- 06 Feb, 2019 40 commits
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Mantas Mikulėnas authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 commit 40906ebe upstream. Tested with 4.19.9. v2: Changed from CXT_FIXUP_MUTE_LED_GPIO to CXT_FIXUP_HP_DOCK because that's what the existing fixups for EliteBooks use. Signed-off-by: Mantas Mikulėnas <grawity@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 commit 4aea96f4 upstream. info.mode and info.port are indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. These issues were detected with the help of Smatch: sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:72 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls' [w] (local cap) sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:75 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs' [w] (local cap) sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:75 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls' [w] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing both info.mode and info.port before using them to index emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls, emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls and emu->portptrs. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 commit 94ffb030 upstream. stream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: sound/core/pcm.c:140 snd_pcm_control_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'pcm->streams' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing stream before using it to index pcm->streams Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 commit 5ae4f61f upstream. ipcm->substream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1031 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_poke() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap) sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1075 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_peek() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing ipcm->substream before using it to index emu->fx8010.pcm Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 commit 0b84304e upstream. info->channel is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: sound/pci/rme9652/hdsp.c:4100 snd_hdsp_channel_info() warn: potential spectre issue 'hdsp->channel_map' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing info->channel before using it to index hdsp->channel_map Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. Also, notice that I refactored the code a bit in order to get rid of the following checkpatch warning: ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition FILE: sound/pci/rme9652/hdsp.c:4103: if ((mapped_channel = hdsp->channel_map[info->channel]) < 0) [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Deepa Dinamani authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 [ Upstream commit 3a0ed3e9 ] Al Viro mentioned (Message-ID <20170626041334.GZ10672@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>) that there is probably a race condition lurking in accesses of sk_stamp on 32-bit machines. sock->sk_stamp is of type ktime_t which is always an s64. On a 32 bit architecture, we might run into situations of unsafe access as the access to the field becomes non atomic. Use seqlocks for synchronization. This allows us to avoid using spinlocks for readers as readers do not need mutual exclusion. Another approach to solve this is to require sk_lock for all modifications of the timestamps. The current approach allows for timestamps to have their own lock: sk_stamp_lock. This allows for the patch to not compete with already existing critical sections, and side effects are limited to the paths in the patch. The addition of the new field maintains the data locality optimizations from commit 9115e8cd ("net: reorganize struct sock for better data locality") Note that all the instances of the sk_stamp accesses are either through the ioctl or the syscall recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Lorenzo Bianconi authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 [ Upstream commit 8e1da73a ] Add napi_disable routine in gro_cells_destroy since starting from commit c42858ea ("gro_cells: remove spinlock protecting receive queues") gro_cell_poll and gro_cells_destroy can run concurrently on napi_skbs list producing a kernel Oops if the tunnel interface is removed while gro_cell_poll is running. The following Oops has been triggered removing a vxlan device while the interface is receiving traffic [ 5628.948853] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008 [ 5628.949981] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 5628.950308] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI [ 5628.950748] CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc6+ #41 [ 5628.952940] RIP: 0010:gro_cell_poll+0x49/0x80 [ 5628.955615] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000004fdd8 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 5628.956250] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffe8ffffc08150 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.957102] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88802356bf00 RDI: ffffe8ffffc08150 [ 5628.957940] RBP: 0000000000000026 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.958803] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.959661] R13: ffffe8ffffc08100 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.960682] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 5628.961616] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 5628.962359] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000000221c000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 [ 5628.963188] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.964034] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 5628.964871] Call Trace: [ 5628.965179] net_rx_action+0xf0/0x380 [ 5628.965637] __do_softirq+0xc7/0x431 [ 5628.966510] run_ksoftirqd+0x24/0x30 [ 5628.966957] smpboot_thread_fn+0xc5/0x160 [ 5628.967436] kthread+0x113/0x130 [ 5628.968283] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 5628.968721] Modules linked in: [ 5628.969099] CR2: 0000000000000008 [ 5628.969510] ---[ end trace 9d9dedc7181661fe ]--- [ 5628.970073] RIP: 0010:gro_cell_poll+0x49/0x80 [ 5628.972965] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000004fdd8 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 5628.973611] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffe8ffffc08150 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.974504] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88802356bf00 RDI: ffffe8ffffc08150 [ 5628.975462] RBP: 0000000000000026 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.976413] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.977375] R13: ffffe8ffffc08100 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000040 [ 5628.978296] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 5628.979327] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 5628.980044] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000000221c000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 [ 5628.980929] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 5628.981736] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 5628.982409] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt [ 5628.983307] Kernel Offset: disabled Fixes: c42858ea ("gro_cells: remove spinlock protecting receive queues") Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo.bianconi@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Juergen Gross authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 [ Upstream commit d81c5054 ] At least old Xen net backends seem to send frags with no real data sometimes. In case such a fragment happens to occur with the frag limit already reached the frontend will BUG currently even if this situation is easily recoverable. Modify the BUG_ON() condition accordingly. Tested-by: Dietmar Hahn <dietmar.hahn@ts.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Jorgen Hansen authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 [ Upstream commit a915b982 ] If a server side socket is bound to an address, but not in the listening state yet, incoming connection requests should receive a reset control packet in response. However, the function used to send the reset silently drops the reset packet if the sending socket isn't bound to a remote address (as is the case for a bound socket not yet in the listening state). This change fixes this by using the src of the incoming packet as destination for the reset packet in this case. Fixes: d021c344 ("VSOCK: Introduce VM Sockets") Reviewed-by: Adit Ranadive <aditr@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Vishnu Dasa <vdasa@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Jorgen Hansen <jhansen@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Jason Wang authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 [ Upstream commit 841df922 ] We miss a write barrier that guarantees used idx is updated and seen before log. This will let userspace sync and copy used ring before used idx is update. Fix this by adding a barrier before log_write(). Fixes: 8dd014ad ("vhost-net: mergeable buffers support") Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Xin Long authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 [ Upstream commit 4a2eb0c3 ] syzbot reported a kernel-infoleak, which is caused by an uninitialized field(sin6_flowinfo) of addr->a.v6 in sctp_inet6addr_event(). The call trace is as below: BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0x19a/0x230 lib/usercopy.c:33 CPU: 1 PID: 8164 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc3+ #95 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x32d/0x480 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x12c/0x290 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:683 kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x32a/0xa50 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:743 kmsan_copy_to_user+0x78/0xd0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:634 _copy_to_user+0x19a/0x230 lib/usercopy.c:33 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:183 [inline] sctp_getsockopt_local_addrs net/sctp/socket.c:5998 [inline] sctp_getsockopt+0x15248/0x186f0 net/sctp/socket.c:7477 sock_common_getsockopt+0x13f/0x180 net/core/sock.c:2937 __sys_getsockopt+0x489/0x550 net/socket.c:1939 __do_sys_getsockopt net/socket.c:1950 [inline] __se_sys_getsockopt+0xe1/0x100 net/socket.c:1947 __x64_sys_getsockopt+0x62/0x80 net/socket.c:1947 do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 sin6_flowinfo is not really used by SCTP, so it will be fixed by simply setting it to 0. The issue exists since very beginning. Thanks Alexander for the reproducer provided. Reported-by: syzbot+ad5d327e6936a2e284be@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Willem de Bruijn authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 [ Upstream commit 6b8d95f1 ] Validate packet socket address length if a length is given. Zero length is equivalent to not setting an address. Fixes: 99137b78 ("packet: validate address length") Reported-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@idosch.org> Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Willem de Bruijn authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 [ Upstream commit 99137b78 ] Packet sockets with SOCK_DGRAM may pass an address for use in dev_hard_header. Ensure that it is of sufficient length. Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Cong Wang authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 [ Upstream commit 7314f548 ] nr_find_socket(), nr_find_peer() and nr_find_listener() lock the sock after finding it in the global list. However, the call path requires BH disabled for the sock lock consistently. Actually the locking is unnecessary at this point, we can just hold the sock refcnt to make sure it is not gone after we unlock the global list, and lock it later only when needed. Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+f621cda8b7e598908efa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Eric Dumazet authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 [ Upstream commit d63967e4 ] Since capi_ioctl() copies 64 bytes after calling capi20_get_manufacturer() we need to ensure to not leak information to user. BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0x16b/0x1f0 lib/usercopy.c:32 CPU: 0 PID: 11245 Comm: syz-executor633 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #2 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613 kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x9d4/0xb00 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:704 kmsan_copy_to_user+0xab/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:601 _copy_to_user+0x16b/0x1f0 lib/usercopy.c:32 capi_ioctl include/linux/uaccess.h:177 [inline] capi_unlocked_ioctl+0x1a0b/0x1bf0 drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:939 do_vfs_ioctl+0xebd/0x2bf0 fs/ioctl.c:46 ksys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:713 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:720 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0x1da/0x270 fs/ioctl.c:718 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x4a/0x70 fs/ioctl.c:718 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 RIP: 0033:0x440019 Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fb 13 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffdd4659fb8 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 0000000000440019 RDX: 0000000020000080 RSI: 00000000c0044306 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000004002c8 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 00000000004018a0 R13: 0000000000401930 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Local variable description: ----data.i@capi_unlocked_ioctl Variable was created at: capi_ioctl drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:747 [inline] capi_unlocked_ioctl+0x82/0x1bf0 drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:939 do_vfs_ioctl+0xebd/0x2bf0 fs/ioctl.c:46 Bytes 12-63 of 64 are uninitialized Memory access of size 64 starts at ffff88807ac5fce8 Data copied to user address 0000000020000080 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Cong Wang authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 [ Upstream commit fb242745 ] syzbot reported the use of uninitialized udp6_addr::sin6_scope_id. We can just set ::sin6_scope_id to zero, as tunnels are unlikely to use an IPv6 address that needs a scope id and there is no interface to bind in this context. For net-next, it looks different as we have cfg->bind_ifindex there so we can probably call ipv6_iface_scope_id(). Same for ::sin6_flowinfo, tunnels don't use it. Fixes: 8024e028 ("udp: Add udp_sock_create for UDP tunnels to open listener socket") Reported-by: syzbot+c56449ed3652e6720f30@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Willem de Bruijn authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 [ Upstream commit 40c3ff6d ] Packet sockets may call dev_header_parse with NULL daddr. Make lowpan_header_ops.create fail. Fixes: 87a93e4e ("ieee802154: change needed headroom/tailroom") Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Acked-by: Alexander Aring <aring@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Tyrel Datwyler authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 [ Upstream commit 756af9c6 ] Commit 33a48ab1 ("ibmveth: Fix DMA unmap error") fixed an issue in the normal code path of ibmveth_xmit_start() that was originally introduced by Commit 6e8ab30e ("ibmveth: Add scatter-gather support"). This original fix missed the error path where dma_unmap_page is wrongly called on the header portion in descs[0] which was mapped with dma_map_single. As a result a failure to DMA map any of the frags results in a dmesg warning when CONFIG_DMA_API_DEBUG is enabled. ------------[ cut here ]------------ DMA-API: ibmveth 30000002: device driver frees DMA memory with wrong function [device address=0x000000000a430000] [size=172 bytes] [mapped as page] [unmapped as single] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 8426 at kernel/dma/debug.c:1085 check_unmap+0x4fc/0xe10 ... <snip> ... DMA-API: Mapped at: ibmveth_start_xmit+0x30c/0xb60 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x100/0x450 sch_direct_xmit+0x224/0x490 __qdisc_run+0x20c/0x980 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1bc/0xf20 This fixes the API misuse by unampping descs[0] with dma_unmap_single. Fixes: 6e8ab30e ("ibmveth: Add scatter-gather support") Signed-off-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Cong Wang authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 [ Upstream commit c4335704 ] There are multiple issues here: 1. After freeing dev->ax25_ptr, we need to set it to NULL otherwise we may use a dangling pointer. 2. There is a race between ax25_setsockopt() and device notifier as reported by syzbot. Close it by holding RTNL lock. 3. We need to test if dev->ax25_ptr is NULL before using it. Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+ae6bb869cbed29b29040@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 [ Upstream commit 5648451e ] vr.vifi is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: net/ipv4/ipmr.c:1616 ipmr_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap) net/ipv4/ipmr.c:1690 ipmr_compat_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing vr.vifi before using it to index mrt->vif_table' Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 [ Upstream commit 69d2c867 ] vr.mifi is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1845 ip6mr_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap) net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1919 ip6mr_compat_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing vr.mifi before using it to index mrt->vif_table' Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 commit 505b5240 upstream. nr is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:805 drm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev->driver->ioctls' [r] drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:810 drm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'drm_ioctls' [r] (local cap) drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:892 drm_ioctl_flags() warn: potential spectre issue 'drm_ioctls' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing nr before using it to index dev->driver->ioctls and drm_ioctls. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20181220000015.GA18973@embeddedorSigned-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Colin Ian King authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 commit 32043fa0 upstream. Currently the copy_to_user of data in the gentry struct is copying uninitiaized data in field _pad from the stack to userspace. Fix this by explicitly memset'ing gentry to zero, this also will zero any compiler added padding fields that may be in struct (currently there are none). Detected by CoverityScan, CID#200783 ("Uninitialized scalar variable") Fixes: b263b31e ("x86, mtrr: Use explicit sizing and padding for the 64-bit ioctls") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: security@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181218172956.1440-1-colin.king@canonical.comSigned-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Dexuan Cui authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 commit fc96df16 upstream. Before 98f4c651, we returned zeros for unopened channels. With 98f4c651, we started to return random on-stack values. We'd better return -EINVAL instead. Fixes: 98f4c651 ("hv: move ringbuffer bus attributes to dev_groups") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Christophe Leroy authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 commit abf221d2 upstream. spi_read() and spi_write() require DMA-safe memory. When CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is selected, those functions cannot be used with buffers on stack. This patch replaces calls to spi_read() and spi_write() by spi_write_then_read() which doesn't require DMA-safe buffers. Fixes: 0c36ec31 ("gpio: gpio driver for max7301 SPI GPIO expander") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Russell King authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 commit 0b479790 upstream. While booting with rootfs on MMC, the following warning is encountered on OMAP4430: omap-dma-engine 4a056000.dma-controller: DMA-API: mapping sg segment longer than device claims to support [len=69632] [max=65536] This is because the DMA engine has a default maximum segment size of 64K but HSMMC sets: mmc->max_blk_size = 512; /* Block Length at max can be 1024 */ mmc->max_blk_count = 0xFFFF; /* No. of Blocks is 16 bits */ mmc->max_req_size = mmc->max_blk_size * mmc->max_blk_count; mmc->max_seg_size = mmc->max_req_size; which ends up telling the block layer that we support a maximum segment size of 65535*512, which exceeds the advertised DMA engine capabilities. Fix this by clamping the maximum segment size to the lower of the maximum request size and of the DMA engine device used for either DMA channel. Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Ulf Hansson authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 commit a0741ba4 upstream. During a re-initialization of the eMMC card, we may fail to re-enable HPI. In these cases, that isn't properly reflected in the card->ext_csd.hpi_en bit, as it keeps being set. This may cause following attempts to use HPI, even if's not enabled. Let's fix this! Fixes: eb0d8f13 ("mmc: core: support HPI send command") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Jörgen Storvist authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 commit 28a86092 upstream. Added USB serial option driver support for Telit LN940 series cellular modules. Covering both QMI and MBIM modes. usb-devices output (0x1900): T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=00 Cnt=01 Dev#= 21 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=1bc7 ProdID=1900 Rev=03.10 S: Manufacturer=Telit S: Product=Telit LN940 Mobile Broadband S: SerialNumber=0123456789ABCDEF C: #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option usb-devices output (0x1901): T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=00 Cnt=01 Dev#= 20 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=1bc7 ProdID=1901 Rev=03.10 S: Manufacturer=Telit S: Product=Telit LN940 Mobile Broadband S: SerialNumber=0123456789ABCDEF C: #Ifs= 6 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(commc) Sub=0e Prot=00 Driver=cdc_mbim I: If#= 5 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim Signed-off-by: Jörgen Storvist <jorgen.storvist@gmail.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Jörgen Storvist authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 commit 30360224 upstream. Added USB serial option driver support for Fibocom NL668 series cellular modules. Reserved USB endpoints 4, 5 and 6 for network + ADB interfaces. usb-devices output (QMI mode) T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=00 Cnt=01 Dev#= 16 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=1508 ProdID=1001 Rev=03.18 S: Manufacturer=Nodecom NL668 Modem S: Product=Nodecom NL668-CN Modem S: SerialNumber= C: #Ifs= 6 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan I: If#= 5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=42 Prot=01 Driver=(none) usb-devices output (ECM mode) T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=00 Cnt=01 Dev#= 17 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=1508 ProdID=1001 Rev=03.18 S: Manufacturer=Nodecom NL668 Modem S: Product=Nodecom NL668-CN Modem S: SerialNumber= C: #Ifs= 7 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(commc) Sub=06 Prot=00 Driver=cdc_ether I: If#= 5 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=cdc_ether I: If#= 6 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=42 Prot=01 Driver=(none) Signed-off-by: Jörgen Storvist <jorgen.storvist@gmail.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Jörgen Storvist authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 commit cc6730df upstream. Added USB serial option driver support for Simcom SIM7500/SIM7600 series cellular modules exposing MBIM interface (VID 0x1e0e,PID 0x9003) T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=00 Cnt=01 Dev#= 14 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=1e0e ProdID=9003 Rev=03.18 S: Manufacturer=SimTech, Incorporated S: Product=SimTech, Incorporated S: SerialNumber=0123456789ABCDEF C: #Ifs= 7 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#= 5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(commc) Sub=0e Prot=00 Driver=cdc_mbim I: If#= 6 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim Signed-off-by: Jörgen Storvist <jorgen.storvist@gmail.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Tore Anderson authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 commit d57ec3c8 upstream. The HP lt4132 is a rebranded Huawei ME906s-158 LTE modem. The interface with protocol 0x16 is "CDC ECM & NCM" according to the *.inf files included with the Windows driver. Attaching the option driver to it doesn't result in a /dev/ttyUSB* device being created, so I've excluded it. Note that it is also excluded for corresponding Huawei-branded devices, cf. commit d544db29 ("USB: support new huawei devices in option.c"). T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=02 Cnt=02 Dev#= 3 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=ff MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 3 P: Vendor=03f0 ProdID=a31d Rev=01.02 S: Manufacturer=HP Inc. S: Product=HP lt4132 LTE/HSPA+ 4G Module S: SerialNumber=0123456789ABCDEF C: #Ifs= 6 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=2mA I: If#=0x0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=06 Prot=10 Driver=option I: If#=0x1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=06 Prot=13 Driver=option I: If#=0x2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=06 Prot=12 Driver=option I: If#=0x3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=06 Prot=16 Driver=(none) I: If#=0x4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=06 Prot=14 Driver=option I: If#=0x5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=06 Prot=1b Driver=option T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=02 Cnt=02 Dev#= 3 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=ff MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 3 P: Vendor=03f0 ProdID=a31d Rev=01.02 S: Manufacturer=HP Inc. S: Product=HP lt4132 LTE/HSPA+ 4G Module S: SerialNumber=0123456789ABCDEF C: #Ifs= 7 Cfg#= 2 Atr=a0 MxPwr=2mA I: If#=0x0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(commc) Sub=06 Prot=00 Driver=cdc_ether I: If#=0x1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=06 Prot=00 Driver=cdc_ether I: If#=0x2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=06 Prot=10 Driver=option I: If#=0x3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=06 Prot=13 Driver=option I: If#=0x4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=06 Prot=12 Driver=option I: If#=0x5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=06 Prot=14 Driver=option I: If#=0x6 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=06 Prot=1b Driver=option T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=02 Cnt=02 Dev#= 3 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=ff MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 3 P: Vendor=03f0 ProdID=a31d Rev=01.02 S: Manufacturer=HP Inc. S: Product=HP lt4132 LTE/HSPA+ 4G Module S: SerialNumber=0123456789ABCDEF C: #Ifs= 3 Cfg#= 3 Atr=a0 MxPwr=2mA I: If#=0x0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(commc) Sub=0e Prot=00 Driver=cdc_mbim I: If#=0x1 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim I: If#=0x2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=06 Prot=14 Driver=option Signed-off-by: Tore Anderson <tore@fud.no> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [ johan: drop id defines ] Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Jörgen Storvist authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 commit 70a7444c upstream. Added USB serial option driver support for GosunCn ZTE WeLink ME3630 series cellular modules for USB modes ECM/NCM and MBIM. usb-devices output MBIM mode: T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=00 Cnt=01 Dev#= 10 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=19d2 ProdID=0602 Rev=03.18 S: Manufacturer=Android S: Product=Android S: SerialNumber= C: #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(commc) Sub=0e Prot=00 Driver=cdc_mbim I: If#= 4 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim usb-devices output ECM/NCM mode: T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=00 Cnt=01 Dev#= 11 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=19d2 ProdID=1476 Rev=03.18 S: Manufacturer=Android S: Product=Android S: SerialNumber= C: #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(commc) Sub=06 Prot=00 Driver=cdc_ether I: If#= 4 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=cdc_ether Signed-off-by: Jörgen Storvist <jorgen.storvist@gmail.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Mathias Nyman authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 commit 45f750c1 upstream. The code to prevent a bus suspend if a USB3 port was still in link training also reacted to USB2 port polling state. This caused bus suspend to busyloop in some cases. USB2 polling state is different from USB3, and should not prevent bus suspend. Limit the USB3 link training state check to USB3 root hub ports only. The origial commit went to stable so this need to be applied there as well Fixes: 2f31a67f ("usb: xhci: Prevent bus suspend if a port connect change or polling state is detected") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Hui Peng authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811647 commit 5146f95d upstream. The function hso_probe reads if_num from the USB device (as an u8) and uses it without a length check to index an array, resulting in an OOB memory read in hso_probe or hso_get_config_data. Add a length check for both locations and updated hso_probe to bail on error. This issue has been assigned CVE-2018-19985. Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com> Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net> Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net> Reviewed-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811252Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Dan Carpenter authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811252 [ Upstream commit 84d7a447 ] "header->number" can be up to USHRT_MAX and it comes from the ioctl so it needs to be capped. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Trent Piepho authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811252 [ Upstream commit cd7f3a24 ] In order to read correctly from asynchronously updated RTC registers, it's necessary to read repeatedly until their values do not change from read to read. It's also necessary to wait for three RTC clock ticks for certain operations. There are no timeouts in this code and these operations could possibly loop forever. To avoid kernel hangs, put in timeouts. The iMX7d can be configured to stop the SRTC on a tamper event, which will lockup the kernel inside this driver as described above. These hangs can happen when running under qemu, which doesn't emulate the SNVS RTC, though currently the driver will refuse to load on qemu due to a timeout in the driver probe method. It could also happen if the SRTC block where somehow placed into reset or the slow speed clock that drives the SRTC counter (but not the CPU) were to stop. The symptoms on a two core iMX7d are a work queue hang on rtc_timer_do_work(), which eventually blocks a systemd fsnotify operation that triggers a work queue flush, causing systemd to hang and thus causing all services that should be started by systemd, like a console getty, to fail to start or stop. Also optimize the wait code to wait less. It only needs to wait for the clock to advance three ticks, not to see it change three times. Cc: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@free-electrons.com> Cc: Alessandro Zummo <a.zummo@towertech.it> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Cc: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org> Cc: Bryan O'Donoghue <pure.logic@nexus-software.ie> Signed-off-by: Trent Piepho <tpiepho@impinj.com> Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Guy Shapiro authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811252 [ Upstream commit 7bb633b1 ] The clear of the LPTA_EN flag should be synced before writing to the alarm register. Omitting this synchronization creates a race when trying to change existing alarm. Signed-off-by: Guy Shapiro <guy.shapiro@mobi-wize.com> Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@free-electrons.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Hans de Goede authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811252 [ Upstream commit 0544ee4b ] Some AMD based HP laptops have a SMB0001 ACPI device node which does not define any methods. This leads to the following error in dmesg: [ 5.222731] cmi: probe of SMB0001:00 failed with error -5 This commit makes acpi_smbus_cmi_add() return -ENODEV instead in this case silencing the error. In case of a failure of the i2c_add_adapter() call this commit now propagates the error from that call instead of -EIO. Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1811252 [ Upstream commit 6c7f25ca ] According to Intel (R) Axxia TM Lionfish Communication Processor Peripheral Subsystem Hardware Reference Manual, the AXXIA I2C module have a programmable Master Wait Timer, which among others, checks the time between commands send in manual mode. When a timeout (25ms) passes, TSS bit is set in Master Interrupt Status register and a Stop command is issued by the hardware. The axxia_i2c_xfer(), does not properly handle this situation, however. For each message a separate axxia_i2c_xfer_msg() is called and this function incorrectly assumes that any interrupt might happen only when waiting for completion. This is mostly correct but there is one exception - a master timeout can trigger if enough time has passed between individual transfers. It will, by definition, happen between transfers when the interrupts are disabled by the code. If that happens, the hardware issues Stop command. The interrupt indicating timeout will not be triggered as soon as we enable them since the Master Interrupt Status is cleared when master mode is entered again (which happens before enabling irqs) meaning this error is lost and the transfer is continued even though the Stop was issued on the bus. The subsequent operations completes without error but a bogus value (0xFF in case of read) is read as the client device is confused because aborted transfer. No error is returned from master_xfer() making caller believe that a valid value was read. To fix the problem, the TSS bit (indicating timeout) in Master Interrupt Status register is checked before each transfer. If it is set, there was a timeout before this transfer and (as described above) the hardware already issued Stop command so the transaction should be aborted thus -ETIMEOUT is returned from the master_xfer() callback. In order to be sure no timeout was issued we can't just read the status just before starting new transaction as there will always be a small window of time (few CPU cycles at best) where this might still happen. For this reason we have to temporally disable the timer before checking for TSS bit. Disabling it will, however, clear the TSS bit so in order to preserve that information, we have to read it in ISR so we have to ensure that the TSS interrupt is not masked between transfers of one transaction. There is no need to call bus recovery or controller reinitialization if that happens so it's skipped. Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Adamski <krzysztof.adamski@nokia.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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