Commit 2278f452 authored by Thomas Gleixner's avatar Thomas Gleixner

Merge tag 'efi-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi into efi/core

Pull EFI changes for v5.5 from Ard Biesheuvel:

  - Change my email address to @kernel.org so I am no longer at the mercy of
    useless corporate email infrastructure

  - Wire up the EFI RNG code for x86. This enables an additional source of
    entropy during early boot.

  - Enable the TPM event log code on ARM platforms.
parents a99d8080 d99c1ba6
......@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ Andy Adamson <andros@citi.umich.edu>
Antoine Tenart <antoine.tenart@free-electrons.com>
Antonio Ospite <ao2@ao2.it> <ao2@amarulasolutions.com>
Archit Taneja <archit@ti.com>
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Arnaud Patard <arnaud.patard@rtp-net.org>
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Axel Dyks <xl@xlsigned.net>
......
......@@ -6003,14 +6003,14 @@ F: sound/usb/misc/ua101.c
EFI TEST DRIVER
L: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
M: Ivan Hu <ivan.hu@canonical.com>
M: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
M: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
S: Maintained
F: drivers/firmware/efi/test/
EFI VARIABLE FILESYSTEM
M: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
M: Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>
M: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
M: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi.git
L: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
......@@ -6189,7 +6189,7 @@ S: Supported
F: security/integrity/evm/
EXTENSIBLE FIRMWARE INTERFACE (EFI)
M: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
M: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
L: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi.git
S: Maintained
......@@ -15006,7 +15006,7 @@ F: include/media/soc_camera.h
F: drivers/staging/media/soc_camera/
SOCIONEXT SYNQUACER I2C DRIVER
M: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
M: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
L: linux-i2c@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
F: drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-synquacer.c
......
......@@ -782,6 +782,9 @@ efi_main(struct efi_config *c, struct boot_params *boot_params)
/* Ask the firmware to clear memory on unclean shutdown */
efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(sys_table);
efi_random_get_seed(sys_table);
efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog(sys_table);
setup_graphics(boot_params);
......
......@@ -38,7 +38,8 @@ OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y
# Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in.
KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o tpm.o
lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o tpm.o \
random.o
# include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for ARM/arm64
arm-deps-y := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c fdt_sw.c
......@@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ arm-deps-$(CONFIG_ARM64) += sort.c
$(obj)/lib-%.o: $(srctree)/lib/%.c FORCE
$(call if_changed_rule,cc_o_c)
lib-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) += arm-stub.o fdt.o string.o random.o \
lib-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) += arm-stub.o fdt.o string.o \
$(patsubst %.c,lib-%.o,$(arm-deps-y))
lib-$(CONFIG_ARM) += arm32-stub.o
......
......@@ -189,6 +189,8 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
goto fail_free_cmdline;
}
efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog(sys_table);
/* Ask the firmware to clear memory on unclean shutdown */
efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(sys_table);
......
......@@ -63,8 +63,6 @@ efi_status_t efi_random_alloc(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
efi_status_t check_platform_features(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg);
efi_status_t efi_random_get_seed(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg);
void *get_efi_config_table(efi_system_table_t *sys_table, efi_guid_t guid);
/* Helper macros for the usual case of using simple C variables: */
......
......@@ -9,6 +9,18 @@
#include "efistub.h"
typedef struct efi_rng_protocol efi_rng_protocol_t;
typedef struct {
u32 get_info;
u32 get_rng;
} efi_rng_protocol_32_t;
typedef struct {
u64 get_info;
u64 get_rng;
} efi_rng_protocol_64_t;
struct efi_rng_protocol {
efi_status_t (*get_info)(struct efi_rng_protocol *,
unsigned long *, efi_guid_t *);
......@@ -28,7 +40,7 @@ efi_status_t efi_get_random_bytes(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
return status;
return rng->get_rng(rng, NULL, size, out);
return efi_call_proto(efi_rng_protocol, get_rng, rng, NULL, size, out);
}
/*
......@@ -161,15 +173,16 @@ efi_status_t efi_random_get_seed(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
return status;
status = rng->get_rng(rng, &rng_algo_raw, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE,
seed->bits);
status = efi_call_proto(efi_rng_protocol, get_rng, rng, &rng_algo_raw,
EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, seed->bits);
if (status == EFI_UNSUPPORTED)
/*
* Use whatever algorithm we have available if the raw algorithm
* is not implemented.
*/
status = rng->get_rng(rng, NULL, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE,
seed->bits);
status = efi_call_proto(efi_rng_protocol, get_rng, rng, NULL,
EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, seed->bits);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
goto err_freepool;
......
......@@ -1645,6 +1645,8 @@ static inline void
efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg) { }
#endif
efi_status_t efi_random_get_seed(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg);
void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog(efi_system_table_t *sys_table);
/*
......
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