- 05 Oct, 2014 1 commit
-
-
Ronald Wahl authored
commit 671796dd upstream. The driver assumes that endpoint 4 is always an interrupt endpoint. Unfortunately the type differs between high-speed and full-speed configurations while in the former case it is indeed an interrupt endpoint this is not true for the latter case - here it is a bulk endpoint. When sending URBs with the wrong type the kernel will generate a warning message including backtrace. In this specific case there will be a huge amount of warnings which can bring the system to freeze. To fix this we are now sending URBs to endpoint 4 using the type found in the endpoint descriptor. A side note: The carl9170 firmware currently specifies endpoint 4 as interrupt endpoint even in the full-speed configuration but this has no relevance because before this firmware is loaded the endpoint type is as described above and after the firmware is running the stick is not reenumerated and so the old descriptor is used. Signed-off-by:
Ronald Wahl <ronald.wahl@raritan.com> Signed-off-by:
John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-
- 17 Sep, 2014 39 commits
-
-
Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
-
Sage Weil authored
commit 73c3d481 upstream. We preallocate a few of the message types we get back from the mon. If we get a larger message than we are expecting, fall back to trying to allocate a new one instead of blindly using the one we have. Signed-off-by:
Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Ilya Dryomov authored
commit 3cea4c30 upstream. Rename front_max field of struct ceph_msg to front_alloc_len to make its purpose more clear. Signed-off-by:
Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Jason Gunthorpe authored
commit 8e54caf4 upstream. Some Atmel TPMs provide completely wrong timeouts from their TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT query. This patch detects that and returns new correct values via a DID/VID table in the TIS driver. Tested on ARM using an AT97SC3204T FW version 37.16 [PHuewe: without this fix these 'broken' Atmel TPMs won't function on older kernels] Signed-off-by:
"Berg, Christopher" <Christopher.Berg@atmel.com> Signed-off-by:
Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Signed-off-by:
Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de> [bwh: Backported to 3.10: - Adjust filename, context - s/chip->ops->/chip->vendor./] Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
-
Linus Torvalds authored
commit 99d263d4 upstream. Josef Bacik found a performance regression between 3.2 and 3.10 and narrowed it down to commit bfcfaa77 ("vfs: use 'unsigned long' accesses for dcache name comparison and hashing"). He reports: "The test case is essentially for (i = 0; i < 1000000; i++) mkdir("a$i"); On xfs on a fio card this goes at about 20k dir/sec with 3.2, and 12k dir/sec with 3.10. This is because we spend waaaaay more time in __d_lookup on 3.10 than in 3.2. The new hashing function for strings is suboptimal for < sizeof(unsigned long) string names (and hell even > sizeof(unsigned long) string names that I've tested). I broke out the old hashing function and the new one into a userspace helper to get real numbers and this is what I'm getting: Old hash table had 1000000 entries, 0 dupes, 0 max dupes New hash table had 12628 entries, 987372 dupes, 900 max dupes We had 11400 buckets with a p50 of 30 dupes, p90 of 240 dupes, p99 of 567 dupes for the new hash My test does the hash, and then does the d_hash into a integer pointer array the same size as the dentry hash table on my system, and then just increments the value at the address we got to see how many entries we overlap with. As you can see the old hash function ended up with all 1 million entries in their own bucket, whereas the new one they are only distributed among ~12.5k buckets, which is why we're using so much more CPU in __d_lookup". The reason for this hash regression is two-fold: - On 64-bit architectures the down-mixing of the original 64-bit word-at-a-time hash into the final 32-bit hash value is very simplistic and suboptimal, and just adds the two 32-bit parts together. In particular, because there is no bit shuffling and the mixing boundary is also a byte boundary, similar character patterns in the low and high word easily end up just canceling each other out. - the old byte-at-a-time hash mixed each byte into the final hash as it hashed the path component name, resulting in the low bits of the hash generally being a good source of hash data. That is not true for the word-at-a-time case, and the hash data is distributed among all the bits. The fix is the same in both cases: do a better job of mixing the bits up and using as much of the hash data as possible. We already have the "hash_32|64()" functions to do that. Reported-by:
Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
-
Al Viro authored
commit 482db906 upstream. D_HASH{MASK,BITS} are used once each, both in the same function (d_hash()). At this point they are actively misguiding - they imply that values are compiler constants, which is no longer true. Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
-
Bart Van Assche authored
commit bcc05910 upstream. If scsi_remove_host() is invoked after a SCSI device has been blocked, if the fast_io_fail_tmo or dev_loss_tmo work gets scheduled on the workqueue executing srp_remove_work() and if an I/O request is scheduled after the SCSI device had been blocked by e.g. multipathd then the following deadlock can occur: kworker/6:1 D ffff880831f3c460 0 195 2 0x00000000 Call Trace: [<ffffffff814aafd9>] schedule+0x29/0x70 [<ffffffff814aa0ef>] schedule_timeout+0x10f/0x2a0 [<ffffffff8105af6f>] msleep+0x2f/0x40 [<ffffffff8123b0ae>] __blk_drain_queue+0x4e/0x180 [<ffffffff8123d2d5>] blk_cleanup_queue+0x225/0x230 [<ffffffffa0010732>] __scsi_remove_device+0x62/0xe0 [scsi_mod] [<ffffffffa000ed2f>] scsi_forget_host+0x6f/0x80 [scsi_mod] [<ffffffffa0002eba>] scsi_remove_host+0x7a/0x130 [scsi_mod] [<ffffffffa07cf5c5>] srp_remove_work+0x95/0x180 [ib_srp] [<ffffffff8106d7aa>] process_one_work+0x1ea/0x6c0 [<ffffffff8106dd9b>] worker_thread+0x11b/0x3a0 [<ffffffff810758bd>] kthread+0xed/0x110 [<ffffffff814b972c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 multipathd D ffff880096acc460 0 5340 1 0x00000000 Call Trace: [<ffffffff814aafd9>] schedule+0x29/0x70 [<ffffffff814aa0ef>] schedule_timeout+0x10f/0x2a0 [<ffffffff814ab79b>] io_schedule_timeout+0x9b/0xf0 [<ffffffff814abe1c>] wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0xdc/0x110 [<ffffffff81244b9b>] blk_execute_rq+0x9b/0x100 [<ffffffff8124f665>] sg_io+0x1a5/0x450 [<ffffffff8124fd21>] scsi_cmd_ioctl+0x2a1/0x430 [<ffffffff8124fef2>] scsi_cmd_blk_ioctl+0x42/0x50 [<ffffffffa00ec97e>] sd_ioctl+0xbe/0x140 [sd_mod] [<ffffffff8124bd04>] blkdev_ioctl+0x234/0x840 [<ffffffff811cb491>] block_ioctl+0x41/0x50 [<ffffffff811a0df0>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x300/0x520 [<ffffffff811a1051>] SyS_ioctl+0x41/0x80 [<ffffffff814b9962>] tracesys+0xd0/0xd5 Fix this by scheduling removal work on another workqueue than the transport layer timers. Signed-off-by:
Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Reviewed-by:
Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by:
David Dillow <dave@thedillows.org> Cc: Sebastian Parschauer <sebastian.riemer@profitbricks.com> Signed-off-by:
Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Tejun Heo authored
commit 2a1b4cf2 upstream. While a queue is being destroyed, all the blkgs are destroyed and its ->root_blkg pointer is set to NULL. If someone else starts to drain while the queue is in this state, the following oops happens. NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000028 IP: [<ffffffff8144e944>] blk_throtl_drain+0x84/0x230 PGD e4a1067 PUD b773067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC Modules linked in: cfq_iosched(-) [last unloaded: cfq_iosched] CPU: 1 PID: 537 Comm: bash Not tainted 3.16.0-rc3-work+ #2 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff88000e222250 ti: ffff88000efd4000 task.ti: ffff88000efd4000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8144e944>] [<ffffffff8144e944>] blk_throtl_drain+0x84/0x230 RSP: 0018:ffff88000efd7bf0 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880015091450 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff88000efd7c10 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffff88000e222250 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880015091450 R13: ffff880015092e00 R14: ffff880015091d70 R15: ffff88001508fc28 FS: 00007f1332650740(0000) GS:ffff88001fa80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 0000000009446000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: ffffffff8144e8f6 ffff880015091450 0000000000000000 ffff880015091d80 ffff88000efd7c28 ffffffff8144ae2f ffff880015091450 ffff88000efd7c58 ffffffff81427641 ffff880015091450 ffffffff82401f00 ffff880015091450 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8144ae2f>] blkcg_drain_queue+0x1f/0x60 [<ffffffff81427641>] __blk_drain_queue+0x71/0x180 [<ffffffff81429b3e>] blk_queue_bypass_start+0x6e/0xb0 [<ffffffff814498b8>] blkcg_deactivate_policy+0x38/0x120 [<ffffffff8144ec44>] blk_throtl_exit+0x34/0x50 [<ffffffff8144aea5>] blkcg_exit_queue+0x35/0x40 [<ffffffff8142d476>] blk_release_queue+0x26/0xd0 [<ffffffff81454968>] kobject_cleanup+0x38/0x70 [<ffffffff81454848>] kobject_put+0x28/0x60 [<ffffffff81427505>] blk_put_queue+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffff817d07bb>] scsi_device_dev_release_usercontext+0x16b/0x1c0 [<ffffffff810bc339>] execute_in_process_context+0x89/0xa0 [<ffffffff817d064c>] scsi_device_dev_release+0x1c/0x20 [<ffffffff817930e2>] device_release+0x32/0xa0 [<ffffffff81454968>] kobject_cleanup+0x38/0x70 [<ffffffff81454848>] kobject_put+0x28/0x60 [<ffffffff817934d7>] put_device+0x17/0x20 [<ffffffff817d11b9>] __scsi_remove_device+0xa9/0xe0 [<ffffffff817d121b>] scsi_remove_device+0x2b/0x40 [<ffffffff817d1257>] sdev_store_delete+0x27/0x30 [<ffffffff81792ca8>] dev_attr_store+0x18/0x30 [<ffffffff8126f75e>] sysfs_kf_write+0x3e/0x50 [<ffffffff8126ea87>] kernfs_fop_write+0xe7/0x170 [<ffffffff811f5e9f>] vfs_write+0xaf/0x1d0 [<ffffffff811f69bd>] SyS_write+0x4d/0xc0 [<ffffffff81d24692>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b 776687bc ("block, blk-mq: draining can't be skipped even if bypass_depth was non-zero") made it easier to trigger this bug by making blk_queue_bypass_start() drain even when it loses the first bypass test to blk_cleanup_queue(); however, the bug has always been there even before the commit as blk_queue_bypass_start() could race against queue destruction, win the initial bypass test but perform the actual draining after blk_cleanup_queue() already destroyed all blkgs. Fix it by skippping calling into policy draining if all the blkgs are already gone. Signed-off-by:
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by:
Shirish Pargaonkar <spargaonkar@suse.com> Reported-by:
Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Reported-by:
Jet Chen <jet.chen@intel.com> Tested-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Roger Quadros authored
commit 40ddbf50 upstream. commit 65b97cf6 introduced in v3.7 caused a regression by using a reversed CS_MASK thus causing omap_calculate_ecc to always fail. As the NAND base driver never checks for .calculate()'s return value, the zeroed ECC values are used as is without showing any error to the user. However, this won't work and the NAND device won't be guarded by any error code. Fix the issue by using the correct mask. Code was tested on omap3beagle using the following procedure - flash the primary bootloader (MLO) from the kernel to the first NAND partition using nandwrite. - boot the board from NAND. This utilizes OMAP ROM loader that relies on 1-bit Hamming code ECC. Fixes: 65b97cf6 (mtd: nand: omap2: handle nand on gpmc) Signed-off-by:
Roger Quadros <rogerq@ti.com> Signed-off-by:
Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Kevin Hao authored
commit a152056c upstream. I got the following panic on my fsl p5020ds board. Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x7375627379737465 Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000000100778 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] SMP NR_CPUS=24 CoreNet Generic Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 3.15.0-next-20140613 #145 task: c0000000fe080000 ti: c0000000fe088000 task.ti: c0000000fe088000 NIP: c000000000100778 LR: c00000000010073c CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c0000000fe08aa00 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (3.15.0-next-20140613) MSR: 0000000080029000 <CE,EE,ME> CR: 24ad2e24 XER: 00000000 DEAR: 7375627379737465 ESR: 0000000000000000 SOFTE: 1 GPR00: c0000000000c99b0 c0000000fe08ac80 c0000000009598e0 c0000000fe001d80 GPR04: 00000000000000d0 0000000000000913 c000000007902b20 0000000000000000 GPR08: c0000000feaae888 0000000000000000 0000000007091000 0000000000200200 GPR12: 0000000028ad2e28 c00000000fff4000 c0000000007abe08 0000000000000000 GPR16: c0000000007ab160 c0000000007aaf98 c00000000060ba68 c0000000007abda8 GPR20: c0000000007abde8 c0000000feaea6f8 c0000000feaea708 c0000000007abd10 GPR24: c000000000989370 c0000000008c6228 00000000000041ed c0000000fe00a400 GPR28: c00000000017c1cc 00000000000000d0 7375627379737465 c0000000fe001d80 NIP [c000000000100778] .__kmalloc_track_caller+0x70/0x168 LR [c00000000010073c] .__kmalloc_track_caller+0x34/0x168 Call Trace: [c0000000fe08ac80] [c00000000087e6b8] uevent_sock_list+0x0/0x10 (unreliable) [c0000000fe08ad20] [c0000000000c99b0] .kstrdup+0x44/0x90 [c0000000fe08adc0] [c00000000017c1cc] .__kernfs_new_node+0x4c/0x130 [c0000000fe08ae70] [c00000000017d7e4] .kernfs_new_node+0x2c/0x64 [c0000000fe08aef0] [c00000000017db00] .kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x34/0xc8 [c0000000fe08af80] [c00000000018067c] .sysfs_create_dir_ns+0x58/0xcc [c0000000fe08b010] [c0000000002c711c] .kobject_add_internal+0xc8/0x384 [c0000000fe08b0b0] [c0000000002c7644] .kobject_add+0x64/0xc8 [c0000000fe08b140] [c000000000355ebc] .device_add+0x11c/0x654 [c0000000fe08b200] [c0000000002b5988] .add_disk+0x20c/0x4b4 [c0000000fe08b2c0] [c0000000003a21d4] .add_mtd_blktrans_dev+0x340/0x514 [c0000000fe08b350] [c0000000003a3410] .mtdblock_add_mtd+0x74/0xb4 [c0000000fe08b3e0] [c0000000003a32cc] .blktrans_notify_add+0x64/0x94 [c0000000fe08b470] [c00000000039b5b4] .add_mtd_device+0x1d4/0x368 [c0000000fe08b520] [c00000000039b830] .mtd_device_parse_register+0xe8/0x104 [c0000000fe08b5c0] [c0000000003b8408] .of_flash_probe+0x72c/0x734 [c0000000fe08b750] [c00000000035ba40] .platform_drv_probe+0x38/0x84 [c0000000fe08b7d0] [c0000000003599a4] .really_probe+0xa4/0x29c [c0000000fe08b870] [c000000000359d3c] .__driver_attach+0x100/0x104 [c0000000fe08b900] [c00000000035746c] .bus_for_each_dev+0x84/0xe4 [c0000000fe08b9a0] [c0000000003593c0] .driver_attach+0x24/0x38 [c0000000fe08ba10] [c000000000358f24] .bus_add_driver+0x1c8/0x2ac [c0000000fe08bab0] [c00000000035a3a4] .driver_register+0x8c/0x158 [c0000000fe08bb30] [c00000000035b9f4] .__platform_driver_register+0x6c/0x80 [c0000000fe08bba0] [c00000000084e080] .of_flash_driver_init+0x1c/0x30 [c0000000fe08bc10] [c000000000001864] .do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x238 [c0000000fe08bd00] [c00000000082cdc0] .kernel_init_freeable+0x188/0x268 [c0000000fe08bdb0] [c0000000000020a0] .kernel_init+0x1c/0xf7c [c0000000fe08be30] [c000000000000884] .ret_from_kernel_thread+0x58/0xd4 Instruction dump: 41bd0010 480000c8 4bf04eb5 60000000 e94d0028 e93f0000 7cc95214 e8a60008 7fc9502a 2fbe0000 419e00c8 e93f0022 <7f7e482a> 39200000 88ed06b2 992d06b2 ---[ end trace b4c9a94804a42d40 ]--- It seems that the corrupted partition header on my mtd device triggers a bug in the ftl. In function build_maps() it will allocate the buffers needed by the mtd partition, but if something goes wrong such as kmalloc failure, mtd read error or invalid partition header parameter, it will free all allocated buffers and then return non-zero. In my case, it seems that partition header parameter 'NumTransferUnits' is invalid. And the ftl_freepart() is a function which free all the partition buffers allocated by build_maps(). Given the build_maps() is a self cleaning function, so there is no need to invoke this function even if build_maps() return with error. Otherwise it will causes the buffers to be freed twice and then weird things would happen. Signed-off-by:
Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Brian Norris <computersforpeace@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Pavel Shilovsky authored
commit f736906a upstream. The existing code calls server->ops->close() that is not right. This causes XFS test generic/310 to fail. Fix this by using server->ops->closedir() function. Signed-off-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org> Signed-off-by:
Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Pavel Shilovsky authored
commit 1bbe4997 upstream. The existing code uses the old MAX_NAME constant. This causes XFS test generic/013 to fail. Fix it by replacing MAX_NAME with PATH_MAX that SMB1 uses. Also remove an unused MAX_NAME constant definition. Signed-off-by:
-
Pavel Shilovsky authored
commit b46799a8 upstream. When we requests rename we also need to update attributes of both source and target parent directories. Not doing it causes generic/309 xfstest to fail on SMB2 mounts. Fix this by marking these directories for force revalidating. Signed-off-by:
-
Steve French authored
commit 18f39e7b upstream. As Raphael Geissert pointed out, tcon_error_exit can dereference tcon and there is one path in which tcon can be null. Signed-off-by:
Raphael Geissert <geissert@debian.org> Signed-off-by:
-
Pavel Shilovsky authored
commit 038bc961 upstream. If we get into read_into_pages() from cifs_readv_receive() and then loose a network, we issue cifs_reconnect that moves all mids to a private list and issue their callbacks. The callback of the async read request sets a mid to retry, frees it and wakes up a process that waits on the rdata completion. After the connection is established we return from read_into_pages() with a short read, use the mid that was freed before and try to read the remaining data from the a newly created socket. Both actions are not what we want to do. In reconnect cases (-EAGAIN) we should not mask off the error with a short read but should return the error code instead. Acked-by:
Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> Signed-off-by:
-
Pavel Shilovsky authored
commit 21496687 upstream. The existing mapping causes unlink() call to return error after delete operation. Changing the mapping to -EACCES makes the client process the call like CIFS protocol does - reset dos attributes with ATTR_READONLY flag masked off and retry the operation. Signed-off-by:
-
Ilya Dryomov authored
commit c27a3e4d upstream. We hard code cephx auth ticket buffer size to 256 bytes. This isn't enough for any moderate setups and, in case tickets themselves are not encrypted, leads to buffer overflows (ceph_x_decrypt() errors out, but ceph_decode_copy() doesn't - it's just a memcpy() wrapper). Since the buffer is allocated dynamically anyway, allocated it a bit later, at the point where we know how much is going to be needed. Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/8979Signed-off-by:
-
Ilya Dryomov authored
commit 597cda35 upstream. Add a helper for processing individual cephx auth tickets. Needed for the next commit, which deals with allocating ticket buffers. (Most of the diff here is whitespace - view with git diff -b). Signed-off-by:
-
Ilya Dryomov authored
commit 5f740d7e upstream. Determining ->last_piece based on the value of ->page_offset + length is incorrect because length here is the length of the entire message. ->last_piece set to false even if page array data item length is <= PAGE_SIZE, which results in invalid length passed to ceph_tcp_{send,recv}page() and causes various asserts to fire. # cat pages-cursor-init.sh #!/bin/bash rbd create --size 10 --image-format 2 foo FOO_DEV=$(rbd map foo) dd if=/dev/urandom of=$FOO_DEV bs=1M &>/dev/null rbd snap create foo@snap rbd snap protect foo@snap rbd clone foo@snap bar # rbd_resize calls librbd rbd_resize(), size is in bytes ./rbd_resize bar $(((4 << 20) + 512)) rbd resize --size 10 bar BAR_DEV=$(rbd map bar) # trigger a 512-byte copyup -- 512-byte page array data item dd if=/dev/urandom of=$BAR_DEV bs=1M count=1 seek=5 The problem exists only in ceph_msg_data_pages_cursor_init(), ceph_msg_data_pages_advance() does the right thing. The size_t cast is unnecessary. Signed-off-by:
Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
-
NeilBrown authored
commit 2446dba0 upstream. Currently we don't abort recovery on a write error if the write error to the recovering device was triggerd by normal IO (as opposed to recovery IO). This means that for one bitmap region, the recovery might write to the recovering device for a few sectors, then not bother for subsequent sectors (as it never writes to failed devices). In this case the bitmap bit will be cleared, but it really shouldn't. The result is that if the recovering device fails and is then re-added (after fixing whatever hardware problem triggerred the failure), the second recovery won't redo the region it was in the middle of, so some of the device will not be recovered properly. If we abort the recovery, the region being processes will be cancelled (bit not cleared) and the whole region will be retried. As the bug can result in data corruption the patch is suitable for -stable. For kernels prior to 3.11 there is a conflict in raid10.c which will require care. Original-from: jiao hui <jiaohui@bwstor.com.cn> Reported-and-tested-by:
jiao hui <jiaohui@bwstor.com.cn> Signed-off-by:
NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
-
Chris Mason authored
commit 85e584da upstream. xfs is using truncate_pagecache_range to invalidate the page cache during DIO reads. This is different from the other filesystems who only invalidate pages during DIO writes. truncate_pagecache_range is meant to be used when we are freeing the underlying data structs from disk, so it will zero any partial ranges in the page. This means a DIO read can zero out part of the page cache page, and it is possible the page will stay in cache. buffered reads will find an up to date page with zeros instead of the data actually on disk. This patch fixes things by using invalidate_inode_pages2_range instead. It preserves the page cache invalidation, but won't zero any pages. [dchinner: catch error and warn if it fails. Comment.] Signed-off-by:
Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Reviewed-by:
Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by:
Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Dave Chinner authored
commit 834ffca6 upstream. Similar to direct IO reads, direct IO writes are using truncate_pagecache_range to invalidate the page cache. This is incorrect due to the sub-block zeroing in the page cache that truncate_pagecache_range() triggers. This patch fixes things by using invalidate_inode_pages2_range instead. It preserves the page cache invalidation, but won't zero any pages. Signed-off-by:
-
Dave Chinner authored
commit 22e757a4 upstream. generic/263 is failing fsx at this point with a page spanning EOF that cannot be invalidated. The operations are: 1190 mapwrite 0x52c00 thru 0x5e569 (0xb96a bytes) 1191 mapread 0x5c000 thru 0x5d636 (0x1637 bytes) 1192 write 0x5b600 thru 0x771ff (0x1bc00 bytes) where 1190 extents EOF from 0x54000 to 0x5e569. When the direct IO write attempts to invalidate the cached page over this range, it fails with -EBUSY and so any attempt to do page invalidation fails. The real question is this: Why can't that page be invalidated after it has been written to disk and cleaned? Well, there's data on the first two buffers in the page (1k block size, 4k page), but the third buffer on the page (i.e. beyond EOF) is failing drop_buffers because it's bh->b_state == 0x3, which is BH_Uptodate | BH_Dirty. IOWs, there's dirty buffers beyond EOF. Say what? OK, set_buffer_dirty() is called on all buffers from __set_page_buffers_dirty(), regardless of whether the buffer is beyond EOF or not, which means that when we get to ->writepage, we have buffers marked dirty beyond EOF that we need to clean. So, we need to implement our own .set_page_dirty method that doesn't dirty buffers beyond EOF. This is messy because the buffer code is not meant to be shared and it has interesting locking issues on the buffer dirty bits. So just copy and paste it and then modify it to suit what we need. Note: the solutions the other filesystems and generic block code use of marking the buffers clean in ->writepage does not work for XFS. It still leaves dirty buffers beyond EOF and invalidations still fail. Hence rather than play whack-a-mole, this patch simply prevents those buffers from being dirtied in the first place. Signed-off-by:
-
Dave Chinner authored
commit 5fd364fe upstream. When running xfs/305, I noticed that quotacheck was flushing dquot buffers that did not have the xfs_dquot_buf_ops verifiers attached: XFS (vdb): _xfs_buf_ioapply: no ops on block 0x1dc8/0x1dc8 ffff880052489000: 44 51 01 04 00 00 65 b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 DQ....e......... ffff880052489010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ ffff880052489020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ ffff880052489030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ CPU: 1 PID: 2376 Comm: mount Not tainted 3.16.0-rc2-dgc+ #306 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 ffff88006fe38000 ffff88004a0ffae8 ffffffff81cf1cca 0000000000000001 ffff88004a0ffb88 ffffffff814d50ca 000010004a0ffc70 0000000000000000 ffff88006be56dc4 0000000000000021 0000000000001dc8 ffff88007c773d80 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81cf1cca>] dump_stack+0x45/0x56 [<ffffffff814d50ca>] _xfs_buf_ioapply+0x3ca/0x3d0 [<ffffffff810db520>] ? wake_up_state+0x20/0x20 [<ffffffff814d51f5>] ? xfs_bdstrat_cb+0x55/0xb0 [<ffffffff814d513b>] xfs_buf_iorequest+0x6b/0xd0 [<ffffffff814d51f5>] xfs_bdstrat_cb+0x55/0xb0 [<ffffffff814d53ab>] __xfs_buf_delwri_submit+0x15b/0x220 [<ffffffff814d6040>] ? xfs_buf_delwri_submit+0x30/0x90 [<ffffffff814d6040>] xfs_buf_delwri_submit+0x30/0x90 [<ffffffff8150f89d>] xfs_qm_quotacheck+0x17d/0x3c0 [<ffffffff81510591>] xfs_qm_mount_quotas+0x151/0x1e0 [<ffffffff814ed01c>] xfs_mountfs+0x56c/0x7d0 [<ffffffff814f0f12>] xfs_fs_fill_super+0x2c2/0x340 [<ffffffff811c9fe4>] mount_bdev+0x194/0x1d0 [<ffffffff814f0c50>] ? xfs_finish_flags+0x170/0x170 [<ffffffff814ef0f5>] xfs_fs_mount+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffff811ca8c9>] mount_fs+0x39/0x1b0 [<ffffffff811e4d67>] vfs_kern_mount+0x67/0x120 [<ffffffff811e757e>] do_mount+0x23e/0xad0 [<ffffffff8117abde>] ? __get_free_pages+0xe/0x50 [<ffffffff811e71e6>] ? copy_mount_options+0x36/0x150 [<ffffffff811e8103>] SyS_mount+0x83/0xc0 [<ffffffff81cfd40b>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2 This was caused by dquot buffer readahead not attaching a verifier structure to the buffer when readahead was issued, resulting in the followup read of the buffer finding a valid buffer and so not attaching new verifiers to the buffer as part of the read. Also, when a verifier failure occurs, we then read the buffer without verifiers. Attach the verifiers manually after this read so that if the buffer is then written it will be verified that the corruption has been repaired. Further, when flushing a dquot we don't ask for a verifier when reading in the dquot buffer the dquot belongs to. Most of the time this isn't an issue because the buffer is still cached, but when it is not cached it will result in writing the dquot buffer without having the verfier attached. Signed-off-by:
-
Steve Wise authored
commit 2f0304d2 upstream. If the user creates a listening cm_id with backlog of 0 the IWCM ends up not allowing any connection requests at all. The correct behavior is for the IWCM to pick a default value if the user backlog parameter is zero. Lustre from version 1.8.8 onward uses a backlog of 0, which breaks iwarp support without this fix. Signed-off-by:
Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com> Signed-off-by:
-
NeilBrown authored
commit b3968552 upstream. When a raid10 commences a resync/recovery/reshape it allocates some buffer space. When a resync/recovery completes the buffer space is freed. But not when the reshape completes. This can result in a small memory leak. There is a subtle side-effect of this bug. When a RAID10 is reshaped to a larger array (more devices), the reshape is immediately followed by a "resync" of the new space. This "resync" will use the buffer space which was allocated for "reshape". This can cause problems including a "BUG" in the SCSI layer. So this is suitable for -stable. Fixes: 3ea7daa5Signed-off-by:
-
NeilBrown authored
commit ce0b0a46 upstream. raid10 reshape clears unwanted bits from a bio->bi_flags using a method which, while clumsy, worked until 3.10 when BIO_OWNS_VEC was added. Since then it clears that bit but shouldn't. This results in a memory leak. So change to used the approved method of clearing unwanted bits. As this causes a memory leak which can consume all of memory the fix is suitable for -stable. Fixes: a38352e0 Reported-by: mdraid.pkoch@dfgh.net (Peter Koch) Signed-off-by:
-
NeilBrown authored
commit 9c4bdf69 upstream. During recovery of a double-degraded RAID6 it is possible for some blocks not to be recovered properly, leading to corruption. If a write happens to one block in a stripe that would be written to a missing device, and at the same time that stripe is recovering data to the other missing device, then that recovered data may not be written. This patch skips, in the double-degraded case, an optimisation that is only safe for single-degraded arrays. Bug was introduced in 2.6.32 and fix is suitable for any kernel since then. In an older kernel with separate handle_stripe5() and handle_stripe6() functions the patch must change handle_stripe6(). Fixes: 6c0069c0 Cc: Yuri Tikhonov <yur@emcraft.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Reported-by:
"Manibalan P" <pmanibalan@amiindia.co.in> Tested-by:
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Vignesh Raman authored
commit 32333edb upstream. The commits 08c30aca "Bluetooth: Remove RFCOMM session refcnt" and 8ff52f7d "Bluetooth: Return RFCOMM session ptrs to avoid freed session" allow rfcomm_recv_ua and rfcomm_session_close to delete the session (and free the corresponding socket) and propagate NULL session pointer to the upper callers. Additional fix is required to terminate the loop in rfcomm_process_rx function to avoid use of freed 'sk' memory. The issue is only reproducible with kernel option CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING enabled making freed memory being changed and filled up with fixed char value used to unmask use-after-free issues. Signed-off-by:
Vignesh Raman <Vignesh_Raman@mentor.com> Signed-off-by:
Vitaly Kuzmichev <Vitaly_Kuzmichev@mentor.com> Acked-by:
Dean Jenkins <Dean_Jenkins@mentor.com> Signed-off-by:
Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by:
-
Vladimir Davydov authored
commit 093facf3 upstream. If the current process is exiting, lingering on socket close will make it unkillable, so we should avoid it. Reproducer: #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #define BTPROTO_L2CAP 0 #define BTPROTO_SCO 2 #define BTPROTO_RFCOMM 3 int main() { int fd; struct linger ling; fd = socket(PF_BLUETOOTH, SOCK_STREAM, BTPROTO_RFCOMM); //or: fd = socket(PF_BLUETOOTH, SOCK_DGRAM, BTPROTO_L2CAP); //or: fd = socket(PF_BLUETOOTH, SOCK_SEQPACKET, BTPROTO_SCO); ling.l_onoff = 1; ling.l_linger = 1000000000; setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, &ling, sizeof(ling)); return 0; } Signed-off-by:
Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Eric W. Biederman authored
commit db181ce0 upstream. Kenton Varda <kenton@sandstorm.io> discovered that by remounting a read-only bind mount read-only in a user namespace the MNT_LOCK_READONLY bit would be cleared, allowing an unprivileged user to the remount a read-only mount read-write. Upon review of the code in remount it was discovered that the code allowed nosuid, noexec, and nodev to be cleared. It was also discovered that the code was allowing the per mount atime flags to be changed. The first naive patch to fix these issues contained the flaw that using default atime settings when remounting a filesystem could be disallowed. To avoid this problems in the future add tests to ensure unprivileged remounts are succeeding and failing at the appropriate times. Acked-by:
Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Signed-off-by:
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Eric W. Biederman authored
commit ffbc6f0e upstream. Since March 2009 the kernel has treated the state that if no MS_..ATIME flags are passed then the kernel defaults to relatime. Defaulting to relatime instead of the existing atime state during a remount is silly, and causes problems in practice for people who don't specify any MS_...ATIME flags and to get the default filesystem atime setting. Those users may encounter a permission error because the default atime setting does not work. A default that does not work and causes permission problems is ridiculous, so preserve the existing value to have a default atime setting that is always guaranteed to work. Using the default atime setting in this way is particularly interesting for applications built to run in restricted userspace environments without /proc mounted, as the existing atime mount options of a filesystem can not be read from /proc/mounts. In practice this fixes user space that uses the default atime setting on remount that are broken by the permission checks keeping less privileged users from changing more privileged users atime settings. Acked-by:
-
Eric W. Biederman authored
commit 9566d674 upstream. While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..." would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if the mount started off locked I realized that there are several additional mount flags that should be locked and are not. In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked. These flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND, and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user. The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch. - nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user. - nodev may not be clearable by a less privielged user. - noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user. - atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user. The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated), and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled. Therefore an unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set by a more privileged user. The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME mnt flags. Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously. Acked-by:
-
Eric W. Biederman authored
commit 07b64558 upstream. There are no races as locked mount flags are guaranteed to never change. Moving the test into do_remount makes it more visible, and ensures all filesystem remounts pass the MNT_LOCK_READONLY permission check. This second case is not an issue today as filesystem remounts are guarded by capable(CAP_DAC_ADMIN) and thus will always fail in less privileged mount namespaces, but it could become an issue in the future. Acked-by:
-
Eric W. Biederman authored
commit a6138db8 upstream. Kenton Varda <kenton@sandstorm.io> discovered that by remounting a read-only bind mount read-only in a user namespace the MNT_LOCK_READONLY bit would be cleared, allowing an unprivileged user to the remount a read-only mount read-write. Correct this by replacing the mask of mount flags to preserve with a mask of mount flags that may be changed, and preserve all others. This ensures that any future bugs with this mask and remount will fail in an easy to detect way where new mount flags simply won't change. Acked-by:
-
Steven Rostedt (Red Hat) authored
commit 021de3d9 upstream. After writting a test to try to trigger the bug that caused the ring buffer iterator to become corrupted, I hit another bug: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5281 at kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3766 rb_iter_peek+0x113/0x238() Modules linked in: ipt_MASQUERADE sunrpc [...] CPU: 1 PID: 5281 Comm: grep Tainted: G W 3.16.0-rc3-test+ #143 Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./To be filled by O.E.M., BIOS SDBLI944.86P 05/08/2007 0000000000000000 ffffffff81809a80 ffffffff81503fb0 0000000000000000 ffffffff81040ca1 ffff8800796d6010 ffffffff810c138d ffff8800796d6010 ffff880077438c80 ffff8800796d6010 ffff88007abbe600 0000000000000003 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81503fb0>] ? dump_stack+0x4a/0x75 [<ffffffff81040ca1>] ? warn_slowpath_common+0x7e/0x97 [<ffffffff810c138d>] ? rb_iter_peek+0x113/0x238 [<ffffffff810c138d>] ? rb_iter_peek+0x113/0x238 [<ffffffff810c14df>] ? ring_buffer_iter_peek+0x2d/0x5c [<ffffffff810c6f73>] ? tracing_iter_reset+0x6e/0x96 [<ffffffff810c74a3>] ? s_start+0xd7/0x17b [<ffffffff8112b13e>] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xda/0xea [<ffffffff8114cf94>] ? seq_read+0x148/0x361 [<ffffffff81132d98>] ? vfs_read+0x93/0xf1 [<ffffffff81132f1b>] ? SyS_read+0x60/0x8e [<ffffffff8150bf9f>] ? tracesys+0xdd/0xe2 Debugging this bug, which triggers when the rb_iter_peek() loops too many times (more than 2 times), I discovered there's a case that can cause that function to legitimately loop 3 times! rb_iter_peek() is different than rb_buffer_peek() as the rb_buffer_peek() only deals with the reader page (it's for consuming reads). The rb_iter_peek() is for traversing the buffer without consuming it, and as such, it can loop for one more reason. That is, if we hit the end of the reader page or any page, it will go to the next page and try again. That is, we have this: 1. iter->head > iter->head_page->page->commit (rb_inc_iter() which moves the iter to the next page) try again 2. event = rb_iter_head_event() event->type_len == RINGBUF_TYPE_TIME_EXTEND rb_advance_iter() try again 3. read the event. But we never get to 3, because the count is greater than 2 and we cause the WARNING and return NULL. Up the counter to 3. Fixes: 69d1b839 "ring-buffer: Bind time extend and data events together" Signed-off-by:
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by:
-
Steven Rostedt (Red Hat) authored
commit 651e22f2 upstream. When performing a consuming read, the ring buffer swaps out a page from the ring buffer with a empty page and this page that was swapped out becomes the new reader page. The reader page is owned by the reader and since it was swapped out of the ring buffer, writers do not have access to it (there's an exception to that rule, but it's out of scope for this commit). When reading the "trace" file, it is a non consuming read, which means that the data in the ring buffer will not be modified. When the trace file is opened, a ring buffer iterator is allocated and writes to the ring buffer are disabled, such that the iterator will not have issues iterating over the data. Although the ring buffer disabled writes, it does not disable other reads, or even consuming reads. If a consuming read happens, then the iterator is reset and starts reading from the beginning again. My tests would sometimes trigger this bug on my i386 box: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5175 at kernel/trace/trace.c:1527 __trace_find_cmdline+0x66/0xaa() Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 5175 Comm: grep Not tainted 3.16.0-rc3-test+ #8 Hardware name: /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006 00000000 00000000 f09c9e1c c18796b3 c1b5d74c f09c9e4c c103a0e3 c1b5154b f09c9e78 00001437 c1b5d74c 000005f7 c10bd85a c10bd85a c1cac57c f09c9eb0 ed0e0000 f09c9e64 c103a185 00000009 f09c9e5c c1b5154b f09c9e78 f09c9e80^M Call Trace: [<c18796b3>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x75 [<c103a0e3>] warn_slowpath_common+0x7e/0x95 [<c10bd85a>] ? __trace_find_cmdline+0x66/0xaa [<c10bd85a>] ? __trace_find_cmdline+0x66/0xaa [<c103a185>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x33/0x35 [<c10bd85a>] __trace_find_cmdline+0x66/0xaa^M [<c10bed04>] trace_find_cmdline+0x40/0x64 [<c10c3c16>] trace_print_context+0x27/0xec [<c10c4360>] ? trace_seq_printf+0x37/0x5b [<c10c0b15>] print_trace_line+0x319/0x39b [<c10ba3fb>] ? ring_buffer_read+0x47/0x50 [<c10c13b1>] s_show+0x192/0x1ab [<c10bfd9a>] ? s_next+0x5a/0x7c [<c112e76e>] seq_read+0x267/0x34c [<c1115a25>] vfs_read+0x8c/0xef [<c112e507>] ? seq_lseek+0x154/0x154 [<c1115ba2>] SyS_read+0x54/0x7f [<c188488e>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb ---[ end trace 3f507febd6b4cc83 ]--- >>>> ##### CPU 1 buffer started #### Which was the __trace_find_cmdline() function complaining about the pid in the event record being negative. After adding more test cases, this would trigger more often. Strangely enough, it would never trigger on a single test, but instead would trigger only when running all the tests. I believe that was the case because it required one of the tests to be shutting down via delayed instances while a new test started up. After spending several days debugging this, I found that it was caused by the iterator becoming corrupted. Debugging further, I found out why the iterator became corrupted. It happened with the rb_iter_reset(). As consuming reads may not read the full reader page, and only part of it, there's a "read" field to know where the last read took place. The iterator, must also start at the read position. In the rb_iter_reset() code, if the reader page was disconnected from the ring buffer, the iterator would start at the head page within the ring buffer (where writes still happen). But the mistake there was that it still used the "read" field to start the iterator on the head page, where it should always start at zero because readers never read from within the ring buffer where writes occur. I originally wrote a patch to have it set the iter->head to 0 instead of iter->head_page->read, but then I questioned why it wasn't always setting the iter to point to the reader page, as the reader page is still valid. The list_empty(reader_page->list) just means that it was successful in swapping out. But the reader_page may still have data. There was a bug report a long time ago that was not reproducible that had something about trace_pipe (consuming read) not matching trace (iterator read). This may explain why that happened. Anyway, the correct answer to this bug is to always use the reader page an not reset the iterator to inside the writable ring buffer. Fixes: d769041f "ring_buffer: implement new locking" Signed-off-by:
-
Jiri Kosina authored
commit 6726655d upstream. There is a following AB-BA dependency between cpu_hotplug.lock and cpuidle_lock: 1) cpu_hotplug.lock -> cpuidle_lock enable_nonboot_cpus() _cpu_up() cpu_hotplug_begin() LOCK(cpu_hotplug.lock) cpu_notify() ... acpi_processor_hotplug() cpuidle_pause_and_lock() LOCK(cpuidle_lock) 2) cpuidle_lock -> cpu_hotplug.lock acpi_os_execute_deferred() workqueue ... acpi_processor_cst_has_changed() cpuidle_pause_and_lock() LOCK(cpuidle_lock) get_online_cpus() LOCK(cpu_hotplug.lock) Fix this by reversing the order acpi_processor_cst_has_changed() does thigs -- let it first execute the protection against CPU hotplug by calling get_online_cpus() and obtain the cpuidle lock only after that (and perform the symmentric change when allowing CPUs hotplug again and dropping cpuidle lock). Spotted by lockdep. Signed-off-by:
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Lan Tianyu authored
commit 236105db upstream. Currently, notify callbacks for fixed button events are run from interrupt context. That is not necessary and after commit 0bf6368e (ACPI / button: Add ACPI Button event via netlink routine) it causes netlink routines to be called from interrupt context which is not correct. Also, that is different from non-fixed device events (including non-fixed button events) whose notify callbacks are all executed from process context. For the above reasons, make fixed button device notify callbacks run in process context which will avoid the deadlock when using netlink to report button events to user space. Fixes: 0bf6368e (ACPI / button: Add ACPI Button event via netlink routine) Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/8/21/606Reported-by:
Benjamin Block <bebl@mageta.org> Reported-by:
Knut Petersen <Knut_Petersen@t-online.de> Signed-off-by:
Lan Tianyu <tianyu.lan@intel.com> [rjw: Function names, subject and changelog.] Signed-off-by:
-
