Commit 2f4b3bf6 authored by Kees Cook's avatar Kees Cook Committed by Linus Torvalds

/proc/pid/status: add "Seccomp" field

It is currently impossible to examine the state of seccomp for a given
process.  While attaching with gdb and attempting "call
prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP,...)" will work with some situations, it is not
reliable.  If the process is in seccomp mode 1, this query will kill the
process (prctl not allowed), if the process is in mode 2 with prctl not
allowed, it will similarly be killed, and in weird cases, if prctl is
filtered to return errno 0, it can look like seccomp is disabled.

When reviewing the state of running processes, there should be a way to
externally examine the seccomp mode.  ("Did this build of Chrome end up
using seccomp?" "Did my distro ship ssh with seccomp enabled?")

This adds the "Seccomp" line to /proc/$pid/status.
Signed-off-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: default avatarCyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: default avatarSerge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
parent 834f82e2
...@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ read the file /proc/PID/status: ...@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ read the file /proc/PID/status:
CapPrm: 0000000000000000 CapPrm: 0000000000000000
CapEff: 0000000000000000 CapEff: 0000000000000000
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
Seccomp: 0
voluntary_ctxt_switches: 0 voluntary_ctxt_switches: 0
nonvoluntary_ctxt_switches: 1 nonvoluntary_ctxt_switches: 1
...@@ -237,6 +238,7 @@ Table 1-2: Contents of the status files (as of 2.6.30-rc7) ...@@ -237,6 +238,7 @@ Table 1-2: Contents of the status files (as of 2.6.30-rc7)
CapPrm bitmap of permitted capabilities CapPrm bitmap of permitted capabilities
CapEff bitmap of effective capabilities CapEff bitmap of effective capabilities
CapBnd bitmap of capabilities bounding set CapBnd bitmap of capabilities bounding set
Seccomp seccomp mode, like prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP, ...)
Cpus_allowed mask of CPUs on which this process may run Cpus_allowed mask of CPUs on which this process may run
Cpus_allowed_list Same as previous, but in "list format" Cpus_allowed_list Same as previous, but in "list format"
Mems_allowed mask of memory nodes allowed to this process Mems_allowed mask of memory nodes allowed to this process
......
...@@ -336,6 +336,13 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p) ...@@ -336,6 +336,13 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
render_cap_t(m, "CapBnd:\t", &cap_bset); render_cap_t(m, "CapBnd:\t", &cap_bset);
} }
static inline void task_seccomp(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
seq_printf(m, "Seccomp:\t%d\n", p->seccomp.mode);
#endif
}
static inline void task_context_switch_counts(struct seq_file *m, static inline void task_context_switch_counts(struct seq_file *m,
struct task_struct *p) struct task_struct *p)
{ {
...@@ -369,6 +376,7 @@ int proc_pid_status(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, ...@@ -369,6 +376,7 @@ int proc_pid_status(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
} }
task_sig(m, task); task_sig(m, task);
task_cap(m, task); task_cap(m, task);
task_seccomp(m, task);
task_cpus_allowed(m, task); task_cpus_allowed(m, task);
cpuset_task_status_allowed(m, task); cpuset_task_status_allowed(m, task);
task_context_switch_counts(m, task); task_context_switch_counts(m, task);
......
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