- 30 May, 2018 40 commits
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Tang Junhui authored
[ Upstream commit 7f4fc93d ] I attach a back-end device to a cache set, and the cache set is not registered yet, this back-end device did not attach successfully, and no error returned: [root]# echo 87859280-fec6-4bcc-20df7ca8f86b > /sys/block/sde/bcache/attach [root]# In sysfs_attach(), the return value "v" is initialized to "size" in the beginning, and if no cache set exist in bch_cache_sets, the "v" value would not change any more, and return to sysfs, sysfs regard it as success since the "size" is a positive number. This patch fixes this issue by assigning "v" with "-ENOENT" in the initialization. Signed-off-by:
Tang Junhui <tang.junhui@zte.com.cn> Reviewed-by:
Michael Lyle <mlyle@lyle.org> Signed-off-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Tang Junhui authored
[ Upstream commit 73ac105b ] back-end device sdm has already attached a cache_set with ID f67ebe1f-f8bc-4d73-bfe5-9dc88607f119, then try to attach with another cache set, and it returns with an error: [root]# cd /sys/block/sdm/bcache [root]# echo 5ccd0a63-148e-48b8-afa2-aca9cbd6279f > attach -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument After that, execute a command to modify the label of bcache device: [root]# echo data_disk1 > label Then we reboot the system, when the system power on, the back-end device can not attach to cache_set, a messages show in the log: Feb 5 12:05:52 ceph152 kernel: [922385.508498] bcache: bch_cached_dev_attach() couldn't find uuid for sdm in set In sysfs_attach(), dc->sb.set_uuid was assigned to the value which input through sysfs, no matter whether it is success or not in bch_cached_dev_attach(). For example, If the back-end device has already attached to an cache set, bch_cached_dev_attach() would fail, but dc->sb.set_uuid was changed. Then modify the label of bcache device, it will call bch_write_bdev_super(), which would write the dc->sb.set_uuid to the super block, so we record a wrong cache set ID in the super block, after the system reboot, the cache set couldn't find the uuid of the back-end device, so the bcache device couldn't exist and use any more. In this patch, we don't assigned cache set ID to dc->sb.set_uuid in sysfs_attach() directly, but input it into bch_cached_dev_attach(), and assigned dc->sb.set_uuid to the cache set ID after the back-end device attached to the cache set successful. Signed-off-by:
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Tang Junhui authored
[ Upstream commit 682811b3 ] After long time running of random small IO writing, I reboot the machine, and after the machine power on, I found bcache got stuck, the stack is: [root@ceph153 ~]# cat /proc/2510/task/*/stack [<ffffffffa06b2455>] closure_sync+0x25/0x90 [bcache] [<ffffffffa06b6be8>] bch_journal+0x118/0x2b0 [bcache] [<ffffffffa06b6dc7>] bch_journal_meta+0x47/0x70 [bcache] [<ffffffffa06be8f7>] bch_prio_write+0x237/0x340 [bcache] [<ffffffffa06a8018>] bch_allocator_thread+0x3c8/0x3d0 [bcache] [<ffffffff810a631f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0 [<ffffffff8164c318>] ret_from_fork+0x58/0x90 [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff [root@ceph153 ~]# cat /proc/2038/task/*/stack [<ffffffffa06b1abd>] __bch_btree_map_nodes+0x12d/0x150 [bcache] [<ffffffffa06b1bd1>] bch_btree_insert+0xf1/0x170 [bcache] [<ffffffffa06b637f>] bch_journal_replay+0x13f/0x230 [bcache] [<ffffffffa06c75fe>] run_cache_set+0x79a/0x7c2 [bcache] [<ffffffffa06c0cf8>] register_bcache+0xd48/0x1310 [bcache] [<ffffffff812f702f>] kobj_attr_store+0xf/0x20 [<ffffffff8125b216>] sysfs_write_file+0xc6/0x140 [<ffffffff811dfbfd>] vfs_write+0xbd/0x1e0 [<ffffffff811e069f>] SyS_write+0x7f/0xe0 [<ffffffff8164c3c9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1 The stack shows the register thread and allocator thread were getting stuck when registering cache device. I reboot the machine several times, the issue always exsit in this machine. I debug the code, and found the call trace as bellow: register_bcache() ==>run_cache_set() ==>bch_journal_replay() ==>bch_btree_insert() ==>__bch_btree_map_nodes() ==>btree_insert_fn() ==>btree_split() //node need split ==>btree_check_reserve() In btree_check_reserve(), It will check if there is enough buckets of RESERVE_BTREE type, since allocator thread did not work yet, so no buckets of RESERVE_BTREE type allocated, so the register thread waits on c->btree_cache_wait, and goes to sleep. Then the allocator thread initialized, the call trace is bellow: bch_allocator_thread() ==>bch_prio_write() ==>bch_journal_meta() ==>bch_journal() ==>journal_wait_for_write() In journal_wait_for_write(), It will check if journal is full by journal_full(), but the long time random small IO writing causes the exhaustion of journal buckets(journal.blocks_free=0), In order to release the journal buckets, the allocator calls btree_flush_write() to flush keys to btree nodes, and waits on c->journal.wait until btree nodes writing over or there has already some journal buckets space, then the allocator thread goes to sleep. but in btree_flush_write(), since bch_journal_replay() is not finished, so no btree nodes have journal (condition "if (btree_current_write(b)->journal)" never satisfied), so we got no btree node to flush, no journal bucket released, and allocator sleep all the times. Through the above analysis, we can see that: 1) Register thread wait for allocator thread to allocate buckets of RESERVE_BTREE type; 2) Alloctor thread wait for register thread to replay journal, so it can flush btree nodes and get journal bucket. then they are all got stuck by waiting for each other. Hua Rui provided a patch for me, by allocating some buckets of RESERVE_BTREE type in advance, so the register thread can get bucket when btree node splitting and no need to waiting for the allocator thread. I tested it, it has effect, and register thread run a step forward, but finally are still got stuck, the reason is only 8 bucket of RESERVE_BTREE type were allocated, and in bch_journal_replay(), after 2 btree nodes splitting, only 4 bucket of RESERVE_BTREE type left, then btree_check_reserve() is not satisfied anymore, so it goes to sleep again, and in the same time, alloctor thread did not flush enough btree nodes to release a journal bucket, so they all got stuck again. So we need to allocate more buckets of RESERVE_BTREE type in advance, but how much is enough? By experience and test, I think it should be as much as journal buckets. Then I modify the code as this patch, and test in the machine, and it works. This patch modified base on Hua Rui’s patch, and allocate more buckets of RESERVE_BTREE type in advance to avoid register thread and allocate thread going to wait for each other. [patch v2] ca->sb.njournal_buckets would be 0 in the first time after cache creation, and no journal exists, so just 8 btree buckets is OK. Signed-off-by:
Hua Rui <huarui.dev@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Coly Li authored
[ Upstream commit 99361bbf ] Kernel thread routine bch_writeback_thread() has the following code block, 447 down_write(&dc->writeback_lock); 448~450 if (check conditions) { 451 up_write(&dc->writeback_lock); 452 set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); 453 454 if (kthread_should_stop()) 455 return 0; 456 457 schedule(); 458 continue; 459 } If condition check is true, its task state is set to TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE and call schedule() to wait for others to wake up it. There are 2 issues in current code, 1, Task state is set to TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE after the condition checks, if another process changes the condition and call wake_up_process(dc-> writeback_thread), then at line 452 task state is set back to TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, the writeback kernel thread will lose a chance to be waken up. 2, At line 454 if kthread_should_stop() is true, writeback kernel thread will return to kernel/kthread.c:kthread() with TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE and call do_exit(). It is not good to enter do_exit() with task state TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, in following code path might_sleep() is called and a warning message is reported by __might_sleep(): "WARNING: do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at [xxxx]". For the first issue, task state should be set before condition checks. Ineed because dc->writeback_lock is required when modifying all the conditions, calling set_current_state() inside code block where dc-> writeback_lock is hold is safe. But this is quite implicit, so I still move set_current_state() before all the condition checks. For the second issue, frankley speaking it does not hurt when kernel thread exits with TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE state, but this warning message scares users, makes them feel there might be something risky with bcache and hurt their data. Setting task state to TASK_RUNNING before returning fixes this problem. In alloc.c:allocator_wait(), there is also a similar issue, and is also fixed in this patch. Changelog: v3: merge two similar fixes into one patch v2: fix the race issue in v1 patch. v1: initial buggy fix. Signed-off-by:
Coly Li <colyli@suse.de> Reviewed-by:
Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Reviewed-by:
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Arnd Bergmann authored
[ Upstream commit ade7db99 ] This bug was fixed before, but came up again with the latest compiler in another function: fs/cifs/cifssmb.c: In function 'CIFSSMBSetEA': fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:6362:3: error: 'strncpy' offset 8 is out of the bounds [0, 4] [-Werror=array-bounds] strncpy(parm_data->list[0].name, ea_name, name_len); Let's apply the same fix that was used for the other instances. Fixes: b2a3ad9c ("cifs: silence compiler warnings showing up with gcc-4.7.0") Signed-off-by:
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by:
Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Dobriyan authored
[ Upstream commit ac7f1061 ] Current code does: if (sscanf(dentry->d_name.name, "%lx-%lx", start, end) != 2) However sscanf() is broken garbage. It silently accepts whitespace between format specifiers (did you know that?). It silently accepts valid strings which result in integer overflow. Do not use sscanf() for any even remotely reliable parsing code. OK # readlink '/proc/1/map_files/55a23af39000-55a23b05b000' /lib/systemd/systemd broken # readlink '/proc/1/map_files/ 55a23af39000-55a23b05b000' /lib/systemd/systemd broken # readlink '/proc/1/map_files/55a23af39000-55a23b05b000 ' /lib/systemd/systemd very broken # readlink '/proc/1/map_files/1000000000000000055a23af39000-55a23b05b000' /lib/systemd/systemd Andrei said: : This patch breaks criu. It was a bug in criu. And this bug is on a minor : path, which works when memfd_create() isn't available. It is a reason why : I ask to not backport this patch to stable kernels. : : In CRIU this bug can be triggered, only if this patch will be backported : to a kernel which version is lower than v3.16. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171120212706.GA14325@avx2Signed-off-by:
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Will Deacon authored
[ Upstream commit 202fb4ef ] If the spinlock "next" ticket wraps around between the initial LDR and the cmpxchg in the LSE version of spin_trylock, then we can erroneously think that we have successfuly acquired the lock because we only check whether the next ticket return by the cmpxchg is equal to the owner ticket in our updated lock word. This patch fixes the issue by performing a full 32-bit check of the lock word when trying to determine whether or not the CASA instruction updated memory. Reported-by:
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Guanglei Li authored
[ Upstream commit 2c0aa086 ] Scenario: 1. Port down and do fail over 2. Ap do rds_bind syscall PID: 47039 TASK: ffff89887e2fe640 CPU: 47 COMMAND: "kworker/u:6" #0 [ffff898e35f159f0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103abf9 #1 [ffff898e35f15a60] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b96e3 #2 [ffff898e35f15b30] oops_end at ffffffff8150f518 #3 [ffff898e35f15b60] no_context at ffffffff8104854c #4 [ffff898e35f15ba0] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81048675 #5 [ffff898e35f15bf0] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff810487d3 #6 [ffff898e35f15c00] do_page_fault at ffffffff815120b8 #7 [ffff898e35f15d10] page_fault at ffffffff8150ea95 [exception RIP: unknown or invalid address] RIP: 0000000000000000 RSP: ffff898e35f15dc8 RFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff889b77f6fc00 RCX:ffffffff81c99d88 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff896019ee08e8 RDI:ffff889b77f6fc00 RBP: ffff898e35f15df0 R8: ffff896019ee08c8 R9:0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:ffff896019ee08c0 R13: ffff889b77f6fe68 R14: ffffffff81c99d80 R15: ffffffffa022a1e0 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #8 [ffff898e35f15dc8] cma_ndev_work_handler at ffffffffa022a228 [rdma_cm] #9 [ffff898e35f15df8] process_one_work at ffffffff8108a7c6 #10 [ffff898e35f15e58] worker_thread at ffffffff8108bda0 #11 [ffff898e35f15ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090fe6 PID: 45659 TASK: ffff880d313d2500 CPU: 31 COMMAND: "oracle_45659_ap" #0 [ffff881024ccfc98] __schedule at ffffffff8150bac4 #1 [ffff881024ccfd40] schedule at ffffffff8150c2cf #2 [ffff881024ccfd50] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8150cee7 #3 [ffff881024ccfdc0] mutex_lock at ffffffff8150cdeb #4 [ffff881024ccfde0] rdma_destroy_id at ffffffffa022a027 [rdma_cm] #5 [ffff881024ccfe10] rds_ib_laddr_check at ffffffffa0357857 [rds_rdma] #6 [ffff881024ccfe50] rds_trans_get_preferred at ffffffffa0324c2a [rds] #7 [ffff881024ccfe80] rds_bind at ffffffffa031d690 [rds] #8 [ffff881024ccfeb0] sys_bind at ffffffff8142a670 PID: 45659 PID: 47039 rds_ib_laddr_check /* create id_priv with a null event_handler */ rdma_create_id rdma_bind_addr cma_acquire_dev /* add id_priv to cma_dev->id_list */ cma_attach_to_dev cma_ndev_work_handler /* event_hanlder is null */ id_priv->id.event_handler Signed-off-by:
Guanglei Li <guanglei.li@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Honglei Wang <honglei.wang@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
Yanjun Zhu <yanjun.zhu@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Acked-by:
Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Acked-by:
Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
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Ross Lagerwall authored
[ Upstream commit 3ac7292a ] The page given to gnttab_end_foreign_access() to free could be a compound page so use put_page() instead of free_page() since it can handle both compound and single pages correctly. This bug was discovered when migrating a Xen VM with several VIFs and CONFIG_DEBUG_VM enabled. It hits a BUG usually after fewer than 10 iterations. All netfront devices disconnect from the backend during a suspend/resume and this will call gnttab_end_foreign_access() if a netfront queue has an outstanding skb. The mismatch between calling get_page() and free_page() on a compound page causes a reference counting error which is detected when DEBUG_VM is enabled. Signed-off-by:
Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com> Reviewed-by:
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
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Ross Lagerwall authored
[ Upstream commit f599c64f ] When a netfront device is set up it registers a netdev fairly early on, before it has set up the queues and is actually usable. A userspace tool like NetworkManager will immediately try to open it and access its state as soon as it appears. The bug can be reproduced by hotplugging VIFs until the VM runs out of grant refs. It registers the netdev but fails to set up any queues (since there are no more grant refs). In the meantime, NetworkManager opens the device and the kernel crashes trying to access the queues (of which there are none). Fix this in two ways: * For initial setup, register the netdev much later, after the queues are setup. This avoids the race entirely. * During a suspend/resume cycle, the frontend reconnects to the backend and the queues are recreated. It is possible (though highly unlikely) to race with something opening the device and accessing the queues after they have been destroyed but before they have been recreated. Extend the region covered by the rtnl semaphore to protect against this race. There is a possibility that we fail to recreate the queues so check for this in the open function. Signed-off-by:
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Matt Redfearn authored
[ Upstream commit 0cde5b44 ] When commit b27311e1 ("MIPS: TXx9: Add RBTX4939 board support") added board support for the RBTX4939, it added a call to led_classdev_register even if the LED class is built as a module. Built-in arch code cannot call module code directly like this. Commit b33b4407 ("MIPS: TXX9: use IS_ENABLED() macro") subsequently changed the inclusion of this code to a single check that CONFIG_LEDS_CLASS is either builtin or a module, but the same issue remains. This leads to MIPS allmodconfig builds failing when CONFIG_MACH_TX49XX=y is set: arch/mips/txx9/rbtx4939/setup.o: In function `rbtx4939_led_probe': setup.c:(.init.text+0xc0): undefined reference to `of_led_classdev_register' make: *** [Makefile:999: vmlinux] Error 1 Fix this by using the IS_BUILTIN() macro instead. Fixes: b27311e1 ("MIPS: TXx9: Add RBTX4939 board support") Signed-off-by:
Matt Redfearn <matt.redfearn@mips.com> Reviewed-by:
James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/18544/Signed-off-by:
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Yonghong Song authored
[ Upstream commit 09584b40 ] With CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON is defined in the config file, tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_kmod.sh failed like below: [root@localhost bpf]# ./test_kmod.sh sysctl: setting key "net.core.bpf_jit_enable": Invalid argument [ JIT enabled:0 hardened:0 ] [ 132.175681] test_bpf: #297 BPF_MAXINSNS: Jump, gap, jump, ... FAIL to prog_create err=-524 len=4096 [ 132.458834] test_bpf: Summary: 348 PASSED, 1 FAILED, [340/340 JIT'ed] [ JIT enabled:1 hardened:0 ] [ 133.456025] test_bpf: #297 BPF_MAXINSNS: Jump, gap, jump, ... FAIL to prog_create err=-524 len=4096 [ 133.730935] test_bpf: Summary: 348 PASSED, 1 FAILED, [340/340 JIT'ed] [ JIT enabled:1 hardened:1 ] [ 134.769730] test_bpf: #297 BPF_MAXINSNS: Jump, gap, jump, ... FAIL to prog_create err=-524 len=4096 [ 135.050864] test_bpf: Summary: 348 PASSED, 1 FAILED, [340/340 JIT'ed] [ JIT enabled:1 hardened:2 ] [ 136.442882] test_bpf: #297 BPF_MAXINSNS: Jump, gap, jump, ... FAIL to prog_create err=-524 len=4096 [ 136.821810] test_bpf: Summary: 348 PASSED, 1 FAILED, [340/340 JIT'ed] [root@localhost bpf]# The test_kmod.sh load/remove test_bpf.ko multiple times with different settings for sysctl net.core.bpf_jit_{enable,harden}. The failed test #297 of test_bpf.ko is designed such that JIT always fails. Commit 290af866 (bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config) introduced the following tightening logic: ... if (!bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(fp->aux)) { fp = bpf_int_jit_compile(fp); #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON if (!fp->jited) { *err = -ENOTSUPP; return fp; } #endif ... With this logic, Test #297 always gets return value -ENOTSUPP when CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON is defined, causing the test failure. This patch fixed the failure by marking Test #297 as expected failure when CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON is defined. Fixes: 290af866 (bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config) Signed-off-by:
Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by:
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Chen Yu authored
[ Upstream commit ba1edb9a ] The following warning was triggered after resumed from S3 - if all the nonboot CPUs were put offline before suspend: [ 1840.329515] unchecked MSR access error: RDMSR from 0x771 at rIP: 0xffffffff86061e3a (native_read_msr+0xa/0x30) [ 1840.329516] Call Trace: [ 1840.329521] __rdmsr_on_cpu+0x33/0x50 [ 1840.329525] generic_exec_single+0x81/0xb0 [ 1840.329527] smp_call_function_single+0xd2/0x100 [ 1840.329530] ? acpi_ds_result_pop+0xdd/0xf2 [ 1840.329532] ? acpi_ds_create_operand+0x215/0x23c [ 1840.329534] rdmsrl_on_cpu+0x57/0x80 [ 1840.329536] ? cpumask_next+0x1b/0x20 [ 1840.329538] ? rdmsrl_on_cpu+0x57/0x80 [ 1840.329541] intel_pstate_update_perf_limits+0xf3/0x220 [ 1840.329544] ? notifier_call_chain+0x4a/0x70 [ 1840.329546] intel_pstate_set_policy+0x4e/0x150 [ 1840.329548] cpufreq_set_policy+0xcd/0x2f0 [ 1840.329550] cpufreq_update_policy+0xb2/0x130 [ 1840.329552] ? cpufreq_update_policy+0x130/0x130 [ 1840.329556] acpi_processor_ppc_has_changed+0x65/0x80 [ 1840.329558] acpi_processor_notify+0x80/0x100 [ 1840.329561] acpi_ev_notify_dispatch+0x44/0x5c [ 1840.329563] acpi_os_execute_deferred+0x14/0x20 [ 1840.329565] process_one_work+0x193/0x3c0 [ 1840.329567] worker_thread+0x35/0x3b0 [ 1840.329569] kthread+0x125/0x140 [ 1840.329571] ? process_one_work+0x3c0/0x3c0 [ 1840.329572] ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60 [ 1840.329575] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x180 [ 1840.329577] ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 [ 1840.329585] unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x774 (tried to write 0x0000000000000000) at rIP: 0xffffffff86061f78 (native_write_msr+0x8/0x30) [ 1840.329586] Call Trace: [ 1840.329587] __wrmsr_on_cpu+0x37/0x40 [ 1840.329589] generic_exec_single+0x81/0xb0 [ 1840.329592] smp_call_function_single+0xd2/0x100 [ 1840.329594] ? acpi_ds_create_operand+0x215/0x23c [ 1840.329595] ? cpumask_next+0x1b/0x20 [ 1840.329597] wrmsrl_on_cpu+0x57/0x70 [ 1840.329598] ? rdmsrl_on_cpu+0x57/0x80 [ 1840.329599] ? wrmsrl_on_cpu+0x57/0x70 [ 1840.329602] intel_pstate_hwp_set+0xd3/0x150 [ 1840.329604] intel_pstate_set_policy+0x119/0x150 [ 1840.329606] cpufreq_set_policy+0xcd/0x2f0 [ 1840.329607] cpufreq_update_policy+0xb2/0x130 [ 1840.329610] ? cpufreq_update_policy+0x130/0x130 [ 1840.329613] acpi_processor_ppc_has_changed+0x65/0x80 [ 1840.329615] acpi_processor_notify+0x80/0x100 [ 1840.329617] acpi_ev_notify_dispatch+0x44/0x5c [ 1840.329619] acpi_os_execute_deferred+0x14/0x20 [ 1840.329620] process_one_work+0x193/0x3c0 [ 1840.329622] worker_thread+0x35/0x3b0 [ 1840.329624] kthread+0x125/0x140 [ 1840.329625] ? process_one_work+0x3c0/0x3c0 [ 1840.329626] ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60 [ 1840.329628] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x180 [ 1840.329631] ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 This is because if there's only one online CPU, the MSR_PM_ENABLE (package wide)can not be enabled after resumed, due to intel_pstate_hwp_enable() will only be invoked on AP's online process after resumed - if there's no AP online, the HWP remains disabled after resumed (BIOS has disabled it in S3). Then if there comes a _PPC change notification which touches HWP register during this stage, the warning is triggered. Since we don't call acpi_processor_register_performance() when HWP is enabled, the pr->performance will be NULL. When this is NULL we don't need to do _PPC change notification. Reported-by:
Doug Smythies <dsmythies@telus.net> Suggested-by:
Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Yu Chen <yu.c.chen@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jean Delvare authored
[ Upstream commit a7770ae1 ] The handling of empty DMI strings looks quite broken to me: * Strings from 1 to 7 spaces are not considered empty. * True empty DMI strings (string index set to 0) are not considered empty, and result in allocating a 0-char string. * Strings with invalid index also result in allocating a 0-char string. * Strings starting with 8 spaces are all considered empty, even if non-space characters follow (sounds like a weird thing to do, but I have actually seen occurrences of this in DMI tables before.) * Strings which are considered empty are reported as 8 spaces, instead of being actually empty. Some of these issues are the result of an off-by-one error in memcmp, the rest is incorrect by design. So let's get it square: missing strings and strings made of only spaces, regardless of their length, should be treated as empty and no memory should be allocated for them. All other strings are non-empty and should be allocated. Signed-off-by:
Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Fixes: 79da4721 ("x86: fix DMI out of memory problems") Cc: Parag Warudkar <parag.warudkar@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
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Arnd Bergmann authored
[ Upstream commit 328008a7 ] The declaration for swsusp_arch_resume marks it as 'asmlinkage', but the definition in x86-32 does not, and it fails to include the header with the declaration. This leads to a warning when building with link-time-optimizations: kernel/power/power.h:108:23: error: type of 'swsusp_arch_resume' does not match original declaration [-Werror=lto-type-mismatch] extern asmlinkage int swsusp_arch_resume(void); ^ arch/x86/power/hibernate_32.c:148:0: note: 'swsusp_arch_resume' was previously declared here int swsusp_arch_resume(void) This moves the declaration into a globally visible header file and fixes up both x86 definitions to match it. Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180202145634.200291-2-arnd@arndb.deSigned-off-by:
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Alex Estrin authored
[ Upstream commit 10293610 ] On reboot SM can program port pkey table before ipoib registered its event handler, which could result in missing pkey event and leave root interface with initial pkey value from index 0. Since OPA port starts with invalid pkey in index 0, root interface will fail to initialize and stay down with no-carrier flag. For IB ipoib interface may end up with pkey different from value opensm put in pkey table idx 0, resulting in connectivity issues (different mcast groups, for example). Close the window by calling event handler after registration to make sure ipoib pkey is in sync with port pkey table. Reviewed-by:
Mike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com> Reviewed-by:
Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by:
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Mel Gorman authored
[ Upstream commit 69d763fc ] Minchan Kim asked the following question -- what locks protects address_space destroying when race happens between inode trauncation and __isolate_lru_page? Jan Kara clarified by describing the race as follows CPU1 CPU2 truncate(inode) __isolate_lru_page() ... truncate_inode_page(mapping, page); delete_from_page_cache(page) spin_lock_irqsave(&mapping->tree_lock, flags); __delete_from_page_cache(page, NULL) page_cache_tree_delete(..) ... mapping = page_mapping(page); page->mapping = NULL; ... spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mapping->tree_lock, flags); page_cache_free_page(mapping, page) put_page(page) if (put_page_testzero(page)) -> false - inode now has no pages and can be freed including embedded address_space if (mapping && !mapping->a_ops->migratepage) - we've dereferenced mapping which is potentially already free. The race is theoretically possible but unlikely. Before the delete_from_page_cache, truncate_cleanup_page is called so the page is likely to be !PageDirty or PageWriteback which gets skipped by the only caller that checks the mappping in __isolate_lru_page. Even if the race occurs, a substantial amount of work has to happen during a tiny window with no preemption but it could potentially be done using a virtual machine to artifically slow one CPU or halt it during the critical window. This patch should eliminate the race with truncation by try-locking the page before derefencing mapping and aborting if the lock was not acquired. There was a suggestion from Huang Ying to use RCU as a side-effect to prevent mapping being freed. However, I do not like the solution as it's an unconventional means of preserving a mapping and it's not a context where rcu_read_lock is obviously protecting rcu data. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180104102512.2qos3h5vqzeisrek@techsingularity.net Fixes: c8244935 ("mm: compaction: make isolate_lru_page() filter-aware again") Signed-off-by:
Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Acked-by:
Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
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Kirill A. Shutemov authored
[ Upstream commit c58f0bb7 ] Patch series "Do not lose dirty bit on THP pages", v4. Vlastimil noted that pmdp_invalidate() is not atomic and we can lose dirty and access bits if CPU sets them after pmdp dereference, but before set_pmd_at(). The bug can lead to data loss, but the race window is tiny and I haven't seen any reports that suggested that it happens in reality. So I don't think it worth sending it to stable. Unfortunately, there's no way to address the issue in a generic way. We need to fix all architectures that support THP one-by-one. All architectures that have THP supported have to provide atomic pmdp_invalidate() that returns previous value. If generic implementation of pmdp_invalidate() is used, architecture needs to provide atomic pmdp_estabish(). pmdp_estabish() is not used out-side generic implementation of pmdp_invalidate() so far, but I think this can change in the future. This patch (of 12): This is an implementation of pmdp_establish() that is only suitable for an architecture that doesn't have hardware dirty/accessed bits. In this case we can't race with CPU which sets these bits and non-atomic approach is fine. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171213105756.69879-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by:
Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Nitin Gupta <nitin.m.gupta@oracle.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Signed-off-by:
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Yisheng Xie authored
[ Upstream commit 0486a38b ] As in manpage of migrate_pages, the errno should be set to EINVAL when none of the node IDs specified by new_nodes are on-line and allowed by the process's current cpuset context, or none of the specified nodes contain memory. However, when test by following case: new_nodes = 0; old_nodes = 0xf; ret = migrate_pages(pid, old_nodes, new_nodes, MAX); The ret will be 0 and no errno is set. As the new_nodes is empty, we should expect EINVAL as documented. To fix the case like above, this patch check whether target nodes AND current task_nodes is empty, and then check whether AND node_states[N_MEMORY] is empty. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1510882624-44342-4-git-send-email-xieyisheng1@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Yisheng Xie <xieyisheng1@huawei.com> Acked-by:
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Chris Salls <salls@cs.ucsb.edu> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Tan Xiaojun <tanxiaojun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
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Yisheng Xie authored
[ Upstream commit 56521e7a ] As Xiaojun reported the ltp of migrate_pages01 will fail on arm64 system which has 4 nodes[0...3], all have memory and CONFIG_NODES_SHIFT=2: migrate_pages01 0 TINFO : test_invalid_nodes migrate_pages01 14 TFAIL : migrate_pages_common.c:45: unexpected failure - returned value = 0, expected: -1 migrate_pages01 15 TFAIL : migrate_pages_common.c:55: call succeeded unexpectedly In this case the test_invalid_nodes of migrate_pages01 will call: SYSC_migrate_pages as: migrate_pages(0, , {0x0000000000000001}, 64, , {0x0000000000000010}, 64) = 0 The new nodes specifies one or more node IDs that are greater than the maximum supported node ID, however, the errno is not set to EINVAL as expected. As man pages of set_mempolicy[1], mbind[2], and migrate_pages[3] mentioned, when nodemask specifies one or more node IDs that are greater than the maximum supported node ID, the errno should set to EINVAL. However, get_nodes only check whether the part of bits [BITS_PER_LONG*BITS_TO_LONGS(MAX_NUMNODES), maxnode) is zero or not, and remain [MAX_NUMNODES, BITS_PER_LONG*BITS_TO_LONGS(MAX_NUMNODES) unchecked. This patch is to check the bits of [MAX_NUMNODES, maxnode) in get_nodes to let migrate_pages set the errno to EINVAL when nodemask specifies one or more node IDs that are greater than the maximum supported node ID, which follows the manpage's guide. [1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/set_mempolicy.2.html [2] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/mbind.2.html [3] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/migrate_pages.2.html Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1510882624-44342-3-git-send-email-xieyisheng1@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Tan Xiaojun <tanxiaojun@huawei.com> Acked-by:
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piaojun authored
[ Upstream commit d984187e ] We should not reuse the dirty bh in jbd2 directly due to the following situation: 1. When removing extent rec, we will dirty the bhs of extent rec and truncate log at the same time, and hand them over to jbd2. 2. The bhs are submitted to jbd2 area successfully. 3. The write-back thread of device help flush the bhs to disk but encounter write error due to abnormal storage link. 4. After a while the storage link become normal. Truncate log flush worker triggered by the next space reclaiming found the dirty bh of truncate log and clear its 'BH_Write_EIO' and then set it uptodate in __ocfs2_journal_access(): ocfs2_truncate_log_worker ocfs2_flush_truncate_log __ocfs2_flush_truncate_log ocfs2_replay_truncate_records ocfs2_journal_access_di __ocfs2_journal_access // here we clear io_error and set 'tl_bh' uptodata. 5. Then jbd2 will flush the bh of truncate log to disk, but the bh of extent rec is still in error state, and unfortunately nobody will take care of it. 6. At last the space of extent rec was not reduced, but truncate log flush worker have given it back to globalalloc. That will cause duplicate cluster problem which could be identified by fsck.ocfs2. Sadly we can hardly revert this but set fs read-only in case of ruining atomicity and consistency of space reclaim. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5A6E8092.8090701@huawei.com Fixes: acf8fdbe ("ocfs2: do not BUG if buffer not uptodate in __ocfs2_journal_access") Signed-off-by:
Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Reviewed-by:
Yiwen Jiang <jiangyiwen@huawei.com> Reviewed-by:
Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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piaojun authored
[ Upstream commit 16c8d569 ] The race between *set_acl and *get_acl will cause getting incomplete xattr data as below: processA processB ocfs2_set_acl ocfs2_xattr_set __ocfs2_xattr_set_handle ocfs2_get_acl_nolock ocfs2_xattr_get_nolock: processB may get incomplete xattr data if processA hasn't set_acl done. So we should use 'ip_xattr_sem' to protect getting extended attribute in ocfs2_get_acl_nolock(), as other processes could be changing it concurrently. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5A5DDCFF.7030001@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com> Signed-off-by:
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piaojun authored
[ Upstream commit 025bcbde ] If metadata is corrupted such as 'invalid inode block', we will get failed by calling 'mount()' and then set filesystem readonly as below: ocfs2_mount ocfs2_initialize_super ocfs2_init_global_system_inodes ocfs2_iget ocfs2_read_locked_inode ocfs2_validate_inode_block ocfs2_error ocfs2_handle_error ocfs2_set_ro_flag(osb, 0); // set readonly In this situation we need return -EROFS to 'mount.ocfs2', so that user can fix it by fsck. And then mount again. In addition, 'mount.ocfs2' should be updated correspondingly as it only return 1 for all errno. And I will post a patch for 'mount.ocfs2' too. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5A4302FA.2010606@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Gang He <ghe@suse.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Logan Gunthorpe authored
[ Upstream commit cbd27448 ] When using the max_mw_size parameter of ntb_transport to limit the size of the Memory windows, communication cannot be established and the queues freeze. This is because the mw_size that's reported to the peer is correctly limited but the size used locally is not. So the MW is initialized with a buffer smaller than the window but the TX side is using the full window. This means the TX side will be writing to a region of the window that points nowhere. This is easily fixed by applying the same limit to tx_size in ntb_transport_init_queue(). Fixes: e26a5843 ("NTB: Split ntb_hw_intel and ntb_transport drivers") Signed-off-by:
Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com> Acked-by:
Allen Hubbe <Allen.Hubbe@dell.com> Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us> Signed-off-by:
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Leon Romanovsky authored
[ Upstream commit b081808a ] Failure in XRCD FW deallocation command leaves memory leaked and returns error to the user which he can't do anything about it. This patch changes behavior to always free memory and always return success to the user. Fixes: e126ba97 ("mlx5: Add driver for Mellanox Connect-IB adapters") Reviewed-by:
Majd Dibbiny <majd@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by:
Yuval Shaia <yuval.shaia@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Michael Bringmann authored
[ Upstream commit ea05ba7c ] This patch fixes some problems encountered at runtime with configurations that support memory-less nodes, or that hot-add CPUs into nodes that are memoryless during system execution after boot. The problems of interest include: * Nodes known to powerpc to be memoryless at boot, but to have CPUs in them are allowed to be 'possible' and 'online'. Memory allocations for those nodes are taken from another node that does have memory until and if memory is hot-added to the node. * Nodes which have no resources assigned at boot, but which may still be referenced subsequently by affinity or associativity attributes, are kept in the list of 'possible' nodes for powerpc. Hot-add of memory or CPUs to the system can reference these nodes and bring them online instead of redirecting the references to one of the set of nodes known to have memory at boot. Note that this software operates under the context of CPU hotplug. We are not doing memory hotplug in this code, but rather updating the kernel's CPU topology (i.e. arch_update_cpu_topology / numa_update_cpu_topology). We are initializing a node that may be used by CPUs or memory before it can be referenced as invalid by a CPU hotplug operation. CPU hotplug operations are protected by a range of APIs including cpu_maps_update_begin/cpu_maps_update_done, cpus_read/write_lock / cpus_read/write_unlock, device locks, and more. Memory hotplug operations, including try_online_node, are protected by mem_hotplug_begin/mem_hotplug_done, device locks, and more. In the case of CPUs being hot-added to a previously memoryless node, the try_online_node operation occurs wholly within the CPU locks with no overlap. Using HMC hot-add/hot-remove operations, we have been able to add and remove CPUs to any possible node without failures. HMC operations involve a degree self-serialization, though. Signed-off-by:
Michael Bringmann <mwb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:
Nathan Fontenot <nfont@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by:
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Michael Bringmann authored
[ Upstream commit a346137e ] On powerpc systems which allow 'hot-add' of CPU or memory resources, it may occur that the new resources are to be inserted into nodes that were not used for these resources at bootup. In the kernel, any node that is used must be defined and initialized. These empty nodes may occur when, * Dedicated vs. shared resources. Shared resources require information such as the VPHN hcall for CPU assignment to nodes. Associativity decisions made based on dedicated resource rules, such as associativity properties in the device tree, may vary from decisions made using the values returned by the VPHN hcall. * memoryless nodes at boot. Nodes need to be defined as 'possible' at boot for operation with other code modules. Previously, the powerpc code would limit the set of possible nodes to those which have memory assigned at boot, and were thus online. Subsequent add/remove of CPUs or memory would only work with this subset of possible nodes. * memoryless nodes with CPUs at boot. Due to the previous restriction on nodes, nodes that had CPUs but no memory were being collapsed into other nodes that did have memory at boot. In practice this meant that the node assignment presented by the runtime kernel differed from the affinity and associativity attributes presented by the device tree or VPHN hcalls. Nodes that might be known to the pHyp were not 'possible' in the runtime kernel because they did not have memory at boot. This patch ensures that sufficient nodes are defined to support configuration requirements after boot, as well as at boot. This patch set fixes a couple of problems. * Nodes known to powerpc to be memoryless at boot, but to have CPUs in them are allowed to be 'possible' and 'online'. Memory allocations for those nodes are taken from another node that does have memory until and if memory is hot-added to the node. * Nodes which have no resources assigned at boot, but which may still be referenced subsequently by affinity or associativity attributes, are kept in the list of 'possible' nodes for powerpc. Hot-add of memory or CPUs to the system can reference these nodes and bring them online instead of redirecting to one of the set of nodes that were known to have memory at boot. This patch extracts the value of the lowest domain level (number of allocable resources) from the device tree property "ibm,max-associativity-domains" to use as the maximum number of nodes to setup as possibly available in the system. This new setting will override the instruction: nodes_and(node_possible_map, node_possible_map, node_online_map); presently seen in the function arch/powerpc/mm/numa.c:initmem_init(). If the "ibm,max-associativity-domains" property is not present at boot, no operation will be performed to define or enable additional nodes, or enable the above 'nodes_and()'. Signed-off-by:
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Jake Daryll Obina authored
[ Upstream commit 5bdd0c6f ] If jffs2_iget() fails for a newly-allocated inode, jffs2_do_clear_inode() can get called twice in the error handling path, the first call in jffs2_iget() itself and the second through iget_failed(). This can result to a use-after-free error in the second jffs2_do_clear_inode() call, such as shown by the oops below wherein the second jffs2_do_clear_inode() call was trying to free node fragments that were already freed in the first jffs2_do_clear_inode() call. [ 78.178860] jffs2: error: (1904) jffs2_do_read_inode_internal: CRC failed for read_inode of inode 24 at physical location 0x1fc00c [ 78.178914] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b7b [ 78.185871] pgd = ffffffc03a567000 [ 78.188794] [6b6b6b6b6b6b6b7b] *pgd=0000000000000000, *pud=0000000000000000 [ 78.194968] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ... [ 78.513147] PC is at rb_first_postorder+0xc/0x28 [ 78.516503] LR is at jffs2_kill_fragtree+0x28/0x90 [jffs2] [ 78.520672] pc : [<ffffff8008323d28>] lr : [<ffffff8000eb1cc8>] pstate: 60000105 [ 78.526757] sp : ffffff800cea38f0 [ 78.528753] x29: ffffff800cea38f0 x28: ffffffc01f3f8e80 [ 78.532754] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffffff800cea3c70 [ 78.536756] x25: 00000000dc67c8ae x24: ffffffc033d6945d [ 78.540759] x23: ffffffc036811740 x22: ffffff800891a5b8 [ 78.544760] x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 0000000000000000 [ 78.548762] x19: ffffffc037d48910 x18: ffffff800891a588 [ 78.552764] x17: 0000000000000800 x16: 0000000000000c00 [ 78.556766] x15: 0000000000000010 x14: 6f2065646f6e695f [ 78.560767] x13: 6461657220726f66 x12: 2064656c69616620 [ 78.564769] x11: 435243203a6c616e x10: 7265746e695f6564 [ 78.568771] x9 : 6f6e695f64616572 x8 : ffffffc037974038 [ 78.572774] x7 : bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb x6 : 0000000000000008 [ 78.576775] x5 : 002f91d85bd44a2f x4 : 0000000000000000 [ 78.580777] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 000000403755e000 [ 78.584779] x1 : 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b x0 : 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b ... [ 79.038551] [<ffffff8008323d28>] rb_first_postorder+0xc/0x28 [ 79.042962] [<ffffff8000eb5578>] jffs2_do_clear_inode+0x88/0x100 [jffs2] [ 79.048395] [<ffffff8000eb9ddc>] jffs2_evict_inode+0x3c/0x48 [jffs2] [ 79.053443] [<ffffff8008201ca8>] evict+0xb0/0x168 [ 79.056835] [<ffffff8008202650>] iput+0x1c0/0x200 [ 79.060228] [<ffffff800820408c>] iget_failed+0x30/0x3c [ 79.064097] [<ffffff8000eba0c0>] jffs2_iget+0x2d8/0x360 [jffs2] [ 79.068740] [<ffffff8000eb0a60>] jffs2_lookup+0xe8/0x130 [jffs2] [ 79.073434] [<ffffff80081f1a28>] lookup_slow+0x118/0x190 [ 79.077435] [<ffffff80081f4708>] walk_component+0xfc/0x28c [ 79.081610] [<ffffff80081f4dd0>] path_lookupat+0x84/0x108 [ 79.085699] [<ffffff80081f5578>] filename_lookup+0x88/0x100 [ 79.089960] [<ffffff80081f572c>] user_path_at_empty+0x58/0x6c [ 79.094396] [<ffffff80081ebe14>] vfs_statx+0xa4/0x114 [ 79.098138] [<ffffff80081ec44c>] SyS_newfstatat+0x58/0x98 [ 79.102227] [<ffffff800808354c>] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4 [ 79.106489] Code: d65f03c0 f9400001 b40000e1 aa0103e0 (f9400821) The jffs2_do_clear_inode() call in jffs2_iget() is unnecessary since iget_failed() will eventually call jffs2_do_clear_inode() if needed, so just remove it. Fixes: 5451f79f ("iget: stop JFFS2 from using iget() and read_inode()") Reviewed-by:
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by:
Jake Daryll Obina <jake.obina@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Carpenter authored
[ Upstream commit 7ad81482 ] We get the "new_profile_index" value from the mouse device when we're handling raw events. Smatch taints it as untrusted data and complains that we need a bounds check. This seems like a reasonable warning otherwise there is a small read beyond the end of the array. Fixes: 0e70f97f ("HID: roccat: Add support for Kova[+] mouse") Signed-off-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Acked-by:
Silvan Jegen <s.jegen@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
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Arnd Bergmann authored
[ Upstream commit 96d5eaa9 ] While testing with the ARM specific memset() macro removed, I ran into a compiler warning that shows an old bug: drivers/scsi/arm/fas216.c: In function 'fas216_rq_sns_done': drivers/scsi/arm/fas216.c:2014:40: error: argument to 'sizeof' in 'memset' call is the same expression as the destination; did you mean to provide an explicit length? [-Werror=sizeof-pointer-memaccess] It turns out that the definition of the scsi_cmd structure changed back in linux-2.6.25, so now we clear only four bytes (sizeof(pointer)) instead of 96 (SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE). I did not check whether we actually need to initialize the buffer here, but it's clear that if we do it, we should use the correct size. Fixes: de25deb1 ("[SCSI] use dynamically allocated sense buffer") Signed-off-by:
Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Liu Bo authored
[ Upstream commit 762221f0 ] The raid6 corruption is that, suppose that all disks can be read without problems and if the content that was read out doesn't match its checksum, currently for raid6 btrfs at most retries twice, - the 1st retry is to rebuild with all other stripes, it'll eventually be a raid5 xor rebuild, - if the 1st fails, the 2nd retry will deliberately fail parity p so that it will do raid6 style rebuild, however, the chances are that another non-parity stripe content also has something corrupted, so that the above retries are not able to return correct content. We've fixed normal reads to rebuild raid6 correctly with more retries in Patch "Btrfs: make raid6 rebuild retry more"[1], this is to fix scrub to do the exactly same rebuild process. [1]: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10091755/Signed-off-by:
Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
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Nikolay Borisov authored
[ Upstream commit 9ea2c7c9 ] When modifying a tree where the root is at BTRFS_MAX_LEVEL - 1 then the level variable is going to be 7 (this is the max height of the tree). On the other hand btrfs_cow_block is always called with "level + 1" as an index into the nodes and slots arrays. This leads to an out of bounds access. Admittdely this will be benign since an OOB access of the nodes array will likely read the 0th element from the slots array, which in this case is going to be 0 (since we start CoW at the top of the tree). The OOB access into the slots array in turn will read the 0th and 1st values of the locks array, which would both be 0 at the time. However, this benign behavior relies on the fact that the path being passed hasn't been initialised, if it has already been used to query a btree then it could potentially have populated the nodes/slots arrays. Fix it by explicitly checking if we are at level 7 (the maximum allowed index in nodes/slots arrays) and explicitly call the CoW routine with NULL for parent's node/slot. Signed-off-by:
Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Fixes-coverity-id: 711515 Reviewed-by:
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Liu Bo authored
[ Upstream commit 343e4fc1 ] Setting plug can merge adjacent IOs before dispatching IOs to the disk driver. Without plug, it'd not be a problem for single disk usecases, but for multiple disks using raid profile, a large IO can be split to several IOs of stripe length, and plug can be helpful to bring them together for each disk so that we can save several disk access. Moreover, fsync issues synchronous writes, so plug can really take effect. Signed-off-by:
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Wei Yongjun authored
[ Upstream commit e749d328 ] Fix to return a negative error code from the request_irq() error handling case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function. Fixes: dce143c3 ("ipmi/powernv: Convert to irq event interface") Signed-off-by:
Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by:
Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Signed-off-by:
Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com> Signed-off-by:
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weiyongjun (A) authored
[ Upstream commit 0ddcff49 ] 'hwname' is malloced in hwsim_new_radio_nl() and should be freed before leaving from the error handling cases, otherwise it will cause memory leak. Fixes: ff4dd73d ("mac80211_hwsim: check HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME length") Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Ulf Magnusson authored
[ Upstream commit 5b1374b3 ] Only the E_NOT operand and not the E_NOT node itself was freed, due to accidentally returning too early in expr_free(). Outline of leak: switch (e->type) { ... case E_NOT: expr_free(e->left.expr); return; ... } *Never reached, 'e' leaked* free(e); Fix by changing the 'return' to a 'break'. Summary from Valgrind on 'menuconfig' (ARCH=x86) before the fix: LEAK SUMMARY: definitely lost: 44,448 bytes in 1,852 blocks ... Summary after the fix: LEAK SUMMARY: definitely lost: 1,608 bytes in 67 blocks ... Signed-off-by:
Ulf Magnusson <ulfalizer@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Signed-off-by:
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Ulf Magnusson authored
[ Upstream commit ae7440ef ] expr_trans_compare() always allocates and returns a new expression, giving the following leak outline: ... *Allocate* basedep = expr_trans_compare(basedep, E_UNEQUAL, &symbol_no); ... for (menu = parent->next; menu; menu = menu->next) { ... *Copy* dep2 = expr_copy(basedep); ... *Free copy* expr_free(dep2); } *basedep lost!* Fix by freeing 'basedep' after the loop. Summary from Valgrind on 'menuconfig' (ARCH=x86) before the fix: LEAK SUMMARY: definitely lost: 344,376 bytes in 14,349 blocks ... Summary after the fix: LEAK SUMMARY: definitely lost: 44,448 bytes in 1,852 blocks ... Signed-off-by:
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Ulf Magnusson authored
[ Upstream commit 0724a7c3 ] If a 'mainmenu' entry appeared in the Kconfig files, two things would leak: - The 'struct property' allocated for the default "Linux Kernel Configuration" prompt. - The string for the T_WORD/T_WORD_QUOTE prompt after the T_MAINMENU token, allocated on the heap in zconf.l. To fix it, introduce a new 'no_mainmenu_stmt' nonterminal that matches if there's no 'mainmenu' and adds the default prompt. That means the prompt only gets allocated once regardless of whether there's a 'mainmenu' statement or not, and managing it becomes simple. Summary from Valgrind on 'menuconfig' (ARCH=x86) before the fix: LEAK SUMMARY: definitely lost: 344,568 bytes in 14,352 blocks ... Summary after the fix: LEAK SUMMARY: definitely lost: 344,440 bytes in 14,350 blocks ... Signed-off-by:
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Guenter Roeck authored
[ Upstream commit f541c09e ] According to all published information, the watchdog disable bit for SB800 compatible controllers is bit 1 of PM register 0x48, not bit 2. For the most part that doesn't matter in practice, since the bit has to be cleared to enable watchdog address decoding, which is the default setting, but it still needs to be fixed. Cc: Zoltán Böszörményi <zboszor@pr.hu> Signed-off-by:
Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by:
Wim Van Sebroeck <wim@iguana.be> Signed-off-by:
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Jan Chochol authored
[ Upstream commit cbebc6ef ] Since commit 57e62324 ("NFS: Store the legacy idmapper result in the keyring") nfs_idmap_cache_timeout changed units from jiffies to seconds. Unfortunately sysctl interface was not updated accordingly. As a effect updating /proc/sys/fs/nfs/idmap_cache_timeout with some value will incorrectly multiply this value by HZ. Also reading /proc/sys/fs/nfs/idmap_cache_timeout will show real value divided by HZ. Fixes: 57e62324 ("NFS: Store the legacy idmapper result in the keyring") Signed-off-by:
Jan Chochol <jan@chochol.info> Signed-off-by:
Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by:
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