proc_create() has shat upon fops argument when mode is S_IFDIR.
Good thing, too, since fops passed to it is completely useless
for any directory.  Just use proc_mkdir(), damnit.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

The procfs debug code in rtl_debug.c is, ironically, very buggy: it lacks proper locking.
Since the most useful part of the code (the stats) are available through more
standard APIs, I think it is best to just delete the whole mess.
Signed-off-by: Sean MacLennan <seanm@seanm.ca>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

proc_mkdir() is there for purpose...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Just have it pinned in dcache all along and let procfs ->kill_sb()
drop it before kill_anon_super().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

no need to search later - we know the card when we are
creating procfs entries
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

filesystem module as whole is pinned down by its superblock, no need
to have opened files on it to add anything to that.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

filesystem module as whole is pinned down by its superblock, no need
to have opened files on it to add anything to that.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

filesystem module as whole is pinned down by its superblock, no need
to have opened files on it to add anything to that.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

and rename __free_pipe_info() to free_pipe_info()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

not used anymore
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

it's used only as a flag to distinguish normal pipes/FIFOs from the
internal per-task one used by file-to-file splice.  And pipe->files
would work just as well for that purpose...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

fs/pipe.c file_operations methods *know* that pipe is not an internal one;
no need to check pipe->inode for those callers.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

simplify get_pipe_info(), while we are at it
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

now it can be done - put mutex into pipe_inode_info, use it instead
of ->i_mutex
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

* new field - pipe->files; number of struct file over that pipe (all
  sharing the same inode, of course); protected by inode->i_lock.
* pipe_release() decrements pipe->files, clears inode->i_pipe when
  if the counter has reached 0 (all under ->i_lock) and, in that case,
  frees pipe after having done pipe_unlock()
* fifo_open() starts with grabbing ->i_lock, and either bumps pipe->files
  if ->i_pipe was non-NULL or allocates a new pipe (dropping and regaining
  ->i_lock) and rechecks ->i_pipe; if it's still NULL, inserts new pipe
  there, otherwise bumps ->i_pipe->files and frees the one we'd allocated.
  At that point we know that ->i_pipe is non-NULL and won't go away, so
  we can do pipe_lock() on it and proceed as we used to.  If we end up
  failing, decrement pipe->files and if it reaches 0 clear ->i_pipe and
  free the sucker after pipe_unlock().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

* use the fact that file_inode(file)->i_pipe doesn't change
  while the file is opened - no locks needed to access that.
* switch to pipe_lock/pipe_unlock where it's easy to do
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

... and take to fs/read_write.c
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

... so that writev(2) doesn't miss it.  Get rid of hpfs_file_write().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

look for file_capable() in there...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

... and provide namespace_lock() as a trivial wrapper;
switch to those two consistently.

Result is patterned after rtnl_lock/rtnl_unlock pair.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

which allows to kill the last argument of umount_tree() and make release_mounts()
static.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

... it's always &unmounted.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

global list of release_mounts() fodder, protected by namespace_sem;
eventually, all umount_tree() callers will use it as kill list.
Helper picking the contents of that list, releasing namespace_sem
and doing release_mounts() on what it got.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

do_loopback calls lock_mount(path) and forget to unlock_mount
if clone_mnt or copy_mnt fails.

[   77.661566] ================================================
[   77.662939] [ BUG: lock held when returning to user space! ]
[   77.664104] 3.9.0-rc5+ #17 Not tainted
[   77.664982] ------------------------------------------------
[   77.666488] mount/514 is leaving the kernel with locks still held!
[   77.668027] 2 locks held by mount/514:
[   77.668817]  #0:  (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#7){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff811cca22>] lock_mount+0x32/0xe0
[   77.671755]  #1:  (&namespace_sem){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffff811cca3a>] lock_mount+0x4a/0xe0
Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

	* check for proc_mkdir() failures
	* fix buffer overrun - sizeof(format string) is *not* enough to
hold sprintf() result.
	* use proc_remove_subtree(); life's much easier with it
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

just what it sounds like; do that only to procfs subtrees you've
created - doing that to something shared with another driver is
not only antisocial, but might cause interesting races with
proc_create() and its ilk.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>