- 21 Jul, 2017 40 commits
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
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Haozhong Zhang authored
commit 691bd434 upstream. It's easier for host applications, such as QEMU, if they can always access guest MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS in VMCS, even though MPX is disabled in guest cpuid. Signed-off-by: Haozhong Zhang <haozhong.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Jim Mattson authored
commit 4531662d upstream. Bits 11:2 must be zero and the linear addess in bits 63:12 must be canonical. Otherwise, WRMSR(BNDCFGS) should raise #GP. Fixes: 0dd376e7 ("KVM: x86: add MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS to msrs_to_save") Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Jim Mattson authored
commit 4439af9f upstream. The BNDCFGS MSR should only be exposed to the guest if the guest supports MPX. (cf. the TSC_AUX MSR and RDTSCP.) Fixes: 0dd376e7 ("KVM: x86: add MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS to msrs_to_save") Change-Id: I3ad7c01bda616715137ceac878f3fa7e66b6b387 Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Jim Mattson authored
commit a8b6fda3 upstream. The MSR permission bitmaps are shared by all VMs. However, some VMs may not be configured to support MPX, even when the host does. If the host supports VMX and the guest does not, we should intercept accesses to the BNDCFGS MSR, so that we can synthesize a #GP fault. Furthermore, if the host does not support MPX and the "ignore_msrs" kvm kernel parameter is set, then we should intercept accesses to the BNDCFGS MSR, so that we can skip over the rdmsr/wrmsr without raising a #GP fault. Fixes: da8999d3 ("KVM: x86: Intel MPX vmx and msr handle") Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Dan Carpenter authored
commit 2ca30331 upstream. In the current code, if the user accidentally writes a bogus command to this sysfs file, then we set the latency tolerance to an uninitialized variable. Fixes: 2d984ad1 (PM / QoS: Introcuce latency tolerance device PM QoS type) Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Hui Wang authored
commit f33f79f3 upstream. On this Lenovo machine, there are two front mics, and both of them are assigned the same name "Mic", but pulseaudio can't support two mics with the same name, as a workaround, we change the location for one of them, then the driver will assign "Front Mic" and "Mic" for them. Signed-off-by: Hui Wang <hui.wang@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Ville Syrjälä authored
commit 8d5c3030 upstream. Clear the notify function pointer in the platform data before we tear down the driver. Otherwise i915 would end up calling a stale function pointer and possibly explode. Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Cc: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20170427160231.13337-3-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.comReviewed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Douglas Anderson authored
commit f6525b96 upstream. When the "if (record->size <= 0)" test is true in pstore_get_backend_records() it's pretty clear that nobody holds a reference to the allocated pstore_record, yet we don't free it. Let's free it. Fixes: 2a2b0acf ("pstore: Allocate records on heap instead of stack") Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit ea0212f4 upstream. The wakeirq infrastructure uses RCU to protect the list of wakeirqs. That breaks the irq bus locking infrastructure, which is allows sleeping functions to be called so interrupt controllers behind slow busses, e.g. i2c, can be handled. The wakeirq functions hold rcu_read_lock and call into irq functions, which in case of interrupts using the irq bus locking will trigger a might_sleep() splat. Convert the wakeirq infrastructure to Sleepable RCU and unbreak it. Fixes: 4990d4fe (PM / Wakeirq: Add automated device wake IRQ handling) Reported-by: Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Tested-by: Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Peter Zijlstra authored
commit 73bb059f upstream. The point of sched_group_mask is to select those CPUs from sched_group_cpus that can actually arrive at this balance domain. The current code gets it wrong, as can be readily demonstrated with a topology like: node 0 1 2 3 0: 10 20 30 20 1: 20 10 20 30 2: 30 20 10 20 3: 20 30 20 10 Where (for example) domain 1 on CPU1 ends up with a mask that includes CPU0: [] CPU1 attaching sched-domain: [] domain 0: span 0-2 level NUMA [] groups: 1 (mask: 1), 2, 0 [] domain 1: span 0-3 level NUMA [] groups: 0-2 (mask: 0-2) (cpu_capacity: 3072), 0,2-3 (cpu_capacity: 3072) This causes sched_balance_cpu() to compute the wrong CPU and consequently should_we_balance() will terminate early resulting in missed load-balance opportunities. The fixed topology looks like: [] CPU1 attaching sched-domain: [] domain 0: span 0-2 level NUMA [] groups: 1 (mask: 1), 2, 0 [] domain 1: span 0-3 level NUMA [] groups: 0-2 (mask: 1) (cpu_capacity: 3072), 0,2-3 (cpu_capacity: 3072) (note: this relies on OVERLAP domains to always have children, this is true because the regular topology domains are still here -- this is before degenerate trimming) Debugged-by: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lvenanci@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Fixes: e3589f6c ("sched: Allow for overlapping sched_domain spans") Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Lauro Ramos Venancio authored
commit f32d782e upstream. The group mask is always used in intersection with the group CPUs. So, when building the group mask, we don't have to care about CPUs that are not part of the group. Signed-off-by: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lvenanci@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: lwang@redhat.com Cc: riel@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1492717903-5195-2-git-send-email-lvenanci@redhat.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Peter Zijlstra authored
commit 0372dd27 upstream. When building the overlapping groups, we very obviously should start with the previous domain of _this_ @cpu, not CPU-0. This can be readily demonstrated with a topology like: node 0 1 2 3 0: 10 20 30 20 1: 20 10 20 30 2: 30 20 10 20 3: 20 30 20 10 Where (for example) CPU1 ends up generating the following nonsensical groups: [] CPU1 attaching sched-domain: [] domain 0: span 0-2 level NUMA [] groups: 1 2 0 [] domain 1: span 0-3 level NUMA [] groups: 1-3 (cpu_capacity = 3072) 0-1,3 (cpu_capacity = 3072) Where the fact that domain 1 doesn't include a group with span 0-2 is the obvious fail. With patch this looks like: [] CPU1 attaching sched-domain: [] domain 0: span 0-2 level NUMA [] groups: 1 0 2 [] domain 1: span 0-3 level NUMA [] groups: 0-2 (cpu_capacity = 3072) 0,2-3 (cpu_capacity = 3072) Debugged-by: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lvenanci@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Fixes: e3589f6c ("sched: Allow for overlapping sched_domain spans") Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Dmitry V. Levin authored
commit 242fc352 upstream. Consistently use types provided by <linux/types.h> to fix the following linux/sched/types.h userspace compilation errors: /usr/include/linux/sched/types.h:57:2: error: unknown type name 'u32' u32 size; ... u64 sched_period; Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fixes: e2d1e2ae ("sched/headers: Move various ABI definitions to <uapi/linux/sched/types.h>") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170705162328.GA11026@altlinux.orgSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Eric Biggers authored
commit 4f9dabfa upstream. Syscalls must validate that their reserved arguments are zero and return EINVAL otherwise. Otherwise, it will be impossible to actually use them for anything in the future because existing programs may be passing garbage in. This is standard practice when adding new APIs. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Horia Geantă authored
commit 7459e1d2 upstream. Driver does not properly handle the case when signals interrupt wait_for_completion_interruptible(): -it does not check for return value -completion structure is allocated on stack; in case a signal interrupts the sleep, it will go out of scope, causing the worker thread (caam_jr_dequeue) to fail when it accesses it wait_for_completion_interruptible() is replaced with uninterruptable wait_for_completion(). We choose to block all signals while waiting for I/O (device executing the split key generation job descriptor) since the alternative - in order to have a deterministic device state - would be to flush the job ring (aborting *all* in-progress jobs). Fixes: 045e3678 ("crypto: caam - ahash hmac support") Fixes: 4c1ec1f9 ("crypto: caam - refactor key_gen, sg") Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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David Gstir authored
commit 854b06f7 upstream. Certain cipher modes like CTS expect the IV (req->info) of ablkcipher_request (or equivalently req->iv of skcipher_request) to contain the last ciphertext block when the {en,de}crypt operation is done. This is currently not the case for the CAAM driver which in turn breaks e.g. cts(cbc(aes)) when the CAAM driver is enabled. This patch fixes the CAAM driver to properly set the IV after the {en,de}crypt operation of ablkcipher finishes. This issue was revealed by the changes in the SW CTS mode in commit 0605c41c ("crypto: cts - Convert to skcipher") Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Herbert Xu authored
commit b82ce244 upstream. It has been reported that sha1-avx2 can cause page faults by reading beyond the end of the input. This patch disables it until it can be fixed. Fixes: 7c1da8d0 ("crypto: sha - SHA1 transform x86_64 AVX2") Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Gilad Ben-Yossef authored
commit 1606043f upstream. The Atmel SHA driver was treating -EBUSY as indication of queueing to backlog without checking that backlog is enabled for the request. Fix it by checking request flags. Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Martin Hicks authored
commit 03d2c511 upstream. An updated patch that also handles the additional key length requirements for the AEAD algorithms. The max keysize is not 96. For SHA384/512 it's 128, and for the AEAD algorithms it's longer still. Extend the max keysize for the AEAD size for AES256 + HMAC(SHA512). Fixes: 357fb605 ("crypto: talitos - add sha224, sha384 and sha512 to existing AEAD algorithms") Signed-off-by: Martin Hicks <mort@bork.org> Acked-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Helge Deller authored
commit 37511fb5 upstream. Jörn Engel noticed that the expand_upwards() function might not return -ENOMEM in case the requested address is (unsigned long)-PAGE_SIZE and if the architecture didn't defined TASK_SIZE as multiple of PAGE_SIZE. Affected architectures are arm, frv, m68k, blackfin, h8300 and xtensa which all define TASK_SIZE as 0xffffffff, but since none of those have an upwards-growing stack we currently have no actual issue. Nevertheless let's fix this just in case any of the architectures with an upward-growing stack (currently parisc, metag and partly ia64) define TASK_SIZE similar. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170702192452.GA11868@p100.box Fixes: bd726c90 ("Allow stack to grow up to address space limit") Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Reported-by: Jörn Engel <joern@purestorage.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Andy Lutomirski authored
commit 796a3bae upstream. test_execve does rather odd mount manipulations to safely create temporary setuid and setgid executables that aren't visible to the rest of the system. Those executables end up in the test's cwd, but that cwd is MNT_DETACHed. The core namespace code considers MNT_DETACHed trees to belong to no mount namespace at all and, in general, MNT_DETACHed trees are only barely function. This interacted with commit 380cf5ba ("fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid") to cause all MNT_DETACHed trees to act as though they're nosuid, breaking the test. Fix it by just not detaching the tree. It's still in a private mount namespace and is therefore still invisible to the rest of the system (except via /proc, and the same nosuid logic will protect all other programs on the system from believing in test_execve's setuid bits). While we're at it, fix some blatant whitespace problems. Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org> Fixes: 380cf5ba ("fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid") Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Eric W. Biederman authored
commit 296990de upstream. Andrei Vagin pointed out that time to executue propagate_umount can go non-linear (and take a ludicrious amount of time) when the mount propogation trees of the mounts to be unmunted by a lazy unmount overlap. Make the walk of the mount propagation trees nearly linear by remembering which mounts have already been visited, allowing subsequent walks to detect when walking a mount propgation tree or a subtree of a mount propgation tree would be duplicate work and to skip them entirely. Walk the list of mounts whose propgatation trees need to be traversed from the mount highest in the mount tree to mounts lower in the mount tree so that odds are higher that the code will walk the largest trees first, allowing later tree walks to be skipped entirely. Add cleanup_umount_visitation to remover the code's memory of which mounts have been visited. Add the functions last_slave and skip_propagation_subtree to allow skipping appropriate parts of the mount propagation tree without needing to change the logic of the rest of the code. A script to generate overlapping mount propagation trees: $ cat runs.h set -e mount -t tmpfs zdtm /mnt mkdir -p /mnt/1 /mnt/2 mount -t tmpfs zdtm /mnt/1 mount --make-shared /mnt/1 mkdir /mnt/1/1 iteration=10 if [ -n "$1" ] ; then iteration=$1 fi for i in $(seq $iteration); do mount --bind /mnt/1/1 /mnt/1/1 done mount --rbind /mnt/1 /mnt/2 TIMEFORMAT='%Rs' nr=$(( ( 2 ** ( $iteration + 1 ) ) + 1 )) echo -n "umount -l /mnt/1 -> $nr " time umount -l /mnt/1 nr=$(cat /proc/self/mountinfo | grep zdtm | wc -l ) time umount -l /mnt/2 $ for i in $(seq 9 19); do echo $i; unshare -Urm bash ./run.sh $i; done Here are the performance numbers with and without the patch: mhash | 8192 | 8192 | 1048576 | 1048576 mounts | before | after | before | after ------------------------------------------------ 1025 | 0.040s | 0.016s | 0.038s | 0.019s 2049 | 0.094s | 0.017s | 0.080s | 0.018s 4097 | 0.243s | 0.019s | 0.206s | 0.023s 8193 | 1.202s | 0.028s | 1.562s | 0.032s 16385 | 9.635s | 0.036s | 9.952s | 0.041s 32769 | 60.928s | 0.063s | 44.321s | 0.064s 65537 | | 0.097s | | 0.097s 131073 | | 0.233s | | 0.176s 262145 | | 0.653s | | 0.344s 524289 | | 2.305s | | 0.735s 1048577 | | 7.107s | | 2.603s Andrei Vagin reports fixing the performance problem is part of the work to fix CVE-2016-6213. Fixes: a05964f3 ("[PATCH] shared mounts handling: umount") Reported-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Reviewed-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Eric W. Biederman authored
commit 99b19d16 upstream. While investigating some poor umount performance I realized that in the case of overlapping mount trees where some of the mounts are locked the code has been failing to unmount all of the mounts it should have been unmounting. This failure to unmount all of the necessary mounts can be reproduced with: $ cat locked_mounts_test.sh mount -t tmpfs test-base /mnt mount --make-shared /mnt mkdir -p /mnt/b mount -t tmpfs test1 /mnt/b mount --make-shared /mnt/b mkdir -p /mnt/b/10 mount -t tmpfs test2 /mnt/b/10 mount --make-shared /mnt/b/10 mkdir -p /mnt/b/10/20 mount --rbind /mnt/b /mnt/b/10/20 unshare -Urm --propagation unchaged /bin/sh -c 'sleep 5; if [ $(grep test /proc/self/mountinfo | wc -l) -eq 1 ] ; then echo SUCCESS ; else echo FAILURE ; fi' sleep 1 umount -l /mnt/b wait %% $ unshare -Urm ./locked_mounts_test.sh This failure is corrected by removing the prepass that marks mounts that may be umounted. A first pass is added that umounts mounts if possible and if not sets mount mark if they could be unmounted if they weren't locked and adds them to a list to umount possibilities. This first pass reconsiders the mounts parent if it is on the list of umount possibilities, ensuring that information of umoutability will pass from child to mount parent. A second pass then walks through all mounts that are umounted and processes their children unmounting them or marking them for reparenting. A last pass cleans up the state on the mounts that could not be umounted and if applicable reparents them to their first parent that remained mounted. While a bit longer than the old code this code is much more robust as it allows information to flow up from the leaves and down from the trunk making the order in which mounts are encountered in the umount propgation tree irrelevant. Fixes: 0c56fe31 ("mnt: Don't propagate unmounts to locked mounts") Reviewed-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Eric W. Biederman authored
commit 570487d3 upstream. It was observed that in some pathlogical cases that the current code does not unmount everything it should. After investigation it was determined that the issue is that mnt_change_mntpoint can can change which mounts are available to be unmounted during mount propagation which is wrong. The trivial reproducer is: $ cat ./pathological.sh mount -t tmpfs test-base /mnt cd /mnt mkdir 1 2 1/1 mount --bind 1 1 mount --make-shared 1 mount --bind 1 2 mount --bind 1/1 1/1 mount --bind 1/1 1/1 echo grep test-base /proc/self/mountinfo umount 1/1 echo grep test-base /proc/self/mountinfo $ unshare -Urm ./pathological.sh The expected output looks like: 46 31 0:25 / /mnt rw,relatime - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 47 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 48 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/2 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 49 54 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/1/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 50 53 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 51 49 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/1/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 54 47 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/1/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 53 48 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 52 50 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 46 31 0:25 / /mnt rw,relatime - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 47 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 48 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/2 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 The output without the fix looks like: 46 31 0:25 / /mnt rw,relatime - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 47 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 48 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/2 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 49 54 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/1/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 50 53 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 51 49 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/1/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 54 47 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/1/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 53 48 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 52 50 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 46 31 0:25 / /mnt rw,relatime - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 47 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 48 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/2 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 52 48 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 That last mount in the output was in the propgation tree to be unmounted but was missed because the mnt_change_mountpoint changed it's parent before the walk through the mount propagation tree observed it. Fixes: 1064f874 ("mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts.") Acked-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Michael Kelley authored
commit 13b9abfc upstream. Extend the disabling of preemption to include the hypercall so that another thread can't get the CPU and corrupt the per-cpu page used for hypercall arguments. Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Johan Hovold authored
commit 3360acdf upstream. Make sure to deregister and release the nvmem device and underlying memory on registration errors. Note that the private data must be freed using put_device() once the struct device has been initialised. Also note that there's a related reference leak in the deregistration function as reported by Mika Westerberg which is being fixed separately. Fixes: b6c217ab ("nvmem: Add backwards compatibility support for older EEPROM drivers.") Fixes: eace75cf ("nvmem: Add a simple NVMEM framework for nvmem providers") Cc: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch> Cc: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org> Cc: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Paul E. McKenney authored
commit 6b5fc3a1 upstream. Wait/wakeup operations do not guarantee ordering on their own. Instead, either locking or memory barriers are required. This commit therefore adds memory barriers to wake_nocb_leader() and nocb_leader_wait(). Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: Krister Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Adam Borowski authored
commit 6987dc8a upstream. Only read access is checked before this call. Actually, at the moment this is not an issue, as every in-tree arch does the same manual checks for VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE, relying on the MMU to tell them apart, but this wasn't the case in the past and may happen again on some odd arch in the future. If anyone cares about 3.7 and earlier, this is a security hole (untested) on real 80386 CPUs. Signed-off-by: Adam Borowski <kilobyte@angband.pl> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Dong Bo authored
commit 48f99c8e upstream. Like arch/arm/, we inherit the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag across fork(). This is undesirable for a number of reasons: * ELF files that don't require executable stack can end up with it anyway * We end up performing un-necessary I-cache maintenance when mapping what should be non-executable pages * Restricting what is executable is generally desirable when defending against overflow attacks This patch clears the personality flag when setting up the personality for newly spwaned native tasks. Given that semi-recent AArch64 toolchains emit a non-executable PT_GNU_STACK header, userspace applications can already not rely on READ_IMPLIES_EXEC so shouldn't be adversely affected by this change. Reported-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Bo <dongbo4@huawei.com> [will: added comment to compat code, rewrote commit message] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Marc Zyngier authored
commit 88cda007 upstream. Contrary to popular belief, PPIs connected to a GICv3 to not have an affinity field similar to that of GICv2. That is consistent with the fact that GICv3 is designed to accomodate thousands of CPUs, and fitting them as a bitmap in a byte is... difficult. Fixes: adbc3695 ("arm64: dts: add the Marvell Armada 3700 family and a development board") Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@free-electrons.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Balbir Singh authored
commit 1e2a516e upstream. This patch fixes a crash seen while doing a kexec from radix mode to hash mode. Key 0 is special in hash and used in the RPN by default, we set the key values to 0 today. In radix mode key 0 is used to control supervisor<->user access. In hash key 0 is used by default, so the first instruction after the switch causes a crash on kexec. Commit 3b10d009 ("powerpc/mm/radix: Prevent kernel execution of user space") introduced the setting of IAMR and AMOR values to prevent execution of user mode instructions from supervisor mode. We need to clean up these SPR's on kexec. Fixes: 3b10d009 ("powerpc/mm/radix: Prevent kernel execution of user space") Reported-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Kees Cook authored
commit da029c11 upstream. To avoid pathological stack usage or the need to special-case setuid execs, just limit all arg stack usage to at most 75% of _STK_LIM (6MB). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Kees Cook authored
commit a73dc537 upstream. Now that explicitly executed loaders are loaded in the mmap region, we have more freedom to decide where we position PIE binaries in the address space to avoid possible collisions with mmap or stack regions. For 64-bit, align to 4GB to allow runtimes to use the entire 32-bit address space for 32-bit pointers. On 32-bit use 4MB, which is the traditional x86 minimum load location, likely to avoid historically requiring a 4MB page table entry when only a portion of the first 4MB would be used (since the NULL address is avoided). For s390 the position could be 0x10000, but that is needlessly close to the NULL address. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498154792-49952-5-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Kees Cook authored
commit 47ebb09d upstream. Now that explicitly executed loaders are loaded in the mmap region, we have more freedom to decide where we position PIE binaries in the address space to avoid possible collisions with mmap or stack regions. For 64-bit, align to 4GB to allow runtimes to use the entire 32-bit address space for 32-bit pointers. On 32-bit use 4MB, which is the traditional x86 minimum load location, likely to avoid historically requiring a 4MB page table entry when only a portion of the first 4MB would be used (since the NULL address is avoided). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498154792-49952-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Kees Cook authored
commit 02445990 upstream. Now that explicitly executed loaders are loaded in the mmap region, we have more freedom to decide where we position PIE binaries in the address space to avoid possible collisions with mmap or stack regions. For 64-bit, align to 4GB to allow runtimes to use the entire 32-bit address space for 32-bit pointers. On 32-bit use 4MB, to match ARM. This could be 0x8000, the standard ET_EXEC load address, but that is needlessly close to the NULL address, and anyone running arm compat PIE will have an MMU, so the tight mapping is not needed. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498251600-132458-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Kees Cook authored
commit 6a9af90a upstream. Now that explicitly executed loaders are loaded in the mmap region, we have more freedom to decide where we position PIE binaries in the address space to avoid possible collisions with mmap or stack regions. 4MB is chosen here mainly to have parity with x86, where this is the traditional minimum load location, likely to avoid historically requiring a 4MB page table entry when only a portion of the first 4MB would be used (since the NULL address is avoided). For ARM the position could be 0x8000, the standard ET_EXEC load address, but that is needlessly close to the NULL address, and anyone running PIE on 32-bit ARM will have an MMU, so the tight mapping is not needed. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498154792-49952-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Kees Cook authored
commit eab09532 upstream. The ELF_ET_DYN_BASE position was originally intended to keep loaders away from ET_EXEC binaries. (For example, running "/lib/ld-linux.so.2 /bin/cat" might cause the subsequent load of /bin/cat into where the loader had been loaded.) With the advent of PIE (ET_DYN binaries with an INTERP Program Header), ELF_ET_DYN_BASE continued to be used since the kernel was only looking at ET_DYN. However, since ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is traditionally set at the top 1/3rd of the TASK_SIZE, a substantial portion of the address space is unused. For 32-bit tasks when RLIMIT_STACK is set to RLIM_INFINITY, programs are loaded above the mmap region. This means they can be made to collide (CVE-2017-1000370) or nearly collide (CVE-2017-1000371) with pathological stack regions. Lowering ELF_ET_DYN_BASE solves both by moving programs below the mmap region in all cases, and will now additionally avoid programs falling back to the mmap region by enforcing MAP_FIXED for program loads (i.e. if it would have collided with the stack, now it will fail to load instead of falling back to the mmap region). To allow for a lower ELF_ET_DYN_BASE, loaders (ET_DYN without INTERP) are loaded into the mmap region, leaving space available for either an ET_EXEC binary with a fixed location or PIE being loaded into mmap by the loader. Only PIE programs are loaded offset from ELF_ET_DYN_BASE, which means architectures can now safely lower their values without risk of loaders colliding with their subsequently loaded programs. For 64-bit, ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is best set to 4GB to allow runtimes to use the entire 32-bit address space for 32-bit pointers. Thanks to PaX Team, Daniel Micay, and Rik van Riel for inspiration and suggestions on how to implement this solution. Fixes: d1fd836d ("mm: split ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170621173201.GA114489@beastSigned-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Cc: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Cyril Bur authored
commit 8d81ae05 upstream. As of perl 5, version 26, subversion 0 (v5.26.0) some new warnings have occurred when running checkpatch. Unescaped left brace in regex is deprecated here (and will be fatal in Perl 5.30), passed through in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/^(.\s*){ <-- HERE \s*/ at scripts/checkpatch.pl line 3544. Unescaped left brace in regex is deprecated here (and will be fatal in Perl 5.30), passed through in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/^(.\s*){ <-- HERE \s*/ at scripts/checkpatch.pl line 3885. Unescaped left brace in regex is deprecated here (and will be fatal in Perl 5.30), passed through in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/^(\+.*(?:do|\))){ <-- HERE / at scripts/checkpatch.pl line 4374. It seems perfectly reasonable to do as the warning suggests and simply escape the left brace in these three locations. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170607060135.17384-1-cyrilbur@gmail.comSigned-off-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com> Acked-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Sahitya Tummala authored
commit b17c070f upstream. __list_lru_walk_one() acquires nlru spin lock (nlru->lock) for longer duration if there are more number of items in the lru list. As per the current code, it can hold the spin lock for upto maximum UINT_MAX entries at a time. So if there are more number of items in the lru list, then "BUG: spinlock lockup suspected" is observed in the below path: spin_bug+0x90 do_raw_spin_lock+0xfc _raw_spin_lock+0x28 list_lru_add+0x28 dput+0x1c8 path_put+0x20 terminate_walk+0x3c path_lookupat+0x100 filename_lookup+0x6c user_path_at_empty+0x54 SyS_faccessat+0xd0 el0_svc_naked+0x24 This nlru->lock is acquired by another CPU in this path - d_lru_shrink_move+0x34 dentry_lru_isolate_shrink+0x48 __list_lru_walk_one.isra.10+0x94 list_lru_walk_node+0x40 shrink_dcache_sb+0x60 do_remount_sb+0xbc do_emergency_remount+0xb0 process_one_work+0x228 worker_thread+0x2e0 kthread+0xf4 ret_from_fork+0x10 Fix this lockup by reducing the number of entries to be shrinked from the lru list to 1024 at once. Also, add cond_resched() before processing the lru list again. Link: http://marc.info/?t=149722864900001&r=1&w=2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498707575-2472-1-git-send-email-stummala@codeaurora.orgSigned-off-by: Sahitya Tummala <stummala@codeaurora.org> Suggested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Suggested-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Polakov <apolyakov@beget.ru> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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