- 06 Sep, 2018 8 commits
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Jann Horn authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1790620 commit f1e255d6 upstream. In general, accessing userspace memory beyond the length of the supplied buffer in VFS read/write handlers can lead to both kernel memory corruption (via kernel_read()/kernel_write(), which can e.g. be triggered via sys_splice()) and privilege escalation inside userspace. Fix it by using simple_read_from_buffer() instead of custom logic. Fixes: 6bc235a2 ("USB: add driver for Meywa-Denki & Kayac YUREX") Signed-off-by:
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
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Johan Hovold authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1790620 commit 01b3cdfc upstream. Fix broken modem-status error handling which could lead to bits of slab data leaking to user space. Fixes: 3b36a8fd ("usb: fix uninitialized variable warning in keyspan_pda") Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.27 Signed-off-by:
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Olli Salonen authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1790620 commit 367b160f upstream. There are two versions of the Qivicon Zigbee stick in circulation. This adds the second USB ID to the cp210x driver. Signed-off-by:
Olli Salonen <olli.salonen@iki.fi> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Carpenter authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1790620 commit e33eab9d upstream. The "r" variable is an int and "bufsize" is an unsigned int so the comparison is type promoted to unsigned. If usb_control_msg() returns a negative that is treated as a high positive value and the error handling doesn't work. Fixes: 2d5a9c72 ("USB: serial: ch341: fix control-message error handling") Signed-off-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Hans de Goede authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1790620 commit 240630e6 upstream. There have been several reports of LPM related hard freezes about once a day on multiple Lenovo 50 series models. Strange enough these reports where not disk model specific as LPM issues usually are and some users with the exact same disk + laptop where seeing them while other users where not seeing these issues. It turns out that enabling LPM triggers a firmware bug somewhere, which has been fixed in later BIOS versions. This commit adds a new ahci_broken_lpm() function and a new ATA_FLAG_NO_LPM for dealing with this. The ahci_broken_lpm() function contains DMI match info for the 4 models which are known to be affected by this and the DMI BIOS date field for known good BIOS versions. If the BIOS date is older then the one in the table LPM will be disabled and a warning will be printed. Note the BIOS dates are for known good versions, some older versions may work too, but we don't know for sure, the table is using dates from BIOS versions for which users have confirmed that upgrading to that version makes the problem go away. Unfortunately I've been unable to get hold of the reporter who reported that BIOS version 2.35 fixed the problems on the W541 for him. I've been able to verify the DMI_SYS_VENDOR and DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION from an older dmidecode, but I don't know the exact BIOS date as reported in the DMI. Lenovo keeps a changelog with dates in their release notes, but the dates there are the release dates not the build dates which are in DMI. So I've chosen to set the date to which we compare to one day past the release date of the 2.34 BIOS. I plan to fix this with a follow up commit once I've the necessary info. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Nadav Amit authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1790620 commit 90d72ce0 upstream. Embarrassingly, the recent fix introduced worse problem than it solved, causing the balloon not to inflate. The VM informed the hypervisor that the pages for lock/unlock are sitting in the wrong address, as it used the page that is used the uninitialized page variable. Fixes: b23220fe ("vmw_balloon: fixing double free when batching mode is off") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
Xavier Deguillard <xdeguillard@vmware.com> Signed-off-by:
Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jann Horn authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1790620 commit a0341fc1 upstream. This read handler had a lot of custom logic and wrote outside the bounds of the provided buffer. This could lead to kernel and userspace memory corruption. Just use simple_read_from_buffer() with a stack buffer. Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Paul Burton authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1790620 commit 523402fa upstream. We currently attempt to check whether a physical address range provided to __ioremap() may be in use by the page allocator by examining the value of PageReserved for each page in the region - lowmem pages not marked reserved are presumed to be in use by the page allocator, and requests to ioremap them fail. The way we check this has been broken since commit 92923ca3 ("mm: meminit: only set page reserved in the memblock region"), because memblock will typically not have any knowledge of non-RAM pages and therefore those pages will not have the PageReserved flag set. Thus when we attempt to ioremap a region outside of RAM we incorrectly fail believing that the region is RAM that may be in use. In most cases ioremap() on MIPS will take a fast-path to use the unmapped kseg1 or xkphys virtual address spaces and never hit this path, so the only way to hit it is for a MIPS32 system to attempt to ioremap() an address range in lowmem with flags other than _CACHE_UNCACHED. Perhaps the most straightforward way to do this is using ioremap_uncached_accelerated(), which is how the problem was discovered. Fix this by making use of walk_system_ram_range() to test the address range provided to __ioremap() against only RAM pages, rather than all lowmem pages. This means that if we have a lowmem I/O region, which is very common for MIPS systems, we're free to ioremap() address ranges within it. A nice bonus is that the test is no longer limited to lowmem. The approach here matches the way x86 performed the same test after commit c81c8a1e ("x86, ioremap: Speed up check for RAM pages") until x86 moved towards a slightly more complicated check using walk_mem_res() for unrelated reasons with commit 0e4c12b4 ("x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages"). Signed-off-by:
Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Reported-by:
Serge Semin <fancer.lancer@gmail.com> Tested-by:
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- 05 Sep, 2018 5 commits
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Theodore Ts'o authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1789653 Ext4_check_descriptors() was getting called before s_gdb_count was initialized. So for file systems w/o the meta_bg feature, allocation bitmaps could overlap the block group descriptors and ext4 wouldn't notice. For file systems with the meta_bg feature enabled, there was a fencepost error which would cause the ext4_check_descriptors() to incorrectly believe that the block allocation bitmap overlaps with the block group descriptor blocks, and it would reject the mount. Fix both of these problems. Signed-off-by:
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (backported from commit 44de022c) Signed-off-by:
Joseph Salisbury <joseph.salisbury@canonical.com> Acked-by:
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Jiri Kosina authored
The article "Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack Buffer" [1] describes two new (sub-)variants of spectrev2-like attacks, making use solely of the RSB contents even on CPUs that don't fallback to BTB on RSB underflow (Skylake+). Mitigate userspace-userspace attacks by always unconditionally filling RSB on context switch when the generic spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled. [1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.07940.pdfSigned-off-by:
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1807261308190.997@cbobk.fhfr.pm CVE-2018-15572 (backported from commit fdf82a78) Signed-off-by:
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by:
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Sebastian Ott authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1790480 During interrupt setup we allocate interrupt vectors, walk the list of msi descriptors, and fill in the message data. Requesting more interrupts than supported on s390 can lead to an out of bounds access. When we restrict the number of interrupts we should also stop walking the msi list after all supported interrupts are handled. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Sebastian Ott <sebott@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> (backported from commit 866f3576) [ kleber: context adjustment ] Signed-off-by:
Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Acked-by:
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Tyler Hicks authored
The irda_setsockopt() function conditionally allocates memory for a new self->ias_object or, in some cases, reuses the existing self->ias_object. Existing objects were incorrectly reinserted into the LM_IAS database which corrupted the doubly linked list used for the hashbin implementation of the LM_IAS database. When combined with a memory leak in irda_bind(), this issue could be leveraged to create a use-after-free vulnerability in the hashbin list. This patch fixes the issue by only inserting newly allocated objects into the database. CVE-2018-6555 Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by:
Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Reviewed-by:
Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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Tyler Hicks authored
The irda_bind() function allocates memory for self->ias_obj without checking to see if the socket is already bound. A userspace process could repeatedly bind the socket, have each new object added into the LM-IAS database, and lose the reference to the old object assigned to the socket to exhaust memory resources. This patch errors out of the bind operation when self->ias_obj is already assigned. CVE-2018-6554 Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by:
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- 04 Sep, 2018 3 commits
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Mauricio Faria de Oliveira authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1787281 Even if properly initialized, the lvname array (i.e., strings) is read from disk, and might contain corrupt data (e.g., lack the null terminating character for strings). So, make sure the partition name string used in pr_warn() has the null terminating character. Fixes: 6ceea22b ("partitions: add aix lvm partition support files") Suggested-by:
Daniel J. Axtens <daniel.axtens@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mfo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> (cherry picked from commit d43fdae7) Signed-off-by:
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Acked-by:
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Mauricio Faria de Oliveira authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1787281 The if-block that sets a successful return value in aix_partition() uses 'lvip[].pps_per_lv' and 'n[].name' potentially uninitialized. For example, if 'numlvs' is zero or alloc_lvn() fails, neither is initialized, but are used anyway if alloc_pvd() succeeds after it. So, make the alloc_pvd() call conditional on their initialization. This has been hit when attaching an apparently corrupted/stressed AIX LUN, misleading the kernel to pr_warn() invalid data and hang. [...] partition (null) (11 pp's found) is not contiguous [...] partition (null) (2 pp's found) is not contiguous [...] partition (null) (3 pp's found) is not contiguous [...] partition (null) (64 pp's found) is not contiguous Fixes: 6ceea22b ("partitions: add aix lvm partition support files") Signed-off-by:
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Kleber Sacilotto de Souza authored
Ignore: yes Signed-off-by:
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- 27 Aug, 2018 13 commits
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Khalid Elmously authored
Signed-off-by:Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
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Heiner Kallweit authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1785739 This condition wasn't adjusted when PHY_IGNORE_INTERRUPT (-2) was added long ago. In case of PHY_IGNORE_INTERRUPT the MAC interrupt indicates also PHY state changes and we should do what the symbol says. Fixes: 84a527a4 ("net: phylib: fix interrupts re-enablement in phy_start") Signed-off-by:
Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> (cherry picked from commit 08f51385) Signed-off-by:
dann frazier <dann.frazier@canonical.com> Acked-by:
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Shaohui Xie authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1785739 If phy was suspended and is starting, current driver always enable phy's interrupts, if phy works in polling, phy can raise unexpected interrupt which will not be handled, the interrupt will block system enter suspend again. So interrupts should only be re-enabled if phy works in interrupt. Signed-off-by:
Shaohui Xie <Shaohui.Xie@nxp.com> Reviewed-by:
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Julian Wiedmann authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1786057 If qeth_qdio_output_handler() detects that a transmit requires async completion, it replaces the pending buffer's metadata object (qeth_qdio_out_buffer) so that this queue buffer can be re-used while the data is pending completion. Later when the CQ indicates async completion of such a metadata object, qeth_qdio_cq_handler() tries to free any data associated with this object (since HW has now completed the transfer). By calling qeth_clear_output_buffer(), it erronously operates on the queue buffer that _previously_ belonged to this transfer ... but which has been potentially re-used several times by now. This results in double-free's of the buffer's data, and failing transmits as the buffer descriptor is scrubbed in mid-air. The correct way of handling this situation is to 1. scrub the queue buffer when it is prepared for re-use, and 2. later obtain the data addresses from the async-completion notifier (ie. the AOB), instead of the queue buffer. All this only affects qeth devices used for af_iucv HiperTransport. Fixes: 0da9581d ("qeth: exploit asynchronous delivery of storage blocks") Signed-off-by:
Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Marta Rybczynska authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1788035 Make sure the CQE phase (validity) is read before the rest of the structure. The phase bit is the highest address and the CQE read will happen on most platforms from lower to upper addresses and will be done by multiple non-atomic loads. If the structure is updated by PCI during the reads from the processor, the processor may get a corrupted copy. The addition of the new nvme_cqe_valid function that verifies the validity bit also allows refactoring of the other CQE read sequences. Signed-off-by:
Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@kalray.eu> Reviewed-by:
Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Reviewed-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by:
Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com> (backported from commit d783e0bd) Signed-off-by:
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Kiran Kumar Modukuri authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1776254 If we meet a conflicting object that is marked FSCACHE_OBJECT_IS_LIVE in the active object tree, we have been emitting a BUG after logging information about it and the new object. Instead, we should wait for the CACHEFILES_OBJECT_ACTIVE flag to be cleared on the old object (or return an error). The ACTIVE flag should be cleared after it has been removed from the active object tree. A timeout of 60s is used in the wait, so we shouldn't be able to get stuck there. Fixes: 9ae326a6 ("CacheFiles: A cache that backs onto a mounted filesystem") Signed-off-by:
Kiran Kumar Modukuri <kiran.modukuri@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> (cherry picked from commit c2412ac4) Signed-off-by:
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Kiran Kumar Modukuri authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1776254 In cachefiles_mark_object_active(), the new object is marked active and then we try to add it to the active object tree. If a conflicting object is already present, we want to wait for that to go away. After the wait, we go round again and try to re-mark the object as being active - but it's already marked active from the first time we went through and a BUG is issued. Fix this by clearing the CACHEFILES_OBJECT_ACTIVE flag before we try again. Analysis from Kiran Kumar Modukuri: [Impact] Oops during heavy NFS + FSCache + Cachefiles CacheFiles: Error: Overlong wait for old active object to go away. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000002 CacheFiles: Error: Object already active kernel BUG at fs/cachefiles/namei.c:163! [Cause] In a heavily loaded system with big files being read and truncated, an fscache object for a cookie is being dropped and a new object being looked. The new object being looked for has to wait for the old object to go away before the new object is moved to active state. [Fix] Clear the flag 'CACHEFILES_OBJECT_ACTIVE' for the new object when retrying the object lookup. [Testcase] Have run ~100 hours of NFS stress tests and have not seen this bug recur. [Regression Potential] - Limited to fscache/cachefiles. Fixes: 9ae326a6 ("CacheFiles: A cache that backs onto a mounted filesystem") Signed-off-by:
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Kiran Kumar Modukuri authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1776277 When a cookie is allocated that causes fscache_object structs to be allocated, those objects are initialised with the cookie pointer, but aren't blessed with a ref on that cookie unless the attachment is successfully completed in fscache_attach_object(). If attachment fails because the parent object was dying or there was a collision, fscache_attach_object() returns without incrementing the cookie counter - but upon failure of this function, the object is released which then puts the cookie, whether or not a ref was taken on the cookie. Fix this by taking a ref on the cookie when it is assigned in fscache_object_init(), even when we're creating a root object. Analysis from Kiran Kumar: This bug has been seen in 4.4.0-124-generic #148-Ubuntu kernel BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1776277 fscache cookie ref count updated incorrectly during fscache object allocation resulting in following Oops. kernel BUG at /build/linux-Y09MKI/linux-4.4.0/fs/fscache/internal.h:321! kernel BUG at /build/linux-Y09MKI/linux-4.4.0/fs/fscache/cookie.c:639! [Cause] Two threads are trying to do operate on a cookie and two objects. (1) One thread tries to unmount the filesystem and in process goes over a huge list of objects marking them dead and deleting the objects. cookie->usage is also decremented in following path: nfs_fscache_release_super_cookie -> __fscache_relinquish_cookie ->__fscache_cookie_put ->BUG_ON(atomic_read(&cookie->usage) <= 0); (2) A second thread tries to lookup an object for reading data in following path: fscache_alloc_object 1) cachefiles_alloc_object -> fscache_object_init -> assign cookie, but usage not bumped. 2) fscache_attach_object -> fails in cant_attach_object because the cookie's backing object or cookie's->parent object are going away 3) fscache_put_object -> cachefiles_put_object ->fscache_object_destroy ->fscache_cookie_put ->BUG_ON(atomic_read(&cookie->usage) <= 0); [NOTE from dhowells] It's unclear as to the circumstances in which (2) can take place, given that thread (1) is in nfs_kill_super(), however a conflicting NFS mount with slightly different parameters that creates a different superblock would do it. A backtrace from Kiran seems to show that this is a possibility: kernel BUG at/build/linux-Y09MKI/linux-4.4.0/fs/fscache/cookie.c:639! ... RIP: __fscache_cookie_put+0x3a/0x40 [fscache] Call Trace: __fscache_relinquish_cookie+0x87/0x120 [fscache] nfs_fscache_release_super_cookie+0x2d/0xb0 [nfs] nfs_kill_super+0x29/0x40 [nfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x48/0x80 deactivate_super+0x5c/0x60 cleanup_mnt+0x3f/0x90 __cleanup_mnt+0x12/0x20 task_work_run+0x86/0xb0 exit_to_usermode_loop+0xc2/0xd0 syscall_return_slowpath+0x4e/0x60 int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f [Fix] Bump up the cookie usage in fscache_object_init, when it is first being assigned a cookie atomically such that the cookie is added and bumped up if its refcount is not zero. Remove the assignment in fscache_attach_object(). [Testcase] I have run ~100 hours of NFS stress tests and not seen this bug recur. [Regression Potential] - Limited to fscache/cachefiles. Fixes: ccc4fc3d ("FS-Cache: Implement the cookie management part of the netfs API") Signed-off-by:
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Kiran Kumar Modukuri authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774336 cachefiles_read_waiter() has the right to access a 'monitor' object by virtue of being called under the waitqueue lock for one of the pages in its purview. However, it has no ref on that monitor object or on the associated operation. What it is allowed to do is to move the monitor object to the operation's to_do list, but once it drops the work_lock, it's actually no longer permitted to access that object. However, it is trying to enqueue the retrieval operation for processing - but it can only do this via a pointer in the monitor object, something it shouldn't be doing. If it doesn't enqueue the operation, the operation may not get processed. If the order is flipped so that the enqueue is first, then it's possible for the work processor to look at the to_do list before the monitor is enqueued upon it. Fix this by getting a ref on the operation so that we can trust that it will still be there once we've added the monitor to the to_do list and dropped the work_lock. The op can then be enqueued after the lock is dropped. The bug can manifest in one of a couple of ways. The first manifestation looks like: FS-Cache: FS-Cache: Assertion failed FS-Cache: 6 == 5 is false ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/fscache/operation.c:494! RIP: 0010:fscache_put_operation+0x1e3/0x1f0 ... fscache_op_work_func+0x26/0x50 process_one_work+0x131/0x290 worker_thread+0x45/0x360 kthread+0xf8/0x130 ? create_worker+0x190/0x190 ? kthread_cancel_work_sync+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 This is due to the operation being in the DEAD state (6) rather than INITIALISED, COMPLETE or CANCELLED (5) because it's already passed through fscache_put_operation(). The bug can also manifest like the following: kernel BUG at fs/fscache/operation.c:69! ... [exception RIP: fscache_enqueue_operation+246] ... #7 [ffff883fff083c10] fscache_enqueue_operation at ffffffffa0b793c6 #8 [ffff883fff083c28] cachefiles_read_waiter at ffffffffa0b15a48 #9 [ffff883fff083c48] __wake_up_common at ffffffff810af028 I'm not entirely certain as to which is line 69 in Lei's kernel, so I'm not entirely clear which assertion failed. Fixes: 9ae326a6 ("CacheFiles: A cache that backs onto a mounted filesystem") Reported-by:
Lei Xue <carmark.dlut@gmail.com> Reported-by:
Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com> Reported-by:
Anthony DeRobertis <aderobertis@metrics.net> Reported-by:
NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Reported-by:
Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Reported-by:
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Kiran Kumar Modukuri authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774336 Alter the state-check assertion in fscache_enqueue_operation() to allow cancelled operations to be given processing time so they can be cleaned up. Also fix a debugging statement that was requiring such operations to have an object assigned. Fixes: 9ae326a6 ("CacheFiles: A cache that backs onto a mounted filesystem") Reported-by:
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Daniel Axtens authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774336 Revert 9bd2e21f in Xenial. Upstream has taken a different solution, which we're about to apply. Signed-off-by:
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Paul Meyer authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1739107 The hv-kvp-daemon service starts after walinuxagent. The default dependencies make hv-kvp-daemon wait until the whole system is up before it can start, which is not necessary and blocks Azure telemetry use case. This commit changes the hv-kvp-daemon.service unit file to start it up as early as possible so that the channel for telemetry can be use. Signed-off-by:
Eric Desrochers <eric.desrochers@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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Khalid Elmously authored
Ignore: yes Signed-off-by:
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- 15 Aug, 2018 1 commit
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Kleber Sacilotto de Souza authored
Signed-off-by:
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- 14 Aug, 2018 10 commits
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Stefan Bader authored
Adding CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT=y to common config. This options gets automatically set based on X86 config. So adding it is purely for consistency and will make no difference on resulting kernels. Ignore: yes Signed-off-by: -
John Johansen authored
The apparmor policy language current does not allow expressing of the locking permission for no-fs unix sockets. However the kernel is enforcing mediation. Add the AA_MAY_LOCK perm to the computed perm mask which will grant permission for all current abi profiles, but still allow specifying auditing of the operation if needed. BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1780227Signed-off-by:
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by:
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Tetsuo Handa authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1778286 syzbot is reporting NULL pointer dereference at xattr_getsecurity() [1], for cap_inode_getsecurity() is returning sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data) when memory allocation failed. Return -ENOMEM if memory allocation failed. [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a55ba438506fe68649a5f50d2d82d56b365e0107Signed-off-by:
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Fixes: 8db6c34f ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities") Reported-by:
syzbot <syzbot+9369930ca44f29e60e2d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14+ Acked-by:
Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by:
James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by:
Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> (cherry picked from commit 1f578172) Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1778286 If userspace attempted to set a "security.capability" xattr shorter than 4 bytes (e.g. 'setfattr -n security.capability -v x file'), then cap_convert_nscap() read past the end of the buffer containing the xattr value because it accessed the ->magic_etc field without verifying that the xattr value is long enough to contain that field. Fix it by validating the xattr value size first. This bug was found using syzkaller with KASAN. The KASAN report was as follows (cleaned up slightly): BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cap_convert_nscap+0x514/0x630 security/commoncap.c:498 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88002d8741c0 by task syz-executor1/2852 CPU: 0 PID: 2852 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc6-00200-gcc0aac99d977 #253 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0xe3/0x195 lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_address_description+0x73/0x260 mm/kasan/report.c:252 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline] kasan_report+0x235/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409 cap_convert_nscap+0x514/0x630 security/commoncap.c:498 setxattr+0x2bd/0x350 fs/xattr.c:446 path_setxattr+0x168/0x1b0 fs/xattr.c:472 SYSC_setxattr fs/xattr.c:487 [inline] SyS_setxattr+0x36/0x50 fs/xattr.c:483 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x18/0x85 Fixes: 8db6c34f ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+ Signed-off-by:
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by:
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> (cherry picked from commit dc32b5c3) Signed-off-by:
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Colin Ian King authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1778286 The pointer fs_ns is assigned from inode->i_ib->s_user_ns before a null pointer check on inode, hence if inode is actually null we will get a null pointer dereference on this assignment. Fix this by only dereferencing inode after the null pointer check on inode. Detected by CoverityScan CID#1455328 ("Dereference before null check") Fixes: 8db6c34f ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities") Signed-off-by:
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Serge E. Hallyn authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1778286 Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do so, then any unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a private namespace, write the xattr, and execute the file with privilege on the host. However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run with limited privilege must continue to support other methods of gaining and dropping privilege. For instance a program installer must detect whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign them if so but set setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn must know how to drop partial capabilities, and do so only if setuid-root. This patch introduces v3 of the security.capability xattr. It builds a vfs_ns_cap_data struct by appending a uid_t rootid to struct vfs_cap_data. This is the absolute uid_t (that is, the uid_t in user namespace which mounted the filesystem, usually init_user_ns) of the root id in whose namespaces the file capabilities may take effect. When a task asks to write a v2 security.capability xattr, if it is privileged with respect to the userns which mounted the filesystem, then nothing should change. Otherwise, the kernel will transparently rewrite the xattr as a v3 with the appropriate rootid. This is done during the execution of setxattr() to catch user-space-initiated capability writes. Subsequently, any task executing the file which has the noted kuid as its root uid, or which is in a descendent user_ns of such a user_ns, will run the file with capabilities. Similarly when asking to read file capabilities, a v3 capability will be presented as v2 if it applies to the caller's namespace. If a task writes a v3 security.capability, then it can provide a uid for the xattr so long as the uid is valid in its own user namespace, and it is privileged with CAP_SETFCAP over its namespace. The kernel will translate that rootid to an absolute uid, and write that to disk. After this, a task in the writer's namespace will not be able to use those capabilities (unless rootid was 0), but a task in a namespace where the given uid is root will. Only a single security.capability xattr may exist at a time for a given file. A task may overwrite an existing xattr so long as it is privileged over the inode. Note this is a departure from previous semantics, which required privilege to remove a security.capability xattr. This check can be re-added if deemed useful. This allows a simple setxattr to work, allows tar/untar to work, and allows us to tar in one namespace and untar in another while preserving the capability, without risking leaking privilege into a parent namespace. Example using tar: $ cp /bin/sleep sleepx $ mkdir b1 b2 $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100000:1 -m b:1:$(id -u):1 -- chown 0:0 b1 $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1 -m b:1:$(id -u):1 -- chown 0:0 b2 $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100000:1000 -- tar --xattrs-include=security.capability --xattrs -cf b1/sleepx.tar sleepx $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1000 -- tar --xattrs-include=security.capability --xattrs -C b2 -xf b1/sleepx.tar $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1000 -- getcap b2/sleepx b2/sleepx = cap_sys_admin+ep # /opt/ltp/testcases/bin/getv3xattr b2/sleepx v3 xattr, rootid is 100001 A patch to linux-test-project adding a new set of tests for this functionality is in the nsfscaps branch at github.com/hallyn/ltp Changelog: Nov 02 2016: fix invalid check at refuse_fcap_overwrite() Nov 07 2016: convert rootid from and to fs user_ns (From ebiederm: mar 28 2017) commoncap.c: fix typos - s/v4/v3 get_vfs_caps_from_disk: clarify the fs_ns root access check nsfscaps: change the code split for cap_inode_setxattr() Apr 09 2017: don't return v3 cap for caps owned by current root. return a v2 cap for a true v2 cap in non-init ns Apr 18 2017: . Change the flow of fscap writing to support s_user_ns writing. . Remove refuse_fcap_overwrite(). The value of the previous xattr doesn't matter. Apr 24 2017: . incorporate Eric's incremental diff . move cap_convert_nscap to setxattr and simplify its usage May 8, 2017: . fix leaking dentry refcount in cap_inode_getsecurity Signed-off-by:
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1784409Signed-off-by:
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Dan Carpenter authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1784409 commit 1376b0a2 upstream. There is a '>' vs '<' typo so this loop is a no-op. Fixes: d35dcc89 ("staging: comedi: quatech_daqp_cs: fix daqp_ao_insn_write()") Signed-off-by:
Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Jann Horn authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1784409 commit ce00bf07 upstream. The old code would indefinitely block other users of nf_log_mutex if a userspace access in proc_dostring() blocked e.g. due to a userfaultfd region. Fix it by moving proc_dostring() out of the locked region. This is a followup to commit 266d07cb ("netfilter: nf_log: fix sleeping function called from invalid context"), which changed this code from using rcu_read_lock() to taking nf_log_mutex. Fixes: 266d07cb ("netfilter: nf_log: fix sleeping function calle[...]") Signed-off-by:
Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by:
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Tokunori Ikegami authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1784409 commit 79ca484b upstream. Currently the functions use to check both chip ready and good. But the chip ready is not enough to check the operation status. So change this to check the chip good instead of this. About the retry functions to make sure the error handling remain it. Signed-off-by:
Tokunori Ikegami <ikegami@allied-telesis.co.jp> Reviewed-by:
Joakim Tjernlund <Joakim.Tjernlund@infinera.com> Cc: Chris Packham <chris.packham@alliedtelesis.co.nz> Cc: Brian Norris <computersforpeace@gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@free-electrons.com> Cc: Marek Vasut <marek.vasut@gmail.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Cyrille Pitchen <cyrille.pitchen@wedev4u.fr> Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@bootlin.com> Signed-off-by:
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