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  1. 18 Mar, 2018 21 commits
  3. 11 Mar, 2018 19 commits
    • Greg Kroah-Hartman's avatar
      Linux 4.9.87 · b6741622
      Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
      b6741622
    • Ernesto A. Fernández's avatar
      btrfs: preserve i_mode if __btrfs_set_acl() fails · 931dde83
      Ernesto A. Fernández authored 
      commit d7d82496 upstream.

When changing a file's acl mask, btrfs_set_acl() will first set the
group bits of i_mode to the value of the mask, and only then set the
actual extended attribute representing the new acl.

If the second part fails (due to lack of space, for example) and the
file had no acl attribute to begin with, the system will from now on
assume that the mask permission bits are actual group permission bits,
potentially granting access to the wrong users.

Prevent this by restoring the original mode bits if __btrfs_set_acl
fails.
Signed-off-by: default avatarErnesto A. Fernández <ernesto.mnd.fernandez@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarNikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      931dde83
    • Daniel Borkmann's avatar
      bpf, ppc64: fix out of bounds access in tail call · 2b70de4e
      Daniel Borkmann authored 
      [ upstream commit d269176e ]

While working on 16338a9b ("bpf, arm64: fix out of bounds access in
tail call") I noticed that ppc64 JIT is partially affected as well. While
the bound checking is correctly performed as unsigned comparison, the
register with the index value however, is never truncated into 32 bit
space, so e.g. a index value of 0x100000000ULL with a map of 1 element
would pass with PPC_CMPLW() whereas we later on continue with the full
64 bit register value. Therefore, as we do in interpreter and other JITs
truncate the value to 32 bit initially in order to fix access.

Fixes: ce076141 ("powerpc/bpf: Implement support for tail calls")
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: default avatarNaveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: default avatarNaveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      2b70de4e
    • Eric Dumazet's avatar
      bpf: add schedule points in percpu arrays management · 2a8bc531
      Eric Dumazet authored 
      [ upstream commit 32fff239 ]

syszbot managed to trigger RCU detected stalls in
bpf_array_free_percpu()

It takes time to allocate a huge percpu map, but even more time to free
it.

Since we run in process context, use cond_resched() to yield cpu if
needed.

Fixes: a10423b8 ("bpf: introduce BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY map")
Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: default avatarsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      2a8bc531
    • Daniel Borkmann's avatar
      bpf, arm64: fix out of bounds access in tail call · 54c6d01b
      Daniel Borkmann authored 
      [ upstream commit 16338a9b ]

I recently noticed a crash on arm64 when feeding a bogus index
into BPF tail call helper. The crash would not occur when the
interpreter is used, but only in case of JIT. Output looks as
follows:

  [  347.007486] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffb850e96492510
  [...]
  [  347.043065] [fffb850e96492510] address between user and kernel address ranges
  [  347.050205] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
  [...]
  [  347.190829] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
  [  347.196128] x11: fffc047ebe782800 x10: ffff808fd7d0fd10
  [  347.201427] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000
  [  347.206726] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 001c991738000000
  [  347.212025] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 000000000000ba5a
  [  347.217325] x3 : 00000000000329c4 x2 : ffff808fd7cf0500
  [  347.222625] x1 : ffff808fd7d0fc00 x0 : ffff808fd7cf0500
  [  347.227926] Process test_verifier (pid: 4548, stack limit = 0x000000007467fa61)
  [  347.235221] Call trace:
  [  347.237656]  0xffff000002f3a4fc
  [  347.240784]  bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8
  [  347.244260]  bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230
  [  347.248694]  SyS_bpf+0x77c/0x1110
  [  347.251999]  el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34
  [  347.255564] Code: 9100075a d280220a 8b0a002a d37df04b (f86b694b)
  [...]

In this case the index used in BPF r3 is the same as in r1
at the time of the call, meaning we fed a pointer as index;
here, it had the value 0xffff808fd7cf0500 which sits in x2.

While I found tail calls to be working in general (also for
hitting the error cases), I noticed the following in the code
emission:

  # bpftool p d j i 988
  [...]
  38:   ldr     w10, [x1,x10]
  3c:   cmp     w2, w10
  40:   b.ge    0x000000000000007c              <-- signed cmp
  44:   mov     x10, #0x20                      // #32
  48:   cmp     x26, x10
  4c:   b.gt    0x000000000000007c
  50:   add     x26, x26, #0x1
  54:   mov     x10, #0x110                     // #272
  58:   add     x10, x1, x10
  5c:   lsl     x11, x2, #3
  60:   ldr     x11, [x10,x11]                  <-- faulting insn (f86b694b)
  64:   cbz     x11, 0x000000000000007c
  [...]

Meaning, the tests passed because commit ddb55992 ("arm64:
bpf: implement bpf_tail_call() helper") was using signed compares
instead of unsigned which as a result had the test wrongly passing.

Change this but also the tail call count test both into unsigned
and cap the index as u32. Latter we did as well in 90caccdd
("bpf: fix bpf_tail_call() x64 JIT") and is needed in addition here,
too. Tested on HiSilicon Hi1616.

Result after patch:

  # bpftool p d j i 268
  [...]
  38:	ldr	w10, [x1,x10]
  3c:	add	w2, w2, #0x0
  40:	cmp	w2, w10
  44:	b.cs	0x0000000000000080
  48:	mov	x10, #0x20                  	// #32
  4c:	cmp	x26, x10
  50:	b.hi	0x0000000000000080
  54:	add	x26, x26, #0x1
  58:	mov	x10, #0x110                 	// #272
  5c:	add	x10, x1, x10
  60:	lsl	x11, x2, #3
  64:	ldr	x11, [x10,x11]
  68:	cbz	x11, 0x0000000000000080
  [...]

Fixes: ddb55992 ("arm64: bpf: implement bpf_tail_call() helper")
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      54c6d01b
    • Daniel Borkmann's avatar
      bpf, x64: implement retpoline for tail call · 017219b5
      Daniel Borkmann authored 
      [ upstream commit a493a87f ]

Implement a retpoline [0] for the BPF tail call JIT'ing that converts
the indirect jump via jmp %rax that is used to make the long jump into
another JITed BPF image. Since this is subject to speculative execution,
we need to control the transient instruction sequence here as well
when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is set, and direct it into a pause + lfence loop.
The latter aligns also with what gcc / clang emits (e.g. [1]).

JIT dump after patch:

  # bpftool p d x i 1
   0: (18) r2 = map[id:1]
   2: (b7) r3 = 0
   3: (85) call bpf_tail_call#12
   4: (b7) r0 = 2
   5: (95) exit

With CONFIG_RETPOLINE:

  # bpftool p d j i 1
  [...]
  33:	cmp    %edx,0x24(%rsi)
  36:	jbe    0x0000000000000072  |*
  38:	mov    0x24(%rbp),%eax
  3e:	cmp    $0x20,%eax
  41:	ja     0x0000000000000072  |
  43:	add    $0x1,%eax
  46:	mov    %eax,0x24(%rbp)
  4c:	mov    0x90(%rsi,%rdx,8),%rax
  54:	test   %rax,%rax
  57:	je     0x0000000000000072  |
  59:	mov    0x28(%rax),%rax
  5d:	add    $0x25,%rax
  61:	callq  0x000000000000006d  |+
  66:	pause                      |
  68:	lfence                     |
  6b:	jmp    0x0000000000000066  |
  6d:	mov    %rax,(%rsp)         |
  71:	retq                       |
  72:	mov    $0x2,%eax
  [...]

  * relative fall-through jumps in error case
  + retpoline for indirect jump

Without CONFIG_RETPOLINE:

  # bpftool p d j i 1
  [...]
  33:	cmp    %edx,0x24(%rsi)
  36:	jbe    0x0000000000000063  |*
  38:	mov    0x24(%rbp),%eax
  3e:	cmp    $0x20,%eax
  41:	ja     0x0000000000000063  |
  43:	add    $0x1,%eax
  46:	mov    %eax,0x24(%rbp)
  4c:	mov    0x90(%rsi,%rdx,8),%rax
  54:	test   %rax,%rax
  57:	je     0x0000000000000063  |
  59:	mov    0x28(%rax),%rax
  5d:	add    $0x25,%rax
  61:	jmpq   *%rax               |-
  63:	mov    $0x2,%eax
  [...]

  * relative fall-through jumps in error case
  - plain indirect jump as before

  [0] https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
  [1] https://github.com/gcc-mirror/gcc/commit/a31e654fa107be968b802786d747e962c2fcdb2bSigned-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      017219b5
    • Daniel Borkmann's avatar
      bpf: fix mlock precharge on arraymaps · 422baf61
      Daniel Borkmann authored 
      [ upstream commit 9c2d63b8 ]

syzkaller recently triggered OOM during percpu map allocation;
while there is work in progress by Dennis Zhou to add __GFP_NORETRY
semantics for percpu allocator under pressure, there seems also a
missing bpf_map_precharge_memlock() check in array map allocation.

Given today the actual bpf_map_charge_memlock() happens after the
find_and_alloc_map() in syscall path, the bpf_map_precharge_memlock()
is there to bail out early before we go and do the map setup work
when we find that we hit the limits anyway. Therefore add this for
array map as well.

Fixes: 6c905981 ("bpf: pre-allocate hash map elements")
Fixes: a10423b8 ("bpf: introduce BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY map")
Reported-by: syzbot+adb03f3f0bb57ce3acda@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennisszhou@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      422baf61
    • Daniel Borkmann's avatar
      bpf: fix wrong exposure of map_flags into fdinfo for lpm · 816cfeb7
      Daniel Borkmann authored 
      [ upstream commit a316338c ]

trie_alloc() always needs to have BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC passed in via
attr->map_flags, since it does not support preallocation yet. We
check the flag, but we never copy the flag into trie->map.map_flags,
which is later on exposed into fdinfo and used by loaders such as
iproute2. Latter uses this in bpf_map_selfcheck_pinned() to test
whether a pinned map has the same spec as the one from the BPF obj
file and if not, bails out, which is currently the case for lpm
since it exposes always 0 as flags.

Also copy over flags in array_map_alloc() and stack_map_alloc().
They always have to be 0 right now, but we should make sure to not
miss to copy them over at a later point in time when we add actual
flags for them to use.

Fixes: b95a5c4d ("bpf: add a longest prefix match trie map implementation")
Reported-by: default avatarJarno Rajahalme <jarno@covalent.io>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      816cfeb7
    • Dan Williams's avatar
      mpls, nospec: Sanitize array index in mpls_label_ok() · 93f3aff1
      Dan Williams authored 
      commit 3968523f upstream.

mpls_label_ok() validates that the 'platform_label' array index from a
userspace netlink message payload is valid. Under speculation the
mpls_label_ok() result may not resolve in the CPU pipeline until after
the index is used to access an array element. Sanitize the index to zero
to prevent userspace-controlled arbitrary out-of-bounds speculation, a
precursor for a speculative execution side channel vulnerability.

Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
 - mpls_label_ok() doesn't take an extack parameter
 - Drop change in mpls_getroute()]
Signed-off-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      93f3aff1
    • David Ahern's avatar
      net: mpls: Pull common label check into helper · d77763dc
      David Ahern authored 
      commit b7b386f4 upstream.

mpls_route_add and mpls_route_del have the same checks on the label.
Move to a helper. Avoid duplicate extack messages in the next patch.
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      d77763dc
    • Alexey Kodanev's avatar
      sctp: verify size of a new chunk in _sctp_make_chunk() · 9b7d7234
      Alexey Kodanev authored 
      
[ Upstream commit 07f2c7ab ]

When SCTP makes INIT or INIT_ACK packet the total chunk length
can exceed SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN which leads to kernel panic when
transmitting these packets, e.g. the crash on sending INIT_ACK:

[  597.804948] skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:00000000ffae06e4 len:120168
               put:120156 head:000000007aa47635 data:00000000d991c2de
               tail:0x1d640 end:0xfec0 dev:<NULL>
...
[  597.976970] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  598.033408] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:104!
[  600.314841] Call Trace:
[  600.345829]  <IRQ>
[  600.371639]  ? sctp_packet_transmit+0x2095/0x26d0 [sctp]
[  600.436934]  skb_put+0x16c/0x200
[  600.477295]  sctp_packet_transmit+0x2095/0x26d0 [sctp]
[  600.540630]  ? sctp_packet_config+0x890/0x890 [sctp]
[  600.601781]  ? __sctp_packet_append_chunk+0x3b4/0xd00 [sctp]
[  600.671356]  ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x3f/0x90 [sctp]
[  600.731482]  sctp_outq_flush+0x663/0x30d0 [sctp]
[  600.788565]  ? sctp_make_init+0xbf0/0xbf0 [sctp]
[  600.845555]  ? sctp_check_transmitted+0x18f0/0x18f0 [sctp]
[  600.912945]  ? sctp_outq_tail+0x631/0x9d0 [sctp]
[  600.969936]  sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.22+0x3be1/0x5cb0 [sctp]
[  601.041593]  ? sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x85f/0xc30 [sctp]
[  601.104837]  ? sctp_generate_t1_cookie_event+0x20/0x20 [sctp]
[  601.175436]  ? sctp_eat_data+0x1710/0x1710 [sctp]
[  601.233575]  sctp_do_sm+0x182/0x560 [sctp]
[  601.284328]  ? sctp_has_association+0x70/0x70 [sctp]
[  601.345586]  ? sctp_rcv+0xef4/0x32f0 [sctp]
[  601.397478]  ? sctp6_rcv+0xa/0x20 [sctp]
...

Here the chunk size for INIT_ACK packet becomes too big, mostly
because of the state cookie (INIT packet has large size with
many address parameters), plus additional server parameters.

Later this chunk causes the panic in skb_put_data():

  skb_packet_transmit()
      sctp_packet_pack()
          skb_put_data(nskb, chunk->skb->data, chunk->skb->len);

'nskb' (head skb) was previously allocated with packet->size
from u16 'chunk->chunk_hdr->length'.

As suggested by Marcelo we should check the chunk's length in
_sctp_make_chunk() before trying to allocate skb for it and
discard a chunk if its size bigger than SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN.
Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com>
Acked-by: default avatarMarcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leinter@gmail.com>
Acked-by: default avatarNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      9b7d7234
    • Julian Wiedmann's avatar
      s390/qeth: fix IPA command submission race · f3d26ce9
      Julian Wiedmann authored 
      
[ Upstream commit d22ffb5a ]

If multiple IPA commands are build & sent out concurrently,
fill_ipacmd_header() may assign a seqno value to a command that's
different from what send_control_data() later assigns to this command's
reply.
This is due to other commands passing through send_control_data(),
and incrementing card->seqno.ipa along the way.

So one IPA command has no reply that's waiting for its seqno, while some
other IPA command has multiple reply objects waiting for it.
Only one of those waiting replies wins, and the other(s) times out and
triggers a recovery via send_ipa_cmd().

Fix this by making sure that the same seqno value is assigned to
a command and its reply object.
Do so immediately before submitting the command & while holding the
irq_pending "lock", to produce nicely ascending seqnos.

As a side effect, *all* IPA commands now use a reply object that's
waiting for its actual seqno. Previously, early IPA commands that were
submitted while the card was still DOWN used the "catch-all" IDX seqno.
Signed-off-by: default avatarJulian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      f3d26ce9
    • Julian Wiedmann's avatar
      s390/qeth: fix IP address lookup for L3 devices · 058db71d
      Julian Wiedmann authored 
      
[ Upstream commit c5c48c58 ]

Current code ("qeth_l3_ip_from_hash()") matches a queried address object
against objects in the IP table by IP address, Mask/Prefix Length and
MAC address ("qeth_l3_ipaddrs_is_equal()"). But what callers actually
require is either
a) "is this IP address registered" (ie. match by IP address only),
before adding a new address.
b) or "is this address object registered" (ie. match all relevant
   attributes), before deleting an address.

Right now
1. the ADD path is too strict in its lookup, and eg. doesn't detect
conflicts between an existing NORMAL address and a new VIPA address
(because the NORMAL address will have mask != 0, while VIPA has
a mask == 0),
2. the DELETE path is not strict enough, and eg. allows del_rxip() to
delete a VIPA address as long as the IP address matches.

Fix all this by adding helpers (_addr_match_ip() and _addr_match_all())
that do the appropriate checking.

Note that the ADD path for NORMAL addresses is special, as qeth keeps
track of how many times such an address is in use (and there is no
immediate way of returning errors to the caller). So when a requested
NORMAL address _fully_ matches an existing one, it's not considered a
conflict and we merely increment the refcount.

Fixes: 5f78e29c ("qeth: optimize IP handling in rx_mode callback")
Signed-off-by: default avatarJulian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      058db71d
    • Julian Wiedmann's avatar
      s390/qeth: fix double-free on IP add/remove race · 2a3db837
      Julian Wiedmann authored 
      
[ Upstream commit 14d066c3 ]

Registering an IPv4 address with the HW takes quite a while, so we
temporarily drop the ip_htable lock. Any concurrent add/remove of the
same IP adjusts the IP's use count, and (on remove) is then blocked by
addr->in_progress.
After the register call has completed, we check the use count for
concurrently attempted add/remove calls - and possibly straight-away
deregister the IP again. This happens via l3_delete_ip(), which
1) looks up the queried IP in the htable (getting a reference to the
   *same* queried object),
2) deregisters the IP from the HW, and
3) frees the IP object.

The caller in l3_add_ip() then does a second free on the same object.

For this case, skip all the extra checks and lookups in l3_delete_ip()
and just deregister & free the IP object ourselves.

Fixes: 5f78e29c ("qeth: optimize IP handling in rx_mode callback")
Signed-off-by: default avatarJulian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      2a3db837
    • Julian Wiedmann's avatar
      s390/qeth: fix IP removal on offline cards · 1537f144
      Julian Wiedmann authored 
      
[ Upstream commit 98d823ab ]

If the HW is not reachable, then none of the IPs in qeth's internal
table has been registered with the HW yet. So when deleting such an IP,
there's no need to stage it for deregistration - just drop it from
the table.

This fixes the "add-delete-add" scenario on an offline card, where the
the second "add" merely increments the IP's use count. But as the IP is
still set to DISP_ADDR_DELETE from the previous "delete" step,
l3_recover_ip() won't register it with the HW when the card goes online.

Fixes: 5f78e29c ("qeth: optimize IP handling in rx_mode callback")
Signed-off-by: default avatarJulian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      1537f144
    • Julian Wiedmann's avatar
      s390/qeth: fix overestimated count of buffer elements · 797658d0
      Julian Wiedmann authored 
      
[ Upstream commit 12472af8 ]

qeth_get_elements_for_range() doesn't know how to handle a 0-length
range (ie. start == end), and returns 1 when it should return 0.
Such ranges occur on TSO skbs, where the L2/L3/L4 headers (and thus all
of the skb's linear data) are skipped when mapping the skb into regular
buffer elements.

This overestimation may cause several performance-related issues:
1. sub-optimal IO buffer selection, where the next buffer gets selected
   even though the skb would actually still fit into the current buffer.
2. forced linearization, if the element count for a non-linear skb
   exceeds QETH_MAX_BUFFER_ELEMENTS.

Rather than modifying qeth_get_elements_for_range() and adding overhead
to every caller, fix up those callers that are in risk of passing a
0-length range.

Fixes: 2863c613 ("qeth: refactor calculation of SBALE count")
Signed-off-by: default avatarJulian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      797658d0
    • Julian Wiedmann's avatar
      s390/qeth: fix SETIP command handling · 3c071871
      Julian Wiedmann authored 
      
[ Upstream commit 1c5b2216 ]

send_control_data() applies some special handling to SETIP v4 IPA
commands. But current code parses *all* command types for the SETIP
command code. Limit the command code check to IPA commands.

Fixes: 5b54e16f ("qeth: do not spin for SETIP ip assist command")
Signed-off-by: default avatarJulian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      3c071871
    • Ursula Braun's avatar
      s390/qeth: fix underestimated count of buffer elements · 8d072588
      Ursula Braun authored 
      
[ Upstream commit 89271c65 ]

For a memory range/skb where the last byte falls onto a page boundary
(ie. 'end' is of the form xxx...xxx001), the PFN_UP() part of the
calculation currently doesn't round up to the next PFN due to an
off-by-one error.
Thus qeth believes that the skb occupies one page less than it
actually does, and may select a IO buffer that doesn't have enough spare
buffer elements to fit all of the skb's data.
HW detects this as a malformed buffer descriptor, and raises an
exception which then triggers device recovery.

Fixes: 2863c613 ("qeth: refactor calculation of SBALE count")
Signed-off-by: default avatarUrsula Braun <ubraun@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJulian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      8d072588
    • Alexey Kodanev's avatar
      sctp: fix dst refcnt leak in sctp_v6_get_dst() · a818270c
      Alexey Kodanev authored 
      
[ Upstream commit 957d761c ]

When going through the bind address list in sctp_v6_get_dst() and
the previously found address is better ('matchlen > bmatchlen'),
the code continues to the next iteration without releasing currently
held destination.

Fix it by releasing 'bdst' before continue to the next iteration, and
instead of introducing one more '!IS_ERR(bdst)' check for dst_release(),
move the already existed one right after ip6_dst_lookup_flow(), i.e. we
shouldn't proceed further if we get an error for the route lookup.

Fixes: dbc2b5e9 ("sctp: fix src address selection if using secondary addresses for ipv6")
Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com>
Acked-by: default avatarNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: default avatarMarcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      a818270c
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