This patch removes the unnecessary FIPS ifdef in cctrng.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Hadar Gat <hadar.gat@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The variable "i" is redundant to be assigned a value
of zero,because it's assigned in the for loop, so remove
redundant one here.
Signed-off-by: Shengju Zhang <zhangshengju@cmss.chinamobile.com>
Signed-off-by: Tang Bin <tangbin@cmss.chinamobile.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

As the Jitter RNG provides an SP800-90B compliant noise source, use this
noise source always for the (re)seeding of the DRBG.

To make sure the DRBG is always properly seeded, the reseed threshold
is reduced to 1<<20 generate operations.

The Jitter RNG may report health test failures. Such health test
failures are treated as transient as follows. The DRBG will not reseed
from the Jitter RNG (but from get_random_bytes) in case of a health
test failure. Though, it produces the requested random number.

The Jitter RNG has a failure counter where at most 1024 consecutive
resets due to a health test failure are considered as a transient error.
If more consecutive resets are required, the Jitter RNG will return
a permanent error which is returned to the caller by the DRBG. With this
approach, the worst case reseed threshold is significantly lower than
mandated by SP800-90A in order to seed with an SP800-90B noise source:
the DRBG has a reseed threshold of 2^20 * 1024 = 2^30 generate requests.

Yet, in case of a transient Jitter RNG health test failure, the DRBG is
seeded with the data obtained from get_random_bytes.

However, if the Jitter RNG fails during the initial seeding operation
even due to a health test error, the DRBG will send an error to the
caller because at that time, the DRBG has received no seed that is
SP800-90B compliant.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

SP800-90B specifies various requirements for the noise source(s) that
may seed any DRNG including SP800-90A DRBGs. In November 2020,
SP800-90B will be mandated for all noise sources that provide entropy
to DRBGs as part of a FIPS 140-[2|3] validation or other evaluation
types. Without SP800-90B compliance, a noise source is defined to always
deliver zero bits of entropy.

This patch ports the SP800-90B compliance from the user space Jitter RNG
version 2.2.0.

The following changes are applied:

- addition of (an enhanced version of) the repetitive count test (RCT)
  from SP800-90B section 4.4.1 - the enhancement is due to the fact of
  using the stuck test as input to the RCT.

- addition of the adaptive proportion test (APT) from SP800-90B section
  4.4.2

- update of the power-on self test to perform a test measurement of 1024
  noise samples compliant to SP800-90B section 4.3

- remove of the continuous random number generator test which is
  replaced by APT and RCT

Health test failures due to the SP800-90B operation are only enforced in
FIPS mode. If a runtime health test failure is detected, the Jitter RNG
is reset. If more than 1024 resets in a row are performed, a permanent
error is returned to the caller.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The variable err is being initialized with a value that is never read
and it is being updated later with a new value.  The initialization is
redundant and can be removed.

Addresses-Coverity: ("Unused value")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The variable error is being initialized with a value that is never read
and it is being updated later with a new value.  The initialization is
redundant and can be removed.

Addresses-Coverity: ("Unused value")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Currently most of the crypto files enable the crypto extension using the
.arch directive but crct10dif-ce-core.S uses .cpu instead. Move that over
to .arch for consistency.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The cctrng doesn't compile without HAS_IOMEM so we should depend
on it.
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Fixes: a583ed31 ("hwrng: cctrng - introduce Arm CryptoCell driver")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Hadar Gat <hadar.gat@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

due to the selects of CRYPTO_DEV_HISI_QM which now depends on ACPI

Fixes: 6c6dd580 ("crypto: hisilicon/qm - add controller reset...")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

This fixes build failure when CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS is defined.

Fixes: a583ed31 ("hwrng: cctrng - introduce Arm CryptoCell driver")
Signed-off-by: Hadar Gat <hadar.gat@arm.com>
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> # build-tested
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Add Kconfig dependency to fix kbuild warnings.

Fixes: 6c6dd580 ("crypto: hisilicon/qm - add controller reset interface")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Shukun Tan <tanshukun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Message logged by 'dev_xxx()' or 'pr_xxx()' should end with a '\n'.

While at it, I've introduced a few pr_cont that looked logical to me.

Fixes: 10b4f094 ("crypto: marvell - add the Virtual Function driver for CPT")
Fixes: d9110b0b ("crypto: marvell - add support for OCTEON TX CPT engine")
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

There are two problems in crypto_spawn_alg.  First of all it may
return spawn->alg even if spawn->dead is set.  This results in a
double-free as detected by syzbot.

Secondly the setting of the DYING flag is racy because we hold
the read-lock instead of the write-lock.  We should instead call
crypto_shoot_alg in a safe manner by gaining a refcount, dropping
the lock, and then releasing the refcount.

This patch fixes both problems.

Reported-by: syzbot+fc0674cde00b66844470@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 4f87ee11 ("crypto: api - Do not zap spawn->alg")
Fixes: 73669cc5 ("crypto: api - Fix race condition in...")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

DMADEVICES is the top-level option for the slave DMA
subsystem, and should not be selected by device drivers,
as this can cause circular dependencies such as:

drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/Kconfig:6:error: recursive dependency detected!
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/Kconfig:6:	symbol NET_VENDOR_FREESCALE depends on PPC_BESTCOMM
drivers/dma/bestcomm/Kconfig:6:	symbol PPC_BESTCOMM depends on DMADEVICES
drivers/dma/Kconfig:6:	symbol DMADEVICES is selected by CRYPTO_DEV_SP_CCP
drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig:10:	symbol CRYPTO_DEV_SP_CCP depends on CRYPTO
crypto/Kconfig:16:	symbol CRYPTO is selected by LIBCRC32C
lib/Kconfig:222:	symbol LIBCRC32C is selected by LIQUIDIO
drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/Kconfig:65:	symbol LIQUIDIO depends on PTP_1588_CLOCK
drivers/ptp/Kconfig:8:	symbol PTP_1588_CLOCK is implied by FEC
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/Kconfig:23:	symbol FEC depends on NET_VENDOR_FREESCALE

The LIQUIDIO driver causing this problem is addressed in a
separate patch, but this change is needed to prevent it from
happening again.

Using "depends on DMADEVICES" is what we do for all other
implementations of slave DMA controllers as well.

Fixes: b3c2fee5 ("crypto: ccp - Ensure all dependencies are specified")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Currently after any algorithm is registered and tested, there's an
unnecessary request_module("cryptomgr") even if it's already loaded.
Also, CRYPTO_MSG_ALG_LOADED is sent twice, and thus if the algorithm is
"crct10dif", lib/crc-t10dif.c replaces the tfm twice rather than once.

This occurs because CRYPTO_MSG_ALG_LOADED is sent using
crypto_probing_notify(), which tries to load "cryptomgr" if the
notification is not handled (NOTIFY_DONE).  This doesn't make sense
because "cryptomgr" doesn't handle this notification.

Fix this by using crypto_notify() instead of crypto_probing_notify().

Fixes: dd8b083f ("crypto: api - Introduce notifier for new crypto algorithms")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.20+
Cc: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The function “platform_get_irq” can log an error already.
Thus omit a redundant message for the exception handling in the
calling function.

This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Acked-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The function “platform_get_irq” can log an error already.
Thus omit a redundant message for the exception handling in the
calling function.

This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The function “platform_get_irq” can log an error already.
Thus omit a redundant message for the exception handling in the
calling function.

This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

When something goes wrong, platform_get_irq() will print an error message,
so in order to avoid the situation of repeat output，we should remove
dev_err here.
Signed-off-by: Tang Bin <tangbin@cmss.chinamobile.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

It is not working well to determine whether the queue is empty based on
whether the used count is 0. It is more stable to get if the queue is
stopping by checking if the tail pointer of the send queue and the
completion queue are equal.
Signed-off-by: Yang Shen <shenyang39@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Shukun Tan <tanshukun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhou Wang <wangzhou1@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: Zaibo Xu <xuzaibo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Add support for controller reset in SEC driver.
Signed-off-by: Yang Shen <shenyang39@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Shukun Tan <tanshukun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhou Wang <wangzhou1@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: Zaibo Xu <xuzaibo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Add support for the controller reset in HPRE driver.
Signed-off-by: Hui Tang <tanghui20@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Shukun Tan <tanshukun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhou Wang <wangzhou1@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: Zaibo Xu <xuzaibo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Register controller reset handle with PCIe AER.
Signed-off-by: Shukun Tan <tanshukun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhou Wang <wangzhou1@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: Zaibo Xu <xuzaibo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Add the main implementation of the controller reset interface, which is
roughly divided into three parts, stop, reset, and reinitialization.
Signed-off-by: Shukun Tan <tanshukun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhou Wang <wangzhou1@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: Zaibo Xu <xuzaibo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The vfs_num module parameter has been used in zip driver, this patch adds
this for HPRE and SEC driver.
Signed-off-by: Hao Fang <fanghao11@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Shukun Tan <tanshukun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhou Wang <wangzhou1@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: Zaibo Xu <xuzaibo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Clean the duplicate SR-IOV related codes, put all into qm.c.
Signed-off-by: Shukun Tan <tanshukun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhou Wang <wangzhou1@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: Zaibo Xu <xuzaibo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

We plan to move vfs_num related code into qm.c, put the param
vfs_num into struct hisi_qm first.
Signed-off-by: Shukun Tan <tanshukun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhou Wang <wangzhou1@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: Zaibo Xu <xuzaibo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

I work for Arm on maintaining the TrustZone CryptoCell TRNG driver.
Signed-off-by: Hadar Gat <hadar.gat@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Introduce low level Arm CryptoCell TRNG HW support.
Signed-off-by: Hadar Gat <hadar.gat@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The Arm CryptoCell is a hardware security engine. This patch adds DT
bindings for its TRNG (True Random Number Generator) engine.
Signed-off-by: Hadar Gat <hadar.gat@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

For skcipher algorithms, the input, output HW S/G tables
look like this: [IV, src][dst, IV]
Now, we can have 2 conditions here:
- there is no IV;
- src and dst are equal (in-place encryption) and scattered
and the error is an "off-by-one" in the HW S/G table.

This issue was seen with KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in skcipher_edesc_alloc+0x95c/0x1018

Read of size 4 at addr ffff000022a02958 by task cryptomgr_test/321

CPU: 2 PID: 321 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted
5.6.0-rc1-00165-ge4ef8383-dirty #4
Hardware name: LS1046A RDB Board (DT)
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0x0/0x260
 show_stack+0x14/0x20
 dump_stack+0xe8/0x144
 print_address_description.isra.11+0x64/0x348
 __kasan_report+0x11c/0x230
 kasan_report+0xc/0x18
 __asan_load4+0x90/0xb0
 skcipher_edesc_alloc+0x95c/0x1018
 skcipher_encrypt+0x84/0x150
 crypto_skcipher_encrypt+0x50/0x68
 test_skcipher_vec_cfg+0x4d4/0xc10
 test_skcipher_vec+0x178/0x1d8
 alg_test_skcipher+0xec/0x230
 alg_test.part.44+0x114/0x4a0
 alg_test+0x1c/0x60
 cryptomgr_test+0x34/0x58
 kthread+0x1b8/0x1c0
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

Allocated by task 321:
 save_stack+0x24/0xb0
 __kasan_kmalloc.isra.10+0xc4/0xe0
 kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x18
 __kmalloc+0x178/0x2b8
 skcipher_edesc_alloc+0x21c/0x1018
 skcipher_encrypt+0x84/0x150
 crypto_skcipher_encrypt+0x50/0x68
 test_skcipher_vec_cfg+0x4d4/0xc10
 test_skcipher_vec+0x178/0x1d8
 alg_test_skcipher+0xec/0x230
 alg_test.part.44+0x114/0x4a0
 alg_test+0x1c/0x60
 cryptomgr_test+0x34/0x58
 kthread+0x1b8/0x1c0
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

Freed by task 0:
(stack is not available)

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff000022a02800
 which belongs to the cache dma-kmalloc-512 of size 512
The buggy address is located 344 bytes inside of
 512-byte region [ffff000022a02800, ffff000022a02a00)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:fffffe00006a8000 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff00093200c400
index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0xffff00000010200(slab|head)
raw: 0ffff00000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff00093200c400
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff000022a02800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff000022a02880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff000022a02900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc
                                                    ^
 ffff000022a02980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff000022a02a00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc

Fixes: 334d37c9 ("crypto: caam - update IV using HW support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.3+
Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Here's the KASAN report:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rsa_pub_done+0x70/0xe8
Read of size 1 at addr ffff000023082014 by task swapper/0/0

CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc1-00162-gfcb90d51 #60
Hardware name: LS1046A RDB Board (DT)
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0x0/0x260
 show_stack+0x14/0x20
 dump_stack+0xe8/0x144
 print_address_description.isra.11+0x64/0x348
 __kasan_report+0x11c/0x230
 kasan_report+0xc/0x18
 __asan_load1+0x5c/0x68
 rsa_pub_done+0x70/0xe8
 caam_jr_dequeue+0x390/0x608
 tasklet_action_common.isra.13+0x1ec/0x230
 tasklet_action+0x24/0x30
 efi_header_end+0x1a4/0x370
 irq_exit+0x114/0x128
 __handle_domain_irq+0x80/0xe0
 gic_handle_irq+0x50/0xa0
 el1_irq+0xb8/0x180
 cpuidle_enter_state+0xa4/0x490
 cpuidle_enter+0x48/0x70
 call_cpuidle+0x44/0x70
 do_idle+0x304/0x338
 cpu_startup_entry+0x24/0x40
 rest_init+0xf8/0x10c
 arch_call_rest_init+0xc/0x14
 start_kernel+0x774/0x7b4

Allocated by task 263:
 save_stack+0x24/0xb0
 __kasan_kmalloc.isra.10+0xc4/0xe0
 kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x18
 __kmalloc+0x178/0x2b8
 rsa_edesc_alloc+0x2cc/0xe10
 caam_rsa_enc+0x9c/0x5f0
 test_akcipher_one+0x78c/0x968
 alg_test_akcipher+0x78/0xf8
 alg_test.part.44+0x114/0x4a0
 alg_test+0x1c/0x60
 cryptomgr_test+0x34/0x58
 kthread+0x1b8/0x1c0
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

Freed by task 0:
 save_stack+0x24/0xb0
 __kasan_slab_free+0x10c/0x188
 kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18
 kfree+0x7c/0x298
 rsa_pub_done+0x68/0xe8
 caam_jr_dequeue+0x390/0x608
 tasklet_action_common.isra.13+0x1ec/0x230
 tasklet_action+0x24/0x30
 efi_header_end+0x1a4/0x370

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff000023082000
 which belongs to the cache dma-kmalloc-256 of size 256
The buggy address is located 20 bytes inside of
 256-byte region [ffff000023082000, ffff000023082100)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:fffffe00006c2080 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff00093200c200 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0xffff00000010200(slab|head)
raw: 0ffff00000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff00093200c200
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff000023081f00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
 ffff000023081f80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
>ffff000023082000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                         ^
 ffff000023082080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff000023082100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc

Fixes: bf537950 ("crypto: caam - add crypto_engine support for RSA algorithms")
Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Here's the KASAN report:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ahash_done+0xdc/0x3b8
Read of size 1 at addr ffff00002303f010 by task swapper/0/0

CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc1-00162-gfcb90d51 #59
Hardware name: LS1046A RDB Board (DT)
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0x0/0x260
 show_stack+0x14/0x20
 dump_stack+0xe8/0x144
 print_address_description.isra.11+0x64/0x348
 __kasan_report+0x11c/0x230
 kasan_report+0xc/0x18
 __asan_load1+0x5c/0x68
 ahash_done+0xdc/0x3b8
 caam_jr_dequeue+0x390/0x608
 tasklet_action_common.isra.13+0x1ec/0x230
 tasklet_action+0x24/0x30
 efi_header_end+0x1a4/0x370
 irq_exit+0x114/0x128
 __handle_domain_irq+0x80/0xe0
 gic_handle_irq+0x50/0xa0
 el1_irq+0xb8/0x180
 cpuidle_enter_state+0xa4/0x490
 cpuidle_enter+0x48/0x70
 call_cpuidle+0x44/0x70
 do_idle+0x304/0x338
 cpu_startup_entry+0x24/0x40
 rest_init+0xf8/0x10c
 arch_call_rest_init+0xc/0x14
 start_kernel+0x774/0x7b4

Allocated by task 263:
 save_stack+0x24/0xb0
 __kasan_kmalloc.isra.10+0xc4/0xe0
 kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x18
 __kmalloc+0x178/0x2b8
 ahash_edesc_alloc+0x58/0x1f8
 ahash_final_no_ctx+0x94/0x6e8
 ahash_final+0x24/0x30
 crypto_ahash_op+0x58/0xb0
 crypto_ahash_final+0x30/0x40
 do_ahash_op+0x2c/0xa0
 test_ahash_vec_cfg+0x894/0x9e0
 test_hash_vec_cfg+0x6c/0x88
 test_hash_vec+0xfc/0x1e0
 __alg_test_hash+0x1ac/0x368
 alg_test_hash+0xf8/0x1c8
 alg_test.part.44+0x114/0x4a0
 alg_test+0x1c/0x60
 cryptomgr_test+0x34/0x58
 kthread+0x1b8/0x1c0
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

Freed by task 0:
 save_stack+0x24/0xb0
 __kasan_slab_free+0x10c/0x188
 kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18
 kfree+0x7c/0x298
 ahash_done+0xd4/0x3b8
 caam_jr_dequeue+0x390/0x608
 tasklet_action_common.isra.13+0x1ec/0x230
 tasklet_action+0x24/0x30
 efi_header_end+0x1a4/0x370

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff00002303f000
 which belongs to the cache dma-kmalloc-128 of size 128
The buggy address is located 16 bytes inside of
 128-byte region [ffff00002303f000, ffff00002303f080)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:fffffe00006c0fc0 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff00093200c000 index:0x0
flags: 0xffff00000000200(slab)
raw: 0ffff00000000200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff00093200c000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff00002303ef00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
 ffff00002303ef80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
>ffff00002303f000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                         ^
 ffff00002303f080: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff00002303f100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc

Fixes: 21b014f0 ("crypto: caam - add crypto_engine support for HASH algorithms")
Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Here's the KASAN report:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in aead_crypt_done+0x60/0xd8
Read of size 1 at addr ffff00002303f014 by task swapper/0/0

CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc1-00162-gfcb90d51 #58
Hardware name: LS1046A RDB Board (DT)
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0x0/0x260
 show_stack+0x14/0x20
 dump_stack+0xe8/0x144
 print_address_description.isra.11+0x64/0x348
 __kasan_report+0x11c/0x230
 kasan_report+0xc/0x18
 __asan_load1+0x5c/0x68
 aead_crypt_done+0x60/0xd8
 caam_jr_dequeue+0x390/0x608
 tasklet_action_common.isra.13+0x1ec/0x230
 tasklet_action+0x24/0x30
 efi_header_end+0x1a4/0x370
 irq_exit+0x114/0x128
 __handle_domain_irq+0x80/0xe0
 gic_handle_irq+0x50/0xa0
 el1_irq+0xb8/0x180
 _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2c/0x78
 finish_task_switch+0xa4/0x2f8
 __schedule+0x3a4/0x890
 schedule_idle+0x28/0x50
 do_idle+0x22c/0x338
 cpu_startup_entry+0x24/0x40
 rest_init+0xf8/0x10c
 arch_call_rest_init+0xc/0x14
 start_kernel+0x774/0x7b4

Allocated by task 263:
 save_stack+0x24/0xb0
 __kasan_kmalloc.isra.10+0xc4/0xe0
 kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x18
 __kmalloc+0x178/0x2b8
 aead_edesc_alloc+0x1b4/0xbf0
 ipsec_gcm_encrypt+0xd4/0x140
 crypto_aead_encrypt+0x50/0x68
 test_aead_vec_cfg+0x498/0xec0
 test_aead_vec+0x110/0x200
 alg_test_aead+0xfc/0x680
 alg_test.part.44+0x114/0x4a0
 alg_test+0x1c/0x60
 cryptomgr_test+0x34/0x58
 kthread+0x1b8/0x1c0
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

Freed by task 0:
 save_stack+0x24/0xb0
 __kasan_slab_free+0x10c/0x188
 kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18
 kfree+0x7c/0x298
 aead_crypt_done+0x58/0xd8
 caam_jr_dequeue+0x390/0x608
 tasklet_action_common.isra.13+0x1ec/0x230
 tasklet_action+0x24/0x30
 efi_header_end+0x1a4/0x370

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff00002303f000
 which belongs to the cache dma-kmalloc-128 of size 128
The buggy address is located 20 bytes inside of
 128-byte region [ffff00002303f000, ffff00002303f080)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:fffffe00006c0fc0 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff00093200c000 index:0x0
flags: 0xffff00000000200(slab)
raw: 0ffff00000000200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff00093200c000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff00002303ef00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
 ffff00002303ef80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
>ffff00002303f000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                         ^
 ffff00002303f080: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff00002303f100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc

Fixes: 1c240226 ("crypto: caam - add crypto_engine support for AEAD algorithms")
Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Here's the KASAN report:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skcipher_crypt_done+0xe8/0x1a8
Read of size 1 at addr ffff00002304001c by task swapper/0/0

CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc1-00162-gfcb90d51 #57
Hardware name: LS1046A RDB Board (DT)
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0x0/0x260
 show_stack+0x14/0x20
 dump_stack+0xe8/0x144
 print_address_description.isra.11+0x64/0x348
 __kasan_report+0x11c/0x230
 kasan_report+0xc/0x18
 __asan_load1+0x5c/0x68
 skcipher_crypt_done+0xe8/0x1a8
 caam_jr_dequeue+0x390/0x608
 tasklet_action_common.isra.13+0x1ec/0x230
 tasklet_action+0x24/0x30
 efi_header_end+0x1a4/0x370
 irq_exit+0x114/0x128
 __handle_domain_irq+0x80/0xe0
 gic_handle_irq+0x50/0xa0
 el1_irq+0xb8/0x180
 _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2c/0x78
 finish_task_switch+0xa4/0x2f8
 __schedule+0x3a4/0x890
 schedule_idle+0x28/0x50
 do_idle+0x22c/0x338
 cpu_startup_entry+0x24/0x40
 rest_init+0xf8/0x10c
 arch_call_rest_init+0xc/0x14
 start_kernel+0x774/0x7b4

Allocated by task 263:
 save_stack+0x24/0xb0
 __kasan_kmalloc.isra.10+0xc4/0xe0
 kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x18
 __kmalloc+0x178/0x2b8
 skcipher_edesc_alloc+0x21c/0x1018
 skcipher_encrypt+0x84/0x150
 crypto_skcipher_encrypt+0x50/0x68
 test_skcipher_vec_cfg+0x4d4/0xc10
 test_skcipher_vec+0xf8/0x1d8
 alg_test_skcipher+0xec/0x230
 alg_test.part.44+0x114/0x4a0
 alg_test+0x1c/0x60
 cryptomgr_test+0x34/0x58
 kthread+0x1b8/0x1c0
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

Freed by task 0:
 save_stack+0x24/0xb0
 __kasan_slab_free+0x10c/0x188
 kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18
 kfree+0x7c/0x298
 skcipher_crypt_done+0xe0/0x1a8
 caam_jr_dequeue+0x390/0x608
 tasklet_action_common.isra.13+0x1ec/0x230
 tasklet_action+0x24/0x30
 efi_header_end+0x1a4/0x370

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff000023040000
 which belongs to the cache dma-kmalloc-512 of size 512
The buggy address is located 28 bytes inside of
 512-byte region [ffff000023040000, ffff000023040200)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:fffffe00006c1000 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff00093200c400 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0xffff00000010200(slab|head)
raw: 0ffff00000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff00093200c400
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff00002303ff00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
 ffff00002303ff80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
>ffff000023040000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                            ^
 ffff000023040080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff000023040100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

Fixes: ee38767f ("crypto: caam - support crypto_engine framework for SKCIPHER algorithms")
Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

This sorts the actual field names too, potentially causing even more
chaos and confusion at merge time if you have edited the MAINTAINERS
file.  But the end result is a more consistent layout, and hopefully
it's a one-time pain minimized by doing this just before the -rc1
release.

This was entirely scripted:

  ./scripts/parse-maintainers.pl --input=MAINTAINERS --output=MAINTAINERS --order
Requested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

They are all supposed to be sorted, but people who add new entries don't
always know the alphabet.  Plus sometimes the entry names get edited,
and people don't then re-order the entry.

Let's see how painful this will be for merging purposes (the MAINTAINERS
file is often edited in various different trees), but Joe claims there's
relatively few patches in -next that touch this, and doing it just
before -rc1 is likely the best time.  Fingers crossed.

This was scripted with

  /scripts/parse-maintainers.pl --input=MAINTAINERS --output=MAINTAINERS

but then I also ended up manually upper-casing a few entry names that
stood out when looking at the end result.
Requested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "A set of three patches to fix the fallout of the newly added split
  lock detection feature.

  It addressed the case where a KVM guest triggers a split lock #AC and
  KVM reinjects it into the guest which is not prepared to handle it.

  Add proper sanity checks which prevent the unconditional injection
  into the guest and handles the #AC on the host side in the same way as
  user space detections are handled. Depending on the detection mode it
  either warns and disables detection for the task or kills the task if
  the mode is set to fatal"

* tag 'x86-urgent-2020-04-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  KVM: VMX: Extend VMXs #AC interceptor to handle split lock #AC in guest
  KVM: x86: Emulate split-lock access as a write in emulator
  x86/split_lock: Provide handle_guest_split_lock()

Pull time(keeping) updates from Thomas Gleixner:

 - Fix the time_for_children symlink in /proc/$PID/ so it properly
   reflects that it part of the 'time' namespace

 - Add the missing userns limit for the allowed number of time
   namespaces, which was half defined but the actual array member was
   not added. This went unnoticed as the array has an exessive empty
   member at the end but introduced a user visible regression as the
   output was corrupted.

 - Prevent further silent ucount corruption by adding a BUILD_BUG_ON()
   to catch half updated data.

* tag 'timers-urgent-2020-04-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  ucount: Make sure ucounts in /proc/sys/user don't regress again
  time/namespace: Add max_time_namespaces ucount
  time/namespace: Fix time_for_children symlink