- 25 Jun, 2014 6 commits
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Maurizio Lombardi authored
In case of of error, the bnx2fc_cmd_mgr_alloc() function will call the bnx2fc_cmd_mgr_free() to perform the cleanup. The problem is that in one case the latter may try to scan some not-yet initialized lists, resulting in a kernel panic. This patch prevents this from happening by freeing the lists before calling bnx2fc_cmd_mgr_free(). Signed-off-by:
Maurizio Lombardi <mlombard@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Eddie Wai <eddie.wai@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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Neil Horman authored
debugfs caught this: WARNING: at lib/debugobjects.c:260 debug_print_object+0x83/0xa0() ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: work_struct hint: fc_scsi_scan_rport+0x0/0xd0 [scsi_transport_fc] CPU: 1 PID: 184 Comm: kworker/1:1 Tainted: G W -------------- 3.10.0-123.el7.x86_64.debug #1 Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL120 G7, BIOS J01 07/01/2013 Workqueue: fc_wq_5 fc_rport_final_delete [scsi_transport_fc] Call Trace: [<ffffffff8169efec>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b [<ffffffff8106cbd1>] warn_slowpath_common+0x61/0x80 [<ffffffff8106cc4c>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x5c/0x80 [<ffffffff8133e003>] debug_print_object+0x83/0xa0 [<ffffffffa04e2f40>] ? fc_parse_wwn+0x100/0x100 [<ffffffff8133f23b>] debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x22b/0x270 [<ffffffffa04e127e>] ? fc_rport_dev_release+0x1e/0x30 [<ffffffff811db3e9>] kfree+0xd9/0x2d0 [<ffffffffa04e127e>] fc_rport_dev_release+0x1e/0x30 [<ffffffff81428032>] device_release+0x32/0xa0 [<ffffffff8132701e>] kobject_release+0x7e/0x1b0 [<ffffffff81326ed8>] kobject_put+0x28/0x60 [<ffffffff81428397>] put_device+0x17/0x20 [<ffffffffa04e5025>] fc_rport_final_delete+0x165/0x210 [<ffffffff810959b0>] process_one_work+0x220/0x710 [<ffffffff81095944>] ? process_one_work+0x1b4/0x710 [<ffffffff81095fbb>] worker_thread+0x11b/0x3a0 [<ffffffff81095ea0>] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710 [<ffffffff8109e0cd>] kthread+0xed/0x100 [<ffffffff8109dfe0>] ? insert_kthread_work+0x80/0x80 [<ffffffff816b2fec>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 [<ffffffff8109dfe0>] ? insert_kthread_work+0x80/0x80 Seems to be because the scan_work work_struct might be active when the housing fc_rport struct gets freed. Ensure that we cancel it prior to freeing the rport Signed-off-by:
Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Reviewed-by:
Vasu Dev <vasu.dev@intel.com> Reviewed-by:
Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Maurizio Lombardi authored
The pm8001_get_phy_settings_info() function does not check the kzalloc() return value and does not free the allocated memory. Signed-off-by:
Suresh Thiagarajan <Suresh.Thiagarajan@pmcs.com> Acked-by:
Jack Wang <xjtuwjp@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Reddy, Sreekanth authored
Updating maintainers Email Ids for the entry LSILOGIC MPT FUSION DRIVERS in MAINTAINERS file Signed-off-by:
Sreekanth Reddy <Sreekanth.Reddy@avagotech.com> Signed-off-by:
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Tomas Henzl authored
commit 0e7c60cb [SCSI] be2iscsi: fix memory leak in error path fixed an potential junk pointer free if mgmt_get_if_info() returned an error fix it on one more place Signed-off-by:
Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
Mike Christie <michaelc@cs.wisc.edu> Signed-off-by:
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Tomas Henzl authored
a jump to 'free_memory' is apparently missing Signed-off-by:
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- 24 Jun, 2014 1 commit
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-coreLinus Torvalds authored
Pull compress bugfixes from Greg KH: "Here are two bugfixes for some compression functions that resolve some errors when uncompressing some pathalogical data. Both were found by Don A Bailey" * tag 'compress-3.16-rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core: lz4: ensure length does not wrap lzo: properly check for overruns
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- 23 Jun, 2014 33 commits
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Linus Torvalds authored
Merge fixes from Andrew Morton: "The nmi patch and watchdog patch aren't actually fixes - they're features which needed a few last-minutes touchups. Otherwise, a rather large batch of fixes - ocfs2 review takes a while and I got distracted and missed last week's batch" * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (31 commits) ocfs2/dlm: do not purge lockres that is queued for assert master ocfs2: do not return DLM_MIGRATE_RESPONSE_MASTERY_REF to avoid endless,loop during umount ocfs2: manually do the iput once ocfs2_add_entry failed in ocfs2_symlink and ocfs2_mknod ocfs2: fix a tiny race when running dirop_fileop_racer ocfs2/dlm: fix misuse of list_move_tail() in dlm_run_purge_list() ocfs2: refcount: take rw_lock in ocfs2_reflink ocfs2: revert "ocfs2: fix NULL pointer dereference when dismount and ocfs2rec simultaneously" ocfs2: fix deadlock when two nodes are converting same lock from PR to EX and idletimeout closes conn ocfs2: should add inode into orphan dir after updating entry in ocfs2_rename() mm: fix crashes from mbind() merging vmas checkpatch: reduce false positives when checking void function return statements ia64: arch/ia64/include/uapi/asm/fcntl.h needs personality.h DMA, CMA: fix possible memory leak slab: fix oops when reading /proc/slab_allocators shmem: fix faulting into a hole while it's punched mm: let mm_find_pmd fix buggy race with THP fault mm: thp: fix DEBUG_PAGEALLOC oops in copy_page_rep() kernel/watchdog.c: print traces for all cpus on lockup detection nmi: provide the option to issue an NMI back trace to every cpu but current Documentation/accounting/getdelays.c: add missing null-terminate after strncpy call ...
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Xue jiufei authored
When workqueue is delayed, it may occur that a lockres is purged while it is still queued for master assert. it may trigger BUG() as follows. N1 N2 dlm_get_lockres() ->dlm_do_master_requery is the master of lockres, so queue assert_master work dlm_thread() start running and purge the lockres dlm_assert_master_worker() send assert master message to other nodes receiving the assert_master message, set master to N2 dlmlock_remote() send create_lock message to N2, but receive DLM_IVLOCKID, if it is RECOVERY lockres, it triggers the BUG(). Another BUG() is triggered when N3 become the new master and send assert_master to N1, N1 will trigger the BUG() because owner doesn't match. So we should not purge lockres when it is queued for assert master. Signed-off-by:joyce.xue <xuejiufei@huawei.com> Reviewed-by:
Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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jiangyiwen authored
The following case may lead to endless loop during umount. node A node B node C node D umount volume, migrate lockres1 to B want to lock lockres1, send MASTER_REQUEST_MSG to C init block mle send MIGRATE_REQUEST_MSG to C find a block mle, and then return DLM_MIGRATE_RESPONSE_MASTERY_REF to B set C in refmap umount successfully try to umount, endless loop occurs when migrate lockres1 since C is in refmap So we can fix this endless loop case by only returning DLM_MIGRATE_RESPONSE_MASTERY_REF if it has a mastery mle when receiving MIGRATE_REQUEST_MSG. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by:jiangyiwen <jiangyiwen@huawei.com> Reviewed-by:
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jiangyiwen authored
When the call to ocfs2_add_entry() failed in ocfs2_symlink() and ocfs2_mknod(), iput() will not be called during dput(dentry) because no d_instantiate(), and this will lead to umount hung. Signed-off-by:
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Yiwen Jiang authored
When running dirop_fileop_racer we found a dead lock case. 2 nodes, say Node A and Node B, mount the same ocfs2 volume. Create /race/16/1 in the filesystem, and let the inode number of dir 16 is less than the inode number of dir race. Node A Node B mv /race/16/1 /race/ right after Node A has got the EX mode of /race/16/, and tries to get EX mode of /race ls /race/16/ In this case, Node A has got the EX mode of /race/16/, and wants to get EX mode of /race/. Node B has got the PR mode of /race/, and wants to get the PR mode of /race/16/. Since EX and PR are mutually exclusive, dead lock happens. This patch fixes this case by locking in ancestor order before trying inode number order. Signed-off-by:Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Reviewed-by:
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Xue jiufei authored
When a lockres in purge list but is still in use, it should be moved to the tail of purge list. dlm_thread will continue to check next lockres in purge list. However, code list_move_tail(&dlm->purge_list, &lockres->purge) will do *no* movements, so dlm_thread will purge the same lockres in this loop again and again. If it is in use for a long time, other lockres will not be processed. Signed-off-by:
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Wengang Wang authored
This patch tries to fix this crash: #5 [ffff88003c1cd690] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810166d5 #6 [ffff88003c1cd730] invalid_op at ffffffff8159b2de [exception RIP: ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks+359] RIP: ffffffffa05dfa27 RSP: ffff88003c1cd7e8 RFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88003c1cdaa8 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: ffff880027a95000 RDI: ffff88003c79b540 RBP: ffff88003c1cd858 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: ffffffff815f6ba0 R10: 00000000000001c9 R11: 00000000000001c9 R12: ffff88002d271500 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000001000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffff88003c1cd860] do_direct_IO at ffffffff811cd31b #8 [ffff88003c1cd950] direct_IO_iovec at ffffffff811cde9c #9 [ffff88003c1cd9b0] do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff811ce764 #10 [ffff88003c1cdb80] __blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff811ce7cc #11 [ffff88003c1cdbb0] ocfs2_direct_IO at ffffffffa05df756 [ocfs2] #12 [ffff88003c1cdbe0] generic_file_direct_write_iter at ffffffff8112f935 #13 [ffff88003c1cdc40] ocfs2_file_write_iter at ffffffffa0600ccc [ocfs2] #14 [ffff88003c1cdd50] do_aio_write at ffffffff8119126c #15 [ffff88003c1cddc0] aio_rw_vect_retry at ffffffff811d9bb4 #16 [ffff88003c1cddf0] aio_run_iocb at ffffffff811db880 #17 [ffff88003c1cde30] io_submit_one at ffffffff811dc238 #18 [ffff88003c1cde80] do_io_submit at ffffffff811dc437 #19 [ffff88003c1cdf70] sys_io_submit at ffffffff811dc530 #20 [ffff88003c1cdf80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8159a159 It crashes at BUG_ON(create && (ext_flags & OCFS2_EXT_REFCOUNTED)); in ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks. ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks is expecting the OCFS2_EXT_REFCOUNTED be removed in ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write() if it was there. But no cluster lock is taken during the time before (or inside) ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write() and after ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks(). It can happen in this case: Node A(which crashes) Node B ------------------------ --------------------------- ocfs2_file_aio_write ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write ocfs2_inode_lock ... ocfs2_inode_unlock #no refcount found .... ocfs2_reflink ocfs2_inode_lock ... ocfs2_inode_unlock #now, refcount flag set on extent ... flush change to disk ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks ocfs2_get_clusters #extent map miss #buffer_head miss read extents from disk found refcount flag on extent crash.. Fix: Take rw_lock in ocfs2_reflink path Signed-off-by:Wengang Wang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
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Xue jiufei authored
75f82eaa ("ocfs2: fix NULL pointer dereference when dismount and ocfs2rec simultaneously") may cause umount hang while shutting down truncate log. The situation is as followes: ocfs2_dismout_volume -> ocfs2_recovery_exit -> free osb->recovery_map -> ocfs2_truncate_shutdown -> lock global bitmap inode -> ocfs2_wait_for_recovery -> check whether osb->recovery_map->rm_used is zero Because osb->recovery_map is already freed, rm_used can be any other values, so it may yield umount hang. Signed-off-by:
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Tariq Saeed authored
ocfs2: fix deadlock when two nodes are converting same lock from PR to EX and idletimeout closes conn Orabug: 18639535 Two node cluster and both nodes hold a lock at PR level and both want to convert to EX at the same time. Master node 1 has sent BAST and then closes the connection due to idletime out. Node 0 receives BAST, sends unlock req with cancel flag but gets error -ENOTCONN. The problem is this error is ignored in dlm_send_remote_unlock_request() on the **incorrect** assumption that the master is dead. See NOTE in comment why it returns DLM_NORMAL. Upon getting DLM_NORMAL, node 0 proceeds to sends convert (without cancel flg) which fails with -ENOTCONN. waits 5 sec and resends. This time gets DLM_IVLOCKID from the master since lock not found in grant, it had been moved to converting queue in response to conv PR->EX req. No way out. Node 1 (master) Node 0 ============== ====== lock mode PR PR convert PR -> EX mv grant -> convert and que BAST ... <-------- convert PR -> EX convert que looks like this: ((node 1, PR -> EX) (node 0, PR -> EX)) ... BAST (want PR -> NL) ------------------> ... idle timout, conn closed ... In response to BAST, sends unlock with cancel convert flag gets -ENOTCONN. Ignores and sends remote convert request gets -ENOTCONN, waits 5 Sec, retries ... reconnects <----------------- convert req goes through on next try does not find lock on grant que status DLM_IVLOCKID ------------------> ... No way out. Fix is to keep retrying unlock with cancel flag until it succeeds or the master dies. Signed-off-by:Tariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
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alex chen authored
There are two files a and b in dir /mnt/ocfs2. node A node B mv a b In ocfs2_rename(), after calling ocfs2_orphan_add(), the inode of file b will be added into orphan dir. If ocfs2_update_entry() fails, ocfs2_rename return error and mv operation fails. But file b still exists in the parent dir. ocfs2_queue_orphan_scan -> ocfs2_queue_recovery_completion -> ocfs2_complete_recovery -> ocfs2_recover_orphans The inode of the file b will be put with iput(). ocfs2_evict_inode -> ocfs2_delete_inode -> ocfs2_wipe_inode -> ocfs2_remove_inode OCFS2_VALID_FL in the inode i_flags will be cleared. The file b still can be accessed on node B. ls /mnt/ocfs2 When first read the file b with ocfs2_read_inode_block(). It will validate the inode using ocfs2_validate_inode_block(). Because OCFS2_VALID_FL not set in the inode i_flags, so the file system will be readonly. So we should add inode into orphan dir after updating entry in ocfs2_rename(). Signed-off-by:alex.chen <alex.chen@huawei.com> Reviewed-by:
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Hugh Dickins authored
In v2.6.34 commit 9d8cebd4 ("mm: fix mbind vma merge problem") introduced vma merging to mbind(), but it should have also changed the convention of passing start vma from queue_pages_range() (formerly check_range()) to new_vma_page(): vma merging may have already freed that structure, resulting in BUG at mm/mempolicy.c:1738 and probably worse crashes. Fixes: 9d8cebd4 ("mm: fix mbind vma merge problem") Reported-by:
Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Tested-by:
Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Acked-by:
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.34+] Signed-off-by:
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Joe Perches authored
The previous patch had a few too many false positives on styles that should be acceptable. Signed-off-by:
Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Tested-by:
Anish Bhatt <anish@chelsio.com> Signed-off-by:
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Andrew Morton authored
fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c: In function 'SYSC_fanotify_init': fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c:726: error: implicit declaration of function 'personality' fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c:726: error: 'PER_LINUX32' undeclared (first use in this function) fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c:726: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c:726: error: for each function it appears in.) Reported-by:
Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Will Woods <wwoods@redhat.com> Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [3.15.x] Signed-off-by:
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Joonsoo Kim authored
We should free memory for bitmap when we find zone mismatch, otherwise this memory will leak. Additionally, I copy code comment from PPC KVM's CMA code to inform why we need to check zone mis-match. Signed-off-by:
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Acked-by:
Zhang Yanfei <zhangyanfei@cn.fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by:
Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Reviewed-by:
Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by:
Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Cc: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Joonsoo Kim authored
Commit b1cb0982 ("change the management method of free objects of the slab") introduced a bug on slab leak detector ('/proc/slab_allocators'). This detector works like as following decription. 1. traverse all objects on all the slabs. 2. determine whether it is active or not. 3. if active, print who allocate this object. but that commit changed the way how to manage free objects, so the logic determining whether it is active or not is also changed. In before, we regard object in cpu caches as inactive one, but, with this commit, we mistakenly regard object in cpu caches as active one. This intoduces kernel oops if DEBUG_PAGEALLOC is enabled. If DEBUG_PAGEALLOC is enabled, kernel_map_pages() is used to detect who corrupt free memory in the slab. It unmaps page table mapping if object is free and map it if object is active. When slab leak detector check object in cpu caches, it mistakenly think this object active so try to access object memory to retrieve caller of allocation. At this point, page table mapping to this object doesn't exist, so oops occurs. Following is oops message reported from Dave. It blew up when something tried to read /proc/slab_allocators (Just cat it, and you should see the oops below) Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC Modules linked in: [snip...] CPU: 1 PID: 9386 Comm: trinity-c33 Not tainted 3.14.0-rc5+ #131 task: ffff8801aa46e890 ti: ffff880076924000 task.ti: ffff880076924000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffaa1a8f4a>] [<ffffffffaa1a8f4a>] handle_slab+0x8a/0x180 RSP: 0018:ffff880076925de0 EFLAGS: 00010002 RAX: 0000000000001000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000005ce85ce7 RDX: ffffea00079be100 RSI: 0000000000001000 RDI: ffff880107458000 RBP: ffff880076925e18 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffff8801e6f84000 R13: ffffea00079be100 R14: ffff880107458000 R15: ffff88022bb8d2c0 FS: 00007fb769e45740(0000) GS:ffff88024d040000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff8801e6f84ff8 CR3: 00000000a22db000 CR4: 00000000001407e0 DR0: 0000000002695000 DR1: 0000000002695000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000070602 Call Trace: leaks_show+0xce/0x240 seq_read+0x28e/0x490 proc_reg_read+0x3d/0x80 vfs_read+0x9b/0x160 SyS_read+0x58/0xb0 tracesys+0xd4/0xd9 Code: f5 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 63 c8 44 3b 0c 8a 0f 84 e3 00 00 00 83 c0 01 44 39 c0 72 eb 41 f6 47 1a 01 0f 84 e9 00 00 00 89 f0 <4d> 8b 4c 04 f8 4d 85 c9 0f 84 88 00 00 00 49 8b 7e 08 4d 8d 46 RIP handle_slab+0x8a/0x180 To fix the problem, I introduce an object status buffer on each slab. With this, we can track object status precisely, so slab leak detector would not access active object and no kernel oops would occur. Memory overhead caused by this fix is only imposed to CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB_LEAK which is mainly used for debugging, so memory overhead isn't big problem. Signed-off-by:
Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Reported-by:
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reviewed-by:
Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Hugh Dickins authored
Trinity finds that mmap access to a hole while it's punched from shmem can prevent the madvise(MADV_REMOVE) or fallocate(FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE) from completing, until the reader chooses to stop; with the puncher's hold on i_mutex locking out all other writers until it can complete. It appears that the tmpfs fault path is too light in comparison with its hole-punching path, lacking an i_data_sem to obstruct it; but we don't want to slow down the common case. Extend shmem_fallocate()'s existing range notification mechanism, so shmem_fault() can refrain from faulting pages into the hole while it's punched, waiting instead on i_mutex (when safe to sleep; or repeatedly faulting when not). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Tested-by:
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Hugh Dickins authored
Trinity has reported: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018 IP: __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3070 (discriminator 1)) CPU: 6 PID: 16173 Comm: trinity-c364 Tainted: G W 3.15.0-rc1-next-20140415-sasha-00020-gaa90d09 #398 lock_acquire (arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:14 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3602) _raw_spin_lock (include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:143 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151) remove_migration_pte (mm/migrate.c:137) rmap_walk (mm/rmap.c:1628 mm/rmap.c:1699) remove_migration_ptes (mm/migrate.c:224) migrate_pages (mm/migrate.c:922 mm/migrate.c:960 mm/migrate.c:1126) migrate_misplaced_page (mm/migrate.c:1733) __handle_mm_fault (mm/memory.c:3762 mm/memory.c:3812 mm/memory.c:3925) handle_mm_fault (mm/memory.c:3948) __get_user_pages (mm/memory.c:1851) __mlock_vma_pages_range (mm/mlock.c:255) __mm_populate (mm/mlock.c:711) SyS_mlockall (include/linux/mm.h:1799 mm/mlock.c:817 mm/mlock.c:791) I believe this comes about because, whereas collapsing and splitting THP functions take anon_vma lock in write mode (which excludes concurrent rmap walks), faulting THP functions (write protection and misplaced NUMA) do not - and mostly they do not need to. But they do use a pmdp_clear_flush(), set_pmd_at() sequence which, for an instant (indeed, for a long instant, given the inter-CPU TLB flush in there), leaves *pmd neither present not trans_huge. Which can confuse a concurrent rmap walk, as when removing migration ptes, seen in the dumped trace. Although that rmap walk has a 4k page to insert, anon_vmas containing THPs are in no way segregated from 4k-page anon_vmas, so the 4k-intent mm_find_pmd() does need to cope with that instant when a trans_huge pmd is temporarily absent. I don't think we need strengthen the locking at the THP end: it's easily handled with an ACCESS_ONCE() before testing both conditions. And since mm_find_pmd() had only one caller who wanted a THP rather than a pmd, let's slightly repurpose it to fail when it hits a THP or non-present pmd, and open code split_huge_page_address() again. Signed-off-by:Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@gentwo.org> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Hugh Dickins authored
Trinity has for over a year been reporting a CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC oops in copy_page_rep() called from copy_user_huge_page() called from do_huge_pmd_wp_page(). I believe this is a DEBUG_PAGEALLOC false positive, due to the source page being split, and a tail page freed, while copy is in progress; and not a problem without DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, since the pmd_same() check will prevent a miscopy from being made visible. Fix by adding get_user_huge_page() and put_user_huge_page(): reducing to the usual get_page() and put_page() on head page in the usual config; but get and put references to all of the tail pages when DEBUG_PAGEALLOC. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by:
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Aaron Tomlin authored
A 'softlockup' is defined as a bug that causes the kernel to loop in kernel mode for more than a predefined period to time, without giving other tasks a chance to run. Currently, upon detection of this condition by the per-cpu watchdog task, debug information (including a stack trace) is sent to the system log. On some occasions, we have observed that the "victim" rather than the actual "culprit" (i.e. the owner/holder of the contended resource) is reported to the user. Often this information has proven to be insufficient to assist debugging efforts. To avoid loss of useful debug information, for architectures which support NMI, this patch makes it possible to improve soft lockup reporting. This is accomplished by issuing an NMI to each cpu to obtain a stack trace. If NMI is not supported we just revert back to the old method. A sysctl and boot-time parameter is available to toggle this feature. [dzickus@redhat.com: add CONFIG_SMP in certain areas] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: additional CONFIG_SMP=n optimisations] [mq@suse.cz: fix warning] Signed-off-by:
Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Jan Moskyto Matejka <mq@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
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Aaron Tomlin authored
Sometimes it is preferred not to use the trigger_all_cpu_backtrace() routine when one wants to avoid capturing a back trace for current. For instance if one was previously captured recently. This patch provides a new routine namely trigger_allbutself_cpu_backtrace() which offers the flexibility to issue an NMI to every cpu but current and capture a back trace accordingly. Patch x86 and sparc to support new routine. [dzickus@redhat.com: add stub in #else clause] [dzickus@redhat.com: don't print message in single processor case, wrap with get/put_cpu based on Oleg's suggestion] [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: undo C99ism] Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by:
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Rickard Strandqvist authored
Added a guaranteed null-terminate after call to strncpy. This was partly found using a static code analysis program called cppcheck. Signed-off-by:
Rickard Strandqvist <rickard_strandqvist@spectrumdigital.se> Acked-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by:
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Micky Ching authored
Add cancel_work_sync() in rtsx_pci_ms_drv_remove() to cancel pending request work when removing the driver. Signed-off-by:
Micky Ching <micky_ching@realsil.com.cn> Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com> says: Cc: Maxim Levitsky <maximlevitsky@gmail.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alex Dubov <oakad@yahoo.com> Cc: Roger Tseng <rogerable@realtek.com> Cc: Wei WANG <wei_wang@realsil.com.cn> Signed-off-by:
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David Rientjes authored
Oleg reports a division by zero error on zero-length write() to the percpu_pagelist_fraction sysctl: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC CPU: 1 PID: 9142 Comm: badarea_io Not tainted 3.15.0-rc2-vm-nfs+ #19 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff8800d5aeb6e0 ti: ffff8800d87a2000 task.ti: ffff8800d87a2000 RIP: 0010: percpu_pagelist_fraction_sysctl_handler+0x84/0x120 RSP: 0018:ffff8800d87a3e78 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000f89 RBX: ffff88011f7fd000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000010 RBP: ffff8800d87a3e98 R08: ffffffff81d002c8 R09: ffff8800d87a3f50 R10: 000000000000000b R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000060 R13: ffffffff81c3c3e0 R14: ffffffff81cfddf8 R15: ffff8801193b0800 FS: 00007f614f1e9740(0000) GS:ffff88011f440000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 00007f614f1fa000 CR3: 00000000d9291000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Call Trace: proc_sys_call_handler+0xb3/0xc0 proc_sys_write+0x14/0x20 vfs_write+0xba/0x1e0 SyS_write+0x46/0xb0 tracesys+0xe1/0xe6 However, if the percpu_pagelist_fraction sysctl is set by the user, it is also impossible to restore it to the kernel default since the user cannot write 0 to the sysctl. This patch allows the user to write 0 to restore the default behavior. It still requires a fraction equal to or larger than 8, however, as stated by the documentation for sanity. If a value in the range [1, 7] is written, the sysctl will return EINVAL. This successfully solves the divide by zero issue at the same time. Signed-off-by:David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Reported-by:
Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Chen Gang authored
The related warning: scripts/kconfig/conf --allmodconfig Kconfig warning: (FAULT_INJECTION_STACKTRACE_FILTER && LATENCYTOP && KMEMCHECK && LOCKDEP) selects FRAME_POINTER which has unmet direct dependencies (DEBUG_KERNEL && (CRIS || M68K || FRV || UML || AVR32 || SUPERH || BLACKFIN || MN10300 || METAG) || ARCH_WANT_FRAME_POINTERS) Signed-off-by:
Chen Gang <gang.chen.5i5j@gmail.com> Cc: Chen Liqin <liqin.linux@gmail.com> Cc: Lennox Wu <lennox.wu@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Don Zickus authored
Peter Wu noticed the following splat on his machine when updating /proc/sys/kernel/watchdog_thresh: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slub.c:965 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 1, name: init 3 locks held by init/1: #0: (sb_writers#3){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff8117b663>] vfs_write+0x143/0x180 #1: (watchdog_proc_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff810e02d3>] proc_dowatchdog+0x33/0x110 #2: (cpu_hotplug.lock){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff810589c2>] get_online_cpus+0x32/0x80 Preemption disabled at:[<ffffffff810e0384>] proc_dowatchdog+0xe4/0x110 CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 3.16.0-rc1-testing #34 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x4e/0x7a __might_sleep+0x11d/0x190 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x4e/0x1e0 perf_event_alloc+0x55/0x440 perf_event_create_kernel_counter+0x26/0xe0 watchdog_nmi_enable+0x75/0x140 update_timers_all_cpus+0x53/0xa0 proc_dowatchdog+0xe4/0x110 proc_sys_call_handler+0xb3/0xc0 proc_sys_write+0x14/0x20 vfs_write+0xad/0x180 SyS_write+0x49/0xb0 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b NMI watchdog: disabled (cpu0): hardware events not enabled What happened is after updating the watchdog_thresh, the lockup detector is restarted to utilize the new value. Part of this process involved disabling preemption. Once preemption was disabled, perf tried to allocate a new event (as part of the restart). This caused the above BUG_ON as you can't sleep with preemption disabled. The preemption restriction seemed agressive as we are not doing anything on that particular cpu, but with all the online cpus (which are protected by the get_online_cpus lock). Remove the restriction and the BUG_ON goes away. Signed-off-by:Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Reported-by:
Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl> Tested-by:
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Christoph Lameter authored
As discussed in various threads on the side: Remove one inactive maintainer, add two new ones and update my email address. Plus add Andrew. And fix the glob to include files like mm/slab_common.c Signed-off-by:
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> Signed-off-by:
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Naoya Horiguchi authored
There's a race between fork() and hugepage migration, as a result we try to "dereference" a swap entry as a normal pte, causing kernel panic. The cause of the problem is that copy_hugetlb_page_range() can't handle "swap entry" family (migration entry and hwpoisoned entry) so let's fix it. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by:
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Hugh Dickins authored
I was well aware of FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE and FALLOC_FL_COLLAPSE_RANGE support being added to fallocate(); but didn't realize until now that I had been too stupid to future-proof shmem_fallocate() against new additions. -EOPNOTSUPP instead of going on to ordinary fallocation. Signed-off-by:
Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [3.15] Signed-off-by:
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David Rientjes authored
Documentation/memory-hotplug.txt incorrectly states that the memory driver "probe" interface is only supported on powerpc and is vague about its application on x86. Clarify the platforms that make this interface available if memory hotplug is enabled. Signed-off-by:
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Petr Tesarik authored
To allow filtering of huge pages, makedumpfile must be able to identify them in the dump. This can be done by checking the appropriate page flag, so communicate its value to makedumpfile through the VMCOREINFO interface. There's only one small catch. Depending on how many page flags are available on a given architecture, this bit can be called PG_head or PG_compound. I sent a similar patch back in 2012, but Eric Biederman did not like using an #ifdef. So, this time I'm adding a common symbol (PG_head_mask) instead. See https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/11/28/91 for the previous version. Signed-off-by:
Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.cz> Acked-by:
Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@kernel.org> Cc: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Srivatsa S. Bhat authored
There is a race between the CPU offline code (within stop-machine) and the smp-call-function code, which can lead to getting IPIs on the outgoing CPU, *after* it has gone offline. Specifically, this can happen when using smp_call_function_single_async() to send the IPI, since this API allows sending asynchronous IPIs from IRQ disabled contexts. The exact race condition is described below. During CPU offline, in stop-machine, we don't enforce any rule in the _DISABLE_IRQ stage, regarding the order in which the outgoing CPU and the other CPUs disable their local interrupts. Due to this, we can encounter a situation in which an IPI is sent by one of the other CPUs to the outgoing CPU (while it is *still* online), but the outgoing CPU ends up noticing it only *after* it has gone offline. CPU 1 CPU 2 (Online CPU) (CPU going offline) Enter _PREPARE stage Enter _PREPARE stage Enter _DISABLE_IRQ stage = Got a device interrupt, and | Didn't notice the IPI the interrupt handler sent an | since interrupts were IPI to CPU 2 using | disabled on this CPU. smp_call_function_single_async() | = Enter _DISABLE_IRQ stage Enter _RUN stage Enter _RUN stage = Busy loop with interrupts | Invoke take_cpu_down() disabled. | and take CPU 2 offline = Enter _EXIT stage Enter _EXIT stage Re-enable interrupts Re-enable interrupts The pending IPI is noted immediately, but alas, the CPU is offline at this point. This of course, makes the smp-call-function IPI handler code running on CPU 2 unhappy and it complains about "receiving an IPI on an offline CPU". One real example of the scenario on CPU 1 is the block layer's complete-request call-path: __blk_complete_request() [interrupt-handler] raise_blk_irq() smp_call_function_single_async() However, if we look closely, the block layer does check that the target CPU is online before firing the IPI. So in this case, it is actually the unfortunate ordering/timing of events in the stop-machine phase that leads to receiving IPIs after the target CPU has gone offline. In reality, getting a late IPI on an offline CPU is not too bad by itself (this can happen even due to hardware latencies in IPI send-receive). It is a bug only if the target CPU really went offline without executing all the callbacks queued on its list. (Note that a CPU is free to execute its pending smp-call-function callbacks in a batch, without waiting for the corresponding IPIs to arrive for each one of those callbacks). So, fixing this issue can be broken up into two parts: 1. Ensure that a CPU goes offline only after executing all the callbacks queued on it. 2. Modify the warning condition in the smp-call-function IPI handler code such that it warns only if an offline CPU got an IPI *and* that CPU had gone offline with callbacks still pending in its queue. Achieving part 1 is straight-forward - just flush (execute) all the queued callbacks on the outgoing CPU in the CPU_DYING stage[1], including those callbacks for which the source CPU's IPIs might not have been received on the outgoing CPU yet. Once we do this, an IPI that arrives late on the CPU going offline (either due to the race mentioned above, or due to hardware latencies) will be completely harmless, since the outgoing CPU would have executed all the queued callbacks before going offline. Overall, this fix (parts 1 and 2 put together) additionally guarantees that we will see a warning only when the *IPI-sender code* is buggy - that is, if it queues the callback _after_ the target CPU has gone offline. [1]. The CPU_DYING part needs a little more explanation: by the time we execute the CPU_DYING notifier callbacks, the CPU would have already been marked offline. But we want to flush out the pending callbacks at this stage, ignoring the fact that the CPU is offline. So restructure the IPI handler code so that we can by-pass the "is-cpu-offline?" check in this particular case. (Of course, the right solution here is to fix CPU hotplug to mark the CPU offline _after_ invoking the CPU_DYING notifiers, but this requires a lot of audit to ensure that this change doesn't break any existing code; hence lets go with the solution proposed above until that is done). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by:Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Suggested-by:
Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Gautham R Shenoy <ego@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Mike Galbraith <mgalbraith@suse.de> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@rjwysocki.net> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by:
Sachin Kamat <sachin.kamat@samsung.com> Signed-off-by:
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Steven Miao authored
mm could be removed from current task struct, using previous vma->vm_mm It will crash on blackfin after updated to Linux 3.15. The commit "mm: per-thread vma caching" caused the crash. mm could be removed from current task struct before mmput()-> exit_mmap()-> delete_vma_from_mm() the detailed fault information: NULL pointer access Kernel OOPS in progress Deferred Exception context CURRENT PROCESS: COMM=modprobe PID=278 CPU=0 invalid mm return address: [0x000531de]; contents of: 0x000531b0: c727 acea 0c42 181d 0000 0000 0000 a0a8 0x000531c0: b090 acaa 0c42 1806 0000 0000 0000 a0e8 0x000531d0: b0d0 e801 0000 05b3 0010 e522 0046 [a090] 0x000531e0: 6408 b090 0c00 17cc 3042 e3ff f37b 2fc8 CPU: 0 PID: 278 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 3.15.0-ADI-2014R1-pre-00345-gea9f446 #25 task: 0572b720 ti: 0569e000 task.ti: 0569e000 Compiled for cpu family 0x27fe (Rev 0), but running on:0x0000 (Rev 0) ADSP-BF609-0.0 500(MHz CCLK) 125(MHz SCLK) (mpu off) Linux version 3.15.0-ADI-2014R1-pre-00345-gea9f446 (steven@steven-OptiPlex-390) (gcc version 4.3.5 (ADI-trunk/svn-5962) ) #25 Tue Jun 10 17:47:46 CST 2014 SEQUENCER STATUS: Not tainted SEQSTAT: 00000027 IPEND: 8008 IMASK: ffff SYSCFG: 2806 EXCAUSE : 0x27 physical IVG3 asserted : <0xffa00744> { _trap + 0x0 } physical IVG15 asserted : <0xffa00d68> { _evt_system_call + 0x0 } logical irq 6 mapped : <0xffa003bc> { _bfin_coretmr_interrupt + 0x0 } logical irq 7 mapped : <0x00008828> { _bfin_fault_routine + 0x0 } logical irq 11 mapped : <0x00007724> { _l2_ecc_err + 0x0 } logical irq 13 mapped : <0x00008828> { _bfin_fault_routine + 0x0 } logical irq 39 mapped : <0x00150788> { _bfin_twi_interrupt_entry + 0x0 } logical irq 40 mapped : <0x00150788> { _bfin_twi_interrupt_entry + 0x0 } RETE: <0x00000000> /* Maybe null pointer? */ RETN: <0x0569fe50> /* kernel dynamic memory (maybe user-space) */ RETX: <0x00000480> /* Maybe fixed code section */ RETS: <0x00053384> { _exit_mmap + 0x28 } PC : <0x000531de> { _delete_vma_from_mm + 0x92 } DCPLB_FAULT_ADDR: <0x00000008> /* Maybe null pointer? */ ICPLB_FAULT_ADDR: <0x000531de> { _delete_vma_from_mm + 0x92 } PROCESSOR STATE: R0 : 00000004 R1 : 0569e000 R2 : 00bf3db4 R3 : 00000000 R4 : 057f9800 R5 : 00000001 R6 : 0569ddd0 R7 : 0572b720 P0 : 0572b854 P1 : 00000004 P2 : 00000000 P3 : 0569dda0 P4 : 0572b720 P5 : 0566c368 FP : 0569fe5c SP : 0569fd74 LB0: 057f523f LT0: 057f523e LC0: 00000000 LB1: 0005317c LT1: 00053172 LC1: 00000002 B0 : 00000000 L0 : 00000000 M0 : 0566f5bc I0 : 00000000 B1 : 00000000 L1 : 00000000 M1 : 00000000 I1 : ffffffff B2 : 00000001 L2 : 00000000 M2 : 00000000 I2 : 00000000 B3 : 00000000 L3 : 00000000 M3 : 00000000 I3 : 057f8000 A0.w: 00000000 A0.x: 00000000 A1.w: 00000000 A1.x: 00000000 USP : 056ffcf8 ASTAT: 02003024 Hardware Trace: 0 Target : <0x00003fb8> { _trap_c + 0x0 } Source : <0xffa006d8> { _exception_to_level5 + 0xa0 } JUMP.L 1 Target : <0xffa00638> { _exception_to_level5 + 0x0 } Source : <0xffa004f2> { _bfin_return_from_exception + 0x6 } RTX 2 Target : <0xffa004ec> { _bfin_return_from_exception + 0x0 } Source : <0xffa00590> { _ex_trap_c + 0x70 } JUMP.S 3 Target : <0xffa00520> { _ex_trap_c + 0x0 } Source : <0xffa0076e> { _trap + 0x2a } JUMP (P4) 4 Target : <0xffa00744> { _trap + 0x0 } FAULT : <0x000531de> { _delete_vma_from_mm + 0x92 } P0 = W[P2 + 2] Source : <0x000531da> { _delete_vma_from_mm + 0x8e } P2 = [P4 + 0x18] 5 Target : <0x000531da> { _delete_vma_from_mm + 0x8e } Source : <0x00053176> { _delete_vma_from_mm + 0x2a } IF CC JUMP pcrel 6 Target : <0x0005314c> { _delete_vma_from_mm + 0x0 } Source : <0x00053380> { _exit_mmap + 0x24 } JUMP.L 7 Target : <0x00053378> { _exit_mmap + 0x1c } Source : <0x00053394> { _exit_mmap + 0x38 } IF !CC JUMP pcrel (BP) 8 Target : <0x00053390> { _exit_mmap + 0x34 } Source : <0xffa020e0> { __cond_resched + 0x20 } RTS 9 Target : <0xffa020c0> { __cond_resched + 0x0 } Source : <0x0005338c> { _exit_mmap + 0x30 } JUMP.L 10 Target : <0x0005338c> { _exit_mmap + 0x30 } Source : <0x0005333a> { _delete_vma + 0xb2 } RTS 11 Target : <0x00053334> { _delete_vma + 0xac } Source : <0x0005507a> { _kmem_cache_free + 0xba } RTS 12 Target : <0x00055068> { _kmem_cache_free + 0xa8 } Source : <0x0005505e> { _kmem_cache_free + 0x9e } IF !CC JUMP pcrel (BP) 13 Target : <0x00055052> { _kmem_cache_free + 0x92 } Source : <0x0005501a> { _kmem_cache_free + 0x5a } IF CC JUMP pcrel 14 Target : <0x00054ff4> { _kmem_cache_free + 0x34 } Source : <0x00054fce> { _kmem_cache_free + 0xe } IF CC JUMP pcrel (BP) 15 Target : <0x00054fc0> { _kmem_cache_free + 0x0 } Source : <0x00053330> { _delete_vma + 0xa8 } JUMP.L Kernel Stack Stack info: SP: [0x0569ff24] <0x0569ff24> /* kernel dynamic memory (maybe user-space) */ Memory from 0x0569ff20 to 056a0000 0569ff20: 00000001 [04e8da5a] 00008000 00000000 00000000 056a0000 04e8da5a 04e8da5a 0569ff40: 04eb9eea ffa00dce 02003025 04ea09c5 057f523f 04ea09c4 057f523e 00000000 0569ff60: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000001 00000000 0569ff80: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 0569ffa0: 0566f5bc 057f8000 057f8000 00000001 04ec0170 056ffcf8 056ffd04 057f9800 0569ffc0: 04d1d498 057f9800 057f8fe4 057f8ef0 00000001 057f928c 00000001 00000001 0569ffe0: 057f9800 00000000 00000008 00000007 00000001 00000001 00000001 <00002806> Return addresses in stack: address : <0x00002806> { _show_cpuinfo + 0x2d2 } Modules linked in: Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel exception [ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel exception Signed-off-by:Steven Miao <realmz6@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com> Reviewed-by:
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Acked-by:
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
Given some pathologically compressed data, lz4 could possibly decide to wrap a few internal variables, causing unknown things to happen. Catch this before the wrapping happens and abort the decompression. Reported-by:
"Don A. Bailey" <donb@securitymouse.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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