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  1. 14 Dec, 2014 19 commits
  3. 05 Nov, 2014 21 commits
    • Ben Hutchings's avatar
      Linux 3.2.64 · 7d039b97
      Ben Hutchings authored
      7d039b97
    • Guillaume Nault's avatar
      l2tp: fix race while getting PMTU on PPP pseudo-wire · 544bd1bf
      Guillaume Nault authored 
      commit eed4d839 upstream.

Use dst_entry held by sk_dst_get() to retrieve tunnel's PMTU.

The dst_mtu(__sk_dst_get(tunnel->sock)) call was racy. __sk_dst_get()
could return NULL if tunnel->sock->sk_dst_cache was reset just before the
call, thus making dst_mtu() dereference a NULL pointer:

[ 1937.661598] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
[ 1937.664005] IP: [<ffffffffa049db88>] pppol2tp_connect+0x33d/0x41e [l2tp_ppp]
[ 1937.664005] PGD daf0c067 PUD d9f93067 PMD 0
[ 1937.664005] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 1937.664005] Modules linked in: l2tp_ppp l2tp_netlink l2tp_core ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter ip_tables ebtable_nat ebtables x_tables udp_tunnel pppoe pppox ppp_generic slhc deflate ctr twofish_generic twofish_x86_64_3way xts lrw gf128mul glue_helper twofish_x86_64 twofish_common blowfish_generic blowfish_x86_64 blowfish_common des_generic cbc xcbc rmd160 sha512_generic hmac crypto_null af_key xfrm_algo 8021q garp bridge stp llc tun atmtcp clip atm ext3 mbcache jbd iTCO_wdt coretemp kvm_intel iTCO_vendor_support kvm pcspkr evdev ehci_pci lpc_ich mfd_core i5400_edac edac_core i5k_amb shpchp button processor thermal_sys xfs crc32c_generic libcrc32c dm_mod usbhid sg hid sr_mod sd_mod cdrom crc_t10dif crct10dif_common ata_generic ahci ata_piix tg3 libahci libata uhci_hcd ptp ehci_hcd pps_core usbcore scsi_mod libphy usb_common [last unloaded: l2tp_core]
[ 1937.664005] CPU: 0 PID: 10022 Comm: l2tpstress Tainted: G           O   3.17.0-rc1 #1
[ 1937.664005] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL160 G5, BIOS O12 08/22/2008
[ 1937.664005] task: ffff8800d8fda790 ti: ffff8800c43c4000 task.ti: ffff8800c43c4000
[ 1937.664005] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa049db88>]  [<ffffffffa049db88>] pppol2tp_connect+0x33d/0x41e [l2tp_ppp]
[ 1937.664005] RSP: 0018:ffff8800c43c7de8  EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 1937.664005] RAX: ffff8800da8a7240 RBX: ffff8800d8c64600 RCX: 000001c325a137b5
[ 1937.664005] RDX: 8c6318c6318c6320 RSI: 000000000000010c RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 1937.664005] RBP: ffff8800c43c7ea8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 1937.664005] R10: ffffffffa048e2c0 R11: ffff8800d8c64600 R12: ffff8800ca7a5000
[ 1937.664005] R13: ffff8800c439bf40 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000009
[ 1937.664005] FS:  00007fd7f610f700(0000) GS:ffff88011a600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1937.664005] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 1937.664005] CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 00000000d9d75000 CR4: 00000000000027e0
[ 1937.664005] Stack:
[ 1937.664005]  ffffffffa049da80 ffff8800d8fda790 000000000000005b ffff880000000009
[ 1937.664005]  ffff8800daf3f200 0000000000000003 ffff8800c43c7e48 ffffffff81109b57
[ 1937.664005]  ffffffff81109b0e ffffffff8114c566 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 1937.664005] Call Trace:
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffffa049da80>] ? pppol2tp_connect+0x235/0x41e [l2tp_ppp]
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff81109b57>] ? might_fault+0x9e/0xa5
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff81109b0e>] ? might_fault+0x55/0xa5
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff8114c566>] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x1c/0x26
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff81309196>] SYSC_connect+0x87/0xb1
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff813e56f7>] ? sysret_check+0x1b/0x56
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff8107590d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x145/0x1a1
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff81213dee>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff8114c262>] ? spin_lock+0x9/0xb
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff813092b4>] SyS_connect+0x9/0xb
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff813e56d2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 1937.664005] Code: 10 2a 84 81 e8 65 76 bd e0 65 ff 0c 25 10 bb 00 00 4d 85 ed 74 37 48 8b 85 60 ff ff ff 48 8b 80 88 01 00 00 48 8b b8 10 02 00 00 <48> 8b 47 20 ff 50 20 85 c0 74 0f 83 e8 28 89 83 10 01 00 00 89
[ 1937.664005] RIP  [<ffffffffa049db88>] pppol2tp_connect+0x33d/0x41e [l2tp_ppp]
[ 1937.664005]  RSP <ffff8800c43c7de8>
[ 1937.664005] CR2: 0000000000000020
[ 1939.559375] ---[ end trace 82d44500f28f8708 ]---

Fixes: f34c4a35 ("l2tp: take PMTU from tunnel UDP socket")
Signed-off-by: default avatarGuillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Acked-by: default avatarEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      544bd1bf
    • Nadav Amit's avatar
      KVM: x86: Fix far-jump to non-canonical check · 77e4d28c
      Nadav Amit authored 
      commit 7e46dddd upstream.

Commit d1442d85 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far
jumps") introduced a bug that caused the fix to be incomplete.  Due to
incorrect evaluation, far jump to segment with L bit cleared (i.e., 32-bit
segment) and RIP with any of the high bits set (i.e, RIP[63:32] != 0) set may
not trigger #GP.  As we know, this imposes a security problem.

In addition, the condition for two warnings was incorrect.

Fixes: d1442d85Reported-by: default avatarDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarNadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
[Add #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 to avoid complaints of undefined behavior. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      77e4d28c
    • Jens Axboe's avatar
      genhd: fix leftover might_sleep() in blk_free_devt() · 607530bf
      Jens Axboe authored 
      commit 46f341ff upstream.

Commit 2da78092 changed the locking from a mutex to a spinlock,
so we now longer sleep in this context. But there was a leftover
might_sleep() in there, which now triggers since we do the final
free from an RCU callback. Get rid of it.
Reported-by: default avatarPontus Fuchs <pontus.fuchs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      607530bf
    • Steven Rostedt (Red Hat)'s avatar
      ring-buffer: Fix infinite spin in reading buffer · 77179bb8
      Steven Rostedt (Red Hat) authored 
      commit 24607f11 upstream.

Commit 651e22f2 "ring-buffer: Always reset iterator to reader page"
fixed one bug but in the process caused another one. The reset is to
update the header page, but that fix also changed the way the cached
reads were updated. The cache reads are used to test if an iterator
needs to be updated or not.

A ring buffer iterator, when created, disables writes to the ring buffer
but does not stop other readers or consuming reads from happening.
Although all readers are synchronized via a lock, they are only
synchronized when in the ring buffer functions. Those functions may
be called by any number of readers. The iterator continues down when
its not interrupted by a consuming reader. If a consuming read
occurs, the iterator starts from the beginning of the buffer.

The way the iterator sees that a consuming read has happened since
its last read is by checking the reader "cache". The cache holds the
last counts of the read and the reader page itself.

Commit 651e22f2 changed what was saved by the cache_read when
the rb_iter_reset() occurred, making the iterator never match the cache.
Then if the iterator calls rb_iter_reset(), it will go into an
infinite loop by checking if the cache doesn't match, doing the reset
and retrying, just to see that the cache still doesn't match! Which
should never happen as the reset is suppose to set the cache to the
current value and there's locks that keep a consuming reader from
having access to the data.

Fixes: 651e22f2 "ring-buffer: Always reset iterator to reader page"
Signed-off-by: default avatarSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      77179bb8
    • Julian Anastasov's avatar
      ipvs: avoid netns exit crash on ip_vs_conn_drop_conntrack · 7756f3a8
      Julian Anastasov authored 
      commit 2627b7e1 upstream.

commit 8f4e0a18 ("IPVS netns exit causes crash in conntrack")
added second ip_vs_conn_drop_conntrack call instead of just adding
the needed check. As result, the first call still can cause
crash on netns exit. Remove it.
Signed-off-by: default avatarJulian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: default avatarHans Schillstrom <hans@schillstrom.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarSimon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      7756f3a8
    • Sergio Gelato's avatar
      nfsd: Fix ACL null pointer deref · 5b6da64a
      Sergio Gelato authored 
      BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1348670

Fix regression introduced in pre-3.14 kernels by cherry-picking
aa07c713
(NFSD: Call ->set_acl with a NULL ACL structure if no entries).

The affected code was removed in 3.14 by commit
4ac7249e
(nfsd: use get_acl and ->set_acl).
The ->set_acl methods are already able to cope with a NULL argument.
Signed-off-by: default avatarSergio Gelato <Sergio.Gelato@astro.su.se>
[bwh: Rewrite the subject]
Signed-off-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      5b6da64a
    • Jan Kara's avatar
      ext2: Fix fs corruption in ext2_get_xip_mem() · 4b808fd2
      Jan Kara authored 
      commit 7ba3ec57 upstream.

Commit 8e3dffc6 "Ext2: mark inode dirty after the function
dquot_free_block_nodirty is called" unveiled a bug in __ext2_get_block()
called from ext2_get_xip_mem(). That function called ext2_get_block()
mistakenly asking it to map 0 blocks while 1 was intended. Before the
above mentioned commit things worked out fine by luck but after that commit
we started returning that we allocated 0 blocks while we in fact
allocated 1 block and thus allocation was looping until all blocks in
the filesystem were exhausted.

Fix the problem by properly asking for one block and also add assertion
in ext2_get_blocks() to catch similar problems.
Reported-and-tested-by: default avatarAndiry Xu <andiry.xu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      4b808fd2
    • Mikulas Patocka's avatar
      dm crypt: fix access beyond the end of allocated space · 15004af9
      Mikulas Patocka authored 
      commit d49ec52f upstream.

The DM crypt target accesses memory beyond allocated space resulting in
a crash on 32 bit x86 systems.

This bug is very old (it dates back to 2.6.25 commit 3a7f6c99 "dm
crypt: use async crypto").  However, this bug was masked by the fact
that kmalloc rounds the size up to the next power of two.  This bug
wasn't exposed until 3.17-rc1 commit 298a9fa0 ("dm crypt: use per-bio
data").  By switching to using per-bio data there was no longer any
padding beyond the end of a dm-crypt allocated memory block.

To minimize allocation overhead dm-crypt puts several structures into one
block allocated with kmalloc.  The block holds struct ablkcipher_request,
cipher-specific scratch pad (crypto_ablkcipher_reqsize(any_tfm(cc))),
struct dm_crypt_request and an initialization vector.

The variable dmreq_start is set to offset of struct dm_crypt_request
within this memory block.  dm-crypt allocates the block with this size:
cc->dmreq_start + sizeof(struct dm_crypt_request) + cc->iv_size.

When accessing the initialization vector, dm-crypt uses the function
iv_of_dmreq, which performs this calculation: ALIGN((unsigned long)(dmreq
+ 1), crypto_ablkcipher_alignmask(any_tfm(cc)) + 1).

dm-crypt allocated "cc->iv_size" bytes beyond the end of dm_crypt_request
structure.  However, when dm-crypt accesses the initialization vector, it
takes a pointer to the end of dm_crypt_request, aligns it, and then uses
it as the initialization vector.  If the end of dm_crypt_request is not
aligned on a crypto_ablkcipher_alignmask(any_tfm(cc)) boundary the
alignment causes the initialization vector to point beyond the allocated
space.

Fix this bug by calculating the variable iv_size_padding and adding it
to the allocated size.

Also correct the alignment of dm_crypt_request.  struct dm_crypt_request
is specific to dm-crypt (it isn't used by the crypto subsystem at all),
so it is aligned on __alignof__(struct dm_crypt_request).
Signed-off-by: default avatarMikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      15004af9
    • Andy Lutomirski's avatar
      x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry · 9e793c5e
      Andy Lutomirski authored 
      commit d974baa3 upstream.

CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.

TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.

This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry.  Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact.  A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: default avatarPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
 - Adjust context
 - Add struct vcpu_vmx *vmx parameter to vmx_set_constant_host_state(), done
   upstream in commit a547c6db ("KVM: VMX: Enable acknowledge interupt
   on vmexit")]
Signed-off-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      9e793c5e
    • Daniel Borkmann's avatar
      net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing · 3a8c709b
      Daniel Borkmann authored 
      commit 26b87c78 upstream.

This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
in the form of ...

  -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
  <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
  -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
  ---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
  [...]
  ---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>

... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
chunks which it eats up one by one.

We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].

The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
2e3216cd ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.

In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
side-effect interpreter run.

One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
look good now.

Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.

Fixes: 2e3216cd ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      3a8c709b
    • Daniel Borkmann's avatar
      net: sctp: fix panic on duplicate ASCONF chunks · 9a3c6f2e
      Daniel Borkmann authored 
      commit b69040d8 upstream.

When receiving a e.g. semi-good formed connection scan in the
form of ...

  -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
  <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
  -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
  ---------------- ASCONF_a; ASCONF_b ----------------->

... where ASCONF_a equals ASCONF_b chunk (at least both serials
need to be equal), we panic an SCTP server!

The problem is that good-formed ASCONF chunks that we reply with
ASCONF_ACK chunks are cached per serial. Thus, when we receive a
same ASCONF chunk twice (e.g. through a lost ASCONF_ACK), we do
not need to process them again on the server side (that was the
idea, also proposed in the RFC). Instead, we know it was cached
and we just resend the cached chunk instead. So far, so good.

Where things get nasty is in SCTP's side effect interpreter, that
is, sctp_cmd_interpreter():

While incoming ASCONF_a (chunk = event_arg) is being marked
!end_of_packet and !singleton, and we have an association context,
we do not flush the outqueue the first time after processing the
ASCONF_ACK singleton chunk via SCTP_CMD_REPLY. Instead, we keep it
queued up, although we set local_cork to 1. Commit 2e3216cd
changed the precedence, so that as long as we get bundled, incoming
chunks we try possible bundling on outgoing queue as well. Before
this commit, we would just flush the output queue.

Now, while ASCONF_a's ASCONF_ACK sits in the corked outq, we
continue to process the same ASCONF_b chunk from the packet. As
we have cached the previous ASCONF_ACK, we find it, grab it and
do another SCTP_CMD_REPLY command on it. So, effectively, we rip
the chunk->list pointers and requeue the same ASCONF_ACK chunk
another time. Since we process ASCONF_b, it's correctly marked
with end_of_packet and we enforce an uncork, and thus flush, thus
crashing the kernel.

Fix it by testing if the ASCONF_ACK is currently pending and if
that is the case, do not requeue it. When flushing the output
queue we may relink the chunk for preparing an outgoing packet,
but eventually unlink it when it's copied into the skb right
before transmission.

Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.

Fixes: 2e3216cd ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      9a3c6f2e
    • Daniel Borkmann's avatar
      net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks · aa001b04
      Daniel Borkmann authored 
      commit 9de7922b upstream.

Commit 6f4c618d ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for
ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however,
it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a
special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels:

skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768
 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950
 end:0x440 dev:<NULL>
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129!
[...]
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70
 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp]
 [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20
 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
 [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0
 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
 [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60

This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap
connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for
example, ...

  -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
  <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
  -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
  ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------>

... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ...

  1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16)
  2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255)

... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the
Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too.
This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks
could be used just as well.

The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all
parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended
up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke
sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with
WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account.

In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in
sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP
address that is also the source address of the packet containing
the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the
failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function
sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a
sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given
skb.

When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed
with ...

  length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
  asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;

... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here
in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage
parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic
for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time,
which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length.

Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in
INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and*
in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over,
that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being
more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and
missized addresses.

Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.

Fixes: b896b82b ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.")
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: default avatarNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
 - Adjust context
 - sctp_sf_violation_paramlen() doesn't take a struct net * parameter]
Signed-off-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      aa001b04
    • Nadav Amit's avatar
      KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps · f8a2b85d
      Nadav Amit authored 
      commit d1442d85 upstream.

Far jmp/call/ret may fault while loading a new RIP.  Currently KVM does not
handle this case, and may result in failed vm-entry once the assignment is
done.  The tricky part of doing so is that loading the new CS affects the
VMCS/VMCB state, so if we fail during loading the new RIP, we are left in
unconsistent state.  Therefore, this patch saves on 64-bit the old CS
descriptor and restores it if loading RIP failed.

This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Signed-off-by: default avatarNadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
 - Adjust context
 - __load_segment_descriptor() does not take an in_task_switch parameter]
Signed-off-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      f8a2b85d
    • Paolo Bonzini's avatar
      KVM: x86: use new CS.RPL as CPL during task switch · 11c0bdb6
      Paolo Bonzini authored 
      commit 2356aaeb upstream.

During task switch, all of CS.DPL, CS.RPL, SS.DPL must match (in addition
to all the other requirements) and will be the new CPL.  So far this
worked by carefully setting the CS selector and flag before doing the
task switch; setting CS.selector will already change the CPL.

However, this will not work once we get the CPL from SS.DPL, because
then you will have to set the full segment descriptor cache to change
the CPL.  ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt) will then return the old CPL during the
task switch, and the check that SS.DPL == CPL will fail.

Temporarily assume that the CPL comes from CS.RPL during task switch
to a protected-mode task.  This is the same approach used in QEMU's
emulation code, which (until version 2.0) manually tracks the CPL.
Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
 - Adjust context
 - load_state_from_tss32() does not support VM86 mode]
Signed-off-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      11c0bdb6
    • Nadav Amit's avatar
      KVM: x86: Emulator fixes for eip canonical checks on near branches · 71ca9dc3
      Nadav Amit authored 
      commit 234f3ce4 upstream.

Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do.  During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur.  The exception to this rule are syscall and sysenter instructions
in which the assigned rip is checked during the assignment to the relevant
MSRs.

This patch fixes the emulator to behave as real CPUs do for near branches.
Far branches are handled by the next patch.

This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Signed-off-by: default avatarNadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
 - Adjust context
 - Use ctxt->regs[] instead of reg_read(), reg_write(), reg_rmw()]
Signed-off-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      71ca9dc3
    • Nadav Amit's avatar
      KVM: x86: Fix wrong masking on relative jump/call · ea8064a2
      Nadav Amit authored 
      commit 05c83ec9 upstream.

Relative jumps and calls do the masking according to the operand size, and not
according to the address size as the KVM emulator does today.

This patch fixes KVM behavior.
Signed-off-by: default avatarNadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      ea8064a2
    • Takuya Yoshikawa's avatar
      KVM: x86 emulator: Use opcode::execute for CALL · befadafe
      Takuya Yoshikawa authored 
      commit d4ddafcd upstream.

CALL: E8
Signed-off-by: default avatarTakuya Yoshikawa <yoshikawa.takuya@oss.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      befadafe
    • Petr Matousek's avatar
      kvm: vmx: handle invvpid vm exit gracefully · 3f09b1f1
      Petr Matousek authored 
      commit a642fc30 upstream.

On systems with invvpid instruction support (corresponding bit in
IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP MSR is set) guest invocation of invvpid
causes vm exit, which is currently not handled and results in
propagation of unknown exit to userspace.

Fix this by installing an invvpid vm exit handler.

This is CVE-2014-3646.
Signed-off-by: default avatarPetr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
 - Adjust filename
 - Drop inapplicable change to exit reason string array]
Signed-off-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      3f09b1f1
    • Nadav Har'El's avatar
      nEPT: Nested INVEPT · 02a988e6
      Nadav Har'El authored 
      commit bfd0a56b upstream.

If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.

In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: default avatarXiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarNadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarXinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarYang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
 - Adjust context, filename
 - Simplify handle_invept() as recommended by Paolo - nEPT is not
   supported so we always raise #UD]
Signed-off-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      02a988e6
    • Andy Honig's avatar
      KVM: x86: Improve thread safety in pit · 30a340f5
      Andy Honig authored 
      commit 2febc839 upstream.

There's a race condition in the PIT emulation code in KVM.  In
__kvm_migrate_pit_timer the pit_timer object is accessed without
synchronization.  If the race condition occurs at the wrong time this
can crash the host kernel.

This fixes CVE-2014-3611.
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      30a340f5
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