- 08 Sep, 2023 9 commits
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Filipe Manana authored
When removing a delayed item, or releasing which will remove it as well, we will modify one of the delayed node's rbtrees and item counter if the delayed item is in one of the rbtrees. This require having the delayed node's mutex locked, otherwise we will race with other tasks modifying the rbtrees and the counter. This is motivated by a previous version of another patch actually calling btrfs_release_delayed_item() after unlocking the delayed node's mutex and against a delayed item that is in a rbtree. So assert at __btrfs_remove_delayed_item() that the delayed node's mutex is locked. Reviewed-by:
Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by:
David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
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Filipe Manana authored
Instead of calling BUG() when we fail to insert a delayed dir index item into the delayed node's tree, we can just release all the resources we have allocated/acquired before and return the error to the caller. This is fine because all existing call chains undo anything they have done before calling btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index() or BUG_ON (when creating pending snapshots in the transaction commit path). So remove the BUG() call and do proper error handling. This relates to a syzbot report linked below, but does not fix it because it only prevents hitting a BUG(), it does not fix the issue where somehow we attempt to use twice the same index number for different index items. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/00000000000036e1290603e097e0@google.com/ CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by:
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Filipe Manana authored
If we fail to add a delayed dir index item because there's already another item with the same index number, we print an error message (and then BUG). However that message isn't very helpful to debug anything because we don't know what's the index number and what are the values of index counters in the inode and its delayed inode (index_cnt fields of struct btrfs_inode and struct btrfs_delayed_node). So update the error message to include the index number and counters. We actually had a recent case where this issue was hit by a syzbot report (see the link below). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/00000000000036e1290603e097e0@google.com/Reviewed-by:
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Qu Wenruo authored
[BUG] After commit 72a69cd0 ("btrfs: subpage: pack all subpage bitmaps into a larger bitmap"), the DEBUG section of btree_dirty_folio() would no longer compile. [CAUSE] If DEBUG is defined, we would do extra checks for btree_dirty_folio(), mostly to make sure the range we marked dirty has an extent buffer and that extent buffer is dirty. For subpage, we need to iterate through all the extent buffers covered by that page range, and make sure they all matches the criteria. However commit 72a69cd0 ("btrfs: subpage: pack all subpage bitmaps into a larger bitmap") changes how we store the bitmap, we pack all the 16 bits bitmaps into a larger bitmap, which would save some space. This means we no longer have btrfs_subpage::dirty_bitmap, instead the dirty bitmap is starting at btrfs_subpage_info::dirty_offset, and has a length of btrfs_subpage_info::bitmap_nr_bits. [FIX] Although I'm not sure if it still makes sense to maintain such code, at least let it compile. This patch would let us test the bits one by one through the bitmaps. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Signed-off-by:
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Josef Bacik authored
If we do fast tree logging we increment a counter on the current transaction for every ordered extent we need to wait for. This means we expect the transaction to still be there when we clear pending on the ordered extent. However if we happen to abort the transaction and clean it up, there could be no running transaction, and thus we'll trip the "ASSERT(trans)" check. This is obviously incorrect, and the code properly deals with the case that the transaction doesn't exist. Fix this ASSERT() to only fire if there's no trans and we don't have BTRFS_FS_ERROR() set on the file system. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Reviewed-by:
Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by:
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Filipe Manana authored
When running delayed items we are holding a delayed node's mutex and then we will attempt to modify a subvolume btree to insert/update/delete the delayed items. However if have an error during the insertions for example, btrfs_insert_delayed_items() may return with a path that has locked extent buffers (a leaf at the very least), and then we attempt to release the delayed node at __btrfs_run_delayed_items(), which requires taking the delayed node's mutex, causing an ABBA type of deadlock. This was reported by syzbot and the lockdep splat is the following: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00024-g93f5de5f #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor.2/13257 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88801835c0c0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256 but task is already holding lock: ffff88802a5ab8e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x3c/0x2a0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:198 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}: __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5475 [inline] lock_release+0x36f/0x9d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5781 up_write+0x79/0x580 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1625 btrfs_tree_unlock_rw fs/btrfs/locking.h:189 [inline] btrfs_unlock_up_safe+0x179/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:239 search_leaf fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1986 [inline] btrfs_search_slot+0x2511/0x2f80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2230 btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x9c/0x180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:4376 btrfs_insert_delayed_item fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:746 [inline] btrfs_insert_delayed_items fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:824 [inline] __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0xd24/0x2410 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1111 __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x1db/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1153 flush_space+0x269/0xe70 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:723 btrfs_async_reclaim_metadata_space+0x106/0x350 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:1078 process_one_work+0x92c/0x12c0 kernel/workqueue.c:2600 worker_thread+0xa63/0x1210 kernel/workqueue.c:2751 kthread+0x2b8/0x350 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x2e/0x60 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:145 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304 -> #0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144 lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 __mutex_lock_common+0x1d8/0x2530 kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 __mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 [inline] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:799 __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256 btrfs_release_delayed_node fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:281 [inline] __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x2b5/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1156 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x859/0x2ff0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2276 btrfs_sync_file+0xf56/0x1330 fs/btrfs/file.c:1988 vfs_fsync_range fs/sync.c:188 [inline] vfs_fsync fs/sync.c:202 [inline] do_fsync fs/sync.c:212 [inline] __do_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:220 [inline] __se_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:218 [inline] __x64_sys_fsync+0x196/0x1e0 fs/sync.c:218 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(btrfs-tree-00); lock(&delayed_node->mutex); lock(btrfs-tree-00); lock(&delayed_node->mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by syz-executor.2/13257: #0: ffff88802c1ee370 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: spin_unlock include/linux/spinlock.h:391 [inline] #0: ffff88802c1ee370 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0xb87/0xe00 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:287 #1: ffff88802c1ee398 (btrfs_trans_num_extwriters){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0xbb2/0xe00 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:288 #2: ffff88802a5ab8e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x3c/0x2a0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:198 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 13257 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00024-g93f5de5f #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 check_noncircular+0x375/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2195 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144 lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 __mutex_lock_common+0x1d8/0x2530 kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 __mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 [inline] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:799 __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256 btrfs_release_delayed_node fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:281 [inline] __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x2b5/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1156 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x859/0x2ff0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2276 btrfs_sync_file+0xf56/0x1330 fs/btrfs/file.c:1988 vfs_fsync_range fs/sync.c:188 [inline] vfs_fsync fs/sync.c:202 [inline] do_fsync fs/sync.c:212 [inline] __do_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:220 [inline] __se_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:218 [inline] __x64_sys_fsync+0x196/0x1e0 fs/sync.c:218 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f3ad047cae9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 (...) RSP: 002b:00007f3ad12510c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f3ad059bf80 RCX: 00007f3ad047cae9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007f3ad04c847a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f3ad059bf80 R15: 00007ffe56af92f8 </TASK> ------------[ cut here ]------------ Fix this by releasing the path before releasing the delayed node in the error path at __btrfs_run_delayed_items(). Reported-by: syzbot+a379155f07c134ea9879@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/000000000000abba27060403b5bd@google.com/ CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Signed-off-by:
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Josef Bacik authored
Internally I got a report of very long stalls on normal operations like creating a new file when auto relocation was running. The reporter used the 'bpf offcputime' tracer to show that we would get stuck in start_transaction for 5 to 30 seconds, and were always being woken up by the transaction commit. Using my timing-everything script, which times how long a function takes and what percentage of that total time is taken up by its children, I saw several traces like this 1083 took 32812902424 ns 29929002926 ns 91.2110% wait_for_commit_duration 25568 ns 7.7920e-05% commit_fs_roots_duration 1007751 ns 0.00307% commit_cowonly_roots_duration 446855602 ns 1.36182% btrfs_run_delayed_refs_duration 271980 ns 0.00082% btrfs_run_delayed_items_duration 2008 ns 6.1195e-06% btrfs_apply_pending_changes_duration 9656 ns 2.9427e-05% switch_commit_roots_duration 1598 ns 4.8700e-06% btrfs_commit_device_sizes_duration 4314 ns 1.3147e-05% btrfs_free_log_root_tree_duration Here I was only tracing functions that happen where we are between START_COMMIT and UNBLOCKED in order to see what would be keeping us blocked for so long. The wait_for_commit() we do is where we wait for a previous transaction that hasn't completed it's commit. This can include all of the unpin work and other cleanups, which tends to be the longest part of our transaction commit. There is no reason we should be blocking new things from entering the transaction at this point, it just adds to random latency spikes for no reason. Fix this by adding a PREP stage. This allows us to properly deal with multiple committers coming in at the same time, we retain the behavior that the winner waits on the previous transaction and the losers all wait for this transaction commit to occur. Nothing else is blocked during the PREP stage, and then once the wait is complete we switch to COMMIT_START and all of the same behavior as before is maintained. Reviewed-by: -
Filipe Manana authored
During the ino lookup ioctl we can end up calling btrfs_iget() to get an inode reference while we are holding on a root's btree. If btrfs_iget() needs to lookup the inode from the root's btree, because it's not currently loaded in memory, then it will need to lock another or the same path in the same root btree. This may result in a deadlock and trigger the following lockdep splat: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00004-gf7757129 #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor277/5012 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88802df41710 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136 but task is already holding lock: ffff88802df418e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}: down_read_nested+0x49/0x2f0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1645 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136 btrfs_search_slot+0x13a4/0x2f80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2302 btrfs_init_root_free_objectid+0x148/0x320 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:4955 btrfs_init_fs_root fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1128 [inline] btrfs_get_root_ref+0x5ae/0xae0 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1338 btrfs_get_fs_root fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1390 [inline] open_ctree+0x29c8/0x3030 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:3494 btrfs_fill_super+0x1c7/0x2f0 fs/btrfs/super.c:1154 btrfs_mount_root+0x7e0/0x910 fs/btrfs/super.c:1519 legacy_get_tree+0xef/0x190 fs/fs_context.c:611 vfs_get_tree+0x8c/0x270 fs/super.c:1519 fc_mount fs/namespace.c:1112 [inline] vfs_kern_mount+0xbc/0x150 fs/namespace.c:1142 btrfs_mount+0x39f/0xb50 fs/btrfs/super.c:1579 legacy_get_tree+0xef/0x190 fs/fs_context.c:611 vfs_get_tree+0x8c/0x270 fs/super.c:1519 do_new_mount+0x28f/0xae0 fs/namespace.c:3335 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3675 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3884 [inline] __se_sys_mount+0x2d9/0x3c0 fs/namespace.c:3861 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd -> #0 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{3:3}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144 lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 down_read_nested+0x49/0x2f0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1645 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136 btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:142 [inline] btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x292/0x3c0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:281 btrfs_search_slot_get_root fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1832 [inline] btrfs_search_slot+0x4ff/0x2f80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2154 btrfs_lookup_inode+0xdc/0x480 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:412 btrfs_read_locked_inode fs/btrfs/inode.c:3892 [inline] btrfs_iget_path+0x2d9/0x1520 fs/btrfs/inode.c:5716 btrfs_search_path_in_tree_user fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1961 [inline] btrfs_ioctl_ino_lookup_user+0x77a/0xf50 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:2105 btrfs_ioctl+0xb0b/0xd40 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:4683 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf8/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:856 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- rlock(btrfs-tree-00); lock(btrfs-tree-01); lock(btrfs-tree-00); rlock(btrfs-tree-01); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor277/5012: #0: ffff88802df418e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 5012 Comm: syz-executor277 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00004-gf7757129 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 check_noncircular+0x375/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2195 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144 lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 down_read_nested+0x49/0x2f0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1645 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136 btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:142 [inline] btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x292/0x3c0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:281 btrfs_search_slot_get_root fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1832 [inline] btrfs_search_slot+0x4ff/0x2f80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2154 btrfs_lookup_inode+0xdc/0x480 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:412 btrfs_read_locked_inode fs/btrfs/inode.c:3892 [inline] btrfs_iget_path+0x2d9/0x1520 fs/btrfs/inode.c:5716 btrfs_search_path_in_tree_user fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1961 [inline] btrfs_ioctl_ino_lookup_user+0x77a/0xf50 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:2105 btrfs_ioctl+0xb0b/0xd40 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:4683 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf8/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:856 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f0bec94ea39 Fix this simply by releasing the path before calling btrfs_iget() as at point we don't need the path anymore. Reported-by: syzbot+bf66ad948981797d2f1d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/00000000000045fa140603c4a969@google.com/ Fixes: 23d0b79d ("btrfs: Add unprivileged version of ino_lookup ioctl") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ Reviewed-by:
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Filipe Manana authored
Commit 675dfe12 ("btrfs: fix block group item corruption after inserting new block group") fixed one race that resulted in not persisting a block group's item when its "used" bytes field decreases to zero. However there's another race that can happen in a much shorter time window that results in the same problem. The following sequence of steps explains how it can happen: 1) Task A creates a metadata block group X, its "used" and "commit_used" fields are initialized to 0; 2) Two extents are allocated from block group X, so its "used" field is updated to 32K, and its "commit_used" field remains as 0; 3) Transaction commit starts, by some task B, and it enters btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups(). There it tries to update the block group item for block group X, which currently has its "used" field with a value of 32K and its "commit_used" field with a value of 0. However that fails since the block group item was not yet inserted, so at update_block_group_item(), the btrfs_search_slot() call returns 1, and then we set 'ret' to -ENOENT. Before jumping to the label 'fail'... 4) The block group item is inserted by task A, when for example btrfs_create_pending_block_groups() is called when releasing its transaction handle. This results in insert_block_group_item() inserting the block group item in the extent tree (or block group tree), with a "used" field having a value of 32K and setting "commit_used", in struct btrfs_block_group, to the same value (32K); 5) Task B jumps to the 'fail' label and then resets the "commit_used" field to 0. At btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups(), because -ENOENT was returned from update_block_group_item(), we add the block group again to the list of dirty block groups, so that we will try again in the critical section of the transaction commit when calling btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups(); 6) Later the two extents from block group X are freed, so its "used" field becomes 0; 7) If no more extents are allocated from block group X before we get into btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups(), then when we call update_block_group_item() again for block group X, we will not update the block group item to reflect that it has 0 bytes used, because the "used" and "commit_used" fields in struct btrfs_block_group have the same value, a value of 0. As a result after committing the transaction we have an empty block group with its block group item having a 32K value for its "used" field. This will trigger errors from fsck ("btrfs check" command) and after mounting again the fs, the cleaner kthread will not automatically delete the empty block group, since its "used" field is not 0. Possibly there are other issues due to this inconsistency. When this issue happens, the error reported by fsck is like this: [1/7] checking root items [2/7] checking extents block group [1104150528 1073741824] used 39796736 but extent items used 0 ERROR: errors found in extent allocation tree or chunk allocation (...) So fix this by not resetting the "commit_used" field of a block group when we don't find the block group item at update_block_group_item(). Fixes: 7248e0ce ("btrfs: skip update of block group item if used bytes are the same") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.2+ Reviewed-by:
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- 22 Aug, 2023 1 commit
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Naohiro Aota authored
When doing a relocation, there is a chance that at the time of btrfs_reloc_clone_csums(), there is no checksum for the corresponding region. In this case, btrfs_finish_ordered_zoned()'s sum points to an invalid item and so ordered_extent's logical is set to some invalid value. Then, btrfs_lookup_block_group() in btrfs_zone_finish_endio() failed to find a block group and will hit an assert or a null pointer dereference as following. This can be reprodcued by running btrfs/028 several times (e.g, 4 to 16 times) with a null_blk setup. The device's zone size and capacity is set to 32 MB and the storage size is set to 5 GB on my setup. KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000088-0x000000000000008f] CPU: 6 PID: 3105720 Comm: kworker/u16:13 Tainted: G W 6.5.0-rc6-kts+ #1 Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X10SRL-F, BIOS 2.0 12/17/2015 Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] RIP: 0010:btrfs_zone_finish_endio.part.0+0x34/0x160 [btrfs] Code: 41 54 49 89 fc 55 48 89 f5 53 e8 57 7d fc ff 48 8d b8 88 00 00 00 48 89 c3 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 > 3c 02 00 0f 85 02 01 00 00 f6 83 88 00 00 00 01 0f 84 a8 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffff88833cf87b08 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000011 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000088 RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed102877b827 R10: ffff888143bdc13b R11: ffff888125b1cbc0 R12: ffff888143bdc000 R13: 0000000000007000 R14: ffff888125b1cba8 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88881e500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f3ed85223d5 CR3: 00000001519b4005 CR4: 00000000001706e0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? die_addr+0x3c/0xa0 ? exc_general_protection+0x148/0x220 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30 ? btrfs_zone_finish_endio.part.0+0x34/0x160 [btrfs] ? btrfs_zone_finish_endio.part.0+0x19/0x160 [btrfs] btrfs_finish_one_ordered+0x7b8/0x1de0 [btrfs] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 ? lock_release+0x47a/0x620 ? btrfs_finish_ordered_zoned+0x59b/0x800 [btrfs] ? __pfx_btrfs_finish_one_ordered+0x10/0x10 [btrfs] ? btrfs_finish_ordered_zoned+0x358/0x800 [btrfs] ? __smp_call_single_queue+0x124/0x350 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 btrfs_work_helper+0x19f/0xc60 [btrfs] ? __pfx_try_to_wake_up+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 process_one_work+0x8c1/0x1430 ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x52/0x60 worker_thread+0x100/0x12c0 ? __kthread_parkme+0xc1/0x1f0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x2ea/0x3c0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> On the zoned mode, writing to pre-allocated region means data relocation write. Such write always uses WRITE command so there is no need of splitting and rewriting logical address. Thus, we can just skip the function for the case. Fixes: cbfce4c7 ("btrfs: optimize the logical to physical mapping for zoned writes") Signed-off-by:Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 21 Aug, 2023 30 commits
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Josef Bacik authored
This reproduces the bug fixed by "btrfs: fix incorrect splitting in btrfs_drop_extent_map_range", we were improperly calculating the range for the split extent. Add a test that exercises this scenario and validates that we get the correct resulting extent_maps in our tree. Reviewed-by:
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Josef Bacik authored
This helper is different from the normal add_extent_mapping in that it will stuff an em into a gap that exists between overlapping em's in the tree. It appeared there was a bug so I wrote a self test to validate it did the correct thing when it worked with two side by side ems. Thankfully it is correct, but more testing is better. Reviewed-by:
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Josef Bacik authored
While investigating weird problems with the extent_map I wrote a self test testing the various edge cases of btrfs_drop_extent_map_range. This can split in different ways and behaves different in each case, so test the various edge cases to make sure everything is functioning properly. Reviewed-by:
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Qu Wenruo authored
Currently the scrub_stripe_read_repair_worker() only does reads to rebuild the corrupted sectors, it doesn't do any writeback. The design is mostly to put writeback into a more ordered manner, to co-operate with dev-replace with zoned mode, which requires every write to be submitted in their bytenr order. However the writeback for repaired sectors into the original mirror doesn't need such strong sync requirement, as it can only happen for non-zoned devices. This patch would move the writeback for repaired sectors into scrub_stripe_read_repair_worker(), which removes two calls sites for repaired sectors writeback. (one from flush_scrub_stripes(), one from scrub_raid56_parity_stripe()) Signed-off-by:
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Qu Wenruo authored
The workqueue fs_info->scrub_worker would go ordered workqueue if it's a device replace operation. However the scrub is relying on multiple workers to do data csum verification, and we always submit several read requests in a row. Thus there is no need to use ordered workqueue just for dev-replace. We have extra synchronization (the main thread will always submit-and-wait for dev-replace writes) to handle it for zoned devices. Signed-off-by:
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Qu Wenruo authored
[REGRESSION] There are several regression reports about the scrub performance with v6.4 kernel. On a PCIe 3.0 device, the old v6.3 kernel can go 3GB/s scrub speed, but v6.4 can only go 1GB/s, an obvious 66% performance drop. [CAUSE] Iostat shows a very different behavior between v6.3 and v6.4 kernel: Device r/s rkB/s rrqm/s %rrqm r_await rareq-sz aqu-sz %util nvme0n1p3 9731.00 3425544.00 17237.00 63.92 2.18 352.02 21.18 100.00 nvme0n1p3 15578.00 993616.00 5.00 0.03 0.09 63.78 1.32 100.00 The upper one is v6.3 while the lower one is v6.4. There are several obvious differences: - Very few read merges This turns out to be a behavior change that we no longer do bio plug/unplug. - Very low aqu-sz This is due to the submit-and-wait behavior of flush_scrub_stripes(), and extra extent/csum tree search. Both behaviors are not that obvious on SATA SSDs, as SATA SSDs have NCQ to merge the reads, while SATA SSDs can not handle high queue depth well either. [FIX] For now this patch focuses on the read speed fix. Dev-replace replace speed needs more work. For the read part, we go two directions to fix the problems: - Re-introduce blk plug/unplug to merge read requests This is pretty simple, and the behavior is pretty easy to observe. This would enlarge the average read request size to 512K. - Introduce multi-group reads and no longer wait for each group Instead of the old behavior, which submits 8 stripes and waits for them, here we would enlarge the total number of stripes to 16 * 8. Which is 8M per device, the same limit as the old scrub in-flight bios size limit. Now every time we fill a group (8 stripes), we submit them and continue to next stripes. Only when the full 16 * 8 stripes are all filled, we submit the remaining ones (the last group), and wait for all groups to finish. Then submit the repair writes and dev-replace writes. This should enlarge the queue depth. This would greatly improve the merge rate (thus read block size) and queue depth: Before (with regression, and cached extent/csum path): Device r/s rkB/s rrqm/s %rrqm r_await rareq-sz aqu-sz %util nvme0n1p3 20666.00 1318240.00 10.00 0.05 0.08 63.79 1.63 100.00 After (with all patches applied): nvme0n1p3 5165.00 2278304.00 30557.00 85.54 0.55 441.10 2.81 100.00 i.e. 1287 to 2224 MB/s. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.4+ Signed-off-by:
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Qu Wenruo authored
One of the bottleneck of the new scrub code is the extra csum tree search. The old code would only do the csum tree search for each scrub bio, which can be as large as 512KiB, thus they can afford to allocate a new path each time. But the new scrub code is doing csum tree search for each stripe, which is only 64KiB, this means we'd better re-use the same csum path during each search. This patch would introduce a per-sctx path for csum tree search, as we don't need to re-allocate the path every time we need to do a csum tree search. With this change we can further improve the queue depth and improve the scrub read performance: Before (with regression and cached extent tree path): Device r/s rkB/s rrqm/s %rrqm r_await rareq-sz aqu-sz %util nvme0n1p3 15875.00 1013328.00 12.00 0.08 0.08 63.83 1.35 100.00 After (with both cached extent/csum tree path): nvme0n1p3 17759.00 1133280.00 10.00 0.06 0.08 63.81 1.50 100.00 Fixes: e02ee89b ("btrfs: scrub: switch scrub_simple_mirror() to scrub_stripe infrastructure") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.4+ Signed-off-by:
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Qu Wenruo authored
Since commit e02ee89b ("btrfs: scrub: switch scrub_simple_mirror() to scrub_stripe infrastructure"), scrub no longer re-use the same path for extent tree search. This can lead to unnecessary extent tree search, especially for the new stripe based scrub, as we have way more stripes to prepare. This patch would re-introduce a shared path for extent tree search, and properly release it when the block group is scrubbed. This change alone can improve scrub performance slightly by reducing the time spend preparing the stripe thus improving the queue depth. Before (with regression): Device r/s rkB/s rrqm/s %rrqm r_await rareq-sz aqu-sz %util nvme0n1p3 15578.00 993616.00 5.00 0.03 0.09 63.78 1.32 100.00 After (with this patch): nvme0n1p3 15875.00 1013328.00 12.00 0.08 0.08 63.83 1.35 100.00 Fixes: e02ee89b ("btrfs: scrub: switch scrub_simple_mirror() to scrub_stripe infrastructure") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.4+ Signed-off-by:
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Lee Trager authored
btrfs supports creating nested subvolumes however snapshots are not recursive. When a snapshot is taken of a volume which contains a subvolume the subvolume is replaced with a stub subvolume which has the same name and uses inode number 2[1]. The stub subvolume kept the directory name but did not set the time or permissions of the stub subvolume. This resulted in all time information being the current time and ownership defaulting to root. When subvolumes and snapshots are created using unshare this results in a snapshot directory the user created but has no permissions for. Test case: [vmuser@archvm ~]# sudo -i [root@archvm ~]# mkdir -p /mnt/btrfs/test [root@archvm ~]# chown vmuser:users /mnt/btrfs/test/ [root@archvm ~]# exit logout [vmuser@archvm ~]$ cd /mnt/btrfs/test [vmuser@archvm test]$ unshare --user --keep-caps --map-auto --map-root-user [root@archvm test]# btrfs subvolume create subvolume Create subvolume './subvolume' [root@archvm test]# btrfs subvolume create subvolume/subsubvolume Create subvolume 'subvolume/subsubvolume' [root@archvm test]# btrfs subvolume snapshot subvolume snapshot Create a snapshot of 'subvolume' in './snapshot' [root@archvm test]# exit logout [vmuser@archvm test]$ tree -ug [vmuser users ] . ├── [vmuser users ] snapshot │ └── [vmuser users ] subsubvolume <-- Without patch perm is root:root └── [vmuser users ] subvolume └── [vmuser users ] subsubvolume 5 directories, 0 files [1] https://btrfs.readthedocs.io/en/latest/btrfs-subvolume.html#nested-subvolumesSigned-off-by:Lee Trager <lee@trager.us> Signed-off-by:
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Filipe Manana authored
At btrfs_readdir_delayed_dir_index(), called when reading a directory, we have this check for an empty list to return immediately, but it's not needed since list_for_each_entry_safe(), called immediately after, is prepared to deal with an empty list, it simply does nothing. So remove the empty list check. Besides shorter source code, it also slightly reduces the binary text size: Before this change: $ size fs/btrfs/btrfs.ko text data bss dec hex filename 1609408 167269 16864 1793541 1b5e05 fs/btrfs/btrfs.ko After this change: $ size fs/btrfs/btrfs.ko text data bss dec hex filename 1609392 167269 16864 1793525 1b5df5 fs/btrfs/btrfs.ko Signed-off-by: -
Anand Jain authored
fs_devices::metadata_uuid value is already updated based on the super_block::METADATA_UUID flag for either fsid or metadata_uuid as appropriate. So, fs_devices::metadata_uuid can be used directly. Reviewed-by:
Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Tested-by:
Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@igalia.com> Signed-off-by:
Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
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Anand Jain authored
The function btrfs_validate_super() should verify the metadata_uuid in the provided superblock argument. Because, all its callers expect it to do that. Such as in the following stacks: write_all_supers() sb = fs_info->super_for_commit; btrfs_validate_write_super(.., sb) btrfs_validate_super(.., sb, ..) scrub_one_super() btrfs_validate_super(.., sb, ..) And check_dev_super() btrfs_validate_super(.., sb, ..) However, it currently verifies the fs_info::super_copy::metadata_uuid instead. Fix this using the correct metadata_uuid in the superblock argument. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: -
Anand Jain authored
The function btrfs_validate_super() should verify the fsid in the provided superblock argument. Because, all its callers expect it to do that. Such as in the following stack: write_all_supers() sb = fs_info->super_for_commit; btrfs_validate_write_super(.., sb) btrfs_validate_super(.., sb, ..) scrub_one_super() btrfs_validate_super(.., sb, ..) And check_dev_super() btrfs_validate_super(.., sb, ..) However, it currently verifies the fs_info::super_copy::fsid instead, which is not correct. Fix this using the correct fsid in the superblock argument. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: -
Anand Jain authored
There is a helper which provides either metadata_uuid or fsid as per METADATA_UUID flag. So use it. Reviewed-by:
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Anand Jain authored
In some cases, we need to read the FSID from the superblock when the metadata_uuid is not set, and otherwise, read the metadata_uuid. So, add a helper. Reviewed-by:
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Qu Wenruo authored
The v0 extent item has been deprecated for a long time, and we don't have any report from the community either. So it's time to remove the v0 extent specific error handling, and just treat them as regular extent tree corruption. This patch would remove the btrfs_print_v0_err() helper, and enhance the involved error handling to treat them just as any extent tree corruption. No reports regarding v0 extents have been seen since the graceful handling was added in 2018. This involves: - btrfs_backref_add_tree_node() This change is a little tricky, the new code is changed to only handle BTRFS_TREE_BLOCK_REF_KEY and BTRFS_SHARED_BLOCK_REF_KEY. But this is safe, as we have rejected any unknown inline refs through btrfs_get_extent_inline_ref_type(). For keyed backrefs, we're safe to skip anything we don't know (that's if it can pass tree-checker in the first place). - btrfs_lookup_extent_info() - lookup_inline_extent_backref() - run_delayed_extent_op() - __btrfs_free_extent() - add_tree_block() Regular error handling of unexpected extent tree item, and abort transaction (if we have a trans handle). - remove_extent_data_ref() It's pretty much the same as the regular rejection of unknown backref key. But for this particular case, we can also remove a BUG_ON(). - extent_data_ref_count() We can remove the BTRFS_EXTENT_REF_V0_KEY BUG_ON(), as it would be rejected by the only caller. - btrfs_print_leaf() Remove the handling for BTRFS_EXTENT_REF_V0_KEY. Signed-off-by:
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Qu Wenruo authored
[BUG] Syzbot reported several warning triggered inside lookup_inline_extent_backref(). [CAUSE] As usual, the reproducer doesn't reliably trigger locally here, but at least we know the WARN_ON() is triggered when an inline backref can not be found, and it can only be triggered when @insert is true. (I.e. inserting a new inline backref, which means the backref should already exist) [ENHANCEMENT] After the WARN_ON(), dump all the parameters and the extent tree leaf to help debug. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d6f9ff86c1d804ba2bc6Signed-off-by:
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Christoph Hellwig authored
Having the assert in the actual helper documents the pre-conditions much better than having it in the caller, so move it. Reviewed-by:
Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> Signed-off-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by:
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Christoph Hellwig authored
Share the calls to extent_clear_unlock_delalloc for btrfs_path allocation failure handling and the normal exit path. This relies on btrfs_free_path ignoring a NULL pointer, and the initialization of cur_offset to start at the beginning of the function. Reviewed-by:
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Christoph Hellwig authored
Use the block group pointer used to track the outstanding NOCOW writes as a boolean to remove the duplicate nocow variable, and keep it contained in the main loop to simplify the logic. Reviewed-by:
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Christoph Hellwig authored
When run_delalloc_nocow has cow_start set to a value other than (u64)-1, it has delayed COW writeback pending behind cur_offset. When an error occurs in such a window, the range going back to cow_start and not just cur_offset needs to be unlocked, but only two error cases handle this correctly Move the code to handle unlock the COW range to the common error handling label and document the logic. To make things even more complicated, cow_file_range as called by fallback_to_cow will unlock the range it is operating on when it fails as well, so we need to reset cow_start right after caling fallback_to_cow instead of only when it succeeded. Reviewed-by:
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Naohiro Aota authored
When multiple writes happen at once, we may need to sacrifice a currently active block group to be zone finished for a new allocation. We choose a block group with the least free space left, and zone finish it. To do the finishing, we need to send IOs for already allocated region and wait for them and on-going IOs. Otherwise, these IOs fail because the zone is already finished at the time the IO reach a device. However, if a block group dedicated to the data relocation is zone finished, there is a chance that finishing it before an ongoing write IO reaches the device. That is because there is timing gap between an allocation is done (block_group->reservations == 0, as pre-allocation is done) and an ordered extent is created when the relocation IO starts. Thus, if we finish the zone between them, we can fail the IOs. We cannot simply use "fs_info->data_reloc_bg == block_group->start" to avoid the zone finishing. Because, the data_reloc_bg may already switch to a new block group, while there are still ongoing write IOs to the old data_reloc_bg. So, this patch reworks the BLOCK_GROUP_FLAG_ZONED_DATA_RELOC bit to indicate there is a data relocation allocation and/or ongoing write to the block group. The bit is set on allocation and cleared in end_io function of the last IO for the currently allocated region. To change the timing of the bit setting also solves the issue that the bit being left even after there is no IO going on. With the current code, if the data_reloc_bg switches after the last IO to the current data_reloc_bg, the bit is set at this timing and there is no one clearing that bit. As a result, that block group is kept unallocatable for anything. Fixes: 343d8a30 ("btrfs: zoned: prevent allocation from previous data relocation BG") Fixes: 74e91b12 ("btrfs: zoned: zone finish unused block group") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Reviewed-by:
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Josef Bacik authored
One of the CI runs triggered the following panic assertion failed: PagePrivate(page) && page->private, in fs/btrfs/subpage.c:229 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/subpage.c:229! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP CPU: 0 PID: 923660 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3+ #1 pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0 lr : btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0 sp : ffff800093213720 x29: ffff800093213720 x28: ffff8000932138b4 x27: 000000000c280000 x26: 00000001b5d00000 x25: 000000000c281000 x24: 000000000c281fff x23: 0000000000001000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffffff42b95bf880 x20: ffff42b9528e0000 x19: 0000000000001000 x18: ffffffffffffffff x17: 667274622f736620 x16: 6e69202c65746176 x15: 0000000000000028 x14: 0000000000000003 x13: 00000000002672d7 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: ffffcd3f0ccd9204 x10: ffffcd3f0554ae50 x9 : ffffcd3f0379528c x8 : ffff800093213428 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffcd3f091771e8 x5 : ffff42b97f333948 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff42b9556cde80 x0 : 000000000000004f Call trace: btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0 btrfs_subpage_set_dirty+0x38/0xa0 btrfs_page_set_dirty+0x58/0x88 relocate_one_page+0x204/0x5f0 relocate_file_extent_cluster+0x11c/0x180 relocate_data_extent+0xd0/0xf8 relocate_block_group+0x3d0/0x4e8 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x2d8/0x490 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x54/0x1a8 btrfs_balance+0x7f4/0x1150 btrfs_ioctl+0x10f0/0x20b8 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x120/0x11d8 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x80/0xd8 do_el0_svc+0x6c/0x158 el0_svc+0x50/0x1b0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198 Code: 91098021 b0007fa0 91346000 97e9c6d2 (d4210000) This is the same problem outlined in 17b17fcd ("btrfs: set_page_extent_mapped after read_folio in btrfs_cont_expand") , and the fix is the same. I originally looked for the same pattern elsewhere in our code, but mistakenly skipped over this code because I saw the page cache readahead before we set_page_extent_mapped, not realizing that this was only in the !page case, that we can still end up with a !uptodate page and then do the btrfs_read_folio further down. The fix here is the same as the above mentioned patch, move the set_page_extent_mapped call to after the btrfs_read_folio() block to make sure that we have the subpage blocksize stuff setup properly before using the page. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Reviewed-by:
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Josef Bacik authored
My initial fix for the generic/475 hangs was related to metadata, but our CI testing uncovered another case where we hang for similar reasons. We again have a task with a plug that is holding an outstanding request that is keeping the dm device from finishing it's suspend, and that task is stuck in the allocator. This time it is stuck trying to allocate data, but we do not have a block group that matches the size class. The larger loop in the allocator looks like this (simplified of course) find_free_extent for_each_block_group { ffe_ctl->cached == btrfs_block_group_cache_done(bg) if (!ffe_ctl->cached) ffe_ctl->have_caching_bg = true; do_allocation() btrfs_wait_block_group_cache_progress(); } if (loop == LOOP_CACHING_WAIT && ffe_ctl->have_caching_bg) go search again; In my earlier fix we were trying to allocate from the block group, but we weren't waiting for the progress because we were only waiting for the free space to be >= the amount of free space we wanted. My fix made it so we waited for forward progress to be made as well, so we would be sure to wait. This time however we did not have a block group that matched our size class, so what was happening was this find_free_extent for_each_block_group { ffe_ctl->cached == btrfs_block_group_cache_done(bg) if (!ffe_ctl->cached) ffe_ctl->have_caching_bg = true; if (size_class_doesn't_match()) goto loop; do_allocation() btrfs_wait_block_group_cache_progress(); loop: release_block_group(block_group); } if (loop == LOOP_CACHING_WAIT && ffe_ctl->have_caching_bg) go search again; The size_class_doesn't_match() part was true, so we'd just skip this block group and never wait for caching, and then because we found a caching block group we'd just go back and do the loop again. We never sleep and thus never flush the plug and we have the same deadlock. Fix the logic for waiting on the block group caching to instead do it unconditionally when we goto loop. This takes the logic out of the allocation step, so now the loop looks more like this find_free_extent for_each_block_group { ffe_ctl->cached == btrfs_block_group_cache_done(bg) if (!ffe_ctl->cached) ffe_ctl->have_caching_bg = true; if (size_class_doesn't_match()) goto loop; do_allocation() btrfs_wait_block_group_cache_progress(); loop: if (loop > LOOP_CACHING_NOWAIT && !ffe_ctl->retry_uncached && !ffe_ctl->cached) { ffe_ctl->retry_uncached = true; btrfs_wait_block_group_cache_progress(); } release_block_group(block_group); } if (loop == LOOP_CACHING_WAIT && ffe_ctl->have_caching_bg) go search again; This simplifies the logic a lot, and makes sure that if we're hitting uncached block groups we're always waiting on them at some point. I ran this through 100 iterations of generic/475, as this particular case was harder to hit than the previous one. Signed-off-by: -
Ruan Jinjie authored
Use LIST_HEAD() to initialize the list_head instead of open-coding it. Signed-off-by:
Ruan Jinjie <ruanjinjie@huawei.com> Reviewed-by:
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Qu Wenruo authored
[PROBLEM] Inside function update_inline_extent_backref(), we have several BUG_ON()s along with some ASSERT()s which can be triggered by corrupted filesystem. [ANAYLYSE] Most of those BUG_ON()s and ASSERT()s are just a way of handling unexpected on-disk data. Although we have tree-checker to rule out obviously incorrect extent tree blocks, it's not enough for these ones. Thus we need proper error handling for them. [FIX] Thankfully all the callers of update_inline_extent_backref() would eventually handle the errror by aborting the current transaction. So this patch would do the proper error handling by: - Make update_inline_extent_backref() to return int The return value would be either 0 or -EUCLEAN. - Replace BUG_ON()s and ASSERT()s with proper error handling This includes: * Dump the bad extent tree leaf * Output an error message for the cause This would include the extent bytenr, num_bytes (if needed), the bad values and expected good values. * Return -EUCLEAN Note here we remove all the WARN_ON()s, as eventually the transaction would be aborted, thus a backtrace would be triggered anyway. - Better comments on why we expect refs == 1 and refs_to_mode == -1 for tree blocks Reviewed-by: -
Naohiro Aota authored
Now that, we can re-enable metadata over-commit. As we moved the activation from the reservation time to the write time, we no longer need to ensure all the reserved bytes is properly activated. Without the metadata over-commit, it suffers from lower performance because it needs to flush the delalloc items more often and allocate more block groups. Re-enabling metadata over-commit will solve the issue. Fixes: 79417d04 ("btrfs: zoned: disable metadata overcommit for zoned") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Reviewed-by:
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Naohiro Aota authored
Now that a non-DATA block group is activated at write time, don't activate it on allocation time. Reviewed-by:
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Naohiro Aota authored
Now that we switched to write time activation, we no longer need to (and must not) count the fresh region as zone unusable. This commit is similar to revert of commit fa2068d7 ("btrfs: zoned: count fresh BG region as zone unusable"). Signed-off-by:
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Naohiro Aota authored
In the current implementation, block groups are activated at reservation time to ensure that all reserved bytes can be written to an active metadata block group. However, this approach has proven to be less efficient, as it activates block groups more frequently than necessary, putting pressure on the active zone resource and leading to potential issues such as early ENOSPC or hung_task. Another drawback of the current method is that it hampers metadata over-commit, and necessitates additional flush operations and block group allocations, resulting in decreased overall performance. To address these issues, this commit introduces a write-time activation of metadata and system block group. This involves reserving at least one active block group specifically for a metadata and system block group. Since metadata write-out is always allocated sequentially, when we need to write to a non-active block group, we can wait for the ongoing IOs to complete, activate a new block group, and then proceed with writing to the new block group. Fixes: b0931513 ("btrfs: zoned: activate metadata block group on flush_space") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Signed-off-by:
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