- 10 Oct, 2018 7 commits
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Sudeep Holla authored
[ Upstream commit 09bebb1a ] Vexpress platforms provide two different restart handlers: SYS_REBOOT that restart the entire system, while DB_RESET only restarts the daughter board containing the CPU. DB_RESET is overridden by SYS_REBOOT if it exists. notifier_chain_register used in register_restart_handler by design relies on notifiers to be registered once only, however vexpress restart notifier can get registered twice. When this happen it corrupts list of notifiers, as result some notifiers can be not called on proper event, traverse on list can be cycled forever, and second unregister can access already freed memory. So far, since this was the only restart handler in the system, no issue was observed even if the same notifier was registered twice. However commit 6c5c0d48 ("watchdog: sp805: add restart handler") added support for SP805 restart handlers and since the system under test contains two vexpress restart and two SP805 watchdog instances, it was observed that during the boot traversing the restart handler list looped forever as there's a cycle in that list resulting in boot hang. This patch fixes the issues by ensuring that the notifier is installed only once. Cc: Sebastian Reichel <sre@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com> Fixes: 46c99ac6 ("power/reset: vexpress: Register with kernel restart handler") Signed-off-by:
Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Anton Vasilyev authored
[ Upstream commit 11b71782 ] hwarc_probe() allocates memory for hwarc, but does not free it if uwb_rc_add() or hwarc_get_version() fail. Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org). Signed-off-by:
Anton Vasilyev <vasilyev@ispras.ru> Signed-off-by:
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Colin Ian King authored
[ Upstream commit c5fae4f4 ] Currently the check on error return from the call to rtsx_write_register is checking the error status from the previous call. Fix this by adding in the missing assignment of retval. Detected by CoverityScan, CID#709877 Fixes: fa590c22 ("staging: rts5208: add support for rts5208 and rts5288") Signed-off-by:
Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Williams authored
[ Upstream commit 3b6c62f3 ] Without this change the distance table calculation for emulated nodes may use the wrong numa node and report an incorrect distance. Signed-off-by:
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/153089328103.27680.14778434392225818887.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.comSigned-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Carpenter authored
[ Upstream commit 7fb2fd4e ] The problem is that if get_user_pages_fast() fails and returns a negative error code, it gets type promoted to a high positive value and treated as a success. Fixes: 06164d2b ("VMCI: queue pairs implementation.") Signed-off-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Matt Ranostay authored
[ Upstream commit ce054546 ] ADC channel 0 photodiode detects both infrared + visible light, but ADC channel 1 just detects infrared. However, the latter is a bit more sensitive in that range so complete darkness or low light causes a error condition in which the chan0 - chan1 is negative that results in a -EAGAIN. This patch changes the resulting lux1_input sysfs attribute message from "Resource temporarily unavailable" to a user-grokable lux value of 0. Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Matt Ranostay <matt.ranostay@konsulko.com> Signed-off-by:
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Stafford Horne authored
[ Upstream commit cefd769f ] As of GCC 9.0.0 the build is reporting warnings like: crypto/ablkcipher.c: In function ‘crypto_ablkcipher_report’: crypto/ablkcipher.c:374:2: warning: ‘strncpy’ specified bound 64 equals destination size [-Wstringop-truncation] strncpy(rblkcipher.geniv, alg->cra_ablkcipher.geniv ?: "<default>", ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ sizeof(rblkcipher.geniv)); ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This means the strnycpy might create a non null terminated string. Fix this by explicitly performing '\0' termination. Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <nick.desaulniers@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by:
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- 29 Sep, 2018 29 commits
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
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Steve Wise authored
commit 308aa2b8 upstream. Once the qp has been flushed, it cannot be flushed again. The user qp flush logic wasn't enforcing it however. The bug can cause touch-after-free crashes like: Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x000001ec Faulting instruction address: 0xc008000016069100 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] ... NIP [c008000016069100] flush_qp+0x80/0x480 [iw_cxgb4] LR [c00800001606cd6c] c4iw_modify_qp+0x71c/0x11d0 [iw_cxgb4] Call Trace: [c00800001606cd6c] c4iw_modify_qp+0x71c/0x11d0 [iw_cxgb4] [c00800001606e868] c4iw_ib_modify_qp+0x118/0x200 [iw_cxgb4] [c0080000119eae80] ib_security_modify_qp+0xd0/0x3d0 [ib_core] [c0080000119c4e24] ib_modify_qp+0xc4/0x2c0 [ib_core] [c008000011df0284] iwcm_modify_qp_err+0x44/0x70 [iw_cm] [c008000011df0fec] destroy_cm_id+0xcc/0x370 [iw_cm] [c008000011ed4358] rdma_destroy_id+0x3c8/0x520 [rdma_cm] [c0080000134b0540] ucma_close+0x90/0x1b0 [rdma_ucm] [c000000000444da4] __fput+0xe4/0x2f0 So fix flush_qp() to only flush the wq once. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com> Signed-off-by:
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by:
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Roderick Colenbrander authored
commit de66a1a0 upstream. Add support for USB based DS4 dongle device, which allows connecting a DS4 through Bluetooth, but hides Bluetooth from the host system. Signed-off-by:
Roderick Colenbrander <roderick.colenbrander@sony.com> Signed-off-by:
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
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Roderick Colenbrander authored
commit cf1015d6 upstream. Support additional DS4 model. Signed-off-by:
Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Catalin Marinas authored
commit db3899a6 upstream. When a kernel is built with CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS the following warning is produced when entering userspace for the first time: WARNING: at /work/Linux/linux-2.6-aarch64/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3519 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 4.4.0-rc3+ #639 Hardware name: Juno (DT) task: ffffffc9768a0000 ti: ffffffc9768a8000 task.ti: ffffffc9768a8000 PC is at check_flags.part.22+0x19c/0x1a8 LR is at check_flags.part.22+0x19c/0x1a8 pc : [<ffffffc0000fba6c>] lr : [<ffffffc0000fba6c>] pstate: 600001c5 sp : ffffffc9768abe10 x29: ffffffc9768abe10 x28: ffffffc9768a8000 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000001 x25: 00000000000000a6 x24: ffffffc00064be6c x23: ffffffc0009f249e x22: ffffffc9768a0000 x21: ffffffc97fea5480 x20: 00000000000001c0 x19: ffffffc00169a000 x18: 0000005558cc7b58 x17: 0000007fb78e3180 x16: 0000005558d2e238 x15: ffffffffffffffff x14: 0ffffffffffffffd x13: 0000000000000008 x12: 0101010101010101 x11: 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x10: fefefefefefeff63 x9 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x8 : 6e655f7371726964 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : ffffffc0001079c4 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : ffffffc001698438 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffffffc9768a0000 x0 : 000000000000002e Call trace: [<ffffffc0000fba6c>] check_flags.part.22+0x19c/0x1a8 [<ffffffc0000fc440>] lock_is_held+0x80/0x98 [<ffffffc00064bafc>] __schedule+0x404/0x730 [<ffffffc00064be6c>] schedule+0x44/0xb8 [<ffffffc000085bb0>] ret_to_user+0x0/0x24 possible reason: unannotated irqs-off. irq event stamp: 502169 hardirqs last enabled at (502169): [<ffffffc000085a98>] el0_irq_naked+0x1c/0x24 hardirqs last disabled at (502167): [<ffffffc0000bb3bc>] __do_softirq+0x17c/0x298 softirqs last enabled at (502168): [<ffffffc0000bb43c>] __do_softirq+0x1fc/0x298 softirqs last disabled at (502143): [<ffffffc0000bb830>] irq_exit+0xa0/0xf0 This happens because we disable interrupts in ret_to_user before calling schedule() in work_resched. This patch adds the necessary trace_hardirqs_off annotation. Signed-off-by:
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reported-by:
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by:
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Li Dongyang authored
commit fe18d649 upstream. Marking mmp bh dirty before writing it will make writeback pick up mmp block later and submit a write, we don't want the duplicate write as kmmpd thread should have full control of reading and writing the mmp block. Another reason is we will also have random I/O error on the writeback request when blk integrity is enabled, because kmmpd could modify the content of the mmp block(e.g. setting new seq and time) while the mmp block is under I/O requested by writeback. Signed-off-by:
Li Dongyang <dongyangli@ddn.com> Signed-off-by:
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by:
Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Theodore Ts'o authored
commit 5f8c1093 upstream. An online resize of a file system with the bigalloc feature enabled and a 1k block size would be refused since ext4_resize_begin() did not understand s_first_data_block is 0 for all bigalloc file systems, even when the block size is 1k. Signed-off-by:
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Theodore Ts'o authored
commit f0a459de upstream. Avoid growing the file system to an extent so that the last block group is too small to hold all of the metadata that must be stored in the block group. This problem can be triggered with the following reproducer: umount /mnt mke2fs -F -m0 -b 4096 -t ext4 -O resize_inode,^has_journal \ -E resize=1073741824 /tmp/foo.img 128M mount /tmp/foo.img /mnt truncate --size 1708M /tmp/foo.img resize2fs /dev/loop0 295400 umount /mnt e2fsck -fy /tmp/foo.img Reported-by:
Torsten Hilbrich <torsten.hilbrich@secunet.com> Signed-off-by:
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Theodore Ts'o authored
commit 4274f516 upstream. When mounting the superblock, ext4_fill_super() calculates the free blocks and free inodes and stores them in the superblock. It's not strictly necessary, since we don't use them any more, but it's nice to keep them roughly aligned to reality. Since it's not critical for file system correctness, the code doesn't call ext4_commit_super(). The problem is that it's in ext4_commit_super() that we recalculate the superblock checksum. So if we're not going to call ext4_commit_super(), we need to call ext4_superblock_csum_set() to make sure the superblock checksum is consistent. Most of the time, this doesn't matter, since we end up calling ext4_commit_super() very soon thereafter, and definitely by the time the file system is unmounted. However, it doesn't work in this sequence: mke2fs -Fq -t ext4 /dev/vdc 128M mount /dev/vdc /vdc cp xfstests/git-versions /vdc godown /vdc umount /vdc mount /dev/vdc tune2fs -l /dev/vdc With this commit, the "tune2fs -l" no longer fails. Reported-by:
Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@gmx.com> Signed-off-by:
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Theodore Ts'o authored
commit 4d982e25 upstream. A specially crafted file system can trick empty_inline_dir() into reading past the last valid entry in a inline directory, and then run into the end of xattr marker. This will trigger a divide by zero fault. Fix this by using the size of the inline directory instead of dir->i_size. Also clean up error reporting in __ext4_check_dir_entry so that the message is clearer and more understandable --- and avoids the division by zero trap if the size passed in is zero. (I'm not sure why we coded it that way in the first place; printing offset % size is actually more confusing and less useful.) https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200933Signed-off-by:
Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
commit e97267cb upstream. vsa.console is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:711 vt_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'vc_cons' [r] Fix this by sanitizing vsa.console before using it to index vc_cons Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Reviewed-by:
Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Lyude Paul authored
commit 6833fb1e upstream. It's true we can't resume the device from poll workers in nouveau_connector_detect(). We can however, prevent the autosuspend timer from elapsing immediately if it hasn't already without risking any sort of deadlock with the runtime suspend/resume operations. So do that instead of entirely avoiding grabbing a power reference. Signed-off-by:
Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
Karol Herbst <kherbst@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Signed-off-by:
Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Junxiao Bi authored
commit 234b69e3 upstream. While reading block, it is possible that io error return due to underlying storage issue, in this case, BH_NeedsValidate was left in the buffer head. Then when reading the very block next time, if it was already linked into journal, that will trigger the following panic. [203748.702517] kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.c:342! [203748.702533] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [203748.702561] Modules linked in: ocfs2 ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue configfs sunrpc dm_switch dm_queue_length dm_multipath bonding be2iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i iw_cxgb4 cxgb4 cxgb3i libcxgbi iw_cxgb3 cxgb3 mdio ib_iser rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm ib_sa ib_mad ib_core ib_addr ipv6 iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ipmi_devintf iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support dcdbas ipmi_ssif i2c_core ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler acpi_pad pcspkr sb_edac edac_core lpc_ich mfd_core shpchp sg tg3 ptp pps_core ext4 jbd2 mbcache2 sr_mod cdrom sd_mod ahci libahci megaraid_sas wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [203748.703024] CPU: 7 PID: 38369 Comm: touch Not tainted 4.1.12-124.18.6.el6uek.x86_64 #2 [203748.703045] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R620/0PXXHP, BIOS 2.5.2 01/28/2015 [203748.703067] task: ffff880768139c00 ti: ffff88006ff48000 task.ti: ffff88006ff48000 [203748.703088] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa05e9f09>] [<ffffffffa05e9f09>] ocfs2_read_blocks+0x669/0x7f0 [ocfs2] [203748.703130] RSP: 0018:ffff88006ff4b818 EFLAGS: 00010206 [203748.703389] RAX: 0000000008620029 RBX: ffff88006ff4b910 RCX: 0000000000000000 [203748.703885] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000023079fe [203748.704382] RBP: ffff88006ff4b8d8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8807578c25b0 [203748.704877] R10: 000000000f637376 R11: 000000003030322e R12: 0000000000000000 [203748.705373] R13: ffff88006ff4b910 R14: ffff880732fe38f0 R15: 0000000000000000 [203748.705871] FS: 00007f401992c700(0000) GS:ffff880bfebc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [203748.706370] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [203748.706627] CR2: 00007f4019252440 CR3: 00000000a621e000 CR4: 0000000000060670 [203748.707124] Stack: [203748.707371] ffff88006ff4b828 ffffffffa0609f52 ffff88006ff4b838 0000000000000001 [203748.707885] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff880bf67c3800 ffffffffa05eca00 [203748.708399] 00000000023079ff ffffffff81c58b80 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [203748.708915] Call Trace: [203748.709175] [<ffffffffa0609f52>] ? ocfs2_inode_cache_io_unlock+0x12/0x20 [ocfs2] [203748.709680] [<ffffffffa05eca00>] ? ocfs2_empty_dir_filldir+0x80/0x80 [ocfs2] [203748.710185] [<ffffffffa05ec0cb>] ocfs2_read_dir_block_direct+0x3b/0x200 [ocfs2] [203748.710691] [<ffffffffa05f0fbf>] ocfs2_prepare_dx_dir_for_insert.isra.57+0x19f/0xf60 [ocfs2] [203748.711204] [<ffffffffa065660f>] ? ocfs2_metadata_cache_io_unlock+0x1f/0x30 [ocfs2] [203748.711716] [<ffffffffa05f4f3a>] ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert+0x13a/0x890 [ocfs2] [203748.712227] [<ffffffffa05f442e>] ? ocfs2_check_dir_for_entry+0x8e/0x140 [ocfs2] [203748.712737] [<ffffffffa061b2f2>] ocfs2_mknod+0x4b2/0x1370 [ocfs2] [203748.713003] [<ffffffffa061c385>] ocfs2_create+0x65/0x170 [ocfs2] [203748.713263] [<ffffffff8121714b>] vfs_create+0xdb/0x150 [203748.713518] [<ffffffff8121b225>] do_last+0x815/0x1210 [203748.713772] [<ffffffff812192e9>] ? path_init+0xb9/0x450 [203748.714123] [<ffffffff8121bca0>] path_openat+0x80/0x600 [203748.714378] [<ffffffff811bcd45>] ? handle_pte_fault+0xd15/0x1620 [203748.714634] [<ffffffff8121d7ba>] do_filp_open+0x3a/0xb0 [203748.714888] [<ffffffff8122a767>] ? __alloc_fd+0xa7/0x130 [203748.715143] [<ffffffff81209ffc>] do_sys_open+0x12c/0x220 [203748.715403] [<ffffffff81026ddb>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase1+0x11b/0x180 [203748.715668] [<ffffffff816f0c9f>] ? system_call_after_swapgs+0xe9/0x190 [203748.715928] [<ffffffff8120a10e>] SyS_open+0x1e/0x20 [203748.716184] [<ffffffff816f0d5e>] system_call_fastpath+0x18/0xd7 [203748.716440] Code: 00 00 48 8b 7b 08 48 83 c3 10 45 89 f8 44 89 e1 44 89 f2 4c 89 ee e8 07 06 11 e1 48 8b 03 48 85 c0 75 df 8b 5d c8 e9 4d fa ff ff <0f> 0b 48 8b 7d a0 e8 dc c6 06 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 [203748.717505] RIP [<ffffffffa05e9f09>] ocfs2_read_blocks+0x669/0x7f0 [ocfs2] [203748.717775] RSP <ffff88006ff4b818> Joesph ever reported a similar panic. Link: https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2013-May/008931.html Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180912063207.29484-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.comSigned-off-by:
Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Vincent Pelletier authored
commit 18164943 upstream. This change has the following effects, in order of descreasing importance: 1) Prevent a stack buffer overflow 2) Do not append an unnecessary NULL to an anyway binary buffer, which is writing one byte past client_digest when caller is: chap_string_to_hex(client_digest, chap_r, strlen(chap_r)); The latter was found by KASAN (see below) when input value hes expected size (32 hex chars), and further analysis revealed a stack buffer overflow can happen when network-received value is longer, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to smash up to 17 bytes after destination buffer (16 bytes attacker-controlled and one null). As switching to hex2bin requires specifying destination buffer length, and does not internally append any null, it solves both issues. This addresses CVE-2018-14633. Beyond this: - Validate received value length and check hex2bin accepted the input, to log this rejection reason instead of just failing authentication. - Only log received CHAP_R and CHAP_C values once they passed sanity checks. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod] Write of size 1 at addr ffff8801090ef7c8 by task kworker/0:0/1021 CPU: 0 PID: 1021 Comm: kworker/0:0 Tainted: G O 4.17.8kasan.sess.connops+ #2 Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 05/19/2014 Workqueue: events iscsi_target_do_login_rx [iscsi_target_mod] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x71/0xac print_address_description+0x65/0x22e ? chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod] kasan_report.cold.6+0x241/0x2fd chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod] chap_server_compute_md5.isra.2+0x2cb/0x860 [iscsi_target_mod] ? chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex.constprop.5+0x50/0x50 [iscsi_target_mod] ? ftrace_caller_op_ptr+0xe/0xe ? __orc_find+0x6f/0xc0 ? unwind_next_frame+0x231/0x850 ? kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? deref_stack_reg+0xd0/0xd0 ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? is_module_text_address+0xa/0x11 ? kernel_text_address+0x4c/0x110 ? __save_stack_trace+0x82/0x100 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ? save_stack+0x8c/0xb0 ? 0xffffffffc1660000 ? iscsi_target_do_login+0x155/0x8d0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? process_one_work+0x35c/0x640 ? worker_thread+0x66/0x5d0 ? kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ? iscsi_update_param_value+0x80/0x80 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsit_release_cmd+0x170/0x170 [iscsi_target_mod] chap_main_loop+0x172/0x570 [iscsi_target_mod] ? chap_server_compute_md5.isra.2+0x860/0x860 [iscsi_target_mod] ? rx_data+0xd6/0x120 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsit_print_session_params+0xd0/0xd0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? cyc2ns_read_begin.part.2+0x90/0x90 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x25/0x50 ? memcmp+0x45/0x70 iscsi_target_do_login+0x875/0x8d0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsi_target_check_first_request.isra.5+0x1a0/0x1a0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? del_timer+0xe0/0xe0 ? memset+0x1f/0x40 ? flush_sigqueue+0x29/0xd0 iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsi_target_nego_release+0x80/0x80 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsi_target_restore_sock_callbacks+0x130/0x130 [iscsi_target_mod] process_one_work+0x35c/0x640 worker_thread+0x66/0x5d0 ? flush_rcu_work+0x40/0x40 kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0 ? kthread_bind+0x30/0x30 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0004243bc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 flags: 0x17fffc000000000() raw: 017fffc000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff raw: ffffea0004243c20 ffffea0004243ba0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8801090ef680: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 01 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 ffff8801090ef700: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 02 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 >ffff8801090ef780: 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 ^ ffff8801090ef800: 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 02 f2 f2 f2 f2 ffff8801090ef880: f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 ================================================================== Signed-off-by:
Vincent Pelletier <plr.vincent@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Vasily Khoruzhick authored
[ Upstream commit f0e0d044 ] Update 'confirmed' timestamp when ARP packet is received. It shouldn't affect locktime logic and anyway entry can be confirmed by any higher-layer protocol. Thus it makes sense to confirm it when ARP packet is received. Fixes: 77d71233 ("neighbour: update neigh timestamps iff update is effective") Signed-off-by:
Vasily Khoruzhick <vasilykh@arista.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
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Colin Ian King authored
[ Upstream commit a7f38002 ] The operation ~(p100_inb(VG_LAN_CFG_1) & HP100_LINK_UP) returns a value that is always non-zero and hence the wait for the link to drop always terminates prematurely. Fix this by using a logical not operator instead of a bitwise complement. This issue has been in the driver since pre-2.6.12-rc2. Detected by CoverityScan, CID#114157 ("Logical vs. bitwise operator") Signed-off-by:
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Willy Tarreau authored
[ Upstream commit 9824dfae ] Fields ->dev and ->next of struct ipddp_route may be copied to userspace on the SIOCFINDIPDDPRT ioctl. This is only accessible to CAP_NET_ADMIN though. Let's manually copy the relevant fields instead of using memcpy(). BugLink: http://blog.infosectcbr.com.au/2018/09/linux-kernel-infoleaks.html Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit bbd6528d ] In the unlikely case ip6_xmit() has to call skb_realloc_headroom(), we need to call skb_set_owner_w() before consuming original skb, otherwise we risk a use-after-free. Bring IPv6 in line with what we do in IPv4 to fix this. Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by:
syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by:
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Toke Høiland-Jørgensen authored
[ Upstream commit c56cae23 ] When splitting a GSO segment that consists of encapsulated packets, the skb->mac_len of the segments can end up being set wrong, causing packet drops in particular when using act_mirred and ifb interfaces in combination with a qdisc that splits GSO packets. This happens because at the time skb_segment() is called, network_header will point to the inner header, throwing off the calculation in skb_reset_mac_len(). The network_header is subsequently adjust by the outer IP gso_segment handlers, but they don't set the mac_len. Fix this by adding skb_reset_mac_len() calls to both the IPv4 and IPv6 gso_segment handlers, after they modify the network_header. Many thanks to Eric Dumazet for his help in identifying the cause of the bug. Acked-by:
Dave Taht <dave.taht@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@toke.dk> Signed-off-by:
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Joel Fernandes (Google) authored
commit b45d71fb upstream. Directories and inodes don't necessarily need to be in the same lockdep class. For ex, hugetlbfs splits them out too to prevent false positives in lockdep. Annotate correctly after new inode creation. If its a directory inode, it will be put into a different class. This should fix a lockdep splat reported by syzbot: > ====================================================== > WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected > 4.18.0-rc8-next-20180810+ #36 Not tainted > ------------------------------------------------------ > syz-executor900/4483 is trying to acquire lock: > 00000000d2bfc8fe (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){++++}, at: inode_lock > include/linux/fs.h:765 [inline] > 00000000d2bfc8fe (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){++++}, at: > shmem_fallocate+0x18b/0x12e0 mm/shmem.c:2602 > > but task is already holding lock: > 0000000025208078 (ashmem_mutex){+.+.}, at: ashmem_shrink_scan+0xb4/0x630 > drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:448 > > which lock already depends on the new lock. > > -> #2 (ashmem_mutex){+.+.}: > __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:925 [inline] > __mutex_lock+0x171/0x1700 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1073 > mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1088 > ashmem_mmap+0x55/0x520 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:361 > call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:1844 [inline] > mmap_region+0xf27/0x1c50 mm/mmap.c:1762 > do_mmap+0xa10/0x1220 mm/mmap.c:1535 > do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:2298 [inline] > vm_mmap_pgoff+0x213/0x2c0 mm/util.c:357 > ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x4da/0x660 mm/mmap.c:1585 > __do_sys_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:100 [inline] > __se_sys_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:91 [inline] > __x64_sys_mmap+0xe9/0x1b0 arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:91 > do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe > > -> #1 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: > __might_fault+0x155/0x1e0 mm/memory.c:4568 > _copy_to_user+0x30/0x110 lib/usercopy.c:25 > copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] > filldir+0x1ea/0x3a0 fs/readdir.c:196 > dir_emit_dot include/linux/fs.h:3464 [inline] > dir_emit_dots include/linux/fs.h:3475 [inline] > dcache_readdir+0x13a/0x620 fs/libfs.c:193 > iterate_dir+0x48b/0x5d0 fs/readdir.c:51 > __do_sys_getdents fs/readdir.c:231 [inline] > __se_sys_getdents fs/readdir.c:212 [inline] > __x64_sys_getdents+0x29f/0x510 fs/readdir.c:212 > do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe > > -> #0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){++++}: > lock_acquire+0x1e4/0x540 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3924 > down_write+0x8f/0x130 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:70 > inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:765 [inline] > shmem_fallocate+0x18b/0x12e0 mm/shmem.c:2602 > ashmem_shrink_scan+0x236/0x630 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:455 > ashmem_ioctl+0x3ae/0x13a0 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:797 > vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] > file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:501 [inline] > do_vfs_ioctl+0x1de/0x1720 fs/ioctl.c:685 > ksys_ioctl+0xa9/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:702 > __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:709 [inline] > __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:707 [inline] > __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:707 > do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe > > other info that might help us debug this: > > Chain exists of: > &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9 --> &mm->mmap_sem --> ashmem_mutex > > Possible unsafe locking scenario: > > CPU0 CPU1 > ---- ---- > lock(ashmem_mutex); > lock(&mm->mmap_sem); > lock(ashmem_mutex); > lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9); > > *** DEADLOCK *** > > 1 lock held by syz-executor900/4483: > #0: 0000000025208078 (ashmem_mutex){+.+.}, at: > ashmem_shrink_scan+0xb4/0x630 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:448 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180821231835.166639-1-joel@joelfernandes.orgSigned-off-by:
Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Reported-by:
NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Suggested-by:
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Vaibhav Nagarnaik authored
commit 83f36555 upstream. When reducing ring buffer size, pages are removed by scheduling a work item on each CPU for the corresponding CPU ring buffer. After the pages are removed from ring buffer linked list, the pages are free()d in a tight loop. The loop does not give up CPU until all pages are removed. In a worst case behavior, when lot of pages are to be freed, it can cause system stall. After the pages are removed from the list, the free() can happen while the work is rescheduled. Call cond_resched() in the loop to prevent the system hangup. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180907223129.71994-1-vnagarnaik@google.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 83f40318 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic") Reported-by:
Jason Behmer <jbehmer@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Vaibhav Nagarnaik <vnagarnaik@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by:
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Boris Ostrovsky authored
commit 70513d58 upstream. Otherwise we may leak kernel stack for events that sample user registers. Reported-by:
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Juergen Gross authored
commit ad4f15dc upstream. Commit 57f230ab ("xen/netfront: raise max number of slots in xennet_get_responses()") raised the max number of allowed slots by one. This seems to be problematic in some configurations with netback using a larger MAX_SKB_FRAGS value (e.g. old Linux kernel with MAX_SKB_FRAGS defined as 18 instead of nowadays 17). Instead of BUG_ON() in this case just fall back to retransmission. Fixes: 57f230ab ("xen/netfront: raise max number of slots in xennet_get_responses()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Mario Limonciello authored
commit ff0e9f26 upstream. An ACPI buffer that was allocated was not being freed after use. Signed-off-by:
Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@dell.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Darren Hart (VMware) <dvhart@infradead.org> Signed-off-by:
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Willy Tarreau authored
commit 49434c6c upstream. snd_emu10k1_fx8010_ioctl(SNDRV_EMU10K1_IOCTL_INFO) allocates memory using kmalloc() and partially fills it by calling snd_emu10k1_fx8010_info() before returning the resulting structure to userspace, leaving uninitialized holes. Let's just use kzalloc() here. BugLink: http://blog.infosectcbr.com.au/2018/09/linux-kernel-infoleaks.htmlSigned-off-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Sakamoto authored
commit 493626f2 upstream. When executing 'fw_run_transaction()' with 'TCODE_WRITE_BLOCK_REQUEST', an address of 'payload' argument is used for streaming DMA mapping by 'firewire_ohci' module if 'size' argument is larger than 8 byte. Although in this case the address should not be on kernel stack, current implementation of ALSA bebob driver uses data in kernel stack for a cue to boot M-Audio devices. This often brings unexpected result, especially for a case of CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y. This commit fixes the bug. Reference: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201021 Reference: https://forum.manjaro.org/t/firewire-m-audio-410-driver-wont-load-firmware/51165 Fixes: a2b2a779('ALSA: bebob: Send a cue to load firmware for M-Audio Firewire series') Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.16+ Signed-off-by:
Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Signed-off-by:
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Sébastien Szymanski authored
commit 90a3b7f8 upstream. The MMTLR bit is in the CS4265_SPDIF_CTL2 register at address 0x12 bit 0 and not at address 0x0 bit 1. Fix this. Signed-off-by:
Sébastien Szymanski <sebastien.szymanski@armadeus.com> Signed-off-by:
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Suren Baghdasaryan authored
commit e285d5bf upstream. According to ETSI TS 102 622 specification chapter 4.4 pipe identifier is 7 bits long which allows for 128 unique pipe IDs. Because NFC_HCI_MAX_PIPES is used as the number of pipes supported and not as the max pipe ID, its value should be 128 instead of 127. nfc_hci_recv_from_llc extracts pipe ID from packet header using NFC_HCI_FRAGMENT(0x7F) mask which allows for pipe ID value of 127. Same happens when NCI_HCP_MSG_GET_PIPE() is being used. With pipes array having only 127 elements and pipe ID of 127 the OOB memory access will result. Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com> Cc: Allen Pais <allen.pais@oracle.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Suggested-by:
Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Reviewed-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Suren Baghdasaryan authored
commit 674d9de0 upstream. When handling SHDLC I-Frame commands "pipe" field used for indexing into an array should be checked before usage. If left unchecked it might access memory outside of the array of size NFC_HCI_MAX_PIPES(127). Malformed NFC HCI frames could be injected by a malicious NFC device communicating with the device being attacked (remote attack vector), or even by an attacker with physical access to the I2C bus such that they could influence the data transfers on that bus (local attack vector). skb->data is controlled by the attacker and has only been sanitized in the most trivial ways (CRC check), therefore we can consider the create_info struct and all of its members to tainted. 'create_info->pipe' with max value of 255 (uint8) is used to take an offset of the hdev->pipes array of 127 elements which can lead to OOB write. Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com> Cc: Allen Pais <allen.pais@oracle.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Suggested-by:
Kevin Deus <kdeus@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 26 Sep, 2018 4 commits
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
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Paul Burton authored
commit 0f02cfbc upstream. When a system suffers from dcache aliasing a user program may observe stale VDSO data from an aliased cache line. Notably this can break the expectation that clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, ...) is, as its name suggests, monotonic. In order to ensure that users observe updates to the VDSO data page as intended, align the user mappings of the VDSO data page such that their cache colouring matches that of the virtual address range which the kernel will use to update the data page - typically its unmapped address within kseg0. This ensures that we don't introduce aliasing cache lines for the VDSO data page, and therefore that userland will observe updates without requiring cache invalidation. Signed-off-by:
Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Reported-by:
Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de> Reported-by:
Rene Nielsen <rene.nielsen@microsemi.com> Reported-by:
Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com> Fixes: ebb5e78c ("MIPS: Initial implementation of a VDSO") Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/20344/Tested-by:
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David Rivshin authored
commit d733f754 upstream. If an emac node has a phy-handle property that points to something which is not a phy, then a segmentation fault will occur when the interface is brought up. This is because while phy_connect() will return ERR_PTR() on failure, of_phy_connect() will return NULL. The common error check uses IS_ERR(), and so missed when of_phy_connect() fails. The NULL pointer is then dereferenced. Also, the common error message referenced slave->data->phy_id, which would be empty in the case of phy-handle. Instead, use the name of the device_node as a useful identifier. And in the phy_id case add the error code for completeness. Fixes: 9e42f715 ("drivers: net: cpsw: add phy-handle parsing") Signed-off-by:
David Rivshin <drivshin@allworx.com> Signed-off-by:
SZ Lin (林上智) <sz.lin@moxa.com> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Carpenter authored
commit b40b3e93 upstream. We accidentally removed the check for negative returns without considering the issue of type promotion. The "if_version_length" variable is type size_t so if __mei_cl_recv() returns a negative then "bytes_recv" is type promoted to a high positive value and treated as success. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 582ab27a ("mei: bus: fix received data size check in NFC fixup") Signed-off-by:
Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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