- 08 Jul, 2021 40 commits
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Stephen Boyd authored
Add "auto" to the usage message so that it's a little clearer that you can pass "auto" as the second argument. When passing "auto" the script tries to find the base path automatically instead of requiring it be passed on the commandline. Also use [<variable>] to indicate the variable argument and that it is optional so that we can differentiate from the literal "auto" that should be passed. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210511003845.2429846-11-swboyd@chromium.orgSigned-off-by:
Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Cc: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org> Cc: Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi@chromium.org> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Stephen Boyd authored
Sometimes if you're using tools that have linked things improperly or have new features/sections that older tools don't expect you'll see warnings printed to stderr. We don't really care about these warnings, so let's just silence these messages to cleanup output of this script. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210511003845.2429846-10-swboyd@chromium.orgSigned-off-by:
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Stephen Boyd authored
Now that stacktraces contain the build ID information we can update this script to use debuginfod-find to locate the debuginfo for the vmlinux and modules automatically. This can replace the existing code that requires specifying a path to vmlinux or tries to find the vmlinux and modules automatically by using the release number. Work it into the script as a fallback option if the vmlinux isn't specified on the commandline. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210511003845.2429846-9-swboyd@chromium.orgSigned-off-by:
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Stephen Boyd authored
Let's use the new printk formats to print the stacktrace entries when printing a backtrace to the kernel logs. This will include any module's build ID[1] in it so that offline/crash debugging can easily locate the debuginfo for a module via something like debuginfod[2]. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210511003845.2429846-8-swboyd@chromium.org Link: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Releases/FeatureBuildId [1] Link: https://sourceware.org/elfutils/Debuginfod.html [2] Signed-off-by:
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Stephen Boyd authored
Let's use the new printk format to print the stacktrace entry when printing a backtrace to the kernel logs. This will include any module's build ID[1] in it so that offline/crash debugging can easily locate the debuginfo for a module via something like debuginfod[2]. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210511003845.2429846-7-swboyd@chromium.org Link: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Releases/FeatureBuildId [1] Link: https://sourceware.org/elfutils/Debuginfod.html [2] Signed-off-by:
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Cc: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org> Cc: Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi@chromium.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Stephen Boyd authored
Let's make kernel stacktraces easier to identify by including the build ID[1] of a module if the stacktrace is printing a symbol from a module. This makes it simpler for developers to locate a kernel module's full debuginfo for a particular stacktrace. Combined with scripts/decode_stracktrace.sh, a developer can download the matching debuginfo from a debuginfod[2] server and find the exact file and line number for the functions plus offsets in a stacktrace that match the module. This is especially useful for pstore crash debugging where the kernel crashes are recorded in something like console-ramoops and the recovery kernel/modules are different or the debuginfo doesn't exist on the device due to space concerns (the debuginfo can be too large for space limited devices). Originally, I put this on the %pS format, but that was quickly rejected given that %pS is used in other places such as ftrace where build IDs aren't meaningful. There was some discussions on the list to put every module build ID into the "Modules linked in:" section of the stacktrace message but that quickly becomes very hard to read once you have more than three or four modules linked in. It also provides too much information when we don't expect each module to be traversed in a stacktrace. Having the build ID for modules that aren't important just makes things messy. Splitting it to multiple lines for each module quickly explodes the number of lines printed in an oops too, possibly wrapping the warning off the console. And finally, trying to stash away each module used in a callstack to provide the ID of each symbol printed is cumbersome and would require changes to each architecture to stash away modules and return their build IDs once unwinding has completed. Instead, we opt for the simpler approach of introducing new printk formats '%pS[R]b' for "pointer symbolic backtrace with module build ID" and '%pBb' for "pointer backtrace with module build ID" and then updating the few places in the architecture layer where the stacktrace is printed to use this new format. Before: Call trace: lkdtm_WARNING+0x28/0x30 [lkdtm] direct_entry+0x16c/0x1b4 [lkdtm] full_proxy_write+0x74/0xa4 vfs_write+0xec/0x2e8 After: Call trace: lkdtm_WARNING+0x28/0x30 [lkdtm 6c2215028606bda50de823490723dc4bc5bf46f9] direct_entry+0x16c/0x1b4 [lkdtm 6c2215028606bda50de823490723dc4bc5bf46f9] full_proxy_write+0x74/0xa4 vfs_write+0xec/0x2e8 [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build with CONFIG_MODULES=n, tweak code layout] [rdunlap@infradead.org: fix build when CONFIG_MODULES is not set] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210513171510.20328-1-rdunlap@infradead.org [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make kallsyms_lookup_buildid() static] [cuibixuan@huawei.com: fix build error when CONFIG_SYSFS is disabled] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210525105049.34804-1-cuibixuan@huawei.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210511003845.2429846-6-swboyd@chromium.org Link: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Releases/FeatureBuildId [1] Link: https://sourceware.org/elfutils/Debuginfod.html [2] Signed-off-by:
Bixuan Cui <cuibixuan@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Cc: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org> Cc: Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi@chromium.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Stephen Boyd authored
Add the running kernel's build ID[1] to the stacktrace information header. This makes it simpler for developers to locate the vmlinux with full debuginfo for a particular kernel stacktrace. Combined with scripts/decode_stracktrace.sh, a developer can download the correct vmlinux from a debuginfod[2] server and find the exact file and line number for the functions plus offsets in a stacktrace. This is especially useful for pstore crash debugging where the kernel crashes are recorded in the pstore logs and the recovery kernel is different or the debuginfo doesn't exist on the device due to space concerns (the data can be large and a security concern). The stacktrace can be analyzed after the crash by using the build ID to find the matching vmlinux and understand where in the function something went wrong. Example stacktrace from lkdtm: WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 3255 at drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c:83 lkdtm_WARNING+0x28/0x30 [lkdtm] Modules linked in: lkdtm rfcomm algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg xt_cgroup uinput xt_MASQUERADE CPU: 4 PID: 3255 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.11 #3 aa23f7a1231c229de205662d5a9e0d4c580f19a1 Hardware name: Google Lazor (rev3+) with KB Backlight (DT) pstate: 00400009 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) pc : lkdtm_WARNING+0x28/0x30 [lkdtm] The hex string aa23f7a1231c229de205662d5a9e0d4c580f19a1 is the build ID, following the kernel version number. Put it all behind a config option, STACKTRACE_BUILD_ID, so that kernel developers can remove this information if they decide it is too much. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210511003845.2429846-5-swboyd@chromium.org Link: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Releases/FeatureBuildId [1] Link: https://sourceware.org/elfutils/Debuginfod.html [2] Signed-off-by:
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Stephen Boyd authored
Parse the kernel's build ID at initialization so that other code can print a hex format string representation of the running kernel's build ID. This will be used in the kdump and dump_stack code so that developers can easily locate the vmlinux debug symbols for a crash/stacktrace. [swboyd@chromium.org: fix implicit declaration of init_vmlinux_build_id()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAE-0n51UjTbay8N9FXAyE7_aR2+ePrQnKSRJ0gbmRsXtcLBVaw@mail.gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210511003845.2429846-4-swboyd@chromium.orgSigned-off-by:
Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Cc: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org> Cc: Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi@chromium.org> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Stephen Boyd authored
Add an API that can parse the build ID out of a buffer, instead of a vma, to support printing a kernel module's build ID for stack traces. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210511003845.2429846-3-swboyd@chromium.orgSigned-off-by:
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Stephen Boyd authored
Patch series "Add build ID to stacktraces", v6. This series adds the kernel's build ID[1] to the stacktrace header printed in oops messages, warnings, etc. and the build ID for any module that appears in the stacktrace after the module name. The goal is to make the stacktrace more self-contained and descriptive by including the relevant build IDs in the kernel logs when something goes wrong. This can be used by post processing tools like script/decode_stacktrace.sh and kernel developers to easily locate the debug info associated with a kernel crash and line up what line and file things started falling apart at. To show how this can be used I've included a patch to decode_stacktrace.sh that downloads the debuginfo from a debuginfod server. This also includes some patches to make the buildid.c file use more const arguments and consolidate logic into buildid.c from kdump. These are left to the end as they were mostly cleanup patches. Here's an example lkdtm stacktrace on arm64. WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 3255 at drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c:83 lkdtm_WARNING+0x28/0x30 [lkdtm] Modules linked in: lkdtm rfcomm algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg xt_cgroup uinput xt_MASQUERADE CPU: 4 PID: 3255 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.11 #3 aa23f7a1231c229de205662d5a9e0d4c580f19a1 Hardware name: Google Lazor (rev3+) with KB Backlight (DT) pstate: 00400009 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) pc : lkdtm_WARNING+0x28/0x30 [lkdtm] lr : lkdtm_do_action+0x24/0x40 [lkdtm] sp : ffffffc0134fbca0 x29: ffffffc0134fbca0 x28: ffffff92d53ba240 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffffffe3622352c0 x23: 0000000000000020 x22: ffffffe362233366 x21: ffffffe3622352e0 x20: ffffffc0134fbde0 x19: 0000000000000008 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: ffffff929b6536fc x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000012 x13: ffffffe380ed892c x12: ffffffe381d05068 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000001 x8 : ffffffe362237000 x7 : aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000008 x2 : ffffff93fef25a70 x1 : ffffff93fef15788 x0 : ffffffe3622352e0 Call trace: lkdtm_WARNING+0x28/0x30 [lkdtm ed5019fdf5e53be37cb1ba7899292d7e143b259e] direct_entry+0x16c/0x1b4 [lkdtm ed5019fdf5e53be37cb1ba7899292d7e143b259e] full_proxy_write+0x74/0xa4 vfs_write+0xec/0x2e8 ksys_write+0x84/0xf0 __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x30 el0_svc_common+0xf4/0x1c0 do_el0_svc_compat+0x28/0x3c el0_svc_compat+0x10/0x1c el0_sync_compat_handler+0xa8/0xcc el0_sync_compat+0x178/0x180 ---[ end trace 3d95032303e59e68 ]--- This patch (of 13): Some kernel elf files have various notes that also happen to have an elf note type of '3', which matches NT_GNU_BUILD_ID but the note name isn't "GNU". For example, this note trips up the existing logic: Owner Data size Description Xen 0x00000008 Unknown note type: (0x00000003) description data: 00 00 00 ffffff80 ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff Let's make sure that it is a GNU note when parsing the build ID so that we can use this function to parse a vmlinux's build ID too. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210511003845.2429846-1-swboyd@chromium.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210511003845.2429846-2-swboyd@chromium.org Fixes: bd7525da ("bpf: Move stack_map_get_build_id into lib") Signed-off-by:
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Tested-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-16-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-15-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-14-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-13-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Signed-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-12-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-11-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: Stefan Kristiansson <stefan.kristiansson@saunalahti.fi> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-10-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-9-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-8-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org> Acked-by:
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-7-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-6-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-5-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-4-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-3-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Patch series "init_mm: cleanup ARCH's text/data/brk setup code", v3. Add setup_initial_init_mm() helper, then use it to cleanup the text, data and brk setup code. This patch (of 15): Add setup_initial_init_mm() helper to setup kernel text, data and brk. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-2-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
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Zhen Lei authored
Fix some spelling mistakes in comments: successfull ==> successful potentialy ==> potentially alloced ==> allocated indicies ==> indices wont ==> won't resposible ==> responsible dirtyness ==> dirtiness droppped ==> dropped alread ==> already occured ==> occurred interupts ==> interrupts extention ==> extension slighly ==> slightly Dont't ==> Don't Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210531034849.9549-2-thunder.leizhen@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Signed-off-by:
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Mike Rapoport authored
The test verifies that file descriptor created with memfd_secret does not allow read/write operations, that secret memory mappings respect RLIMIT_MEMLOCK and that remote accesses with process_vm_read() and ptrace() to the secret memory fail. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-8-rppt@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by:
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Mike Rapoport authored
Wire up memfd_secret system call on architectures that define ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP, namely arm64, risc-v and x86. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-7-rppt@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by:
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by:
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Mike Rapoport authored
It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings. Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-6-rppt@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
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Mike Rapoport authored
Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly enable it at the boot time. Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes that have access to the file descriptor. Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the "traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says: "Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse." memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user visible APIs. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e0 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page migration. Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings. However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page. The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: suppress Kconfig whine] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Acked-by:
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Mike Rapoport authored
On arm64, set_direct_map_*() functions may return 0 without actually changing the linear map. This behaviour can be controlled using kernel parameters, so we need a way to determine at runtime whether calls to set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() and set_direct_map_default_noflush() have any effect. Extend set_memory API with can_set_direct_map() function that allows checking if calling set_direct_map_*() will actually change the page table, replace several occurrences of open coded checks in arm64 with the new function and provide a generic stub for architectures that always modify page tables upon calls to set_direct_map APIs. [arnd@arndb.de: arm64: kfence: fix header inclusion ] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-4-rppt@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
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Mike Rapoport authored
ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP and ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY configuration options have no meaning when CONFIG_MMU is disabled and there is no point to enable them for the nommu case. Add an explicit dependency on MMU for these options. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-3-rppt@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reviewed-by:
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Mike Rapoport authored
Patch series "mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas", v20. This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor. The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will be present only in the page table of the owning mm. Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings. It's designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. In the future the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest memory in a virtual machine host. For demonstration of secret memory usage we've created a userspace library https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/secret-memory-preloader.git that does two things: the first is act as a preloader for openssl to redirect all the OPENSSL_malloc calls to secret memory meaning any secret keys get automatically protected this way and the other thing it does is expose the API to the user who needs it. We anticipate that a lot of the use cases would be like the openssl one: many toolkits that deal with secret keys already have special handling for the memory to try to give them greater protection, so this would simply be pluggable into the toolkits without any need for user application modification. Hiding secret memory mappings behind an anonymous file allows usage of the page cache for tracking pages allocated for the "secret" mappings as well as using address_space_operations for e.g. page migration callbacks. The anonymous file may be also used implicitly, like hugetlb files, to implement mmap(MAP_SECRET) and use the secret memory areas with "native" mm ABIs in the future. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e0 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. In addition, there is also a long term goal to improve management of the direct map. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ This patch (of 7): It will be used by the upcoming secret memory implementation. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-1-rppt@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-2-rppt@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
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Oliver Glitta authored
Many stack traces are similar so there are many similar arrays. Stackdepot saves each unique stack only once. Replace field addrs in struct track with depot_stack_handle_t handle. Use stackdepot to save stack trace. The benefits are smaller memory overhead and possibility to aggregate per-cache statistics in the future using the stackdepot handle instead of matching stacks manually. [rdunlap@infradead.org: rename save_stack_trace()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210513051920.29320-1-rdunlap@infradead.org [vbabka@suse.cz: fix lockdep splat] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210516195150.26740-1-vbabka@suse.czLink: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210414163434.4376-1-glittao@gmail.comSigned-off-by:
Oliver Glitta <glittao@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Reviewed-by:
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by:
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Nathan Chancellor authored
Now that we handle all of the sections in a Hexagon defconfig, select ARCH_WANT_LD_ORPHAN_WARN so that unhandled sections are warned about by default. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521011239.1332345-4-nathan@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Reviewed-by:
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Acked-by:
Brian Cain <bcain@codeaurora.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Oliver Glitta <glittao@gmail.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
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Nathan Chancellor authored
ld.lld warns that the '.modinfo' section is not currently handled: ld.lld: warning: kernel/built-in.a(workqueue.o):(.modinfo) is being placed in '.modinfo' ld.lld: warning: kernel/built-in.a(printk/printk.o):(.modinfo) is being placed in '.modinfo' ld.lld: warning: kernel/built-in.a(irq/spurious.o):(.modinfo) is being placed in '.modinfo' ld.lld: warning: kernel/built-in.a(rcu/update.o):(.modinfo) is being placed in '.modinfo' The '.modinfo' section was added in commit 898490c0 ("moduleparam: Save information about built-in modules in separate file") to the DISCARDS macro but Hexagon has never used that macro. The unification of DISCARDS happened in commit 023bf6f1 ("linker script: unify usage of discard definition") in 2009, prior to Hexagon being added in 2011. Switch Hexagon over to the DISCARDS macro so that anything that is expected to be discarded gets discarded. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521011239.1332345-3-nathan@kernel.org Fixes: e95bf452 ("Hexagon: Add configuration and makefiles for the Hexagon architecture.") Signed-off-by:
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Nathan Chancellor authored
Patch series "hexagon: Fix build error with CONFIG_STACKDEPOT and select CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_LD_ORPHAN_WARN". This series fixes an error with ARCH=hexagon that was pointed out by the patch "mm/slub: use stackdepot to save stack trace in objects". The first patch fixes that error by handling the '.irqentry.text' and '.softirqentry.text' sections. The second patch switches Hexagon over to the common DISCARDS macro, which should have been done when Hexagon was merged into the tree to match commit 023bf6f1 ("linker script: unify usage of discard definition"). The third patch selects CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_LD_ORPHAN_WARN so that something like this does not happen again. This patch (of 3): Patch "mm/slub: use stackdepot to save stack trace in objects" in -mm selects CONFIG_STACKDEPOT when CONFIG_STACKTRACE_SUPPORT is selected and CONFIG_STACKDEPOT requires IRQENTRY_TEXT and SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT to be handled after commit 505a0ef1 ("kasan: stackdepot: move filter_irq_stacks() to stackdepot.c") due to the use of the __{,soft}irqentry_text_{start,end} section symbols. If those sections are not handled, the build is broken. $ make ARCH=hexagon CROSS_COMPILE=hexagon-linux- LLVM=1 LLVM_IAS=1 defconfig all ... ld.lld: error: undefined symbol: __irqentry_text_start >>> referenced by stackdepot.c >>> stackdepot.o:(filter_irq_stacks) in archive lib/built-in.a >>> referenced by stackdepot.c >>> stackdepot.o:(filter_irq_stacks) in archive lib/built-in.a ld.lld: error: undefined symbol: __irqentry_text_end >>> referenced by stackdepot.c >>> stackdepot.o:(filter_irq_stacks) in archive lib/built-in.a >>> referenced by stackdepot.c >>> stackdepot.o:(filter_irq_stacks) in archive lib/built-in.a ld.lld: error: undefined symbol: __softirqentry_text_start >>> referenced by stackdepot.c >>> stackdepot.o:(filter_irq_stacks) in archive lib/built-in.a >>> referenced by stackdepot.c >>> stackdepot.o:(filter_irq_stacks) in archive lib/built-in.a ld.lld: error: undefined symbol: __softirqentry_text_end >>> referenced by stackdepot.c >>> stackdepot.o:(filter_irq_stacks) in archive lib/built-in.a >>> referenced by stackdepot.c >>> stackdepot.o:(filter_irq_stacks) in archive lib/built-in.a ... Add these sections to the Hexagon linker script so the build continues to work. ld.lld's orphan section warning would have caught this prior to the -mm commit mentioned above: ld.lld: warning: kernel/built-in.a(softirq.o):(.softirqentry.text) is being placed in '.softirqentry.text' ld.lld: warning: kernel/built-in.a(softirq.o):(.softirqentry.text) is being placed in '.softirqentry.text' ld.lld: warning: kernel/built-in.a(softirq.o):(.softirqentry.text) is being placed in '.softirqentry.text' Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521011239.1332345-1-nathan@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521011239.1332345-2-nathan@kernel.org Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1381 Fixes: 505a0ef1 ("kasan: stackdepot: move filter_irq_stacks() to stackdepot.c") Signed-off-by:
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Zhen Lei authored
Fix some spelling mistakes in comments found by "codespell": Hoever ==> However poiter ==> pointer representaion ==> representation uppon ==> upon independend ==> independent aquired ==> acquired mis-match ==> mismatch scrach ==> scratch struture ==> structure Analagous ==> Analogous interation ==> iteration And some were discovered manually by Joe Perches and Christoph Lameter: stroed ==> stored arch independent ==> an architecture independent A example structure for ==> Example structure for Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210609150027.14805-2-thunder.leizhen@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
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Zhen Lei authored
Fix some spelling mistakes in comments: permanentely ==> permanently wont ==> won't remaning ==> remaining succed ==> succeed shouldnt ==> shouldn't alpha-numeric ==> alphanumeric storeing ==> storing funtion ==> function documenation ==> documentation Determin ==> Determine intepreted ==> interpreted ammount ==> amount obious ==> obvious interupts ==> interrupts occured ==> occurred asssociated ==> associated taking into acount ==> taking into account squence ==> sequence stil ==> still contiguos ==> contiguous matchs ==> matches Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210607072555.12416-1-thunder.leizhen@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Zhen Lei authored
Fix some spelling mistakes in comments found by "codespell": thats ==> that's unitialized ==> uninitialized panicing ==> panicking sucess ==> success possitive ==> positive intepreted ==> interpreted Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210607133036.12525-2-thunder.leizhen@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
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