- 05 Sep, 2018 1 commit
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Tyler Hicks authored
The irda_bind() function allocates memory for self->ias_obj without checking to see if the socket is already bound. A userspace process could repeatedly bind the socket, have each new object added into the LM-IAS database, and lose the reference to the old object assigned to the socket to exhaust memory resources. This patch errors out of the bind operation when self->ias_obj is already assigned. CVE-2018-6554 Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by:
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reviewed-by:
Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Reviewed-by:
Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
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- 04 Sep, 2018 3 commits
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Mauricio Faria de Oliveira authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1787281 Even if properly initialized, the lvname array (i.e., strings) is read from disk, and might contain corrupt data (e.g., lack the null terminating character for strings). So, make sure the partition name string used in pr_warn() has the null terminating character. Fixes: 6ceea22b ("partitions: add aix lvm partition support files") Suggested-by:
Daniel J. Axtens <daniel.axtens@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mfo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> (cherry picked from commit d43fdae7) Signed-off-by:
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Acked-by:
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Mauricio Faria de Oliveira authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1787281 The if-block that sets a successful return value in aix_partition() uses 'lvip[].pps_per_lv' and 'n[].name' potentially uninitialized. For example, if 'numlvs' is zero or alloc_lvn() fails, neither is initialized, but are used anyway if alloc_pvd() succeeds after it. So, make the alloc_pvd() call conditional on their initialization. This has been hit when attaching an apparently corrupted/stressed AIX LUN, misleading the kernel to pr_warn() invalid data and hang. [...] partition (null) (11 pp's found) is not contiguous [...] partition (null) (2 pp's found) is not contiguous [...] partition (null) (3 pp's found) is not contiguous [...] partition (null) (64 pp's found) is not contiguous Fixes: 6ceea22b ("partitions: add aix lvm partition support files") Signed-off-by:
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Kleber Sacilotto de Souza authored
Ignore: yes Signed-off-by:
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- 27 Aug, 2018 13 commits
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Khalid Elmously authored
Signed-off-by:Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
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Heiner Kallweit authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1785739 This condition wasn't adjusted when PHY_IGNORE_INTERRUPT (-2) was added long ago. In case of PHY_IGNORE_INTERRUPT the MAC interrupt indicates also PHY state changes and we should do what the symbol says. Fixes: 84a527a4 ("net: phylib: fix interrupts re-enablement in phy_start") Signed-off-by:
Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> (cherry picked from commit 08f51385) Signed-off-by:
dann frazier <dann.frazier@canonical.com> Acked-by:
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Shaohui Xie authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1785739 If phy was suspended and is starting, current driver always enable phy's interrupts, if phy works in polling, phy can raise unexpected interrupt which will not be handled, the interrupt will block system enter suspend again. So interrupts should only be re-enabled if phy works in interrupt. Signed-off-by:
Shaohui Xie <Shaohui.Xie@nxp.com> Reviewed-by:
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Julian Wiedmann authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1786057 If qeth_qdio_output_handler() detects that a transmit requires async completion, it replaces the pending buffer's metadata object (qeth_qdio_out_buffer) so that this queue buffer can be re-used while the data is pending completion. Later when the CQ indicates async completion of such a metadata object, qeth_qdio_cq_handler() tries to free any data associated with this object (since HW has now completed the transfer). By calling qeth_clear_output_buffer(), it erronously operates on the queue buffer that _previously_ belonged to this transfer ... but which has been potentially re-used several times by now. This results in double-free's of the buffer's data, and failing transmits as the buffer descriptor is scrubbed in mid-air. The correct way of handling this situation is to 1. scrub the queue buffer when it is prepared for re-use, and 2. later obtain the data addresses from the async-completion notifier (ie. the AOB), instead of the queue buffer. All this only affects qeth devices used for af_iucv HiperTransport. Fixes: 0da9581d ("qeth: exploit asynchronous delivery of storage blocks") Signed-off-by:
Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Joseph Salisbury <joseph.salisbury@canonical.com> Acked-by:
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Marta Rybczynska authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1788035 Make sure the CQE phase (validity) is read before the rest of the structure. The phase bit is the highest address and the CQE read will happen on most platforms from lower to upper addresses and will be done by multiple non-atomic loads. If the structure is updated by PCI during the reads from the processor, the processor may get a corrupted copy. The addition of the new nvme_cqe_valid function that verifies the validity bit also allows refactoring of the other CQE read sequences. Signed-off-by:
Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@kalray.eu> Reviewed-by:
Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Reviewed-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by:
Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com> (backported from commit d783e0bd) Signed-off-by:
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Kiran Kumar Modukuri authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1776254 If we meet a conflicting object that is marked FSCACHE_OBJECT_IS_LIVE in the active object tree, we have been emitting a BUG after logging information about it and the new object. Instead, we should wait for the CACHEFILES_OBJECT_ACTIVE flag to be cleared on the old object (or return an error). The ACTIVE flag should be cleared after it has been removed from the active object tree. A timeout of 60s is used in the wait, so we shouldn't be able to get stuck there. Fixes: 9ae326a6 ("CacheFiles: A cache that backs onto a mounted filesystem") Signed-off-by:
Kiran Kumar Modukuri <kiran.modukuri@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> (cherry picked from commit c2412ac4) Signed-off-by:
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Kiran Kumar Modukuri authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1776254 In cachefiles_mark_object_active(), the new object is marked active and then we try to add it to the active object tree. If a conflicting object is already present, we want to wait for that to go away. After the wait, we go round again and try to re-mark the object as being active - but it's already marked active from the first time we went through and a BUG is issued. Fix this by clearing the CACHEFILES_OBJECT_ACTIVE flag before we try again. Analysis from Kiran Kumar Modukuri: [Impact] Oops during heavy NFS + FSCache + Cachefiles CacheFiles: Error: Overlong wait for old active object to go away. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000002 CacheFiles: Error: Object already active kernel BUG at fs/cachefiles/namei.c:163! [Cause] In a heavily loaded system with big files being read and truncated, an fscache object for a cookie is being dropped and a new object being looked. The new object being looked for has to wait for the old object to go away before the new object is moved to active state. [Fix] Clear the flag 'CACHEFILES_OBJECT_ACTIVE' for the new object when retrying the object lookup. [Testcase] Have run ~100 hours of NFS stress tests and have not seen this bug recur. [Regression Potential] - Limited to fscache/cachefiles. Fixes: 9ae326a6 ("CacheFiles: A cache that backs onto a mounted filesystem") Signed-off-by:
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Kiran Kumar Modukuri authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1776277 When a cookie is allocated that causes fscache_object structs to be allocated, those objects are initialised with the cookie pointer, but aren't blessed with a ref on that cookie unless the attachment is successfully completed in fscache_attach_object(). If attachment fails because the parent object was dying or there was a collision, fscache_attach_object() returns without incrementing the cookie counter - but upon failure of this function, the object is released which then puts the cookie, whether or not a ref was taken on the cookie. Fix this by taking a ref on the cookie when it is assigned in fscache_object_init(), even when we're creating a root object. Analysis from Kiran Kumar: This bug has been seen in 4.4.0-124-generic #148-Ubuntu kernel BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1776277 fscache cookie ref count updated incorrectly during fscache object allocation resulting in following Oops. kernel BUG at /build/linux-Y09MKI/linux-4.4.0/fs/fscache/internal.h:321! kernel BUG at /build/linux-Y09MKI/linux-4.4.0/fs/fscache/cookie.c:639! [Cause] Two threads are trying to do operate on a cookie and two objects. (1) One thread tries to unmount the filesystem and in process goes over a huge list of objects marking them dead and deleting the objects. cookie->usage is also decremented in following path: nfs_fscache_release_super_cookie -> __fscache_relinquish_cookie ->__fscache_cookie_put ->BUG_ON(atomic_read(&cookie->usage) <= 0); (2) A second thread tries to lookup an object for reading data in following path: fscache_alloc_object 1) cachefiles_alloc_object -> fscache_object_init -> assign cookie, but usage not bumped. 2) fscache_attach_object -> fails in cant_attach_object because the cookie's backing object or cookie's->parent object are going away 3) fscache_put_object -> cachefiles_put_object ->fscache_object_destroy ->fscache_cookie_put ->BUG_ON(atomic_read(&cookie->usage) <= 0); [NOTE from dhowells] It's unclear as to the circumstances in which (2) can take place, given that thread (1) is in nfs_kill_super(), however a conflicting NFS mount with slightly different parameters that creates a different superblock would do it. A backtrace from Kiran seems to show that this is a possibility: kernel BUG at/build/linux-Y09MKI/linux-4.4.0/fs/fscache/cookie.c:639! ... RIP: __fscache_cookie_put+0x3a/0x40 [fscache] Call Trace: __fscache_relinquish_cookie+0x87/0x120 [fscache] nfs_fscache_release_super_cookie+0x2d/0xb0 [nfs] nfs_kill_super+0x29/0x40 [nfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x48/0x80 deactivate_super+0x5c/0x60 cleanup_mnt+0x3f/0x90 __cleanup_mnt+0x12/0x20 task_work_run+0x86/0xb0 exit_to_usermode_loop+0xc2/0xd0 syscall_return_slowpath+0x4e/0x60 int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f [Fix] Bump up the cookie usage in fscache_object_init, when it is first being assigned a cookie atomically such that the cookie is added and bumped up if its refcount is not zero. Remove the assignment in fscache_attach_object(). [Testcase] I have run ~100 hours of NFS stress tests and not seen this bug recur. [Regression Potential] - Limited to fscache/cachefiles. Fixes: ccc4fc3d ("FS-Cache: Implement the cookie management part of the netfs API") Signed-off-by:
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Kiran Kumar Modukuri authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774336 cachefiles_read_waiter() has the right to access a 'monitor' object by virtue of being called under the waitqueue lock for one of the pages in its purview. However, it has no ref on that monitor object or on the associated operation. What it is allowed to do is to move the monitor object to the operation's to_do list, but once it drops the work_lock, it's actually no longer permitted to access that object. However, it is trying to enqueue the retrieval operation for processing - but it can only do this via a pointer in the monitor object, something it shouldn't be doing. If it doesn't enqueue the operation, the operation may not get processed. If the order is flipped so that the enqueue is first, then it's possible for the work processor to look at the to_do list before the monitor is enqueued upon it. Fix this by getting a ref on the operation so that we can trust that it will still be there once we've added the monitor to the to_do list and dropped the work_lock. The op can then be enqueued after the lock is dropped. The bug can manifest in one of a couple of ways. The first manifestation looks like: FS-Cache: FS-Cache: Assertion failed FS-Cache: 6 == 5 is false ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/fscache/operation.c:494! RIP: 0010:fscache_put_operation+0x1e3/0x1f0 ... fscache_op_work_func+0x26/0x50 process_one_work+0x131/0x290 worker_thread+0x45/0x360 kthread+0xf8/0x130 ? create_worker+0x190/0x190 ? kthread_cancel_work_sync+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 This is due to the operation being in the DEAD state (6) rather than INITIALISED, COMPLETE or CANCELLED (5) because it's already passed through fscache_put_operation(). The bug can also manifest like the following: kernel BUG at fs/fscache/operation.c:69! ... [exception RIP: fscache_enqueue_operation+246] ... #7 [ffff883fff083c10] fscache_enqueue_operation at ffffffffa0b793c6 #8 [ffff883fff083c28] cachefiles_read_waiter at ffffffffa0b15a48 #9 [ffff883fff083c48] __wake_up_common at ffffffff810af028 I'm not entirely certain as to which is line 69 in Lei's kernel, so I'm not entirely clear which assertion failed. Fixes: 9ae326a6 ("CacheFiles: A cache that backs onto a mounted filesystem") Reported-by:
Lei Xue <carmark.dlut@gmail.com> Reported-by:
Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com> Reported-by:
Anthony DeRobertis <aderobertis@metrics.net> Reported-by:
NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Reported-by:
Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Reported-by:
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Kiran Kumar Modukuri authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774336 Alter the state-check assertion in fscache_enqueue_operation() to allow cancelled operations to be given processing time so they can be cleaned up. Also fix a debugging statement that was requiring such operations to have an object assigned. Fixes: 9ae326a6 ("CacheFiles: A cache that backs onto a mounted filesystem") Reported-by:
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Daniel Axtens authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774336 Revert 9bd2e21f in Xenial. Upstream has taken a different solution, which we're about to apply. Signed-off-by:
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Paul Meyer authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1739107 The hv-kvp-daemon service starts after walinuxagent. The default dependencies make hv-kvp-daemon wait until the whole system is up before it can start, which is not necessary and blocks Azure telemetry use case. This commit changes the hv-kvp-daemon.service unit file to start it up as early as possible so that the channel for telemetry can be use. Signed-off-by:
Eric Desrochers <eric.desrochers@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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Khalid Elmously authored
Ignore: yes Signed-off-by:
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- 15 Aug, 2018 1 commit
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Kleber Sacilotto de Souza authored
Signed-off-by:
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- 14 Aug, 2018 22 commits
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Stefan Bader authored
Adding CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT=y to common config. This options gets automatically set based on X86 config. So adding it is purely for consistency and will make no difference on resulting kernels. Ignore: yes Signed-off-by: -
John Johansen authored
The apparmor policy language current does not allow expressing of the locking permission for no-fs unix sockets. However the kernel is enforcing mediation. Add the AA_MAY_LOCK perm to the computed perm mask which will grant permission for all current abi profiles, but still allow specifying auditing of the operation if needed. BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1780227Signed-off-by:
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by:
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Tetsuo Handa authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1778286 syzbot is reporting NULL pointer dereference at xattr_getsecurity() [1], for cap_inode_getsecurity() is returning sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data) when memory allocation failed. Return -ENOMEM if memory allocation failed. [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a55ba438506fe68649a5f50d2d82d56b365e0107Signed-off-by:
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Fixes: 8db6c34f ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities") Reported-by:
syzbot <syzbot+9369930ca44f29e60e2d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14+ Acked-by:
Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by:
James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by:
Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> (cherry picked from commit 1f578172) Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1778286 If userspace attempted to set a "security.capability" xattr shorter than 4 bytes (e.g. 'setfattr -n security.capability -v x file'), then cap_convert_nscap() read past the end of the buffer containing the xattr value because it accessed the ->magic_etc field without verifying that the xattr value is long enough to contain that field. Fix it by validating the xattr value size first. This bug was found using syzkaller with KASAN. The KASAN report was as follows (cleaned up slightly): BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cap_convert_nscap+0x514/0x630 security/commoncap.c:498 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88002d8741c0 by task syz-executor1/2852 CPU: 0 PID: 2852 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc6-00200-gcc0aac99d977 #253 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0xe3/0x195 lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_address_description+0x73/0x260 mm/kasan/report.c:252 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline] kasan_report+0x235/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409 cap_convert_nscap+0x514/0x630 security/commoncap.c:498 setxattr+0x2bd/0x350 fs/xattr.c:446 path_setxattr+0x168/0x1b0 fs/xattr.c:472 SYSC_setxattr fs/xattr.c:487 [inline] SyS_setxattr+0x36/0x50 fs/xattr.c:483 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x18/0x85 Fixes: 8db6c34f ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+ Signed-off-by:
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by:
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> (cherry picked from commit dc32b5c3) Signed-off-by:
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Colin Ian King authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1778286 The pointer fs_ns is assigned from inode->i_ib->s_user_ns before a null pointer check on inode, hence if inode is actually null we will get a null pointer dereference on this assignment. Fix this by only dereferencing inode after the null pointer check on inode. Detected by CoverityScan CID#1455328 ("Dereference before null check") Fixes: 8db6c34f ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities") Signed-off-by:
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Serge E. Hallyn authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1778286 Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do so, then any unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a private namespace, write the xattr, and execute the file with privilege on the host. However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run with limited privilege must continue to support other methods of gaining and dropping privilege. For instance a program installer must detect whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign them if so but set setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn must know how to drop partial capabilities, and do so only if setuid-root. This patch introduces v3 of the security.capability xattr. It builds a vfs_ns_cap_data struct by appending a uid_t rootid to struct vfs_cap_data. This is the absolute uid_t (that is, the uid_t in user namespace which mounted the filesystem, usually init_user_ns) of the root id in whose namespaces the file capabilities may take effect. When a task asks to write a v2 security.capability xattr, if it is privileged with respect to the userns which mounted the filesystem, then nothing should change. Otherwise, the kernel will transparently rewrite the xattr as a v3 with the appropriate rootid. This is done during the execution of setxattr() to catch user-space-initiated capability writes. Subsequently, any task executing the file which has the noted kuid as its root uid, or which is in a descendent user_ns of such a user_ns, will run the file with capabilities. Similarly when asking to read file capabilities, a v3 capability will be presented as v2 if it applies to the caller's namespace. If a task writes a v3 security.capability, then it can provide a uid for the xattr so long as the uid is valid in its own user namespace, and it is privileged with CAP_SETFCAP over its namespace. The kernel will translate that rootid to an absolute uid, and write that to disk. After this, a task in the writer's namespace will not be able to use those capabilities (unless rootid was 0), but a task in a namespace where the given uid is root will. Only a single security.capability xattr may exist at a time for a given file. A task may overwrite an existing xattr so long as it is privileged over the inode. Note this is a departure from previous semantics, which required privilege to remove a security.capability xattr. This check can be re-added if deemed useful. This allows a simple setxattr to work, allows tar/untar to work, and allows us to tar in one namespace and untar in another while preserving the capability, without risking leaking privilege into a parent namespace. Example using tar: $ cp /bin/sleep sleepx $ mkdir b1 b2 $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100000:1 -m b:1:$(id -u):1 -- chown 0:0 b1 $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1 -m b:1:$(id -u):1 -- chown 0:0 b2 $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100000:1000 -- tar --xattrs-include=security.capability --xattrs -cf b1/sleepx.tar sleepx $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1000 -- tar --xattrs-include=security.capability --xattrs -C b2 -xf b1/sleepx.tar $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1000 -- getcap b2/sleepx b2/sleepx = cap_sys_admin+ep # /opt/ltp/testcases/bin/getv3xattr b2/sleepx v3 xattr, rootid is 100001 A patch to linux-test-project adding a new set of tests for this functionality is in the nsfscaps branch at github.com/hallyn/ltp Changelog: Nov 02 2016: fix invalid check at refuse_fcap_overwrite() Nov 07 2016: convert rootid from and to fs user_ns (From ebiederm: mar 28 2017) commoncap.c: fix typos - s/v4/v3 get_vfs_caps_from_disk: clarify the fs_ns root access check nsfscaps: change the code split for cap_inode_setxattr() Apr 09 2017: don't return v3 cap for caps owned by current root. return a v2 cap for a true v2 cap in non-init ns Apr 18 2017: . Change the flow of fscap writing to support s_user_ns writing. . Remove refuse_fcap_overwrite(). The value of the previous xattr doesn't matter. Apr 24 2017: . incorporate Eric's incremental diff . move cap_convert_nscap to setxattr and simplify its usage May 8, 2017: . fix leaking dentry refcount in cap_inode_getsecurity Signed-off-by:
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1784409Signed-off-by:
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Dan Carpenter authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1784409 commit 1376b0a2 upstream. There is a '>' vs '<' typo so this loop is a no-op. Fixes: d35dcc89 ("staging: comedi: quatech_daqp_cs: fix daqp_ao_insn_write()") Signed-off-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Jann Horn authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1784409 commit ce00bf07 upstream. The old code would indefinitely block other users of nf_log_mutex if a userspace access in proc_dostring() blocked e.g. due to a userfaultfd region. Fix it by moving proc_dostring() out of the locked region. This is a followup to commit 266d07cb ("netfilter: nf_log: fix sleeping function called from invalid context"), which changed this code from using rcu_read_lock() to taking nf_log_mutex. Fixes: 266d07cb ("netfilter: nf_log: fix sleeping function calle[...]") Signed-off-by:
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by:
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Tokunori Ikegami authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1784409 commit 79ca484b upstream. Currently the functions use to check both chip ready and good. But the chip ready is not enough to check the operation status. So change this to check the chip good instead of this. About the retry functions to make sure the error handling remain it. Signed-off-by:
Tokunori Ikegami <ikegami@allied-telesis.co.jp> Reviewed-by:
Joakim Tjernlund <Joakim.Tjernlund@infinera.com> Cc: Chris Packham <chris.packham@alliedtelesis.co.nz> Cc: Brian Norris <computersforpeace@gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@free-electrons.com> Cc: Marek Vasut <marek.vasut@gmail.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Cyrille Pitchen <cyrille.pitchen@wedev4u.fr> Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@bootlin.com> Signed-off-by:
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Tokunori Ikegami authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1784409 commit 45f75b8a upstream. For the word write functions it is retried for error. But it is not implemented to retry for the erase functions. To make sure for the erase functions change to retry as same. This is needed to prevent the flash erase error caused only once. It was caused by the error case of chip_good() in the do_erase_oneblock(). Also it was confirmed on the MACRONIX flash device MX29GL512FHT2I-11G. But the error issue behavior is not able to reproduce at this moment. The flash controller is parallel Flash interface integrated on BCM53003. Signed-off-by:
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Tokunori Ikegami authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1784409 commit 85a82e28 upstream. The definition can be used for other program and erase operations also. So change the naming to MAX_RETRIES from MAX_WORD_RETRIES. Signed-off-by:
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Mikulas Patocka authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1784409 commit d12067f4 upstream. dm_bufio_shrink_count() is called from do_shrink_slab to find out how many freeable objects are there. The reported value doesn't have to be precise, so we don't need to take the dm-bufio lock. Suggested-by:
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Martin Kaiser authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1784409 commit 3f77f244 upstream. The v21 version of the NAND flash controller contains a Spare Area Size Register (SPAS) at offset 0x10. Its setting defaults to the maximum spare area size of 218 bytes. The size that is set in this register is used by the controller when it calculates the ECC bytes internally in hardware. Usually, this register is updated from settings in the IIM fuses when the system is booting from NAND flash. For other boot media, however, the SPAS register remains at the default setting, which may not work for the particular flash chip on the board. The same goes for flash chips whose configuration cannot be set in the IIM fuses (e.g. chips with 2k sector size and 128 bytes spare area size can't be configured in the IIM fuses on imx25 systems). Set the SPAS register explicitly during the preset operation. Derive the register value from mtd->oobsize that was detected during probe by decoding the flash chip's ID bytes. While at it, rename the define for the spare area register's offset to NFC_V21_RSLTSPARE_AREA. The register at offset 0x10 on v1 controllers is different from the register on v21 controllers. Fixes: d4840180 ("mtd: mxc_nand: set NFC registers after reset") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Martin Kaiser <martin@kaiser.cx> Reviewed-by:
Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com> Signed-off-by:
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Mikulas Patocka authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1784409 commit 41c73a49 upstream. If the first allocation attempt using GFP_NOWAIT fails, drop the lock and retry using GFP_NOIO allocation (lock is dropped because the allocation can take some time). Note that we won't do GFP_NOIO allocation when we loop for the second time, because the lock shouldn't be dropped between __wait_for_free_buffer and __get_unclaimed_buffer. Signed-off-by:
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Douglas Anderson authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1784409 commit 9ea61cac upstream. We've seen in-field reports showing _lots_ (18 in one case, 41 in another) of tasks all sitting there blocked on: mutex_lock+0x4c/0x68 dm_bufio_shrink_count+0x38/0x78 shrink_slab.part.54.constprop.65+0x100/0x464 shrink_zone+0xa8/0x198 In the two cases analyzed, we see one task that looks like this: Workqueue: kverityd verity_prefetch_io __switch_to+0x9c/0xa8 __schedule+0x440/0x6d8 schedule+0x94/0xb4 schedule_timeout+0x204/0x27c schedule_timeout_uninterruptible+0x44/0x50 wait_iff_congested+0x9c/0x1f0 shrink_inactive_list+0x3a0/0x4cc shrink_lruvec+0x418/0x5cc shrink_zone+0x88/0x198 try_to_free_pages+0x51c/0x588 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x648/0xa88 __get_free_pages+0x34/0x7c alloc_buffer+0xa4/0x144 __bufio_new+0x84/0x278 dm_bufio_prefetch+0x9c/0x154 verity_prefetch_io+0xe8/0x10c process_one_work+0x240/0x424 worker_thread+0x2fc/0x424 kthread+0x10c/0x114 ...and that looks to be the one holding the mutex. The problem has been reproduced on fairly easily: 0. Be running Chrome OS w/ verity enabled on the root filesystem 1. Pick test patch: http://crosreview.com/412360 2. Install launchBalloons.sh and balloon.arm from http://crbug.com/468342 ...that's just a memory stress test app. 3. On a 4GB rk3399 machine, run nice ./launchBalloons.sh 4 900 100000 ...that tries to eat 4 * 900 MB of memory and keep accessing. 4. Login to the Chrome web browser and restore many tabs With that, I've seen printouts like: DOUG: long bufio 90758 ms ...and stack trace always show's we're in dm_bufio_prefetch(). The problem is that we try to allocate memory with GFP_NOIO while we're holding the dm_bufio lock. Instead we should be using GFP_NOWAIT. Using GFP_NOIO can cause us to sleep while holding the lock and that causes the above problems. The current behavior explained by David Rientjes: It will still try reclaim initially because __GFP_WAIT (or __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM) is set by GFP_NOIO. This is the cause of contention on dm_bufio_lock() that the thread holds. You want to pass GFP_NOWAIT instead of GFP_NOIO to alloc_buffer() when holding a mutex that can be contended by a concurrent slab shrinker (if count_objects didn't use a trylock, this pattern would trivially deadlock). This change significantly increases responsiveness of the system while in this state. It makes a real difference because it unblocks kswapd. In the bug report analyzed, kswapd was hung: kswapd0 D ffffffc000204fd8 0 72 2 0x00000000 Call trace: [<ffffffc000204fd8>] __switch_to+0x9c/0xa8 [<ffffffc00090b794>] __schedule+0x440/0x6d8 [<ffffffc00090bac0>] schedule+0x94/0xb4 [<ffffffc00090be44>] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x28/0x44 [<ffffffc00090d900>] __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x120/0x1ac [<ffffffc00090d9d8>] mutex_lock+0x4c/0x68 [<ffffffc000708e7c>] dm_bufio_shrink_count+0x38/0x78 [<ffffffc00030b268>] shrink_slab.part.54.constprop.65+0x100/0x464 [<ffffffc00030dbd8>] shrink_zone+0xa8/0x198 [<ffffffc00030e578>] balance_pgdat+0x328/0x508 [<ffffffc00030eb7c>] kswapd+0x424/0x51c [<ffffffc00023f06c>] kthread+0x10c/0x114 [<ffffffc000203dd0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40 By unblocking kswapd memory pressure should be reduced. Suggested-by:
Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by:
Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Signed-off-by:
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Vlastimil Babka authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1784409 commit 7810e678 upstream. In __alloc_pages_slowpath() we reset zonelist and preferred_zoneref for allocations that can ignore memory policies. The zonelist is obtained from current CPU's node. This is a problem for __GFP_THISNODE allocations that want to allocate on a different node, e.g. because the allocating thread has been migrated to a different CPU. This has been observed to break SLAB in our 4.4-based kernel, because there it relies on __GFP_THISNODE working as intended. If a slab page is put on wrong node's list, then further list manipulations may corrupt the list because page_to_nid() is used to determine which node's list_lock should be locked and thus we may take a wrong lock and race. Current SLAB implementation seems to be immune by luck thanks to commit 511e3a05 ("mm/slab: make cache_grow() handle the page allocated on arbitrary node") but there may be others assuming that __GFP_THISNODE works as promised. We can fix it by simply removing the zonelist reset completely. There is actually no reason to reset it, because memory policies and cpusets don't affect the zonelist choice in the first place. This was different when commit 183f6371 ("mm: ignore mempolicies when using ALLOC_NO_WATERMARK") introduced the code, as mempolicies provided their own restricted zonelists. We might consider this for 4.17 although I don't know if there's anything currently broken. SLAB is currently not affected, but in kernels older than 4.7 that don't yet have 511e3a05 ("mm/slab: make cache_grow() handle the page allocated on arbitrary node") it is. That's at least 4.4 LTS. Older ones I'll have to check. So stable backports should be more important, but will have to be reviewed carefully, as the code went through many changes. BTW I think that also the ac->preferred_zoneref reset is currently useless if we don't also reset ac->nodemask from a mempolicy to NULL first (which we probably should for the OOM victims etc?), but I would leave that for a separate patch. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180525130853.13915-1-vbabka@suse.czSigned-off-by:
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Fixes: 183f6371 ("mm: ignore mempolicies when using ALLOC_NO_WATERMARK") Acked-by:
Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Brad Love authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1784409 commit 3ee9bc12 upstream. The cx25840 driver currently configures 885, 887, and 888 using default divisors for each chip. This check to see if the cx23885 driver has passed the cx25840 a non-default clock rate for a specific chip. If a cx23885 board has left clk_freq at 0, the clock default values will be used to configure the PLLs. This patch only has effect on 888 boards who set clk_freq to 25M. Signed-off-by:
Brad Love <brad@nextdimension.cc> Signed-off-by:
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Tony Luck authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1784409 commit 40c36e27 upstream. Some injection testing resulted in the following console log: mce: [Hardware Error]: CPU 22: Machine Check Exception: f Bank 1: bd80000000100134 mce: [Hardware Error]: RIP 10:<ffffffffc05292dd> {pmem_do_bvec+0x11d/0x330 [nd_pmem]} mce: [Hardware Error]: TSC c51a63035d52 ADDR 3234bc4000 MISC 88 mce: [Hardware Error]: PROCESSOR 0:50654 TIME 1526502199 SOCKET 0 APIC 38 microcode 2000043 mce: [Hardware Error]: Run the above through 'mcelog --ascii' Kernel panic - not syncing: Machine check from unknown source This confused everybody because the first line quite clearly shows that we found a logged error in "Bank 1", while the last line says "unknown source". The problem is that the Linux code doesn't do the right thing for a local machine check that results in a fatal error. It turns out that we know very early in the handler whether the machine check is fatal. The call to mce_no_way_out() has checked all the banks for the CPU that took the local machine check. If it says we must crash, we can do so right away with the right messages. We do scan all the banks again. This means that we might initially not see a problem, but during the second scan find something fatal. If this happens we print a slightly different message (so I can see if it actually every happens). [ bp: Remove unneeded severity assignment. ] Signed-off-by:
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Cc: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/52e049a497e86fd0b71c529651def8871c804df0.1527283897.git.tony.luck@intel.comSigned-off-by:
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Yazen Ghannam authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1784409 commit fead35c6 upstream. Check the MCG_STATUS_LMCES bit on Intel to verify that current MCE is local. It is always local on AMD. Signed-off-by:
Yazen Ghannam <Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com> [ Massaged it a bit. Reflowed comments. Shut up -Wmaybe-uninitialized. ] Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Rosenberg authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1784409 commit 717adfda upstream. If our length is greater than the size of the buffer, we overflow the buffer Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com> Reviewed-by:
Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1784409 commit 4f65245f upstream. uref->field_index, uref->usage_index, finfo.field_index and cinfo.index can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c:473 hiddev_ioctl_usage() warn: potential spectre issue 'report->field' (local cap) drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c:477 hiddev_ioctl_usage() warn: potential spectre issue 'field->usage' (local cap) drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c:757 hiddev_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'report->field' (local cap) drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c:801 hiddev_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'hid->collection' (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing such structure fields before using them to index report->field, field->usage and hid->collection Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by:
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