- 09 Oct, 2017 5 commits
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Johannes Thumshirn authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1693369 Provide a stub implementation for scsi_is_sas_rphy for kernel configurations which do not have CONFIG_SCSI_SAS_ATTRS defined. Reported-by:
kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Suggested-by:
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:
Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> (back ported from commit c1a23f6d) Signed-off-by:
Joseph Salisbury <joseph.salisbury@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
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James Bottomley authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1693369 The current discovery routines use the VPD 0x83 inquiry page to find the device SAS address and match it to the end point in the enclosure. This doesn't work for SATA devices because expanders (or hosts) simply make up an endpoint address for STP and thus the address returned by the VPD page never matches. Instead of doing this, for SAS attached devices, match by the direct endpoint address instead. Signed-off-by:
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> (cherry picked from commit 3f8d6f2a) Signed-off-by:
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James Bottomley authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1693369 For a device known to be SAS connected, this will return the endpoint address. This is useful for getting the SAS address of SATA devices. Reviewed-by:
Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
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Mauricio Faria de Oliveira authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1718397 Currently, aio-nr is incremented in steps of 'num_possible_cpus() * 8' for io_setup(nr_events, ..) with 'nr_events < num_possible_cpus() * 4': ioctx_alloc() ... nr_events = max(nr_events, num_possible_cpus() * 4); nr_events *= 2; ... ctx->max_reqs = nr_events; ... aio_nr += ctx->max_reqs; .... This limits the number of aio contexts actually available to much less than aio-max-nr, and is increasingly worse with greater number of CPUs. For example, with 64 CPUs, only 256 aio contexts are actually available (with aio-max-nr = 65536) because the increment is 512 in that scenario. Note: 65536 [max aio contexts] / (64*4*2) [increment per aio context] is 128, but make it 256 (double) as counting against 'aio-max-nr * 2': ioctx_alloc() ... if (aio_nr + nr_events > (aio_max_nr * 2UL) || ... goto err_ctx; ... This patch uses the original value of nr_events (from userspace) to increment aio-nr and count against aio-max-nr, which resolves those. Signed-off-by:
Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mauricfo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reported-by:
Lekshmi C. Pillai <lekshmi.cpillai@in.ibm.com> Tested-by:
Paul Nguyen <nguyenp@us.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:
Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org> (cherry picked from commit 2a8a9867) Signed-off-by:
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Acked-by:
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Shrirang Bagul authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721455 Dell Wireless 5819/5818 devices are re-branded Sierra Wireless MC74 series which will by default boot with vid 0x413c and pid's 0x81cf, 0x81d0, 0x81d1,0x81d2. Signed-off-by:
Shrirang Bagul <shrirang.bagul@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 06 Oct, 2017 9 commits
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Jan Beulich authored
Rather than constructing a local structure instance on the stack, fill the fields directly on the shared ring, just like other backends do. Build on the fact that all response structure flavors are actually identical (the old code did make this assumption too). This is XSA-216. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by:
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Tyler Hicks authored
BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1567597 Add a new action, SECCOMP_RET_LOG, that logs a syscall before allowing the syscall. At the implementation level, this action is identical to the existing SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW action. However, it can be very useful when initially developing a seccomp filter for an application. The developer can set the default action to be SECCOMP_RET_LOG, maybe mark any obviously needed syscalls with SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, and then put the application through its paces. A list of syscalls that triggered the default action (SECCOMP_RET_LOG) can be easily gleaned from the logs and that list can be used to build the syscall whitelist. Finally, the developer can change the default action to the desired value. This provides a more friendly experience than seeing the application get killed, then updating the filter and rebuilding the app, seeing the application get killed due to a different syscall, then updating the filter and rebuilding the app, etc. The functionality is similar to what's supported by the various LSMs. SELinux has permissive mode, AppArmor has complain mode, SMACK has bring-up mode, etc. SECCOMP_RET_LOG is given a lower value than SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW as allow while logging is slightly more restrictive than quietly allowing. Unfortunately, the tests added for SECCOMP_RET_LOG are not capable of inspecting the audit log to verify that the syscall was logged. With this patch, the logic for deciding if an action will be logged is: if action == RET_ALLOW: do not log else if action == RET_KILL && RET_KILL in actions_logged: log else if action == RET_LOG && RET_LOG in actions_logged: log else if filter-requests-logging && action in actions_logged: log else if audit_enabled && process-is-being-audited: log else: do not log Signed-off-by:
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> (backported from commit 59f5cf44) Acked-by:
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Tyler Hicks authored
BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1721676 Add a new filter flag, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG, that enables logging for all actions except for SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW for the given filter. SECCOMP_RET_KILL actions are always logged, when "kill" is in the actions_logged sysctl, and SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW actions are never logged, regardless of this flag. This flag can be used to create noisy filters that result in all non-allowed actions to be logged. A process may have one noisy filter, which is loaded with this flag, as well as a quiet filter that's not loaded with this flag. This allows for the actions in a set of filters to be selectively conveyed to the admin. Since a system could have a large number of allocated seccomp_filter structs, struct packing was taken in consideration. On 64 bit x86, the new log member takes up one byte of an existing four byte hole in the struct. On 32 bit x86, the new log member creates a new four byte hole (unavoidable) and consumes one of those bytes. Unfortunately, the tests added for SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG are not capable of inspecting the audit log to verify that the actions taken in the filter were logged. With this patch, the logic for deciding if an action will be logged is: if action == RET_ALLOW: do not log else if action == RET_KILL && RET_KILL in actions_logged: log else if filter-requests-logging && action in actions_logged: log else if audit_enabled && process-is-being-audited: log else: do not log Signed-off-by:
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Tyler Hicks authored
BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1721676 BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1567597 Userspace needs to be able to reliably detect the support of a filter flag. A good way of doing that is by attempting to enter filter mode, with the flag bit(s) in question set, and a NULL pointer for the args parameter of seccomp(2). EFAULT indicates that the flag is valid and EINVAL indicates that the flag is invalid. This patch adds a selftest that can be used to test this method of detection in userspace. Signed-off-by:
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Tyler Hicks authored
BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1721676 BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1567597 Adminstrators can write to this sysctl to set the seccomp actions that are allowed to be logged. Any actions not found in this sysctl will not be logged. For example, all SECCOMP_RET_KILL, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP, and SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO actions would be loggable if "kill trap errno" were written to the sysctl. SECCOMP_RET_TRACE actions would not be logged since its string representation ("trace") wasn't present in the sysctl value. The path to the sysctl is: /proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_logged The actions_avail sysctl can be read to discover the valid action names that can be written to the actions_logged sysctl with the exception of "allow". SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW actions cannot be configured for logging. The default setting for the sysctl is to allow all actions to be logged except SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW. While only SECCOMP_RET_KILL actions are currently logged, an upcoming patch will allow applications to request additional actions to be logged. There's one important exception to this sysctl. If a task is specifically being audited, meaning that an audit context has been allocated for the task, seccomp will log all actions other than SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW despite the value of actions_logged. This exception preserves the existing auditing behavior of tasks with an allocated audit context. With this patch, the logic for deciding if an action will be logged is: if action == RET_ALLOW: do not log else if action == RET_KILL && RET_KILL in actions_logged: log else if audit_enabled && task-is-being-audited: log else: do not log Signed-off-by:
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Tyler Hicks authored
BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1721676 BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1567597 Userspace code that needs to check if the kernel supports a given action may not be able to use the /proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_avail sysctl. The process may be running in a sandbox and, therefore, sufficient filesystem access may not be available. This patch adds an operation to the seccomp(2) syscall that allows userspace code to ask the kernel if a given action is available. If the action is supported by the kernel, 0 is returned. If the action is not supported by the kernel, -1 is returned with errno set to -EOPNOTSUPP. If this check is attempted on a kernel that doesn't support this new operation, -1 is returned with errno set to -EINVAL meaning that userspace code will have the ability to differentiate between the two error cases. Signed-off-by:
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by:
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Tyler Hicks authored
BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1721676 BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1567597 This patch creates a read-only sysctl containing an ordered list of seccomp actions that the kernel supports. The ordering, from left to right, is the lowest action value (kill) to the highest action value (allow). Currently, a read of the sysctl file would return "kill trap errno trace allow". The contents of this sysctl file can be useful for userspace code as well as the system administrator. The path to the sysctl is: /proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_avail libseccomp and other userspace code can easily determine which actions the current kernel supports. The set of actions supported by the current kernel may be different than the set of action macros found in kernel headers that were installed where the userspace code was built. In addition, this sysctl will allow system administrators to know which actions are supported by the kernel and make it easier to configure exactly what seccomp logs through the audit subsystem. Support for this level of logging configuration will come in a future patch. Signed-off-by:
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Kees Cook authored
BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1721676 BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1567597 Both the upcoming logging improvements and changes to RET_KILL will need to know which filter a given seccomp return value originated from. In order to delay logic processing of result until after the seccomp loop, this adds a single pointer assignment on matches. This will allow both log and RET_KILL logic to work off the filter rather than doing more expensive tests inside the time-critical run_filters loop. Running tight cycles of getpid() with filters attached shows no measurable difference in speed. Suggested-by:
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Wen-chien Jesse Sung authored
BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1721511 The new version can be found at OpenNSL git repo: https://github.com/Broadcom-Switch/OpenNSL/tree/v3.4.1.5Signed-off-by:
Wen-chien Jesse Sung <jesse.sung@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Acked-by:
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- 05 Oct, 2017 26 commits
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721550Signed-off-by:
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Arnd Bergmann authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721550 xen_swiotlb_dma_mmap was backported from v4.10, but older kernels before commit 00085f1e ("dma-mapping: use unsigned long for dma_attrs") use a different signature: arm/xen/mm.c:202:10: error: initialization from incompatible pointer type [-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types] .mmap = xen_swiotlb_dma_mmap, ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ arm/xen/mm.c:202:10: note: (near initialization for 'xen_swiotlb_dma_ops.mmap') This adapts the patch to the old calling conventions. Fixes: "swiotlb-xen: implement xen_swiotlb_dma_mmap callback" Signed-off-by:
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by:
Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Stefano Stabellini authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721550 commit 7e91c7df upstream. This function creates userspace mapping for the DMA-coherent memory. Signed-off-by:
Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> Signed-off-by:
Oleksandr Dmytryshyn <oleksandr.dmytryshyn@globallogic.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrii Anisov <andrii_anisov@epam.com> Signed-off-by:
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Vladis Dronov authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721550 commit 8e75f7a7 upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/pull/441Reported-by:
sohu0106 <sohu0106@126.com> Signed-off-by:
Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com> Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721550 commit c0a1666b upstream. This fixes a compilation failure on 32-bit systems. Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Robert Jarzmik authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721550 commit 4c35430a upstream. The number of requestor lines was clamped to 0 for all pxa architectures in the requestor declaration. Fix this by using the value. Fixes: 72b195cb ("ARM: pxa: add the number of DMA requestor lines") Signed-off-by:
Robert Jarzmik <robert.jarzmik@free.fr> Signed-off-by:
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Robert Jarzmik authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721550 commit 72b195cb upstream. Declare the number of DMA requestor lines per platform : - for pxa25x: 40 requestor lines - for pxa27x: 75 requestor lines - for pxa3xx: 100 requestor lines This information will be used to activate the DMA flow control or not. Signed-off-by:
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Robert Jarzmik authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721550 commit c283e41e upstream. The DMA chip has a fixed number of requestor lines used for flow control. This number is platform dependent. The pxa_dma dma driver will use this value to activate or not the flow control. There won't be any impact on mmp_pdma driver. Signed-off-by:
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Frederic Barrat authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721550 commit 197267d0 upstream. cxl keeps a driver use count, which is used with the hash memory model on p8 to know when to upgrade local TLBIs to global and to trigger callbacks to manage the MMU for PSL8. If a process opens a context and closes without attaching or fails the attachment, the driver use count is never decremented. As a consequence, TLB invalidations remain global, even if there are no active cxl contexts. We should increment the driver use count when the process is attaching to the cxl adapter, and not on open. It's not needed before the adapter starts using the context and the use count is decremented on the detach path, so it makes more sense. It affects only the user api. The kernel api is already doing The Right Thing. Signed-off-by:
Frederic Barrat <fbarrat@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Fixes: 7bb5d91a ("cxl: Rework context lifetimes") Acked-by:
Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> [ajd: backport to stable v4.4 tree] Signed-off-by:
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Haozhong Zhang authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721550 commit 5753743f upstream. WARN_ON_ONCE(pi_test_sn(&vmx->pi_desc)) in kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt() intends to detect the violation of invariant that VT-d PI notification event is not suppressed when vcpu is in the guest mode. Because the two checks for the target vcpu mode and the target suppress field cannot be performed atomically, the target vcpu mode may change in between. If that does happen, WARN_ON_ONCE() here may raise false alarms. As the previous patch fixed the real invariant breaker, remove this WARN_ON_ONCE() to avoid false alarms, and document the allowed cases instead. Signed-off-by:
Haozhong Zhang <haozhong.zhang@intel.com> Reported-by:
"Ramamurthy, Venkatesh" <venkatesh.ramamurthy@intel.com> Reported-by:
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Reviewed-by:
Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Haozhong Zhang authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721550 commit dc91f2eb upstream. In kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt() and pi_pre_block(), KVM assumes that PI notification events should not be suppressed when the target vCPU is not blocked. vmx_update_pi_irte() sets the SN field before changing an interrupt from posting to remapping, but it does not check the vCPU mode. Therefore, the change of SN field may break above the assumption. Besides, I don't see reasons to suppress notification events here, so remove the changes of SN field to avoid race condition. Signed-off-by:
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Myungho Jung authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721550 commit b94bf594 upstream. timer_migration sysctl acts as a boolean switch, so the allowed values should be restricted to 0 and 1. Add the necessary extra fields to the sysctl table entry to enforce that. [ tglx: Rewrote changelog ] Signed-off-by:
Myungho Jung <mhjungk@gmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1492640690-3550-1-git-send-email-mhjungk@gmail.comSigned-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Kazuhiro Hayashi <kazuhiro3.hayashi@toshiba.co.jp> Signed-off-by:
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Andreas Gruenbacher authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721550 commit 10201655 upstream. The switch to rhashtables (commit 88ffbf3e) broke the debugfs glock dump (/sys/kernel/debug/gfs2/<device>/glocks) for dumps bigger than a single buffer: the right function for restarting an rhashtable iteration from the beginning of the hash table is rhashtable_walk_enter; rhashtable_walk_stop + rhashtable_walk_start will just resume from the current position. The upstream commit doesn't directly apply to 4.4.y because 4.4.y doesn't have rhashtable_walk_enter and the following mainline commits: 92ecd73a gfs2: Deduplicate gfs2_{glocks,glstats}_open cc37a627 gfs2: Replace rhashtable_walk_init with rhashtable_walk_enter Other than rhashtable_walk_enter, rhashtable_walk_init can fail. To handle the failure case in gfs2_glock_seq_stop, we check if rhashtable_walk_init has initialized iter->walker; if it has not, we must not call rhashtable_walk_stop or rhashtable_walk_exit. Signed-off-by:
Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721550 commit 814fb7bb upstream. [Please apply to 4.4-stable. Note: the backport includes the fpstate_init() call in xstateregs_set(), since fix is useless without it. It was added by commit 91c3dba7 ("x86/fpu/xstate: Fix PTRACE frames for XSAVES"), but it doesn't make sense to backport that whole commit.] On x86, userspace can use the ptrace() or rt_sigreturn() system calls to set a task's extended state (xstate) or "FPU" registers. ptrace() can set them for another task using the PTRACE_SETREGSET request with NT_X86_XSTATE, while rt_sigreturn() can set them for the current task. In either case, registers can be set to any value, but the kernel assumes that the XSAVE area itself remains valid in the sense that the CPU can restore it. However, in the case where the kernel is using the uncompacted xstate format (which it does whenever the XSAVES instruction is unavailable), it was possible for userspace to set the xcomp_bv field in the xstate_header to an arbitrary value. However, all bits in that field are reserved in the uncompacted case, so when switching to a task with nonzero xcomp_bv, the XRSTOR instruction failed with a #GP fault. This caused the WARN_ON_FPU(err) in copy_kernel_to_xregs() to be hit. In addition, since the error is otherwise ignored, the FPU registers from the task previously executing on the CPU were leaked. Fix the bug by checking that the user-supplied value of xcomp_bv is 0 in the uncompacted case, and returning an error otherwise. The reason for validating xcomp_bv rather than simply overwriting it with 0 is that we want userspace to see an error if it (incorrectly) provides an XSAVE area in compacted format rather than in uncompacted format. Note that as before, in case of error we clear the task's FPU state. This is perhaps non-ideal, especially for PTRACE_SETREGSET; it might be better to return an error before changing anything. But it seems the "clear on error" behavior is fine for now, and it's a little tricky to do otherwise because it would mean we couldn't simply copy the full userspace state into kernel memory in one __copy_from_user(). This bug was found by syzkaller, which hit the above-mentioned WARN_ON_FPU(): WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at ./arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h:373 __switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0 CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.13.0 #453 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0 task.stack: ffffa78cc036c000 RIP: 0010:__switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0 RSP: 0000:ffffa78cc08bbb88 EFLAGS: 00010082 RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff9ba2b8bf2180 RCX: 00000000c0000100 RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: 000000005cb10700 RDI: ffff9ba2b8bf36c0 RBP: ffffa78cc08bbbd0 R08: 00000000929fdf46 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9ba2b8bf3680 R15: ffff9ba2bf5d7b40 FS: 00007f7e5cb10700(0000) GS:ffff9ba2bf400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000004005cc CR3: 0000000079fd5000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 Call Trace: Code: 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 11 fd ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 e7 fa ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 c2 fa ff ff <0f> ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 d4 fc ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f Here is a C reproducer. The expected behavior is that the program spin forever with no output. However, on a buggy kernel running on a processor with the "xsave" feature but without the "xsaves" feature (e.g. Sandy Bridge through Broadwell for Intel), within a second or two the program reports that the xmm registers were corrupted, i.e. were not restored correctly. With CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU=y it also hits the above kernel warning. #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <stdbool.h> #include <inttypes.h> #include <linux/elf.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/ptrace.h> #include <sys/uio.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <unistd.h> int main(void) { int pid = fork(); uint64_t xstate[512]; struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = xstate, .iov_len = sizeof(xstate) }; if (pid == 0) { bool tracee = true; for (int i = 0; i < sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN) && tracee; i++) tracee = (fork() != 0); uint32_t xmm0[4] = { [0 ... 3] = tracee ? 0x00000000 : 0xDEADBEEF }; asm volatile(" movdqu %0, %%xmm0\n" " mov %0, %%rbx\n" "1: movdqu %%xmm0, %0\n" " mov %0, %%rax\n" " cmp %%rax, %%rbx\n" " je 1b\n" : "+m" (xmm0) : : "rax", "rbx", "xmm0"); printf("BUG: xmm registers corrupted! tracee=%d, xmm0=%08X%08X%08X%08X\n", tracee, xmm0[0], xmm0[1], xmm0[2], xmm0[3]); } else { usleep(100000); ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0, 0); wait(NULL); ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov); xstate[65] = -1; ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov); ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0, 0); wait(NULL); } return 1; } Note: the program only tests for the bug using the ptrace() system call. The bug can also be reproduced using the rt_sigreturn() system call, but only when called from a 32-bit program, since for 64-bit programs the kernel restores the FPU state from the signal frame by doing XRSTOR directly from userspace memory (with proper error checking). Reported-by:
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by:
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com> Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Fixes: 0b29643a ("x86/xsaves: Change compacted format xsave area header") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170922174156.16780-2-ebiggers3@gmail.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170923130016.21448-25-mingo@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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satoru takeuchi authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721550 commit 6d6d2829 upstream. `btrfs sub set-default` succeeds to set an ID which isn't corresponding to any fs/file tree. If such the bad ID is set to a filesystem, we can't mount this filesystem without specifying `subvol` or `subvolid` mount options. Fixes: 6ef5ed0d ("Btrfs: add ioctl and incompat flag to set the default mount subvol") Signed-off-by:
Satoru Takeuchi <satoru.takeuchi@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs@gmx.com> Reviewed-by:
David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
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Naohiro Aota authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721550 commit 78ad4ce0 upstream. btrfs_cmp_data_prepare() (almost) always returns 0 i.e. ignoring errors from gather_extent_pages(). While the pages are freed by btrfs_cmp_data_free(), cmp->num_pages still has > 0. Then, btrfs_extent_same() try to access the already freed pages causing faults (or violates PageLocked assertion). This patch just return the error as is so that the caller stop the process. Signed-off-by:
Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com> Fixes: f4414602 ("btrfs: fix deadlock with extent-same and readpage") Reviewed-by:
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Naohiro Aota authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721550 commit bb166d72 upstream. __del_reloc_root should be called before freeing up reloc_root->node. If not, calling __del_reloc_root() dereference reloc_root->node, causing the system BUG. Fixes: 6bdf131f ("Btrfs: don't leak reloc root nodes on error") Signed-off-by:
Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by:
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Nicolai Stange authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721550 commit 9561475d upstream. The driver_override implementation is susceptible to a race condition when different threads are reading vs. storing a different driver override. Add locking to avoid the race condition. This is in close analogy to commit 62655397 ("driver core: platform: fix race condition with driver_override") from Adrian Salido. Fixes: 782a985d ("PCI: Introduce new device binding path using pci_dev.driver_override") Signed-off-by:
Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jim Mattson authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721550 commit 51aa68e7 upstream. If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8. This fixes CVE-2017-12154. Signed-off-by:
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by:
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jan H. Schönherr authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721550 commit 3a8b0677 upstream. The value of the guest_irq argument to vmx_update_pi_irte() is ultimately coming from a KVM_IRQFD API call. Do not BUG() in vmx_update_pi_irte() if the value is out-of bounds. (Especially, since KVM as a whole seems to hang after that.) Instead, print a message only once if we find that we don't have a route for a certain IRQ (which can be out-of-bounds or within the array). This fixes CVE-2017-1000252. Fixes: efc64404 ("KVM: x86: Update IRTE for posted-interrupts") Signed-off-by:
Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de> Signed-off-by:
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Will Deacon authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721550 commit 760bfb47 upstream. We currently route pte translation faults via do_page_fault, which elides the address check against TASK_SIZE before invoking the mm fault handling code. However, this can cause issues with the path walking code in conjunction with our word-at-a-time implementation because load_unaligned_zeropad can end up faulting in kernel space if it reads across a page boundary and runs into a page fault (e.g. by attempting to read from a guard region). In the case of such a fault, load_unaligned_zeropad has registered a fixup to shift the valid data and pad with zeroes, however the abort is reported as a level 3 translation fault and we dispatch it straight to do_page_fault, despite it being a kernel address. This results in calling a sleeping function from atomic context: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/arm64/mm/fault.c:313 in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 10290 Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [...] [<ffffff8e016cd0cc>] ___might_sleep+0x134/0x144 [<ffffff8e016cd158>] __might_sleep+0x7c/0x8c [<ffffff8e016977f0>] do_page_fault+0x140/0x330 [<ffffff8e01681328>] do_mem_abort+0x54/0xb0 Exception stack(0xfffffffb20247a70 to 0xfffffffb20247ba0) [...] [<ffffff8e016844fc>] el1_da+0x18/0x78 [<ffffff8e017f399c>] path_parentat+0x44/0x88 [<ffffff8e017f4c9c>] filename_parentat+0x5c/0xd8 [<ffffff8e017f5044>] filename_create+0x4c/0x128 [<ffffff8e017f59e4>] SyS_mkdirat+0x50/0xc8 [<ffffff8e01684e30>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28 Code: 36380080 d5384100 f9400800 9402566d (d4210000) ---[ end trace 2d01889f2bca9b9f ]--- Fix this by dispatching all translation faults to do_translation_faults, which avoids invoking the page fault logic for faults on kernel addresses. Reported-by:
Ankit Jain <ankijain@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by:
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Marc Zyngier authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721550 commit 5371513f upstream. When the kernel is entered at EL2 on an ARMv8.0 system, we construct the EL1 pstate and make sure this uses the the EL1 stack pointer (we perform an exception return to EL1h). But if the kernel is either entered at EL1 or stays at EL2 (because we're on a VHE-capable system), we fail to set SPsel, and use whatever stack selection the higher exception level has choosen for us. Let's not take any chance, and make sure that SPsel is set to one before we decide the mode we're going to run in. Acked-by:
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Oleg Nesterov authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721550 commit 66a733ea upstream. As Chris explains, get_seccomp_filter() and put_seccomp_filter() can end up using different filters. Once we drop ->siglock it is possible for task->seccomp.filter to have been replaced by SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC. Fixes: f8e529ed ("seccomp, ptrace: add support for dumping seccomp filters") Reported-by:
Chris Salls <chrissalls5@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> [tycho: add __get_seccomp_filter vs. open coding refcount_inc()] Signed-off-by:
Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com> [kees: tweak commit log] Signed-off-by:
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Christoph Hellwig authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721550 commit f507b54d upstream. The job structure is allocated as part of the request, so we should not free it in the error path of bsg_prepare_job. Signed-off-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by:
Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by:
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Vladis Dronov authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721550 commit e785fa0a upstream. nl80211_set_rekey_data() does not check if the required attributes NL80211_REKEY_DATA_{REPLAY_CTR,KEK,KCK} are present when processing NL80211_CMD_SET_REKEY_OFFLOAD request. This request can be issued by users with CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege and may result in NULL dereference and a system crash. Add a check for the required attributes presence. This patch is based on the patch by bo Zhang. This fixes CVE-2017-12153. References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1491046 Fixes: e5497d76 ("cfg80211/nl80211: support GTK rekey offload") Reported-by:
bo Zhang <zhangbo5891001@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Andreas Gruenbacher authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1721550 commit fc46820b upstream. In generic_file_llseek_size, return -ENXIO for negative offsets as well as offsets beyond EOF. This affects filesystems which don't implement SEEK_HOLE / SEEK_DATA internally, possibly because they don't support holes. Fixes xfstest generic/448. Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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