1. 02 Jan, 2018 5 commits
    • Dave Hansen's avatar
      x86/mm/pti: Disable global pages if PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y · acfee9b8
      Dave Hansen authored
      commit c313ec66 upstream.
      
      Global pages stay in the TLB across context switches.  Since all contexts
      share the same kernel mapping, these mappings are marked as global pages
      so kernel entries in the TLB are not flushed out on a context switch.
      
      But, even having these entries in the TLB opens up something that an
      attacker can use, such as the double-page-fault attack:
      
         http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a191.pdf
      
      That means that even when PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION switches page tables
      on return to user space the global pages would stay in the TLB cache.
      
      Disable global pages so that kernel TLB entries can be flushed before
      returning to user space. This way, all accesses to kernel addresses from
      userspace result in a TLB miss independent of the existence of a kernel
      mapping.
      
      Suppress global pages via the __supported_pte_mask. The user space
      mappings set PAGE_GLOBAL for the minimal kernel mappings which are
      required for entry/exit. These mappings are set up manually so the
      filtering does not take place.
      
      [ The __supported_pte_mask simplification was written by Thomas Gleixner. ]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Signed-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      acfee9b8
    • Thomas Gleixner's avatar
      x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE · 72a2bedd
      Thomas Gleixner authored
      commit a89f040f upstream.
      
      Many x86 CPUs leak information to user space due to missing isolation of
      user space and kernel space page tables. There are many well documented
      ways to exploit that.
      
      The upcoming software migitation of isolating the user and kernel space
      page tables needs a misfeature flag so code can be made runtime
      conditional.
      
      Add the BUG bits which indicates that the CPU is affected and add a feature
      bit which indicates that the software migitation is enabled.
      
      Assume for now that _ALL_ x86 CPUs are affected by this. Exceptions can be
      made later.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Signed-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      72a2bedd
    • Jing Xia's avatar
      tracing: Fix crash when it fails to alloc ring buffer · 98669825
      Jing Xia authored
      commit 24f2aaf9 upstream.
      
      Double free of the ring buffer happens when it fails to alloc new
      ring buffer instance for max_buffer if TRACER_MAX_TRACE is configured.
      The root cause is that the pointer is not set to NULL after the buffer
      is freed in allocate_trace_buffers(), and the freeing of the ring
      buffer is invoked again later if the pointer is not equal to Null,
      as:
      
      instance_mkdir()
          |-allocate_trace_buffers()
              |-allocate_trace_buffer(tr, &tr->trace_buffer...)
      	|-allocate_trace_buffer(tr, &tr->max_buffer...)
      
                // allocate fail(-ENOMEM),first free
                // and the buffer pointer is not set to null
              |-ring_buffer_free(tr->trace_buffer.buffer)
      
             // out_free_tr
          |-free_trace_buffers()
              |-free_trace_buffer(&tr->trace_buffer);
      
      	      //if trace_buffer is not null, free again
      	    |-ring_buffer_free(buf->buffer)
                      |-rb_free_cpu_buffer(buffer->buffers[cpu])
                          // ring_buffer_per_cpu is null, and
                          // crash in ring_buffer_per_cpu->pages
      
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171226071253.8968-1-chunyan.zhang@spreadtrum.com
      
      Fixes: 737223fb ("tracing: Consolidate buffer allocation code")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJing Xia <jing.xia@spreadtrum.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarChunyan Zhang <chunyan.zhang@spreadtrum.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      98669825
    • Steven Rostedt (VMware)'s avatar
      tracing: Fix possible double free on failure of allocating trace buffer · 21a9c734
      Steven Rostedt (VMware) authored
      commit 4397f045 upstream.
      
      Jing Xia and Chunyan Zhang reported that on failing to allocate part of the
      tracing buffer, memory is freed, but the pointers that point to them are not
      initialized back to NULL, and later paths may try to free the freed memory
      again. Jing and Chunyan fixed one of the locations that does this, but
      missed a spot.
      
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171226071253.8968-1-chunyan.zhang@spreadtrum.com
      
      Fixes: 737223fb ("tracing: Consolidate buffer allocation code")
      Reported-by: default avatarJing Xia <jing.xia@spreadtrum.com>
      Reported-by: default avatarChunyan Zhang <chunyan.zhang@spreadtrum.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      21a9c734
    • Steven Rostedt (VMware)'s avatar
      tracing: Remove extra zeroing out of the ring buffer page · 234bc126
      Steven Rostedt (VMware) authored
      commit 6b7e633f upstream.
      
      The ring_buffer_read_page() takes care of zeroing out any extra data in the
      page that it returns. There's no need to zero it out again from the
      consumer. It was removed from one consumer of this function, but
      read_buffers_splice_read() did not remove it, and worse, it contained a
      nasty bug because of it.
      
      Fixes: 2711ca23 ("ring-buffer: Move zeroing out excess in page to ring buffer code")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      234bc126
  2. 29 Dec, 2017 35 commits