Skip to content

L
linux
Switch branch/tag
  1. 16 Dec, 2021 7 commits
    • Martin KaFai Lau's avatar
      bpf, selftests: Fix racing issue in btf_skc_cls_ingress test · c2fcbf81
      Martin KaFai Lau authored 
      The libbpf CI reported occasional failure in btf_skc_cls_ingress:

  test_syncookie:FAIL:Unexpected syncookie states gen_cookie:80326634 recv_cookie:0
  bpf prog error at line 97

"error at line 97" means the bpf prog cannot find the listening socket
when the final ack is received.  It then skipped processing
the syncookie in the final ack which then led to "recv_cookie:0".

The problem is the userspace program did not do accept() and went
ahead to close(listen_fd) before the kernel (and the bpf prog) had
a chance to process the final ack.

The fix is to add accept() call so that the userspace will wait for
the kernel to finish processing the final ack first before close()-ing
everything.

Fixes: 9a856cae ("bpf: selftest: Add test_btf_skc_cls_ingress")
Reported-by: default avatarAndrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMartin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211216191630.466151-1-kafai@fb.com
      c2fcbf81
    • Alexei Starovoitov's avatar
      selftest/bpf: Add a test that reads various addresses. · 7edc3fcb
      Alexei Starovoitov authored 
      Add a function to bpf_testmod that returns invalid kernel and user addresses.
Then attach an fexit program to that function that tries to read
memory through these addresses.

This logic checks that bpf_probe_read_kernel and BPF_PROBE_MEM logic is sane.
Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
      7edc3fcb
    • Alexei Starovoitov's avatar
      bpf: Fix extable address check. · 588a25e9
      Alexei Starovoitov authored 
      The verifier checks that PTR_TO_BTF_ID pointer is either valid or NULL,
but it cannot distinguish IS_ERR pointer from valid one.

When offset is added to IS_ERR pointer it may become small positive
value which is a user address that is not handled by extable logic
and has to be checked for at the runtime.

Tighten BPF_PROBE_MEM pointer check code to prevent this case.

Fixes: 4c5de127 ("bpf: Emit explicit NULL pointer checks for PROBE_LDX instructions.")
Reported-by: default avatarLorenzo Fontana <lorenzo.fontana@elastic.co>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
      588a25e9
    • Alexei Starovoitov's avatar
      bpf: Fix extable fixup offset. · 433956e9
      Alexei Starovoitov authored 
      The prog - start_of_ldx is the offset before the faulting ldx to the location
after it, so this will be used to adjust pt_regs->ip for jumping over it and
continuing, and with old temp it would have been fixed up to the wrong offset,
causing crash.

Fixes: 4c5de127 ("bpf: Emit explicit NULL pointer checks for PROBE_LDX instructions.")
Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
      433956e9
    • Daniel Borkmann's avatar
      bpf, selftests: Add test case trying to taint map value pointer · b1a7288d
      Daniel Borkmann authored 
      Add a test case which tries to taint map value pointer arithmetic into a
unknown scalar with subsequent export through the map.

Before fix:

  # ./test_verifier 1186
  #1186/u map access: trying to leak tained dst reg FAIL
  Unexpected success to load!
  verification time 24 usec
  stack depth 8
  processed 15 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 0 total_states 1 peak_states 1 mark_read 1
  #1186/p map access: trying to leak tained dst reg FAIL
  Unexpected success to load!
  verification time 8 usec
  stack depth 8
  processed 15 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 0 total_states 1 peak_states 1 mark_read 1
  Summary: 0 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 2 FAILED

After fix:

  # ./test_verifier 1186
  #1186/u map access: trying to leak tained dst reg OK
  #1186/p map access: trying to leak tained dst reg OK
  Summary: 2 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
      b1a7288d
    • Daniel Borkmann's avatar
      bpf: Make 32->64 bounds propagation slightly more robust · e572ff80
      Daniel Borkmann authored 
      Make the bounds propagation in __reg_assign_32_into_64() slightly more
robust and readable by aligning it similarly as we did back in the
__reg_combine_64_into_32() counterpart. Meaning, only propagate or
pessimize them as a smin/smax pair.
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
      e572ff80
    • Daniel Borkmann's avatar
      bpf: Fix signed bounds propagation after mov32 · 3cf2b61e
      Daniel Borkmann authored 
      For the case where both s32_{min,max}_value bounds are positive, the
__reg_assign_32_into_64() directly propagates them to their 64 bit
counterparts, otherwise it pessimises them into [0,u32_max] universe and
tries to refine them later on by learning through the tnum as per comment
in mentioned function. However, that does not always happen, for example,
in mov32 operation we call zext_32_to_64(dst_reg) which invokes the
__reg_assign_32_into_64() as is without subsequent bounds update as
elsewhere thus no refinement based on tnum takes place.

Thus, not calling into the __update_reg_bounds() / __reg_deduce_bounds() /
__reg_bound_offset() triplet as we do, for example, in case of ALU ops via
adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(), will lead to more pessimistic bounds when
dumping the full register state:

Before fix:

  0: (b4) w0 = -1
  1: R0_w=invP4294967295
     (id=0,imm=ffffffff,
      smin_value=4294967295,smax_value=4294967295,
      umin_value=4294967295,umax_value=4294967295,
      var_off=(0xffffffff; 0x0),
      s32_min_value=-1,s32_max_value=-1,
      u32_min_value=-1,u32_max_value=-1)

  1: (bc) w0 = w0
  2: R0_w=invP4294967295
     (id=0,imm=ffffffff,
      smin_value=0,smax_value=4294967295,
      umin_value=4294967295,umax_value=4294967295,
      var_off=(0xffffffff; 0x0),
      s32_min_value=-1,s32_max_value=-1,
      u32_min_value=-1,u32_max_value=-1)

Technically, the smin_value=0 and smax_value=4294967295 bounds are not
incorrect, but given the register is still a constant, they break assumptions
about const scalars that smin_value == smax_value and umin_value == umax_value.

After fix:

  0: (b4) w0 = -1
  1: R0_w=invP4294967295
     (id=0,imm=ffffffff,
      smin_value=4294967295,smax_value=4294967295,
      umin_value=4294967295,umax_value=4294967295,
      var_off=(0xffffffff; 0x0),
      s32_min_value=-1,s32_max_value=-1,
      u32_min_value=-1,u32_max_value=-1)

  1: (bc) w0 = w0
  2: R0_w=invP4294967295
     (id=0,imm=ffffffff,
      smin_value=4294967295,smax_value=4294967295,
      umin_value=4294967295,umax_value=4294967295,
      var_off=(0xffffffff; 0x0),
      s32_min_value=-1,s32_max_value=-1,
      u32_min_value=-1,u32_max_value=-1)

Without the smin_value == smax_value and umin_value == umax_value invariant
being intact for const scalars, it is possible to leak out kernel pointers
from unprivileged user space if the latter is enabled. For example, when such
registers are involved in pointer arithmtics, then adjust_ptr_min_max_vals()
will taint the destination register into an unknown scalar, and the latter
can be exported and stored e.g. into a BPF map value.

Fixes: 3f50f132 ("bpf: Verifier, do explicit ALU32 bounds tracking")
Reported-by: default avatarKuee K1r0a <liulin063@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
      3cf2b61e
  3. 15 Dec, 2021 4 commits
    • Daniel Borkmann's avatar
      bpf, selftests: Update test case for atomic cmpxchg on r0 with pointer · e523102c
      Daniel Borkmann authored 
      Fix up unprivileged test case results for 'Dest pointer in r0' verifier tests
given they now need to reject R0 containing a pointer value, and add a couple
of new related ones with 32bit cmpxchg as well.

  root@foo:~/bpf/tools/testing/selftests/bpf# ./test_verifier
  #0/u invalid and of negative number OK
  #0/p invalid and of negative number OK
  [...]
  #1268/p XDP pkt read, pkt_meta' <= pkt_data, bad access 1 OK
  #1269/p XDP pkt read, pkt_meta' <= pkt_data, bad access 2 OK
  #1270/p XDP pkt read, pkt_data <= pkt_meta', good access OK
  #1271/p XDP pkt read, pkt_data <= pkt_meta', bad access 1 OK
  #1272/p XDP pkt read, pkt_data <= pkt_meta', bad access 2 OK
  Summary: 1900 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED
Acked-by: default avatarBrendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
      e523102c
    • Daniel Borkmann's avatar
      bpf: Fix kernel address leakage in atomic cmpxchg's r0 aux reg · a82fe085
      Daniel Borkmann authored 
      The implementation of BPF_CMPXCHG on a high level has the following parameters:

  .-[old-val]                                          .-[new-val]
  BPF_R0 = cmpxchg{32,64}(DST_REG + insn->off, BPF_R0, SRC_REG)
                          `-[mem-loc]          `-[old-val]

Given a BPF insn can only have two registers (dst, src), the R0 is fixed and
used as an auxilliary register for input (old value) as well as output (returning
old value from memory location). While the verifier performs a number of safety
checks, it misses to reject unprivileged programs where R0 contains a pointer as
old value.

Through brute-forcing it takes about ~16sec on my machine to leak a kernel pointer
with BPF_CMPXCHG. The PoC is basically probing for kernel addresses by storing the
guessed address into the map slot as a scalar, and using the map value pointer as
R0 while SRC_REG has a canary value to detect a matching address.

Fix it by checking R0 for pointers, and reject if that's the case for unprivileged
programs.

Fixes: 5ffa2550 ("bpf: Add instructions for atomic_[cmp]xchg")
Reported-by: Ryota Shiga (Flatt Security)
Acked-by: default avatarBrendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
      a82fe085
    • Daniel Borkmann's avatar
      bpf, selftests: Add test case for atomic fetch on spilled pointer · 180486b4
      Daniel Borkmann authored 
      Test whether unprivileged would be able to leak the spilled pointer either
by exporting the returned value from the atomic{32,64} operation or by reading
and exporting the value from the stack after the atomic operation took place.

Note that for unprivileged, the below atomic cmpxchg test case named "Dest
pointer in r0 - succeed" is failing. The reason is that in the dst memory
location (r10 -8) there is the spilled register r10:

  0: R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  0: (bf) r0 = r10
  1: R0_w=fp0 R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r0
  2: R0_w=fp0 R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=fp
  2: (b7) r1 = 0
  3: R0_w=fp0 R1_w=invP0 R10=fp0 fp-8_w=fp
  3: (db) r0 = atomic64_cmpxchg((u64 *)(r10 -8), r0, r1)
  4: R0_w=fp0 R1_w=invP0 R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm
  4: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r0 -8)
  5: R0_w=fp0 R1_w=invP(id=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm
  5: (b7) r0 = 0
  6: R0_w=invP0 R1_w=invP(id=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm
  6: (95) exit

However, allowing this case for unprivileged is a bit useless given an
update with a new pointer will fail anyway:

  0: R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  0: (bf) r0 = r10
  1: R0_w=fp0 R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r0
  2: R0_w=fp0 R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=fp
  2: (db) r0 = atomic64_cmpxchg((u64 *)(r10 -8), r0, r10)
  R10 leaks addr into mem
Acked-by: default avatarBrendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
      180486b4
    • Daniel Borkmann's avatar
      bpf: Fix kernel address leakage in atomic fetch · 7d3baf0a
      Daniel Borkmann authored 
      The change in commit 37086bfd ("bpf: Propagate stack bounds to registers
in atomics w/ BPF_FETCH") around check_mem_access() handling is buggy since
this would allow for unprivileged users to leak kernel pointers. For example,
an atomic fetch/and with -1 on a stack destination which holds a spilled
pointer will migrate the spilled register type into a scalar, which can then
be exported out of the program (since scalar != pointer) by dumping it into
a map value.

The original implementation of XADD was preventing this situation by using
a double call to check_mem_access() one with BPF_READ and a subsequent one
with BPF_WRITE, in both cases passing -1 as a placeholder value instead of
register as per XADD semantics since it didn't contain a value fetch. The
BPF_READ also included a check in check_stack_read_fixed_off() which rejects
the program if the stack slot is of __is_pointer_value() if dst_regno < 0.
The latter is to distinguish whether we're dealing with a regular stack spill/
fill or some arithmetical operation which is disallowed on non-scalars, see
also 6e7e63cb ("bpf: Forbid XADD on spilled pointers for unprivileged
users") for more context on check_mem_access() and its handling of placeholder
value -1.

One minimally intrusive option to fix the leak is for the BPF_FETCH case to
initially check the BPF_READ case via check_mem_access() with -1 as register,
followed by the actual load case with non-negative load_reg to propagate
stack bounds to registers.

Fixes: 37086bfd ("bpf: Propagate stack bounds to registers in atomics w/ BPF_FETCH")
Reported-by: <n4ke4mry@gmail.com>
Acked-by: default avatarBrendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
      7d3baf0a
  5. 14 Dec, 2021 2 commits
  7. 10 Dec, 2021 4 commits
    • Paul Chaignon's avatar
      selftests/bpf: Tests for state pruning with u32 spill/fill · 0be2516f
      Paul Chaignon authored 
      This patch adds tests for the verifier's tracking for spilled, <8B
registers. The first two test cases ensure the verifier doesn't
incorrectly prune states in case of <8B spill/fills. The last one simply
checks that a filled u64 register is marked unknown if the register
spilled in the same slack slot was less than 8B.

The map value access at the end of the first program is only incorrect
for the path R6=32. If the precision bit for register R8 isn't
backtracked through the u32 spill/fill, the R6=32 path is pruned at
instruction 9 and the program is incorrectly accepted. The second
program is a variation of the same with u32 spills and a u64 fill.

The additional instructions to introduce the first pruning point may be
a bit fragile as they depend on the heuristics for pruning points in the
verifier (currently at least 8 instructions and 2 jumps). If the
heuristics are changed, the pruning point may move (e.g., to the
subsequent jump) or disappear, which would cause the test to always pass.
Signed-off-by: default avatarPaul Chaignon <paul@isovalent.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
      0be2516f
    • Paul Chaignon's avatar
      bpf: Fix incorrect state pruning for <8B spill/fill · 345e004d
      Paul Chaignon authored 
      Commit 354e8f19 ("bpf: Support <8-byte scalar spill and refill")
introduced support in the verifier to track <8B spill/fills of scalars.
The backtracking logic for the precision bit was however skipping
spill/fills of less than 8B. That could cause state pruning to consider
two states equivalent when they shouldn't be.

As an example, consider the following bytecode snippet:

  0:  r7 = r1
  1:  call bpf_get_prandom_u32
  2:  r6 = 2
  3:  if r0 == 0 goto pc+1
  4:  r6 = 3
  ...
  8: [state pruning point]
  ...
  /* u32 spill/fill */
  10: *(u32 *)(r10 - 8) = r6
  11: r8 = *(u32 *)(r10 - 8)
  12: r0 = 0
  13: if r8 == 3 goto pc+1
  14: r0 = 1
  15: exit

The verifier first walks the path with R6=3. Given the support for <8B
spill/fills, at instruction 13, it knows the condition is true and skips
instruction 14. At that point, the backtracking logic kicks in but stops
at the fill instruction since it only propagates the precision bit for
8B spill/fill. When the verifier then walks the path with R6=2, it will
consider it safe at instruction 8 because R6 is not marked as needing
precision. Instruction 14 is thus never walked and is then incorrectly
removed as 'dead code'.

It's also possible to lead the verifier to accept e.g. an out-of-bound
memory access instead of causing an incorrect dead code elimination.

This regression was found via Cilium's bpf-next CI where it was causing
a conntrack map update to be silently skipped because the code had been
removed by the verifier.

This commit fixes it by enabling support for <8B spill/fills in the
bactracking logic. In case of a <8B spill/fill, the full 8B stack slot
will be marked as needing precision. Then, in __mark_chain_precision,
any tracked register spilled in a marked slot will itself be marked as
needing precision, regardless of the spill size. This logic makes two
assumptions: (1) only 8B-aligned spill/fill are tracked and (2) spilled
registers are only tracked if the spill and fill sizes are equal. Commit
ef979017 ("bpf: selftest: Add verifier tests for <8-byte scalar
spill and refill") covers the first assumption and the next commit in
this patchset covers the second.

Fixes: 354e8f19 ("bpf: Support <8-byte scalar spill and refill")
Signed-off-by: default avatarPaul Chaignon <paul@isovalent.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
      345e004d
    • Eric Dumazet's avatar
      sch_cake: do not call cake_destroy() from cake_init() · ab443c53
      Eric Dumazet authored 
      qdiscs are not supposed to call their own destroy() method
from init(), because core stack already does that.

syzbot was able to trigger use after free:

DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock)
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 21902 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:586 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:586 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 21902 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:586 __mutex_lock+0x9ec/0x12f0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:740
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 21902 Comm: syz-executor189 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:586 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock+0x9ec/0x12f0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:740
Code: 08 84 d2 0f 85 19 08 00 00 8b 05 97 38 4b 04 85 c0 0f 85 27 f7 ff ff 48 c7 c6 20 00 ac 89 48 c7 c7 a0 fe ab 89 e8 bf 76 ba ff <0f> 0b e9 0d f7 ff ff 48 8b 44 24 40 48 8d b8 c8 08 00 00 48 89 f8
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000627f290 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff88802315d700 RSI: ffffffff815f1db8 RDI: fffff52000c4fe44
RBP: ffff88818f28e000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffffff815ebb5e R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffffc9000627f458 R15: 0000000093c30000
FS:  0000555556abc400(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fda689c3303 CR3: 000000001cfbb000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 tcf_chain0_head_change_cb_del+0x2e/0x3d0 net/sched/cls_api.c:810
 tcf_block_put_ext net/sched/cls_api.c:1381 [inline]
 tcf_block_put_ext net/sched/cls_api.c:1376 [inline]
 tcf_block_put+0xbc/0x130 net/sched/cls_api.c:1394
 cake_destroy+0x3f/0x80 net/sched/sch_cake.c:2695
 qdisc_create.constprop.0+0x9da/0x10f0 net/sched/sch_api.c:1293
 tc_modify_qdisc+0x4c5/0x1980 net/sched/sch_api.c:1660
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x413/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5571
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2496
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345
 netlink_sendmsg+0x904/0xdf0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:724
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2409
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2463
 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2492
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f1bb06badb9
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x7f1bb06bad8f.
RSP: 002b:00007fff3012a658 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f1bb06badb9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200007c0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff3012a688
R13: 00007fff3012a6a0 R14: 00007fff3012a6e0 R15: 00000000000013c2
 </TASK>

Fixes: 046f6fd5 ("sched: Add Common Applications Kept Enhanced (cake) qdisc")
Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: default avatarsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Acked-by: default avatarToke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@toke.dk>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211210142046.698336-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.comSigned-off-by: default avatarJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
      ab443c53
    • Jie2x Zhou's avatar
      selftests: net: Correct ping6 expected rc from 2 to 1 · 92816e26
      Jie2x Zhou authored 
      ./fcnal-test.sh -v -t ipv6_ping
TEST: ping out, VRF bind - ns-B IPv6 LLA                                      [FAIL]
TEST: ping out, VRF bind - multicast IP                                       [FAIL]

ping6 is failing as it should.
COMMAND: ip netns exec ns-A /bin/ping6 -c1 -w1 fe80::7c4c:bcff:fe66:a63a%red
strace of ping6 shows it is failing with '1',
so change the expected rc from 2 to 1.

Fixes: c0644e71 ("selftests: Add ipv6 ping tests to fcnal-test")
Reported-by: default avatarkernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Suggested-by: default avatarDavid Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJie2x Zhou <jie2x.zhou@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211209020230.37270-1-jie2x.zhou@intel.comSigned-off-by: default avatarJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
      92816e26
  9. 09 Dec, 2021 23 commits
GitLab Nexedi Edition | About GitLab | About Nexedi | 沪ICP备2021021310号-2 | 沪ICP备2021021310号-7