1. 17 Apr, 2023 1 commit
    • Chuck Lever's avatar
      SUNRPC: Fix failures of checksum Kunit tests · d5142519
      Chuck Lever authored
      Scott reports that when the new GSS krb5 Kunit tests are built as
      a separate module and loaded, the RFC 6803 and RFC 8009 checksum
      tests all fail, even though they pass when run under kunit.py.
      
      It appears that passing a buffer backed by static const memory to
      gss_krb5_checksum() is a problem. A printk in checksum_case() shows
      the correct plaintext, but by the time the buffer has been converted
      to a scatterlist and arrives at checksummer(), it contains all
      zeroes.
      
      Replacing this buffer with one that is dynamically allocated fixes
      the issue.
      Reported-by: default avatarScott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
      Fixes: 02142b2c ("SUNRPC: Add checksum KUnit tests for the RFC 6803 encryption types")
      Tested-by: default avatarScott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
      d5142519
  2. 13 Apr, 2023 1 commit
  3. 04 Apr, 2023 3 commits
  4. 31 Mar, 2023 2 commits
  5. 22 Mar, 2023 1 commit
    • Chuck Lever's avatar
      SUNRPC: Fix a crash in gss_krb5_checksum() · 5f24a872
      Chuck Lever authored
      Anna says:
      > KASAN reports [...] a slab-out-of-bounds in gss_krb5_checksum(),
      > and it can cause my client to panic when running cthon basic
      > tests with krb5p.
      
      > Running faddr2line gives me:
      >
      > gss_krb5_checksum+0x4b6/0x630:
      > ahash_request_free at
      > /home/anna/Programs/linux-nfs.git/./include/crypto/hash.h:619
      > (inlined by) gss_krb5_checksum at
      > /home/anna/Programs/linux-nfs.git/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c:358
      
      My diagnosis is that the memcpy() at the end of gss_krb5_checksum()
      reads past the end of the buffer containing the checksum data
      because the callers have ignored gss_krb5_checksum()'s API contract:
      
       * Caller provides the truncation length of the output token (h) in
       * cksumout.len.
      
      Instead they provide the fixed length of the hmac buffer. This
      length happens to be larger than the value returned by
      crypto_ahash_digestsize().
      
      Change these errant callers to work like krb5_etm_{en,de}crypt().
      As a defensive measure, bound the length of the byte copy at the
      end of gss_krb5_checksum().
      
      Kunit sez:
      Testing complete. Ran 68 tests: passed: 68
      Elapsed time: 81.680s total, 5.875s configuring, 75.610s building, 0.103s running
      Reported-by: default avatarAnna Schumaker <schumaker.anna@gmail.com>
      Fixes: 8270dbfc ("SUNRPC: Obscure Kerberos integrity keys")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
      5f24a872
  6. 17 Mar, 2023 1 commit
    • Jeff Layton's avatar
      nfsd: don't replace page in rq_pages if it's a continuation of last page · 27c934dd
      Jeff Layton authored
      The splice read calls nfsd_splice_actor to put the pages containing file
      data into the svc_rqst->rq_pages array. It's possible however to get a
      splice result that only has a partial page at the end, if (e.g.) the
      filesystem hands back a short read that doesn't cover the whole page.
      
      nfsd_splice_actor will plop the partial page into its rq_pages array and
      return. Then later, when nfsd_splice_actor is called again, the
      remainder of the page may end up being filled out. At this point,
      nfsd_splice_actor will put the page into the array _again_ corrupting
      the reply. If this is done enough times, rq_next_page will overrun the
      array and corrupt the trailing fields -- the rq_respages and
      rq_next_page pointers themselves.
      
      If we've already added the page to the array in the last pass, don't add
      it to the array a second time when dealing with a splice continuation.
      This was originally handled properly in nfsd_splice_actor, but commit
      91e23b1c ("NFSD: Clean up nfsd_splice_actor()") removed the check
      for it.
      
      Fixes: 91e23b1c ("NFSD: Clean up nfsd_splice_actor()")
      Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Reported-by: default avatarDario Lesca <d.lesca@solinos.it>
      Tested-by: default avatarDavid Critch <dcritch@redhat.com>
      Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2150630Signed-off-by: default avatarJeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
      27c934dd
  7. 10 Mar, 2023 1 commit
    • Chuck Lever's avatar
      NFS & NFSD: Update GSS dependencies · e57d0652
      Chuck Lever authored
      Geert reports that:
      > On v6.2, "make ARCH=m68k defconfig" gives you
      > CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5=m
      > On v6.3, it became builtin, due to dropping the dependencies on
      > the individual crypto modules.
      >
      > $ grep -E "CRYPTO_(MD5|DES|CBC|CTS|ECB|HMAC|SHA1|AES)" .config
      > CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES=y
      > CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_TI=m
      > CONFIG_CRYPTO_DES=m
      > CONFIG_CRYPTO_CBC=m
      > CONFIG_CRYPTO_CTS=m
      > CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECB=m
      > CONFIG_CRYPTO_HMAC=m
      > CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD5=m
      > CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1=m
      
      This behavior is triggered by the "default y" in the definition of
      RPCSEC_GSS.
      
      The "default y" was added in 2010 by commit df486a25 ("NFS: Fix
      the selection of security flavours in Kconfig"). However,
      svc_gss_principal was removed in 2012 by commit 03a4e1f6
      ("nfsd4: move principal name into svc_cred"), so the 2010 fix is
      no longer necessary. We can safely change the NFS_V4 and NFSD_V4
      dependencies back to RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5 to get the nicer v6.2
      behavior back.
      
      Selecting KRB5 symbolically represents the true requirement here:
      that all spec-compliant NFSv4 implementations must have Kerberos
      available to use.
      Reported-by: default avatarGeert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
      Fixes: dfe9a123 ("SUNRPC: Enable rpcsec_gss_krb5.ko to be built without CRYPTO_DES")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
      e57d0652
  8. 08 Mar, 2023 1 commit
  9. 07 Mar, 2023 1 commit
  10. 27 Feb, 2023 2 commits
  11. 20 Feb, 2023 26 commits