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- 08 Sep, 2013 2 commits
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Shirish Pargaonkar authored
Move the post (successful) session setup code to respective dialect routines. For smb1, session key is per smb connection. For smb2/smb3, session key is per smb session. If client and server do not require signing, free session key for smb1/2/3. If client and server require signing smb1 - Copy (kmemdup) session key for the first session to connection. Free session key of that and subsequent sessions on this connection. smb2 - For every session, keep the session key and free it when the session is being shutdown. smb3 - For every session, generate the smb3 signing key using the session key and then free the session key. There are two unrelated line formatting changes as well. Reviewed-by:Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> Signed-off-by:
Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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Scott Lovenberg authored
The max string length definitions for user name, domain name, password, and share name have been moved into their own header file in uapi so the mount helper can use autoconf to define them instead of keeping the kernel side and userland side definitions in sync manually. The names have also been standardized with a "CIFS" prefix and "LEN" suffix. Signed-off-by:
Scott Lovenberg <scott.lovenberg@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Chen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 31 Jul, 2013 1 commit
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Chen Gang authored
For cifs_set_cifscreds() in "fs/cifs/connect.c", 'desc' buffer length is 'CIFSCREDS_DESC_SIZE' (56 is less than 256), and 'ses->domainName' length may be "255 + '\0'". The related sprintf() may cause memory overflow, so need extend related buffer enough to hold all things. It is also necessary to be sure of 'ses->domainName' must be less than 256, and define the related macro instead of hard code number '256'. Signed-off-by:
Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
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- 24 Jun, 2013 5 commits
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Jeff Layton authored
Now that we track what sort of NEGOTIATE response was received, stop mandating that every session on a socket use the same type of auth. Push that decision out into the session setup code, and make the sectype a per-session property. This should allow us to mix multiple sectypes on a socket as long as they are compatible with the NEGOTIATE response. With this too, we can now eliminate the ses->secFlg field since that info is redundant and harder to work with than a securityEnum. Signed-off-by:
Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by:
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Jeff Layton authored
Currently, we determine this according to flags in the sec_mode, flags in the global_secflags and via other methods. That makes the semantics very hard to follow and there are corner cases where we don't handle this correctly. Add a new bool to the TCP_Server_Info that acts as a simple flag to tell us whether signing is enabled on this connection or not, and fix up the places that need to determine this to use that flag. This is a bit weird for the SMB2 case, where signing is per-session. SMB2 needs work in this area already though. The existing SMB2 code has similar logic to what we're using here, so there should be no real change in behavior. These changes should make it easier to implement per-session signing in the future though. Signed-off-by:
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Jeff Layton authored
This field is completely unused: CIFS_SES_W9X is completely unused. CIFS_SES_LANMAN and CIFS_SES_OS2 are set but never checked. CIFS_SES_NT4 is checked, but never set. Signed-off-by:
Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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Jeff Layton authored
These look pretty cargo-culty to me, but let's be certain. Leave them in place for now. Pop a WARN if it ever does happen. Also, move to a more standard idiom for setting the "server" pointer. Signed-off-by:
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Jeff Layton authored
...rc is always set to 0. Signed-off-by:
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- 05 May, 2013 2 commits
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Joe Perches authored
It's not obvious from reading the macro names that these macros are for debugging. Convert the names to a single more typical kernel style cifs_dbg macro. cERROR(1, ...) -> cifs_dbg(VFS, ...) cFYI(1, ...) -> cifs_dbg(FYI, ...) cFYI(DBG2, ...) -> cifs_dbg(NOISY, ...) Move the terminating format newline from the macro to the call site. Add CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG function cifs_vfs_err to emit the "CIFS VFS: " prefix for VFS messages. Size is reduced ~ 1% when CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG is set (default y) $ size fs/cifs/cifs.ko* text data bss dec hex filename 265245 2525 132 267902 4167e fs/cifs/cifs.ko.new 268359 2525 132 271016 422a8 fs/cifs/cifs.ko.old Other miscellaneous changes around these conversions: o Miscellaneous typo fixes o Add terminating \n's to almost all formats and remove them from the macros to be more kernel style like. A few formats previously had defective \n's o Remove unnecessary OOM messages as kmalloc() calls dump_stack o Coalesce formats to make grep easier, added missing spaces when coalescing formats o Use %s, __func__ instead of embedded function name o Removed unnecessary "cifs: " prefixes o Convert kzalloc with multiply to kcalloc o Remove unused cifswarn macro Signed-off-by:
Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by:
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Silviu-Mihai Popescu authored
This replaces calls to kmalloc followed by memcpy with a single call to kmemdup. This was found via make coccicheck. Signed-off-by:
Silviu-Mihai Popescu <silviupopescu1990@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 27 Sep, 2012 1 commit
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Pavel Shilovsky authored
Signed-off-by:
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- 24 Jul, 2012 3 commits
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Pavel Shilovsky authored
Signed-off-by:
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Pavel Shilovsky authored
Reviewed-by:
Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org> Signed-off-by:
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Pavel Shilovsky authored
Reviewed-by:
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- 23 Jul, 2012 1 commit
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Jeff Layton authored
Calling key_revoke here isn't ideal as further requests for the key will end up returning -EKEYREVOKED until it gets purged from the cache. What we really intend here is to force a new upcall on the next request_key. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 02 Feb, 2012 1 commit
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Shirish Pargaonkar authored
For null user mounts, do not invoke string length function during session setup. Cc: <stable@kernel.org Reported-and-Tested-by:
Chris Clayton <chris2553@googlemail.com> Acked-by:
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- 31 Jan, 2012 1 commit
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Dan Carpenter authored
We should check that we're not copying memory from beyond the end of the blob. Signed-off-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
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- 19 Jan, 2012 1 commit
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Steve French authored
to reflect the unicode encoding used by CIFS protocol. Signed-off-by:
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- 30 Oct, 2011 1 commit
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Shirish Pargaonkar authored
Re-posting a patch originally posted by Oskar Liljeblad after rebasing on 3.2. Modify cifs to assume that the supplied password is encoded according to iocharset. Before this patch passwords would be treated as raw 8-bit data, which made authentication with Unicode passwords impossible (at least passwords with characters > 0xFF). The previous code would as a side effect accept passwords encoded with ISO 8859-1, since Unicode < 0x100 basically is ISO 8859-1. Software which relies on that will no longer support password chars > 0x7F unless it also uses iocharset=iso8859-1. (mount.cifs does not care about the encoding so it will work as expected.) Signed-off-by:
Oskar Liljeblad <oskar@osk.mine.nu> Signed-off-by:
A <nimbus1_03087@yahoo.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 13 Oct, 2011 1 commit
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Jeff Layton authored
server->maxBuf is the maximum SMB size (including header) that the server can handle. CIFSMaxBufSize is the maximum amount of data (sans header) that the client can handle. Currently maxBuf is being capped at CIFSMaxBufSize + the max headers size, and the two values are used somewhat interchangeably in the code. This makes little sense as these two values are not related at all. Separate them and make sure the code uses the right values in the right places. Signed-off-by:
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- 03 Aug, 2011 1 commit
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Steve French authored
This reverts commit c4d3396b. Problems discovered with readdir to Samba due to not accounting for header size properly with this change
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- 31 Jul, 2011 1 commit
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Jeff Layton authored
Currently, we mirror the same size back to the server that it sends us. That makes little sense. Instead we should be sending the server the maximum buffer size that we can handle -- CIFSMaxBufSize minus the 4 byte RFC1001 header. Signed-off-by:
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- 12 Jul, 2011 1 commit
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Shirish Pargaonkar authored
When using NTLMSSP authentication mechanism, if server mandates signing, keep the flags in type 3 messages of the NTLMSSP exchange same as in type 1 messages (i.e. keep the indicated capabilities same). Some of the servers such as Samba, expect the flags such as Negotiate_Key_Exchange in type 3 message of NTLMSSP exchange as well. Some servers like Windows do not. https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=8212Signed-off-by:
Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail> Acked-by:
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- 27 May, 2011 1 commit
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Steve French authored
secMode to sec_mode and cifsTconInfo to cifs_tcon and cifsSesInfo to cifs_ses Signed-off-by:
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- 19 May, 2011 3 commits
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Jeff Layton authored
This is the same patch as originally posted, just with some merge conflicts fixed up... Currently, the ByteCount is usually converted to host-endian on receive. This is confusing however, as we need to keep two sets of routines for accessing it, and keep track of when to use each routine. Munging received packets like this also limits when the signature can be calulated. Simplify the code by keeping the received ByteCount in little-endian format. This allows us to eliminate a set of routines for accessing it and we can now drop the *_le suffixes from the accessor functions since that's now implied. While we're at it, switch all of the places that read the ByteCount directly to use the get_bcc inline which should also clean up some unaligned accesses. Signed-off-by:
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Steve French authored
There is one big endian field in the cifs protocol, the RFC1001 length, which cifs code (unlike in the smb2 code) had been handling as u32 until the last possible moment, when it was converted to be32 (its native form) before sending on the wire. To remove the last sparse endian warning, and to make this consistent with the smb2 implementation (which always treats the fields in their native size and endianness), convert all uses of smb_buf_length to be32. This version incorporates Christoph's comment about using be32_add_cpu, and fixes a typo in the second version of the patch. Signed-off-by: -
Steve French authored
local cifs functions (repost) Using kernel crypto APIs for DES encryption during LM and NT hash generation instead of local functions within cifs. Source file smbdes.c is deleted sans four functions, one of which uses ecb des functionality provided by kernel crypto APIs. Remove function SMBOWFencrypt. Add return codes to various functions such as calc_lanman_hash, SMBencrypt, and SMBNTencrypt. Includes fix noticed by Dan Carpenter. Signed-off-by:
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- 29 Apr, 2011 2 commits
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Jeff Layton authored
It's possible that when we go to decode the string area in the SESSION_SETUP response, that bytes_remaining will be 0. Decrementing it at that point will mean that it can go "negative" and wrap. Check for a bytes_remaining value of 0, and don't try to decode the string area if that's the case. Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-and-Acked-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jeff Layton authored
The buffer length checks in this function depend on this value being a signed data type, but 690c522f converted it to an unsigned type. Also, eliminate a problem with the null termination check in the same function. cifs_strndup_from_ucs handles that situation correctly already, and the existing check could potentially lead to a buffer overrun since it increments bleft without checking to see whether it falls off the end of the buffer. Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-and-Acked-by:
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- 12 Apr, 2011 2 commits
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Steve French authored
make modules C=2 M=fs/cifs CF=-D__CHECK_ENDIAN__ Found for example: CHECK fs/cifs/cifssmb.c fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:728:22: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:728:22: expected unsigned short [unsigned] [usertype] Tid fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:728:22: got restricted __le16 [usertype] <noident> fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:1883:45: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:1883:45: expected long long [signed] [usertype] fl_start fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:1883:45: got restricted __le64 [usertype] start fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:1884:54: warning: restricted __le64 degrades to integer fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:1885:58: warning: restricted __le64 degrades to integer fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:1886:43: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:1886:43: expected unsigned int [unsigned] fl_pid fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:1886:43: got restricted __le32 [usertype] pid In checking new smb2 code for missing endian conversions, I noticed some endian errors had crept in over the last few releases into the cifs code (symlink, ntlmssp, posix lock, and also a less problematic warning in fscache). A followon patch will address a few smb2 endian problems. Reviewed-by:
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Steve French authored
We artificially limited the user name to 32 bytes, but modern servers handle larger. Set the maximum length to a reasonable 256, and make the user name string dynamically allocated rather than a fixed size in session structure. Also clean up old checkpatch warning. Signed-off-by:
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- 21 Feb, 2011 1 commit
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Shirish Pargaonkar authored
LANMAN response length was changed to 16 bytes instead of 24 bytes. Revert it back to 24 bytes. Signed-off-by:
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- 20 Jan, 2011 2 commits
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Jeff Layton authored
It's possible that when we access the ByteCount that the alignment will be off. Most CPUs deal with that transparently, but there's usually some performance impact. Some CPUs raise an exception on unaligned accesses. Fix this by accessing the byte count using the get_unaligned and put_unaligned inlined functions. While we're at it, fix the types of some of the variables that end up getting returns from these functions. Acked-by:
Pavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jeff Layton authored
Since we don't time out individual requests anymore, remove the code that we used to use for setting timeouts on different requests. Reviewed-by:
Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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- 09 Jan, 2011 1 commit
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Jeff Layton authored
I see no real need to leave these sorts of options under an EXPERIMENTAL ifdef. Since you need a mount option to turn this code on, that only blows out the testing matrix. local_leases has been under the EXPERIMENTAL tag for some time, but it's only the mount option that's under this label. Move it out from under this tag. The NTLMSSP code is also under EXPERIMENTAL, but it needs a mount option to turn it on, and in the future any distro will reasonably want this enabled. Go ahead and move it out from under the EXPERIMENTAL tag. Signed-off-by:
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- 06 Jan, 2011 1 commit
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Shirish Pargaonkar authored
Indicate to the server a capability of NTLM2 session security (NTLM2 Key) during ntlmssp protocol exchange in one of the bits of the flags field. If server supports this capability, send NTLM2 key even if signing is not required on the server. If the server requires signing, the session keys exchanged for NTLMv2 and NTLM2 session security in auth packet of the nlmssp exchange are same. Send the same flags in authenticate message (type 3) that client sent in negotiate message (type 1). Remove function setup_ntlmssp_neg_req Make sure ntlmssp negotiate and authenticate messages are zero'ed before they are built. Reported-and-Tested-by:
Robbert Kouprie <robbert@exx.nl> Signed-off-by:
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- 29 Oct, 2010 2 commits
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Shirish Pargaonkar authored
Removed following fields from smb session structure cryptkey, ntlmv2_hash, tilen, tiblob and ntlmssp_auth structure is allocated dynamically only if the auth mech in NTLMSSP. response field within a session_key structure is used to initially store the target info (either plucked from type 2 challenge packet in case of NTLMSSP or fabricated in case of NTLMv2 without extended security) and then to store Message Authentication Key (mak) (session key + client response). Server challenge or cryptkey needed during a NTLMSSP authentication is now part of ntlmssp_auth structure which gets allocated and freed once authenticaiton process is done. Signed-off-by:
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Shirish Pargaonkar authored
Need to have cryptkey or server challenge in smb connection (struct TCP_Server_Info) for ntlm and ntlmv2 auth types for which cryptkey (Encryption Key) is supplied just once in Negotiate Protocol response during an smb connection setup for all the smb sessions over that smb connection. For ntlmssp, cryptkey or server challenge is provided for every smb session in type 2 packet of ntlmssp negotiation, the cryptkey provided during Negotiation Protocol response before smb connection does not count. Rename cryptKey to cryptkey and related changes. Signed-off-by:
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- 27 Oct, 2010 1 commit
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Shirish Pargaonkar authored
Minor cleanup - Fix spelling mistake, make meaningful (goto) label In function setup_ntlmv2_rsp(), do not return 0 and leak memory, let the tiblob get freed. For function find_domain_name(), pass already available nls table pointer instead of loading and unloading the table again in this function. For ntlmv2, the case sensitive password length is the length of the response, so subtract session key length (16 bytes) from the .len. Signed-off-by:
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- 26 Oct, 2010 1 commit
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Shirish Pargaonkar authored
Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by:
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