- 06 Dec, 2014 3 commits
-
-
Andy Lutomirski authored
commit af726f21 upstream. There's nothing special enough about the espfix64 double fault fixup to justify writing it in assembly. Move it to C. This also fixes a bug: if the double fault came from an IST stack, the old asm code would return to a partially uninitialized stack frame. Fixes: 3891a04aSigned-off-by:
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Reviewed-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-
Aaro Koskinen authored
commit 26927f76 upstream. If SERIAL_8250 is compiled as a module, the platform specific setup for Loongson will be a module too, and it will not work very well. At least on Loongson 3 it will trigger a build failure, since loongson_sysconf is not exported to modules. Fix by making the platform specific serial code always built-in. Signed-off-by:
Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi> Reported-by:
Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com> Cc: Markos Chandras <Markos.Chandras@imgtec.com> Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/8533/Signed-off-by:
-
Aaro Koskinen authored
commit bbaf113a upstream. Fix incorrect cast that always results in wrong address for the new frame on 64-bit kernels. Signed-off-by:
Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@nsn.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/8110/Signed-off-by:
-
- 21 Nov, 2014 37 commits
-
-
Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
-
Johannes Weiner authored
commit 49426420 upstream. Commit 3812c8c8 ("mm: memcg: do not trap chargers with full callstack on OOM") assumed that only a few places that can trigger a memcg OOM situation do not return VM_FAULT_OOM, like optional page cache readahead. But there are many more and it's impractical to annotate them all. First of all, we don't want to invoke the OOM killer when the failed allocation is gracefully handled, so defer the actual kill to the end of the fault handling as well. This simplifies the code quite a bit for added bonus. Second, since a failed allocation might not be the abrupt end of the fault, the memcg OOM handler needs to be re-entrant until the fault finishes for subsequent allocation attempts. If an allocation is attempted after the task already OOMed, allow it to bypass the limit so that it can quickly finish the fault and invoke the OOM killer. Reported-by:
azurIt <azurit@pobox.sk> Signed-off-by:
Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Johannes Weiner authored
commit 3812c8c8 upstream. The memcg OOM handling is incredibly fragile and can deadlock. When a task fails to charge memory, it invokes the OOM killer and loops right there in the charge code until it succeeds. Comparably, any other task that enters the charge path at this point will go to a waitqueue right then and there and sleep until the OOM situation is resolved. The problem is that these tasks may hold filesystem locks and the mmap_sem; locks that the selected OOM victim may need to exit. For example, in one reported case, the task invoking the OOM killer was about to charge a page cache page during a write(), which holds the i_mutex. The OOM killer selected a task that was just entering truncate() and trying to acquire the i_mutex: OOM invoking task: mem_cgroup_handle_oom+0x241/0x3b0 mem_cgroup_cache_charge+0xbe/0xe0 add_to_page_cache_locked+0x4c/0x140 add_to_page_cache_lru+0x22/0x50 grab_cache_page_write_begin+0x8b/0xe0 ext3_write_begin+0x88/0x270 generic_file_buffered_write+0x116/0x290 __generic_file_aio_write+0x27c/0x480 generic_file_aio_write+0x76/0xf0 # takes ->i_mutex do_sync_write+0xea/0x130 vfs_write+0xf3/0x1f0 sys_write+0x51/0x90 system_call_fastpath+0x18/0x1d OOM kill victim: do_truncate+0x58/0xa0 # takes i_mutex do_last+0x250/0xa30 path_openat+0xd7/0x440 do_filp_open+0x49/0xa0 do_sys_open+0x106/0x240 sys_open+0x20/0x30 system_call_fastpath+0x18/0x1d The OOM handling task will retry the charge indefinitely while the OOM killed task is not releasing any resources. A similar scenario can happen when the kernel OOM killer for a memcg is disabled and a userspace task is in charge of resolving OOM situations. In this case, ALL tasks that enter the OOM path will be made to sleep on the OOM waitqueue and wait for userspace to free resources or increase the group's limit. But a userspace OOM handler is prone to deadlock itself on the locks held by the waiting tasks. For example one of the sleeping tasks may be stuck in a brk() call with the mmap_sem held for writing but the userspace handler, in order to pick an optimal victim, may need to read files from /proc/<pid>, which tries to acquire the same mmap_sem for reading and deadlocks. This patch changes the way tasks behave after detecting a memcg OOM and makes sure nobody loops or sleeps with locks held: 1. When OOMing in a user fault, invoke the OOM killer and restart the fault instead of looping on the charge attempt. This way, the OOM victim can not get stuck on locks the looping task may hold. 2. When OOMing in a user fault but somebody else is handling it (either the kernel OOM killer or a userspace handler), don't go to sleep in the charge context. Instead, remember the OOMing memcg in the task struct and then fully unwind the page fault stack with -ENOMEM. pagefault_out_of_memory() will then call back into the memcg code to check if the -ENOMEM came from the memcg, and then either put the task to sleep on the memcg's OOM waitqueue or just restart the fault. The OOM victim can no longer get stuck on any lock a sleeping task may hold. Debugged by Michal Hocko. Signed-off-by:
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Johannes Weiner authored
commit fb2a6fc5 upstream. The memcg OOM handler open-codes a sleeping lock for OOM serialization (trylock, wait, repeat) because the required locking is so specific to memcg hierarchies. However, it would be nice if this construct would be clearly recognizable and not be as obfuscated as it is right now. Clean up as follows: 1. Remove the return value of mem_cgroup_oom_unlock() 2. Rename mem_cgroup_oom_lock() to mem_cgroup_oom_trylock(). 3. Pull the prepare_to_wait() out of the memcg_oom_lock scope. This makes it more obvious that the task has to be on the waitqueue before attempting to OOM-trylock the hierarchy, to not miss any wakeups before going to sleep. It just didn't matter until now because it was all lumped together into the global memcg_oom_lock spinlock section. 4. Pull the mem_cgroup_oom_notify() out of the memcg_oom_lock scope. It is proctected by the hierarchical OOM-lock. 5. The memcg_oom_lock spinlock is only required to propagate the OOM lock in any given hierarchy atomically. Restrict its scope to mem_cgroup_oom_(trylock|unlock). 6. Do not wake up the waitqueue unconditionally at the end of the function. Only the lockholder has to wake up the next in line after releasing the lock. Note that the lockholder kicks off the OOM-killer, which in turn leads to wakeups from the uncharges of the exiting task. But a contender is not guaranteed to see them if it enters the OOM path after the OOM kills but before the lockholder releases the lock. Thus there has to be an explicit wakeup after releasing the lock. 7. Put the OOM task on the waitqueue before marking the hierarchy as under OOM as that is the point where we start to receive wakeups. No point in listening before being on the waitqueue. 8. Likewise, unmark the hierarchy before finishing the sleep, for symmetry. Signed-off-by:
-
Johannes Weiner authored
commit 519e5247 upstream. System calls and kernel faults (uaccess, gup) can handle an out of memory situation gracefully and just return -ENOMEM. Enable the memcg OOM killer only for user faults, where it's really the only option available. Signed-off-by:
-
Johannes Weiner authored
commit 3a13c4d7 upstream. The x86 fault handler bails in the middle of error handling when the task has a fatal signal pending. For a subsequent patch this is a problem in OOM situations because it relies on pagefault_out_of_memory() being called even when the task has been killed, to perform proper per-task OOM state unwinding. Shortcutting the fault like this is a rather minor optimization that saves a few instructions in rare cases. Just remove it for user-triggered faults. Use the opportunity to split the fault retry handling from actual fault errors and add locking documentation that reads suprisingly similar to ARM's. Signed-off-by:
KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: azurIt <azurit@pobox.sk> Signed-off-by:
-
Johannes Weiner authored
commit 759496ba upstream. Unlike global OOM handling, memory cgroup code will invoke the OOM killer in any OOM situation because it has no way of telling faults occuring in kernel context - which could be handled more gracefully - from user-triggered faults. Pass a flag that identifies faults originating in user space from the architecture-specific fault handlers to generic code so that memcg OOM handling can be improved. Signed-off-by:
-
Johannes Weiner authored
commit 87134102 upstream. Kernel faults are expected to handle OOM conditions gracefully (gup, uaccess etc.), so they should never invoke the OOM killer. Reserve this for faults triggered in user context when it is the only option. Most architectures already do this, fix up the remaining few. Signed-off-by:
-
Johannes Weiner authored
commit 94bce453 upstream. The memcg code can trap tasks in the context of the failing allocation until an OOM situation is resolved. They can hold all kinds of locks (fs, mm) at this point, which makes it prone to deadlocking. This series converts memcg OOM handling into a two step process that is started in the charge context, but any waiting is done after the fault stack is fully unwound. Patches 1-4 prepare architecture handlers to support the new memcg requirements, but in doing so they also remove old cruft and unify out-of-memory behavior across architectures. Patch 5 disables the memcg OOM handling for syscalls, readahead, kernel faults, because they can gracefully unwind the stack with -ENOMEM. OOM handling is restricted to user triggered faults that have no other option. Patch 6 reworks memcg's hierarchical OOM locking to make it a little more obvious wth is going on in there: reduce locked regions, rename locking functions, reorder and document. Patch 7 implements the two-part OOM handling such that tasks are never trapped with the full charge stack in an OOM situation. This patch: Back before smart OOM killing, when faulting tasks were killed directly on allocation failures, the arch-specific fault handlers needed special protection for the init process. Now that all fault handlers call into the generic OOM killer (see commit 609838cf: "mm: invoke oom-killer from remaining unconverted page fault handlers"), which already provides init protection, the arch-specific leftovers can be removed. Signed-off-by:
-
Johannes Weiner authored
commit 609838cf upstream. A few remaining architectures directly kill the page faulting task in an out of memory situation. This is usually not a good idea since that task might not even use a significant amount of memory and so may not be the optimal victim to resolve the situation. Since 2.6.29's 1c0fe6e3 ("mm: invoke oom-killer from page fault") there is a hook that architecture page fault handlers are supposed to call to invoke the OOM killer and let it pick the right task to kill. Convert the remaining architectures over to this hook. To have the previous behavior of simply taking out the faulting task the vm.oom_kill_allocating_task sysctl can be set to 1. Signed-off-by:
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Acked-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> [arch/arc bits] Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: Chen Liqin <liqin.chen@sunplusct.com> Cc: Lennox Wu <lennox.wu@gmail.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Daniel Borkmann authored
commit 9de7922b upstream. Commit 6f4c618d ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however, it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950 end:0x440 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129! [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp] [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp] [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter] [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60 This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for example, ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------> ... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ... 1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16) 2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255) ... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too. This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks could be used just as well. The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account. In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP address that is also the source address of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given skb. When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed with ... length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length); asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length; ... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time, which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length. Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and* in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over, that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and missized addresses. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: b896b82b ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.") Signed-off-by:
Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> Signed-off-by:
-
Daniel Borkmann authored
commit b69040d8 upstream. When receiving a e.g. semi-good formed connection scan in the form of ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ---------------- ASCONF_a; ASCONF_b -----------------> ... where ASCONF_a equals ASCONF_b chunk (at least both serials need to be equal), we panic an SCTP server! The problem is that good-formed ASCONF chunks that we reply with ASCONF_ACK chunks are cached per serial. Thus, when we receive a same ASCONF chunk twice (e.g. through a lost ASCONF_ACK), we do not need to process them again on the server side (that was the idea, also proposed in the RFC). Instead, we know it was cached and we just resend the cached chunk instead. So far, so good. Where things get nasty is in SCTP's side effect interpreter, that is, sctp_cmd_interpreter(): While incoming ASCONF_a (chunk = event_arg) is being marked !end_of_packet and !singleton, and we have an association context, we do not flush the outqueue the first time after processing the ASCONF_ACK singleton chunk via SCTP_CMD_REPLY. Instead, we keep it queued up, although we set local_cork to 1. Commit 2e3216cd changed the precedence, so that as long as we get bundled, incoming chunks we try possible bundling on outgoing queue as well. Before this commit, we would just flush the output queue. Now, while ASCONF_a's ASCONF_ACK sits in the corked outq, we continue to process the same ASCONF_b chunk from the packet. As we have cached the previous ASCONF_ACK, we find it, grab it and do another SCTP_CMD_REPLY command on it. So, effectively, we rip the chunk->list pointers and requeue the same ASCONF_ACK chunk another time. Since we process ASCONF_b, it's correctly marked with end_of_packet and we enforce an uncork, and thus flush, thus crashing the kernel. Fix it by testing if the ASCONF_ACK is currently pending and if that is the case, do not requeue it. When flushing the output queue we may relink the chunk for preparing an outgoing packet, but eventually unlink it when it's copied into the skb right before transmission. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: 2e3216cd ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet") Signed-off-by:
-
Daniel Borkmann authored
commit 26b87c78 upstream. This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes in the form of ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------> [...] ---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------> ... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton, since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of chunks which it eats up one by one. We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may then turn it into a response flood when flushing the queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF serial numbers and could see the server side consuming excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more]. The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit 2e3216cd ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set, but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling. In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the side-effect interpreter run. One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible. I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to look good now. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: 2e3216cd ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet") Signed-off-by:
-
Nadav Amit authored
commit a2b9e6c1 upstream. Commit fc3a9157 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator. The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO. This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code. Signed-off-by:
Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il> Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Tomas Henzl authored
commit 2cc5bfaf upstream. When the driver calls scsi_done and after that frees it's internal preallocated memory it can happen that a new job is enqueud before the memory is freed. The allocation fails and the message "cmd_alloc returned NULL" is shown. Patch below fixes it by moving cmd->scsi_done after cmd_free. Signed-off-by:
Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Stephen M. Cameron <scameron@beardog.cce.hp.com> Signed-off-by:
James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com> Cc: Masoud Sharbiani <msharbiani@twitter.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Eugenia Emantayev authored
commit 2d4b6466 upstream. Fix a race between BlueFlame flow and stamping in post send flow. Example: SW: Build WQE 0 on the TX buffer, except the ownership bit SW: Set ownership for WQE 0 on the TX buffer SW: Ring doorbell for WQE 0 SW: Build WQE 1 on the TX buffer, except the ownership bit SW: Set ownership for WQE 1 on the TX buffer HW: Read WQE 0 and then WQE 1, before doorbell was rung/BF was done for WQE 1 HW: Produce CQEs for WQE 0 and WQE 1 SW: Process the CQEs, and stamp WQE 0 and WQE 1 accordingly (on the TX buffer) SW: Copy WQE 1 from the TX buffer to the BF register - ALREADY STAMPED! HW: CQE error with index 0xFFFF - the BF WQE's control segment is STAMPED, so the BF index is 0xFFFF. Error: Invalid Opcode. As a result QP enters the error state and no traffic can be sent. Solution: When stamping - do not stamp last completed wqe. Signed-off-by:
Eugenia Emantayev <eugenia@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by:
Amir Vadai <amirv@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Ben Dooks authored
commit 63328070 upstream. Currently BUG() uses .word or .hword to create the necessary illegal instructions. However if we are building BE8 then these get swapped by the linker into different illegal instructions in the text. This means that the BUG() macro does not get trapped properly. Change to using <asm/opcodes.h> to provide the necessary ARM instruction building as we cannot rely on gcc/gas having the `.inst` instructions which where added to try and resolve this issue (reported by Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>). Signed-off-by:
Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk> Reviewed-by:
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com> Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Vince Weaver authored
commit 1996388e upstream. This was discussed back in February: https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/2/18/956 But I never saw a patch come out of it. On IvyBridge we share the SandyBridge cache event tables, but the dTLB-load-miss event is not compatible. Patch it up after the fact to the proper DTLB_LOAD_MISSES.DEMAND_LD_MISS_CAUSES_A_WALK Signed-off-by:
Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Signed-off-by:
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.11.1407141528200.17214@vincent-weaver-1.umelst.maine.eduSigned-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Hou Pengyang <houpengyang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Alexander Usyskin authored
commit cfda2794 upstream. function 'strncpy' will fill whole buffer 'id.name' of fixed size (32) with string value and will not leave place for NULL-terminator. Possible buffer boundaries violation in following string operations. Replace strncpy with strlcpy. Signed-off-by:
Alexander Usyskin <alexander.usyskin@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Pawel Moll authored
commit b3f20785 upstream. When running a 32-bit userspace on a 64-bit kernel (eg. i386 application on x86_64 kernel or 32-bit arm userspace on arm64 kernel) some of the perf ioctls must be treated with special care, as they have a pointer size encoded in the command. For example, PERF_EVENT_IOC_ID in 32-bit world will be encoded as 0x80042407, but 64-bit kernel will expect 0x80082407. In result the ioctl will fail returning -ENOTTY. This patch solves the problem by adding code fixing up the size as compat_ioctl file operation. Reported-by:
Drew Richardson <drew.richardson@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Pawel Moll <pawel.moll@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
David Ahern <daahern@cisco.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Yoichi Yuasa authored
commit 5596b0b2 upstream. [ 1.904000] BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/1/0x00000002 [ 1.908000] Modules linked in: [ 1.916000] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.12.0-rc2-lemote-los.git-5318619-dirty #1 [ 1.920000] Stack : 0000000031aac000 ffffffff810d0000 0000000000000052 ffffffff802730a4 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 ffffffff810cdf90 ffffffff810d0000 ffffffff8068b968 ffffffff806f5537 ffffffff810cdf90 980000009f0782e8 0000000000000001 ffffffff80720000 ffffffff806b0000 980000009f078000 980000009f290000 ffffffff805f312c 980000009f05b5d8 ffffffff80233518 980000009f05b5e8 ffffffff80274b7c 980000009f078000 ffffffff8068b968 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 980000009f05b520 0000000000000000 ffffffff805f2f6c 0000000000000000 ffffffff80700000 ffffffff80700000 ffffffff806fc758 ffffffff80700000 ffffffff8020be98 ffffffff806fceb0 ffffffff805f2f6c ... [ 2.028000] Call Trace: [ 2.032000] [<ffffffff8020be98>] show_stack+0x80/0x98 [ 2.036000] [<ffffffff805f2f6c>] __schedule_bug+0x44/0x6c [ 2.040000] [<ffffffff805fac58>] __schedule+0x518/0x5b0 [ 2.044000] [<ffffffff805f8a58>] schedule_timeout+0x128/0x1f0 [ 2.048000] [<ffffffff80240314>] msleep+0x3c/0x60 [ 2.052000] [<ffffffff80495400>] do_probe+0x238/0x3a8 [ 2.056000] [<ffffffff804958b0>] ide_probe_port+0x340/0x7e8 [ 2.060000] [<ffffffff80496028>] ide_host_register+0x2d0/0x7a8 [ 2.064000] [<ffffffff8049c65c>] ide_pci_init_two+0x4e4/0x790 [ 2.068000] [<ffffffff8049f9b8>] amd74xx_probe+0x148/0x2c8 [ 2.072000] [<ffffffff803f571c>] pci_device_probe+0xc4/0x130 [ 2.076000] [<ffffffff80478f60>] driver_probe_device+0x98/0x270 [ 2.080000] [<ffffffff80479298>] __driver_attach+0xe0/0xe8 [ 2.084000] [<ffffffff80476ab0>] bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xe0 [ 2.088000] [<ffffffff80478468>] bus_add_driver+0x230/0x310 [ 2.092000] [<ffffffff80479b44>] driver_register+0x84/0x158 [ 2.096000] [<ffffffff80200504>] do_one_initcall+0x104/0x160 Signed-off-by:
Yoichi Yuasa <yuasa@linux-mips.org> Reported-by:
-
Pali Rohár authored
commit a666b6ff upstream. Without this patch, dell-wmi is trying to access elements of dynamically allocated array without checking the array size. This can lead to memory corruption or a kernel panic. This patch adds the missing checks for array size. Signed-off-by:
Pali Rohár <pali.rohar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Ben Dooks authored
commit 888be254 upstream. If we are running BE8, the data and instruction endianness do not match, so use <asm/opcodes.h> to correctly translate memory accesses into ARM instructions. Acked-by:
Jon Medhurst <tixy@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
Taras Kondratiuk <taras.kondratiuk@linaro.org> [wangnan: backport to 3.10 and 3.14: - adjust context - backport all changes on arch/arm/kernel/probes.c to arch/arm/kernel/kprobes-common.c since we don't have commit c18377c3. - After the above adjustments, becomes same to Taras Kondratiuk's original patch: http://lists.linaro.org/pipermail/linaro-kernel/2014-January/010346.html ] Signed-off-by:
Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Jiri Pirko authored
commit 859828c0 upstream. br_stp_rcv() is reached by non-rx_handler path. That means there is no guarantee that dev is bridge port and therefore simple NULL check of ->rx_handler_data is not enough. There is need to check if dev is really bridge port and since only rcu read lock is held here, do it by checking ->rx_handler pointer. Note that synchronize_net() in netdev_rx_handler_unregister() ensures this approach as valid. Introduced originally by: commit f350a0a8 "bridge: use rx_handler_data pointer to store net_bridge_port pointer" Fixed but not in the best way by: commit b5ed54e9 "bridge: fix RCU races with bridge port" Reintroduced by: commit 716ec052 "bridge: fix NULL pointer deref of br_port_get_rcu" Please apply to stable trees as well. Thanks. RH bugzilla reference: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1025770Reported-by:
Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com> Debugged-by:
Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us> Acked-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Florian Westphal authored
commit 945b2b2d upstream. Quoting Samu Kallio: Basically what's happening is, during netns cleanup, nf_nat_net_exit gets called before ipv4_net_exit. As I understand it, nf_nat_net_exit is supposed to kill any conntrack entries which have NAT context (through nf_ct_iterate_cleanup), but for some reason this doesn't happen (perhaps something else is still holding refs to those entries?). When ipv4_net_exit is called, conntrack entries (including those with NAT context) are cleaned up, but the nat_bysource hashtable is long gone - freed in nf_nat_net_exit. The bug happens when attempting to free a conntrack entry whose NAT hash 'prev' field points to a slot in the freed hash table (head for that bin). We ignore conntracks with null nat bindings. But this is wrong, as these are in bysource hash table as well. Restore nat-cleaning for the netns-is-being-removed case. bug: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=65191 Fixes: c2d421e1 ('netfilter: nf_nat: fix race when unloading protocol modules') Reported-by:
Samu Kallio <samu.kallio@aberdeencloud.com> Debugged-by:
Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Tested-by:
Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> [samu.kallio@aberdeencloud.com: backport to 3.10-stable] Signed-off-by:
-
Pablo Neira authored
commit e10038a8 upstream. This structure is not exposed to userspace, so fix this by defining struct sk_filter; so we skip the casting in kernelspace. This is safe since userspace has no way to lurk with that internal pointer. Fixes: e6f30c73 ("netfilter: x_tables: add xt_bpf match") Signed-off-by:
Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Houcheng Lin authored
commit b51d3fa3 upstream. The kernel should reserve enough room in the skb so that the DONE message can always be appended. However, in case of e.g. new attribute erronously not being size-accounted for, __nfulnl_send() will still try to put next nlmsg into this full skbuf, causing the skb to be stuck forever and blocking delivery of further messages. Fix issue by releasing skb immediately after nlmsg_put error and WARN() so we can track down the cause of such size mismatch. [ fw@strlen.de: add tailroom/len info to WARN ] Signed-off-by:
Houcheng Lin <houcheng@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Florian Westphal authored
commit c1e7dc91 upstream. don't try to queue payloads > 0xffff - NLA_HDRLEN, it does not work. The nla length includes the size of the nla struct, so anything larger results in u16 integer overflow. This patch is similar to 9cefbbc9 (netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: cleanup copy_range usage). Signed-off-by:
-
Florian Westphal authored
commit 9dfa1dfe upstream. We currently neither account for the nlattr size, nor do we consider the size of the trailing NLMSG_DONE when allocating nlmsg skb. This can result in nflog to stop working, as __nfulnl_send() re-tries sending forever if it failed to append NLMSG_DONE (which will never work if buffer is not large enough). Reported-by:
-
Andrey Vagin authored
commit 1195d94e upstream. proc_dointvec_minmax() returns zero if a new value has been set. So we don't need to check all charecters have been handled. Below you can find two examples. In the new value has not been handled properly. $ strace ./a.out open("/proc/sys/kernel/auto_msgmni", O_WRONLY) = 3 write(3, "0\n\0", 3) = 2 close(3) = 0 exit_group(0) $ cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace $strace ./a.out open("/proc/sys/kernel/auto_msgmni", O_WRONLY) = 3 write(3, "0\n", 2) = 2 close(3) = 0 $ cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace a.out-697 [000] .... 3280.998235: unregister_ipcns_notifier <-proc_ipcauto_dointvec_minmax Fixes: 9eefe520 ("ipc: do not use a negative value to re-enable msgmni automatic recomputin") Signed-off-by:
Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Bjorn Helgaas authored
commit 96a2adbc upstream. kernel/time/jiffies.c provides a default clocksource_default_clock() definition explicitly marked "weak". arch/s390 provides its own definition intended to override the default, but the "weak" attribute on the declaration applied to the s390 definition as well, so the linker chose one based on link order (see 10629d71 ("PCI: Remove __weak annotation from pcibios_get_phb_of_node decl")). Remove the "weak" attribute from the clocksource_default_clock() declaration so we always prefer a non-weak definition over the weak one, independent of link order. Fixes: f1b82746 ("clocksource: Cleanup clocksource selection") Signed-off-by:
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Acked-by:
John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Acked-by:
-
Bjorn Helgaas authored
commit 107bcc6d upstream. kernel/debug/debug_core.c provides a default kgdb_arch_pc() definition explicitly marked "weak". Several architectures provide their own definitions intended to override the default, but the "weak" attribute on the declaration applied to the arch definitions as well, so the linker chose one based on link order (see 10629d71 ("PCI: Remove __weak annotation from pcibios_get_phb_of_node decl")). Remove the "weak" attribute from the declaration so we always prefer a non-weak definition over the weak one, independent of link order. Fixes: 688b744d ("kgdb: fix signedness mixmatches, add statics, add declaration to header") Tested-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> # for ARC build Signed-off-by:
Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Dan Carpenter authored
commit f2e323ec upstream. We need to add a limit check here so we don't overflow the buffer. Signed-off-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Trond Myklebust authored
commit 869f9dfa upstream. Any attempt to call nfs_remove_bad_delegation() while a delegation is being returned is currently a no-op. This means that we can end up looping forever in nfs_end_delegation_return() if something causes the delegation to be revoked. This patch adds a mechanism whereby the state recovery code can communicate to the delegation return code that the delegation is no longer valid and that it should not be used when reclaiming state. It also changes the return value for nfs4_handle_delegation_recall_error() to ensure that nfs_end_delegation_return() does not reattempt the lock reclaim before state recovery is done. http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAN-5tyHwG=Cn2Q9KsHWadewjpTTy_K26ee+UnSvHvG4192p-Xw@mail.gmail.comSigned-off-by:
Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Jan Kara authored
commit 16caf5b6 upstream. Variable 'err' needn't be initialized when nfs_getattr() uses it to check whether it should call generic_fillattr() or not. That can result in spurious error returns. Initialize 'err' properly. Signed-off-by:
Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
-
Trond Myklebust authored
commit f8ebf7a8 upstream. If state recovery failed, then we should not attempt to reclaim delegated state. http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAN-5tyHwG=Cn2Q9KsHWadewjpTTy_K26ee+UnSvHvG4192p-Xw@mail.gmail.comSigned-off-by:
-
Trond Myklebust authored
commit 4dfd4f7a upstream. NFSv4.0 does not have TEST_STATEID/FREE_STATEID functionality, so unlike NFSv4.1, the recovery procedure when stateids have expired or have been revoked requires us to just forget the delegation. http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAN-5tyHwG=Cn2Q9KsHWadewjpTTy_K26ee+UnSvHvG4192p-Xw@mail.gmail.comSigned-off-by:
-
