ASCONF_b -----------------> ... where ASCONF_a equals ASCONF_b chunk (at least both serials need to be equal), we panic an SCTP server! The problem is that good-formed ASCONF chunks that we reply with ASCONF_ACK chunks are cached per serial. Thus, when we receive a same ASCONF chunk twice (e.g. through a lost ASCONF_ACK), we do not need to process them again on the server side (that was the idea, also proposed in the RFC). Instead, we know it was cached and we just resend the cached chunk instead. So far, so good. Where things get nasty is in SCTP's side effect interpreter, that is, sctp_cmd_interpreter(): While incoming ASCONF_a (chunk = event_arg) is being marked !end_of_packet and !singleton, and we have an association context, we do not flush the outqueue the first time after processing the ASCONF_ACK singleton chunk via SCTP_CMD_REPLY. Instead, we keep it queued up, although we set local_cork to 1. Commit 2e3216cd changed the precedence, so that as long as we get bundled, incoming chunks we try possible bundling on outgoing queue as well. Before this commit, we would just flush the output queue. Now, while ASCONF_a's ASCONF_ACK sits in the corked outq, we continue to process the same ASCONF_b chunk from the packet. As we have cached the previous ASCONF_ACK, we find it, grab it and do another SCTP_CMD_REPLY command on it. So, effectively, we rip the chunk->list pointers and requeue the same ASCONF_ACK chunk another time. Since we process ASCONF_b, it's correctly marked with end_of_packet and we enforce an uncork, and thus flush, thus crashing the kernel. Fix it by testing if the ASCONF_ACK is currently pending and if that is the case, do not requeue it. When flushing the output queue we may relink the chunk for preparing an outgoing packet, but eventually unlink it when it's copied into the skb right before transmission. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: 2e3216cd ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet") Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Borkmann authored
commit 9de7922b upstream. Commit 6f4c618d ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however, it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950 end:0x440 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129! [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp] [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp] [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter] [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60 This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for example, ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------> ... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ... 1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16) 2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255) ... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too. This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks could be used just as well. The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account. In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP address that is also the source address of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given skb. When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed with ... length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length); asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length; ... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time, which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length. Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and* in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over, that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and missized addresses. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: b896b82b ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.") Signed-off-by:
Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by:
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Lv Zheng authored
commit 79149001 upstream. It is reported that Samsung laptops that need to poll events are broken by the following commit: Commit 3afcf2ec Subject: ACPI / EC: Add support to disallow QR_EC to be issued when SCI_EVT isn't set The behaviors of the 2 vendor firmwares are conflict: 1. Acer: OSPM shouldn't issue QR_EC unless SCI_EVT is set, firmware automatically sets SCI_EVT as long as there is event queued up. 2. Samsung: OSPM should issue QR_EC whatever SCI_EVT is set, firmware returns 0 when there is no event queued up. This patch is a quick fix to distinguish the behaviors to make Acer behavior only effective for Acer EC firmware so that the breakages on Samsung EC firmware can be avoided. Fixes: 3afcf2ec (ACPI / EC: Add support to disallow QR_EC to be issued ...) Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=44161Reported-and-tested-by:
Ortwin Glück <odi@odi.ch> Signed-off-by:
Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com> [ rjw : Subject ] Signed-off-by:
Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Lv Zheng authored
commit 3afcf2ec upstream. There is a platform refusing to respond QR_EC when SCI_EVT isn't set (Acer Aspire V5-573G). Currently, we rely on the behaviour that the EC firmware can respond something (for example, 0x00 to indicate "no outstanding events") to QR_EC even when SCI_EVT is not set, but the reporter has complained about AC/battery pluging/unpluging and video brightness change delay on that platform. This is because the work item that has issued QR_EC has to wait until timeout in this case, and the _Qxx method evaluation work item queued after QR_EC one is delayed. It sounds reasonable to fix this issue by: 1. Implementing SCI_EVT sanity check before issuing QR_EC in the EC driver's main state machine. 2. Moving QR_EC issuing out of the work queue used by _Qxx evaluation to a seperate IRQ handling thread. This patch fixes this issue using solution 1. By disallowing QR_EC to be issued when SCI_EVT isn't set, we are able to handle such platform in the EC driver's main state machine. This patch enhances the state machine in this way to survive with such malfunctioning EC firmware. Note that this patch can also fix CLEAR_ON_RESUME quirk which also relies on the assumption that the platforms are able to respond even when SCI_EVT isn't set. Fixes: c0d65341 ACPI / EC: Fix race condition in ec_transaction_completed() Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=82611Reported-and-tested-by:
Alexander Mezin <mezin.alexander@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Andy Lutomirski authored
commit 653bc77a upstream. Rusty noticed a Really Bad Bug (tm) in my NT fix. The entry code reads out of bounds, causing the NT fix to be unreliable. But, and this is much, much worse, if your stack is somehow just below the top of the direct map (or a hole), you read out of bounds and crash. Excerpt from the crash: [ 1.129513] RSP: 0018:ffff88001da4bf88 EFLAGS: 00010296 2b:* f7 84 24 90 00 00 00 testl $0x4000,0x90(%rsp) That read is deterministically above the top of the stack. I thought I even single-stepped through this code when I wrote it to check the offset, but I clearly screwed it up. Fixes: 8c7aa698 ("x86_64, entry: Filter RFLAGS.NT on entry from userspace") Reported-by:
Rusty Russell <rusty@ozlabs.org> Signed-off-by:
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Rabin Vincent authored
commit 086ba77a upstream. ARM has some private syscalls (for example, set_tls(2)) which lie outside the range of NR_syscalls. If any of these are called while syscall tracing is being performed, out-of-bounds array access will occur in the ftrace and perf sys_{enter,exit} handlers. # trace-cmd record -e raw_syscalls:* true && trace-cmd report ... true-653 [000] 384.675777: sys_enter: NR 192 (0, 1000, 3, 4000022, ffffffff, 0) true-653 [000] 384.675812: sys_exit: NR 192 = 1995915264 true-653 [000] 384.675971: sys_enter: NR 983045 (76f74480, 76f74000, 76f74b28, 76f74480, 76f76f74, 1) true-653 [000] 384.675988: sys_exit: NR 983045 = 0 ... # trace-cmd record -e syscalls:* true [ 17.289329] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address aaaaaace [ 17.289590] pgd = 9e71c000 [ 17.289696] [aaaaaace] *pgd=00000000 [ 17.289985] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM [ 17.290169] Modules linked in: [ 17.290391] CPU: 0 PID: 704 Comm: true Not tainted 3.18.0-rc2+ #21 [ 17.290585] task: 9f4dab00 ti: 9e710000 task.ti: 9e710000 [ 17.290747] PC is at ftrace_syscall_enter+0x48/0x1f8 [ 17.290866] LR is at syscall_trace_enter+0x124/0x184 Fix this by ignoring out-of-NR_syscalls-bounds syscall numbers. Commit cd0980fc "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls" added the check for less than zero, but it should have also checked for greater than NR_syscalls. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/1414620418-29472-1-git-send-email-rabin@rab.in Fixes: cd0980fc "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls" Signed-off-by:
Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in> Signed-off-by:
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Rannaud authored
commit 69a91c23 upstream. The man page for open(2) indicates that when O_CREAT is specified, the 'mode' argument applies only to future accesses to the file: Note that this mode applies only to future accesses of the newly created file; the open() call that creates a read-only file may well return a read/write file descriptor. The man page for open(2) implies that 'mode' is treated identically by O_CREAT and O_TMPFILE. O_TMPFILE, however, behaves differently: int fd = open("/tmp", O_TMPFILE | O_RDWR, 0); assert(fd == -1); assert(errno == EACCES); int fd = open("/tmp", O_TMPFILE | O_RDWR, 0600); assert(fd > 0); For O_CREAT, do_last() sets acc_mode to MAY_OPEN only: if (*opened & FILE_CREATED) { /* Don't check for write permission, don't truncate */ open_flag &= ~O_TRUNC; will_truncate = false; acc_mode = MAY_OPEN; path_to_nameidata(path, nd); goto finish_open_created; } But for O_TMPFILE, do_tmpfile() passes the full op->acc_mode to may_open(). This patch lines up the behavior of O_TMPFILE with O_CREAT. After the inode is created, may_open() is called with acc_mode = MAY_OPEN, in do_tmpfile(). A different, but related glibc bug revealed the discrepancy: https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=17523 The glibc lazily loads the 'mode' argument of open() and openat() using va_arg() only if O_CREAT is present in 'flags' (to support both the 2 argument and the 3 argument forms of open; same idea for openat()). However, the glibc ignores the 'mode' argument if O_TMPFILE is in 'flags'. On x86_64, for open(), it magically works anyway, as 'mode' is in RDX when entering open(), and is still in RDX on SYSCALL, which is where the kernel looks for the 3rd argument of a syscall. But openat() is not quite so lucky: 'mode' is in RCX when entering the glibc wrapper for openat(), while the kernel looks for the 4th argument of a syscall in R10. Indeed, the syscall calling convention differs from the regular calling convention in this respect on x86_64. So the kernel sees mode = 0 when trying to use glibc openat() with O_TMPFILE, and fails with EACCES. Signed-off-by:
Eric Rannaud <e@nanocritical.com> Acked-by:
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Cyril Brulebois authored
commit 664d6a79 upstream. 0x1b75 0xa200 AirLive WN-200USB wireless 11b/g/n dongle References: https://bugs.debian.org/766802Reported-by:
Martin Mokrejs <mmokrejs@fold.natur.cuni.cz> Signed-off-by:
Cyril Brulebois <kibi@debian.org> Acked-by:
Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by:
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
commit d8e7d53a upstream. Back in commit 5136b2da ("PCI: convert bus code to use dev_groups"), I misstyped the 'enable' sysfs filename as 'enabled', which broke the userspace API. This patch fixes that issue by renaming the file back. Fixes: 5136b2da ("PCI: convert bus code to use dev_groups") Reported-by:
Jeff Epler <jepler@unpythonic.net> Tested-by: Jeff Epler <jepler@unpythonic.net> # on v3.14-rt Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jan Kara authored
commit 6050d47a upstream. When ext4_handle_dirty_dx_node() or ext4_handle_dirty_dirent_node() fail, there's really something wrong with the fs and there's no point in continuing further. Just return error from make_indexed_dir() in that case. Also initialize frames array so that if we return early due to error, dx_release() doesn't try to dereference uninitialized memory (which could happen also due to error in do_split()). Coverity-id: 741300 Signed-off-by:
Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> [ kamal: backport to 3.13-stable: context ] Signed-off-by:
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Darrick J. Wong authored
commit 98c1a759 upstream. If metadata checksumming is turned on for the FS, we need to tell the journal to use checksumming too. Signed-off-by:
Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jan Kara authored
commit 599a9b77 upstream. When we fail to load block bitmap in __ext4_new_inode() we will dereference NULL pointer in ext4_journal_get_write_access(). So check for error from ext4_read_block_bitmap(). Coverity-id: 989065 Signed-off-by:
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Jan Kara authored
commit 9378c676 upstream. When there are no meta block groups update_backups() will compute the backup block in 32-bit arithmetics thus possibly overflowing the block number and corrupting the filesystem. OTOH filesystems without meta block groups larger than 16 TB should be rare. Fix the problem by doing the counting in 64-bit arithmetics. Coverity-id: 741252 Signed-off-by:
Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jan Kara authored
commit ea5d05b3 upstream. If __bitmap_shift_left() or __bitmap_shift_right() are asked to shift by a multiple of BITS_PER_LONG, they will try to shift a long value by BITS_PER_LONG bits which is undefined. Change the functions to avoid the undefined shift. Coverity id: 1192175 Coverity id: 1192174 Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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David Rientjes authored
commit 6d50e60c upstream. If an anonymous mapping is not allowed to fault thp memory and then madvise(MADV_HUGEPAGE) is used after fault, khugepaged will never collapse this memory into thp memory. This occurs because the madvise(2) handler for thp, hugepage_madvise(), clears VM_NOHUGEPAGE on the stack and it isn't stored in vma->vm_flags until the final action of madvise_behavior(). This causes the khugepaged_enter_vma_merge() to be a no-op in hugepage_madvise() when the vma had previously had VM_NOHUGEPAGE set. Fix this by passing the correct vma flags to the khugepaged mm slot handler. There's no chance khugepaged can run on this vma until after madvise_behavior() returns since we hold mm->mmap_sem. It would be possible to clear VM_NOHUGEPAGE directly from vma->vm_flags in hugepage_advise(), but I didn't want to introduce special case behavior into madvise_behavior(). I think it's best to just let it always set vma->vm_flags itself. Signed-off-by:
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Reported-by:
Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Yu Zhao authored
commit 5ddacbe9 upstream. Compound page should be freed by put_page() or free_pages() with correct order. Not doing so will cause tail pages leaked. The compound order can be obtained by compound_order() or use HPAGE_PMD_ORDER in our case. Some people would argue the latter is faster but I prefer the former which is more general. This bug was observed not just on our servers (the worst case we saw is 11G leaked on a 48G machine) but also on our workstations running Ubuntu based distro. $ cat /proc/vmstat | grep thp_zero_page_alloc thp_zero_page_alloc 55 thp_zero_page_alloc_failed 0 This means there is (thp_zero_page_alloc - 1) * (2M - 4K) memory leaked. Fixes: 97ae1749 ("thp: implement refcounting for huge zero page") Signed-off-by:
Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com> Acked-by:
Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Bob Liu <lliubbo@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Wang Nan authored
commit 401507d6 upstream. Commit ff7ee93f ("cgroup/kmemleak: Annotate alloc_page() for cgroup allocations") introduces kmemleak_alloc() for alloc_page_cgroup(), but corresponding kmemleak_free() is missing, which makes kmemleak be wrongly disabled after memory offlining. Log is pasted at the end of this commit message. This patch add kmemleak_free() into free_page_cgroup(). During page offlining, this patch removes corresponding entries in kmemleak rbtree. After that, the freed memory can be allocated again by other subsystems without killing kmemleak. bash # for x in 1 2 3 4; do echo offline > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory$x/state ; sleep 1; done ; dmesg | grep leak Offlined Pages 32768 kmemleak: Cannot insert 0xffff880016969000 into the object search tree (overlaps existing) CPU: 0 PID: 412 Comm: sleep Not tainted 3.17.0-rc5+ #86 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x46/0x58 create_object+0x266/0x2c0 kmemleak_alloc+0x26/0x50 kmem_cache_alloc+0xd3/0x160 __sigqueue_alloc+0x49/0xd0 __send_signal+0xcb/0x410 send_signal+0x45/0x90 __group_send_sig_info+0x13/0x20 do_notify_parent+0x1bb/0x260 do_exit+0x767/0xa40 do_group_exit+0x44/0xa0 SyS_exit_group+0x17/0x20 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b kmemleak: Kernel memory leak detector disabled kmemleak: Object 0xffff880016900000 (size 524288): kmemleak: comm "swapper/0", pid 0, jiffies 4294667296 kmemleak: min_count = 0 kmemleak: count = 0 kmemleak: flags = 0x1 kmemleak: checksum = 0 kmemleak: backtrace: log_early+0x63/0x77 kmemleak_alloc+0x4b/0x50 init_section_page_cgroup+0x7f/0xf5 page_cgroup_init+0xc5/0xd0 start_kernel+0x333/0x408 x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c x86_64_start_kernel+0xf5/0xfc Fixes: ff7ee93f (cgroup/kmemleak: Annotate alloc_page() for cgroup allocations) Signed-off-by:
Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com> Acked-by:
Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Acked-by:
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by:
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Dexuan Cui authored
commit d1cd1210 upstream. pte_pfn() returns a PFN of long (32 bits in 32-PAE), so "long << PAGE_SHIFT" will overflow for PFNs above 4GB. Due to this issue, some Linux 32-PAE distros, running as guests on Hyper-V, with 5GB memory assigned, can't load the netvsc driver successfully and hence the synthetic network device can't work (we can use the kernel parameter mem=3000M to work around the issue). Cast pte_pfn() to phys_addr_t before shifting. Fixes: "commit d7656534: x86, mm: Create slow_virt_to_phys()" Signed-off-by:
Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com> Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: olaf@aepfle.de Cc: apw@canonical.com Cc: jasowang@redhat.com Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com Cc: riel@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1414580017-27444-1-git-send-email-decui@microsoft.comSigned-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
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Alex Deucher authored
commit 8c3e4347 upstream. 0x4c6e is a secondary device id so should not be used by the driver. Noticed-by:
Mark Kettenis <mark.kettenis@xs4all.nl> Signed-off-by:
Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
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Alex Deucher authored
commit 72b3f918 upstream. - bapm seems to cause CPU stuck messages so disable it. - nb dpm seems to prevent GPU dpm from getting enabled, so disable it. bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85107Signed-off-by:
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Alex Deucher authored
commit 6fa45593 upstream. Causes problems on some boards. bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=82889Signed-off-by:
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Dmitry Kasatkin authored
commit 3b1deef6 upstream. evm_inode_setxattr() can be called with no value. The function does not check the length so that following command can be used to produce the kernel oops: setfattr -n security.evm FOO. This patch fixes it. Changes in v3: * there is no reason to return different error codes for EVM_XATTR_HMAC and non EVM_XATTR_HMAC. Remove unnecessary test then. Changes in v2: * testing for validity of xattr type [ 1106.396921] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 1106.398192] IP: [<ffffffff812af7b8>] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48 [ 1106.399244] PGD 29048067 PUD 290d7067 PMD 0 [ 1106.399953] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 1106.400020] Modules linked in: bridge stp llc evdev serio_raw i2c_piix4 button fuse [ 1106.400020] CPU: 0 PID: 3635 Comm: setxattr Not tainted 3.16.0-kds+ #2936 [ 1106.400020] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 [ 1106.400020] task: ffff8800291a0000 ti: ffff88002917c000 task.ti: ffff88002917c000 [ 1106.400020] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812af7b8>] [<ffffffff812af7b8>] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48 [ 1106.400020] RSP: 0018:ffff88002917fd50 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 1106.400020] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88002917fdf8 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1106.400020] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff818136d3 RDI: ffff88002917fdf8 [ 1106.400020] RBP: ffff88002917fd68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000003ec1df [ 1106.400020] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8800438a0a00 [ 1106.400020] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 1106.400020] FS: 00007f7dfa7d7740(0000) GS:ffff88005da00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1106.400020] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1106.400020] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000003763e000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 1106.400020] Stack: [ 1106.400020] ffff8800438a0a00 ffff88002917fdf8 0000000000000000 ffff88002917fd98 [ 1106.400020] ffffffff812a1030 ffff8800438a0a00 ffff88002917fdf8 0000000000000000 [ 1106.400020] 0000000000000000 ffff88002917fde0 ffffffff8116d08a ffff88002917fdc8 [ 1106.400020] Call Trace: [ 1106.400020] [<ffffffff812a1030>] security_inode_setxattr+0x5d/0x6a [ 1106.400020] [<ffffffff8116d08a>] vfs_setxattr+0x6b/0x9f [ 1106.400020] [<ffffffff8116d1e0>] setxattr+0x122/0x16c [ 1106.400020] [<ffffffff811687e8>] ? mnt_want_write+0x21/0x45 [ 1106.400020] [<ffffffff8114d011>] ? __sb_start_write+0x10f/0x143 [ 1106.400020] [<ffffffff811687e8>] ? mnt_want_write+0x21/0x45 [ 1106.400020] [<ffffffff811687c0>] ? __mnt_want_write+0x48/0x4f [ 1106.400020] [<ffffffff8116d3e6>] SyS_setxattr+0x6e/0xb0 [ 1106.400020] [<ffffffff81529da9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 1106.400020] Code: c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 55 49 89 d5 41 54 49 89 fc 53 48 89 f3 48 c7 c6 d3 36 81 81 48 89 df e8 18 22 04 00 85 c0 75 07 <41> 80 7d 00 02 74 0d 48 89 de 4c 89 e7 e8 5a fe ff ff eb 03 83 [ 1106.400020] RIP [<ffffffff812af7b8>] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48 [ 1106.400020] RSP <ffff88002917fd50> [ 1106.400020] CR2: 0000000000000000 [ 1106.428061] ---[ end trace ae08331628ba3050 ]--- Reported-by:
Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by:
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Dmitry Kasatkin authored
commit a48fda9d upstream. ima_inode_setxattr() can be called with no value. Function does not check the length so that following command can be used to produce kernel oops: setfattr -n security.ima FOO. This patch fixes it. Changes in v3: * for stable reverted "allow setting hash only in fix or log mode" It will be a separate patch. Changes in v2: * testing validity of xattr type * allow setting hash only in fix or log mode (Mimi) [ 261.562522] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 261.564109] IP: [<ffffffff812af272>] ima_inode_setxattr+0x3e/0x5a [ 261.564109] PGD 3112f067 PUD 42965067 PMD 0 [ 261.564109] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 261.564109] Modules linked in: bridge stp llc evdev serio_raw i2c_piix4 button fuse [ 261.564109] CPU: 0 PID: 3299 Comm: setxattr Not tainted 3.16.0-kds+ #2924 [ 261.564109] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 [ 261.564109] task: ffff8800428c2430 ti: ffff880042be0000 task.ti: ffff880042be0000 [ 261.564109] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812af272>] [<ffffffff812af272>] ima_inode_setxattr+0x3e/0x5a [ 261.564109] RSP: 0018:ffff880042be3d50 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 261.564109] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000015 [ 261.564109] RDX: 0000001500000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8800375cc600 [ 261.564109] RBP: ffff880042be3d68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000004d6256 [ 261.564109] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88002149ba00 [ 261.564109] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 261.564109] FS: 00007f6c1e219740(0000) GS:ffff88005da00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 261.564109] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 261.564109] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000003b35a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 261.564109] Stack: [ 261.564109] ffff88002149ba00 ffff880042be3df8 0000000000000000 ffff880042be3d98 [ 261.564109] ffffffff812a101b ffff88002149ba00 ffff880042be3df8 0000000000000000 [ 261.564109] 0000000000000000 ffff880042be3de0 ffffffff8116d08a ffff880042be3dc8 [ 261.564109] Call Trace: [ 261.564109] [<ffffffff812a101b>] security_inode_setxattr+0x48/0x6a [ 261.564109] [<ffffffff8116d08a>] vfs_setxattr+0x6b/0x9f [ 261.564109] [<ffffffff8116d1e0>] setxattr+0x122/0x16c [ 261.564109] [<ffffffff811687e8>] ? mnt_want_write+0x21/0x45 [ 261.564109] [<ffffffff8114d011>] ? __sb_start_write+0x10f/0x143 [ 261.564109] [<ffffffff811687e8>] ? mnt_want_write+0x21/0x45 [ 261.564109] [<ffffffff811687c0>] ? __mnt_want_write+0x48/0x4f [ 261.564109] [<ffffffff8116d3e6>] SyS_setxattr+0x6e/0xb0 [ 261.564109] [<ffffffff81529da9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 261.564109] Code: 48 89 f7 48 c7 c6 58 36 81 81 53 31 db e8 73 27 04 00 85 c0 75 28 bf 15 00 00 00 e8 8a a5 d9 ff 84 c0 75 05 83 cb ff eb 15 31 f6 <41> 80 7d 00 03 49 8b 7c 24 68 40 0f 94 c6 e8 e1 f9 ff ff 89 d8 [ 261.564109] RIP [<ffffffff812af272>] ima_inode_setxattr+0x3e/0x5a [ 261.564109] RSP <ffff880042be3d50> [ 261.564109] CR2: 0000000000000000 [ 261.599998] ---[ end trace 39a89a3fc267e652 ]--- Reported-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
commit 317168d0 upstream. In compat mode, we copy each field of snd_pcm_status struct but don't touch the reserved fields, and this leaves uninitialized values there. Meanwhile the native ioctl does zero-clear the whole structure, so we should follow the same rule in compat mode, too. Reported-by:
Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Imre Deak authored
commit 94fb823f upstream. If a device's dev_pm_ops::freeze callback fails during the QUIESCE phase, we don't rollback things correctly calling the thaw and complete callbacks. This could leave some devices in a suspended state in case of an error during resuming from hibernation. Signed-off-by:
Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Brian Silverman authored
commit 30a6b803 upstream. free_pi_state and exit_pi_state_list both clean up futex_pi_state's. exit_pi_state_list takes the hb lock first, and most callers of free_pi_state do too. requeue_pi doesn't, which means free_pi_state can free the pi_state out from under exit_pi_state_list. For example: task A | task B exit_pi_state_list | pi_state = | curr->pi_state_list->next | | futex_requeue(requeue_pi=1) | // pi_state is the same as | // the one in task A | free_pi_state(pi_state) | list_del_init(&pi_state->list) | kfree(pi_state) list_del_init(&pi_state->list) | Move the free_pi_state calls in requeue_pi to before it drops the hb locks which it's already holding. [ tglx: Removed a pointless free_pi_state() call and the hb->lock held debugging. The latter comes via a seperate patch ] Signed-off-by:
Brian Silverman <bsilver16384@gmail.com> Cc: austin.linux@gmail.com Cc: darren@dvhart.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1414282837-23092-1-git-send-email-bsilver16384@gmail.comSigned-off-by:
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Mathias Krause authored
commit 6891c450 upstream. If userland creates a timer without specifying a sigevent info, we'll create one ourself, using a stack local variable. Particularly will we use the timer ID as sival_int. But as sigev_value is a union containing a pointer and an int, that assignment will only partially initialize sigev_value on systems where the size of a pointer is bigger than the size of an int. On such systems we'll copy the uninitialized stack bytes from the timer_create() call to userland when the timer actually fires and we're going to deliver the signal. Initialize sigev_value with 0 to plug the stack info leak. Found in the PaX patch, written by the PaX Team. Fixes: 5a9fa730 ("posix-timers: kill ->it_sigev_signo and...") Signed-off-by:
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1412456799-32339-1-git-send-email-minipli@googlemail.comSigned-off-by:
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Hans de Goede authored
commit 993b3a3f upstream. These models need i8042.notimeout, otherwise the touchpad will not work. BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=69731 BugLink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1111138Signed-off-by:
Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jack Pham authored
commit 1200a82a upstream. On ISOC endpoints the last trb_pool entry used as a LINK TRB is not getting zeroed out correctly due to memset being called incorrectly and in the wrong place. If pool allocated from DMA was not zero-initialized to begin with this will result in the size and ctrl values being random garbage. Call memset correctly after assignment of the trb_link pointer. Fixes: f6bafc6a ("usb: dwc3: convert TRBs into bitshifts") Signed-off-by:
Jack Pham <jackp@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by:
Felipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com> Signed-off-by:
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Emmanuel Grumbach authored
commit 1ffde699 upstream. This reverts commit aa11bbf3. This commit was causing connection issues and is not needed if IWL_MVM_RS_RSSI_BASED_INIT_RATE is set to false by default. Regardless of the issues mentioned above, this patch added the following WARNING: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3946 at drivers/net/wireless/iwlwifi/mvm/tx.c:190 iwl_mvm_set_tx_params+0x60a/0x6f0 [iwlmvm]() Got an HT rate for a non data frame 0x8 CPU: 0 PID: 3946 Comm: wpa_supplicant Tainted: G O 3.17.0+ #6 Hardware name: LENOVO 20ANCTO1WW/20ANCTO1WW, BIOS GLET71WW (2.25 ) 07/02/2014 0000000000000009 ffffffff814fa911 ffff8804288db8f8 ffffffff81064f52 0000000000001808 ffff8804288db948 ffff88040add8660 ffff8804291b5600 0000000000000000 ffffffff81064fb7 ffffffffa07b73d0 0000000000000020 Call Trace: [<ffffffff814fa911>] ? dump_stack+0x41/0x51 [<ffffffff81064f52>] ? warn_slowpath_common+0x72/0x90 [<ffffffff81064fb7>] ? warn_slowpath_fmt+0x47/0x50 [<ffffffffa07a39ea>] ? iwl_mvm_set_tx_params+0x60a/0x6f0 [iwlmvm] [<ffffffffa07a3cf8>] ? iwl_mvm_tx_skb+0x48/0x3c0 [iwlmvm] [<ffffffffa079cb9b>] ? iwl_mvm_mac_tx+0x7b/0x180 [iwlmvm] [<ffffffffa0746ce9>] ? __ieee80211_tx+0x2b9/0x3c0 [mac80211] [<ffffffffa07492f3>] ? ieee80211_tx+0xb3/0x100 [mac80211] [<ffffffffa0749c49>] ? ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x459/0xca0 [mac80211] [<ffffffff814116e7>] ? dev_hard_start_xmit+0x337/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81430d46>] ? sch_direct_xmit+0x96/0x1f0 [<ffffffff81411ba3>] ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x203/0x4f0 [<ffffffff8142f670>] ? ether_setup+0x70/0x70 [<ffffffff814e96a1>] ? packet_sendmsg+0xf81/0x1110 [<ffffffff8140625c>] ? skb_free_datagram+0xc/0x40 [<ffffffff813f7538>] ? sock_sendmsg+0x88/0xc0 [<ffffffff813f7274>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x14/0x60 [<ffffffff811c47c2>] ? __inode_wait_for_writeback+0x62/0xb0 [<ffffffff813f7a91>] ? SYSC_sendto+0xf1/0x180 [<ffffffff813f88f9>] ? __sys_recvmsg+0x39/0x70 [<ffffffff8150066d>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f ---[ end trace cc19a150d311fc63 ]--- which was reported here: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85691Signed-off-by:
Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Emmanuel Grumbach authored
commit a0855054 upstream. When mac80211 wants to ensure that a frame is sent, it calls the flush() callback. Until now, iwldvm implemented this by waiting that all the frames are sent (ACKed or timeout). In case of weak signal, this can take a significant amount of time, delaying the next connection (in case of roaming). Many users have reported that the flush would take too long leading to the following error messages to be printed: iwlwifi 0000:03:00.0: fail to flush all tx fifo queues Q 2 iwlwifi 0000:03:00.0: Current SW read_ptr 161 write_ptr 201 iwl data: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fe ff 01 00 00 00 00 00 [snip] iwlwifi 0000:03:00.0: FH TRBs(0) = 0x00000000 [snip] iwlwifi 0000:03:00.0: Q 0 is active and mapped to fifo 3 ra_tid 0x0000 [9,9] [snip] Instead of waiting for these packets, simply drop them. This significantly improves the responsiveness of the network. Note that all the queues are flushed, but the VO one. This is not typically used by the applications and it likely contains management frames that are useful for connection or roaming. This bug is tracked here: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=56581 But it is duplicated in distributions' trackers. A simple search in Ubuntu's database led to these bugs: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux-firmware/+bug/1270808 https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1305406 https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1356236 https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1360597 https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1361809 Depends-on: 77be2c54 ("mac80211: add vif to flush call") Signed-off-by:
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Emmanuel Grumbach authored
commit 77be2c54 upstream. This will allow the low level driver to make decision based on the vif such as queues etc... Since the vif might be NULL, we can't add it to the tracing functions. Signed-off-by:
Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> [ kamal: 3.13-stable prereq backport (omitted rtl8821ae) for a0855054 iwlwifi: dvm: drop non VO frames when flushing ] Signed-off-by:
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Emmanuel Grumbach authored
commit 9180ac50 upstream. The LTR is the handshake between the device and the root complex about the latency allowed when the bus exits power save. This configuration was missing and this led to high latency in the link power up. The end user could experience high latency in the network because of this. Signed-off-by:
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J. Bruce Fields authored
commit 51904b08 upstream. Unknown operation numbers are caught in nfsd4_decode_compound() which sets op->opnum to OP_ILLEGAL and op->status to nfserr_op_illegal. The error causes the main loop in nfsd4_proc_compound() to skip most processing. But nfsd4_proc_compound also peeks ahead at the next operation in one case and doesn't take similar precautions there. Signed-off-by:
J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Felipe Balbi authored
commit bfa6b18c upstream. Currently, there's no guarantee that udc->driver will be valid when using soft_connect sysfs interface. In fact, we can very easily trigger a NULL pointer dereference by trying to disconnect when a gadget driver isn't loaded. Fix this bug: ~# echo disconnect > soft_connect [ 33.685743] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000014 [ 33.694221] pgd = ed0cc000 [ 33.697174] [00000014] *pgd=ae351831, *pte=00000000, *ppte=00000000 [ 33.703766] Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] SMP ARM [ 33.708697] Modules linked in: xhci_plat_hcd xhci_hcd snd_soc_davinci_mcasp snd_soc_tlv320aic3x snd_soc_edma snd_soc_omap snd_soc_evm snd_soc_core dwc3 snd_compress snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_pcm snd_timer snd lis3lv02d_i2c matrix_keypad lis3lv02d dwc3_omap input_polldev soundcore [ 33.734372] CPU: 0 PID: 1457 Comm: bash Not tainted 3.17.0-09740-ga93416e-dirty #345 [ 33.742457] task: ee71ce00 ti: ee68a000 task.ti: ee68a000 [ 33.748116] PC is at usb_udc_softconn_store+0xa4/0xec [ 33.753416] LR is at mark_held_locks+0x78/0x90 [ 33.758057] pc : [<c04df128>] lr : [<c00896a4>] psr: 20000013 [ 33.758057] sp : ee68bec8 ip : c0c00008 fp : ee68bee4 [ 33.770050] r10: ee6b394c r9 : ee68bf80 r8 : ee6062c0 [ 33.775508] r7 : 00000000 r6 : ee6062c0 r5 : 0000000b r4 : ee739408 [ 33.782346] r3 : 00000000 r2 : 00000000 r1 : ee71d390 r0 : ee664170 [ 33.789168] Flags: nzCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user [ 33.796636] Control: 10c5387d Table: ad0cc059 DAC: 00000015 [ 33.802638] Process bash (pid: 1457, stack limit = 0xee68a248) [ 33.808740] Stack: (0xee68bec8 to 0xee68c000) [ 33.813299] bec0: 0000000b c0411284 ee6062c0 00000000 ee68bef4 ee68bee8 [ 33.821862] bee0: c04112ac c04df090 ee68bf14 ee68bef8 c01c2868 c0411290 0000000b ee6b3940 [ 33.830419] bf00: 00000000 00000000 ee68bf4c ee68bf18 c01c1a24 c01c2818 00000000 00000000 [ 33.838990] bf20: ee61b940 ee2f47c0 0000000b 000ce408 ee68bf80 c000f304 ee68a000 00000000 [ 33.847544] bf40: ee68bf7c ee68bf50 c0152dd8 c01c1960 ee68bf7c c0170af8 ee68bf7c ee2f47c0 [ 33.856099] bf60: ee2f47c0 000ce408 0000000b c000f304 ee68bfa4 ee68bf80 c0153330 c0152d34 [ 33.864653] bf80: 00000000 00000000 0000000b 000ce408 b6e7fb50 00000004 00000000 ee68bfa8 [ 33.873204] bfa0: c000f080 c01532e8 0000000b 000ce408 00000001 000ce408 0000000b 00000000 [ 33.881763] bfc0: 0000000b 000ce408 b6e7fb50 00000004 0000000b 00000000 000c5758 00000000 [ 33.890319] bfe0: 00000000 bec2c924 b6de422d b6e1d226 40000030 00000001 75716d2f 00657565 [ 33.898890] [<c04df128>] (usb_udc_softconn_store) from [<c04112ac>] (dev_attr_store+0x28/0x34) [ 33.907920] [<c04112ac>] (dev_attr_store) from [<c01c2868>] (sysfs_kf_write+0x5c/0x60) [ 33.916200] [<c01c2868>] (sysfs_kf_write) from [<c01c1a24>] (kernfs_fop_write+0xd0/0x194) [ 33.924773] [<c01c1a24>] (kernfs_fop_write) from [<c0152dd8>] (vfs_write+0xb0/0x1bc) [ 33.932874] [<c0152dd8>] (vfs_write) from [<c0153330>] (SyS_write+0x54/0xb0) [ 33.940247] [<c0153330>] (SyS_write) from [<c000f080>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48) [ 33.948160] Code: e1a01007 e12fff33 e5140004 e5143008 (e5933014) [ 33.954625] ---[ end trace f849bead94eab7ea ]--- Fixes: 2ccea03a (usb: gadget: introduce UDC Class) Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit d2e6d62c upstream. commit c58d80f5 ("usb: musb: Ensure that cppi41 timer gets armed on premature DMA TX irq") fixed hrtimer scheduling bug. There is one left which does not trigger that often. The following scenario is still possible: lock(&x->lock); hrtimer_start(&x->t); unlock(&x->lock); expires: t->function(); lock(&x->lock); lock(&x->lock); if (!hrtimer_queued(&x->t)) hrtimer_start(&x->t); unlock(&x->lock); if (!list_empty(x->early_tx_list)) ret = HRTIMER_RESTART; -> hrtimer_forward_now(...) } else ret = HRTIMER_NORESTART; unlock(&x->lock); and the timer callback returns HRTIMER_RESTART for an armed timer. This is wrong and we run into the BUG_ON() in __run_hrtimer(). This can happens on SMP or PREEMPT-RT. The patch fixes the problem by only starting the timer if the timer is not yet queued. Reported-by:
Torben Hohn <torbenh@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
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Perry Hung authored
commit 7f2719f0 upstream. An official recent Windows driver from FTDI detects counterfeit devices and reprograms the internal EEPROM containing the USB PID to 0, effectively bricking the device. Add support for this VID/PID pair to correctly bind the driver on these devices. See: http://hackaday.com/2014/10/22/watch-that-windows-update-ftdi-drivers-are-killing-fake-chips/Signed-off-by:
Perry Hung <iperry@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Jan Kara authored
commit 84ce0f0e upstream. When sg_scsi_ioctl() fails to prepare request to submit in blk_rq_map_kern() we jump to a label where we just end up copying (luckily zeroed-out) kernel buffer to userspace instead of reporting error. Fix the problem by jumping to the right label. CC: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> CC: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org Coverity-id: 1226871 Signed-off-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jason Baron authored
commit 8030122a upstream. Fix CE event being reported as HW_EVENT_ERR_UNCORRECTED. Signed-off-by:
Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e6dd616f2cd51583a7e77af6f639b86313c74144.1413405053.git.jbaron@akamai.comSigned-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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