Because sched.h and thread_info.h are a tangled mess, I turned
in_compat_syscall() into a macro.  If we had current_thread_struct()
or similar and we could use it from thread_info.h, then this would
be a bit cleaner.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ccc8a1b2f41f9c264a41f771bb4a6539a642ad72.1473801993.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

in_exception_stack() has some recursion checking which makes sure the
stack trace code never traverses a given exception stack more than once.
This prevents an infinite loop if corruption somehow causes a stack's
"next stack" pointer to point to itself (directly or indirectly).

The recursion checking can be useful for other stacks in addition to the
exception stack, so extend it to work for all stacks.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nilay Vaish <nilayvaish@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/95de5db4cfe111754845a5cef04e20630d01423f.1473905218.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

When an interrupt happens in entry code while running on a software IRQ
stack, and the IRQ stack was empty, regs->sp will contain the stack end
address (e.g., irq_stack_ptr).  If the regs are passed to dump_trace(),
get_stack_info() will report STACK_TYPE_UNKNOWN, causing dump_trace() to
return prematurely without trying to go to the next stack.

Update the bounds checking for software interrupt stacks so that the
ending address is now considered part of the stack.

This means that it's now possible for the 'walk_stack' callbacks --
print_context_stack() and print_context_stack_bp() -- to be called with
an empty stack.  But that's fine; they're already prepared to deal with
that due to their on_stack() checks.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nilay Vaish <nilayvaish@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5a5e5de92dcf11e8dc6b6e8e50ad7639d067830b.1473905218.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

valid_stack_ptr() is buggy: it assumes that all stacks are of size
THREAD_SIZE, which is not true for exception stacks.  So the
walk_stack() callbacks will need to know the location of the beginning
of the stack as well as the end.

Another issue is that in general the various features of a stack (type,
size, next stack pointer, description string) are scattered around in
various places throughout the stack dump code.

Encapsulate all that information in a single place with a new stack_info
struct and a get_stack_info() interface.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nilay Vaish <nilayvaish@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8164dd0db96b7e6a279fa17ae5e6dc375eecb4a9.1473905218.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

in_exception_stack() does some bad, bad things just so the unwinder can
print different values for different areas of the debug exception stack.

There's no need to clarify where exactly on the stack it is.  Just print
"#DB" and be done with it.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nilay Vaish <nilayvaish@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e91cb410169dd576678dd427c35efb716fd0cee1.1473905218.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Pull PCI fixes from Bjorn Helgaas:
 "Here are two changes for v4.8.  The first fixes a "[Firmware Bug]: reg
  0x10: invalid BAR (can't size)" warning on Haswell, and the second
  fixes a problem in some new runtime suspend functionality we merged
  for v4.8.  Summary:

  Enumeration:
    Mark Haswell Power Control Unit as having non-compliant BARs (Bjorn Helgaas)

  Power management:
    Fix bridge_d3 update on device removal (Lukas Wunner)"

* tag 'pci-v4.8-fixes-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/helgaas/pci:
  PCI: Fix bridge_d3 update on device removal
  PCI: Mark Haswell Power Control Unit as having non-compliant BARs

Pull uaccess fixes from Al Viro:
 "Fixes for broken uaccess primitives - mostly lack of proper zeroing
  in copy_from_user()/get_user()/__get_user(), but for several
  architectures there's more (broken clear_user() on frv and
  strncpy_from_user() on hexagon)"

* 'uaccess-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (28 commits)
  avr32: fix copy_from_user()
  microblaze: fix __get_user()
  microblaze: fix copy_from_user()
  m32r: fix __get_user()
  blackfin: fix copy_from_user()
  sparc32: fix copy_from_user()
  sh: fix copy_from_user()
  sh64: failing __get_user() should zero
  score: fix copy_from_user() and friends
  score: fix __get_user/get_user
  s390: get_user() should zero on failure
  ppc32: fix copy_from_user()
  parisc: fix copy_from_user()
  openrisc: fix copy_from_user()
  nios2: fix __get_user()
  nios2: copy_from_user() should zero the tail of destination
  mn10300: copy_from_user() should zero on access_ok() failure...
  mn10300: failing __get_user() and get_user() should zero
  mips: copy_from_user() must zero the destination on access_ok() failure
  ARC: uaccess: get_user to zero out dest in cause of fault
  ...

Pull xen regression fix from David Vrabel:
 "Fix SMP boot in arm guests"

* tag 'for-linus-4.8b-rc6-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
  arm/xen: fix SMP guests boot

show_stack_log_lvl() and dump_trace() are already preemption safe:

- If they're running in irq or exception context, preemption is already
  disabled and the percpu stack pointers can be trusted.

- If they're running with preemption enabled, they must be running on
  the task stack anyway, so it doesn't matter if they're comparing the
  stack pointer against a percpu stack pointer from this CPU or another
  one: either way it won't match.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nilay Vaish <nilayvaish@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a0ca0b1044eca97d4f0ec7c1619cf80b3b65560d.1473371307.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Commit 88e957d6 ("xen: introduce xen_vcpu_id mapping") broke SMP
ARM guests on Xen. When FIFO-based event channels are in use (this is
the default), evtchn_fifo_alloc_control_block() is called on
CPU_UP_PREPARE event and this happens before we set up xen_vcpu_id
mapping in xen_starting_cpu. Temporary fix the issue by setting direct
Linux CPU id <-> Xen vCPU id mapping for all possible CPUs at boot. We
don't currently support kexec/kdump on Xen/ARM so these ids always
match.

In future, we have several ways to solve the issue, e.g.:

- Eliminate all hypercalls from CPU_UP_PREPARE, do them from the
  starting CPU. This can probably be done for both x86 and ARM and, if
  done, will allow us to get Xen's idea of vCPU id from CPUID/MPIDR on
  the starting CPU directly, no messing with ACPI/device tree
  required.

- Save vCPU id information from ACPI/device tree on ARM and use it to
  initialize xen_vcpu_id mapping. This is the same trick we currently
  do on x86.
Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Tested-by: Wei Chen <Wei.Chen@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>

really ugly, but apparently avr32 compilers turns access_ok() into
something so bad that they want it in assembler.  Left that way,
zeroing added in inline wrapper.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

It could be done in exception-handling bits in __get_user_b() et.al.,
but the surgery involved would take more knowledge of sh64 details
than I have or _want_ to have.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

* should zero on any failure
* __get_user() should use __copy_from_user(), not copy_from_user()

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

should clear on access_ok() failures.  Also remove the useless
range truncation logics.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

... that should zero on faults.  Also remove the <censored> helpful
logics wrt range truncation copied from ppc32.  Where it had ever
been needed only in case of copy_from_user() *and* had not been merged
into the mainline until a month after the need had disappeared.
A decade before openrisc went into mainline, I might add...

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

a) should not leave crap on fault
b) should _not_ require access_ok() in any cases.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Al reported potential issue with ARC get_user() as it wasn't clearing
out destination pointer in case of fault due to bad address etc.

Verified using following

| {
|  	u32 bogus1 = 0xdeadbeef;
|	u64 bogus2 = 0xdead;
|	int rc1, rc2;
|
|  	pr_info("Orig values %x %llx\n", bogus1, bogus2);
|	rc1 = get_user(bogus1, (u32 __user *)0x40000000);
|	rc2 = get_user(bogus2, (u64 __user *)0x50000000);
|	pr_info("access %d %d, new values %x %llx\n",
|		rc1, rc2, bogus1, bogus2);
| }

| [ARCLinux]# insmod /mnt/kernel-module/qtn.ko
| Orig values deadbeef dead
| access -14 -14, new values 0 0
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

It's -EFAULT, not -1 (and contrary to the comment in there,
__strnlen_user() can return 0 - on faults).

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

It should check access_ok().  Otherwise a bunch of places turn into
trivially exploitable rootholes.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

* copy_from_user() on access_ok() failure ought to zero the destination
* none of those primitives should skip the access_ok() check in case of
small constant size.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

both for access_ok() failures and for faults halfway through

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Starting with v4.8, we allow a PCIe port to runtime suspend to D3hot if the
port itself and its children satisfy a number of conditions.  Once a child
is removed, we recheck those conditions in case the removed device was
blocking the port from suspending.

The rechecking needs to happen *after* the device has been removed from the
bus it resides on.  Otherwise when walking the port's subordinate bus in
pci_bridge_d3_update(), the device being removed would erroneously still be
taken into account.

However the device is removed from the bus_list in pci_destroy_dev() and we
currently recheck *before* that.  Fix it.

Fixes: 9d26d3a8 ("PCI: Put PCIe ports into D3 during suspend")
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>

Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
 "Three fixes:

   - AMD microcode loading fix with randomization

   - an lguest tooling fix

   - and an APIC enumeration boundary condition fix"

* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/apic: Fix num_processors value in case of failure
  tools/lguest: Don't bork the terminal in case of wrong args
  x86/microcode/AMD: Fix load of builtin microcode with randomized memory

Pull scheduler fix from Ingo Molnar:
 "A try_to_wake_up() memory ordering race fix causing a busy-loop in
  ttwu()"

* 'sched-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  sched/core: Fix a race between try_to_wake_up() and a woken up task