net/tls: prevent skb_orphan() from leaking TLS plain text with offload

sk_validate_xmit_skb() and drivers depend on the sk member of
struct sk_buff to identify segments requiring encryption.
Any operation which removes or does not preserve the original TLS
socket such as skb_orphan() or skb_clone() will cause clear text
leaks.

Make the TCP socket underlying an offloaded TLS connection
mark all skbs as decrypted, if TLS TX is in offload mode.
Then in sk_validate_xmit_skb() catch skbs which have no socket
(or a socket with no validation) and decrypted flag set.

Note that CONFIG_SOCK_VALIDATE_XMIT, CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE and
sk->sk_validate_xmit_skb are slightly interchangeable right now,
they all imply TLS offload. The new checks are guarded by
CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE because that's the option guarding the
sk_buff->decrypted member.

Second, smaller issue with orphaning is that it breaks
the guarantee that packets will be delivered to device
queues in-order. All TLS offload drivers depend on that
scheduling property. This means skb_orphan_partial()'s
trick of preserving partial socket references will cause
issues in the drivers. We need a full orphan, and as a
result netem delay/throttling will cause all TLS offload
skbs to be dropped.

Reusing the sk_buff->decrypted flag also protects from
leaking clear text when incoming, decrypted skb is redirected
(e.g. by TC).

See commit 0608c69c ("bpf: sk_msg, sock{map|hash} redirect
through ULP") for justification why the internal flag is safe.
The only location which could leak the flag in is tcp_bpf_sendmsg(),
which is taken care of by clearing the previously unused bit.

v2:
 - remove superfluous decrypted mark copy (Willem);
 - remove the stale doc entry (Boris);
 - rely entirely on EOR marking to prevent coalescing (Boris);
 - use an internal sendpages flag instead of marking the socket
   (Boris).
v3 (Willem):
 - reorganize the can_skb_orphan_partial() condition;
 - fix the flag leak-in through tcp_bpf_sendmsg.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Pismenny <borisp@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Documentation/networking/tls-offload.rst

@@ -506,21 +506,3 @@ Drivers should ignore the changes to TLS the device feature flags.
 These flags will be acted upon accordingly by the core ``ktls`` code.
 TLS device feature flags only control adding of new TLS connection
 offloads, old connections will remain active after flags are cleared.
-
-Known bugs
-==========
-
-skb_orphan() leaks clear text
------------------------------
-
-Currently drivers depend on the :c:member:`sk` member of
-:c:type:`struct sk_buff <sk_buff>` to identify segments requiring
-encryption. Any operation which removes or does not preserve the socket
-association such as :c:func:`skb_orphan` or :c:func:`skb_clone`
-will cause the driver to miss the packets and lead to clear text leaks.
-
-Redirects leak clear text
--------------------------
-
-In the RX direction, if segment has already been decrypted by the device
-and it gets redirected or mirrored - clear text will be transmitted out.

include/linux/skbuff.h

@@ -1374,6 +1374,14 @@ static inline void skb_copy_hash(struct sk_buff *to, const struct sk_buff *from)
 	to->l4_hash = from->l4_hash;
 };
 
+static inline void skb_copy_decrypted(struct sk_buff *to,
+				      const struct sk_buff *from)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE
+	to->decrypted = from->decrypted;
+#endif
+}
+
 #ifdef NET_SKBUFF_DATA_USES_OFFSET
 static inline unsigned char *skb_end_pointer(const struct sk_buff *skb)
 {

include/linux/socket.h

@@ -292,6 +292,9 @@ struct ucred {
 #define MSG_BATCH	0x40000 /* sendmmsg(): more messages coming */
 #define MSG_EOF         MSG_FIN
 #define MSG_NO_SHARED_FRAGS 0x80000 /* sendpage() internal : page frags are not shared */
+#define MSG_SENDPAGE_DECRYPTED	0x100000 /* sendpage() internal : page may carry
+					  * plain text and require encryption
+					  */
 
 #define MSG_ZEROCOPY	0x4000000	/* Use user data in kernel path */
 #define MSG_FASTOPEN	0x20000000	/* Send data in TCP SYN */

include/net/sock.h

@@ -2482,6 +2482,7 @@ static inline bool sk_fullsock(const struct sock *sk)
 
 /* Checks if this SKB belongs to an HW offloaded socket
  * and whether any SW fallbacks are required based on dev.
+ * Check decrypted mark in case skb_orphan() cleared socket.
  */
 static inline struct sk_buff *sk_validate_xmit_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
 						   struct net_device *dev)
@@ -2489,8 +2490,15 @@ static inline struct sk_buff *sk_validate_xmit_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
 #ifdef CONFIG_SOCK_VALIDATE_XMIT
 	struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
 
-	if (sk && sk_fullsock(sk) && sk->sk_validate_xmit_skb)
+	if (sk && sk_fullsock(sk) && sk->sk_validate_xmit_skb) {
 		skb = sk->sk_validate_xmit_skb(sk, dev, skb);
+#ifdef CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE
+	} else if (unlikely(skb->decrypted)) {
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("unencrypted skb with no associated socket - dropping\n");
+		kfree_skb(skb);
+		skb = NULL;
+#endif
+	}
 #endif
 
 	return skb;

net/core/sock.c

@@ -1992,6 +1992,19 @@ void skb_set_owner_w(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(skb_set_owner_w);
 
+static bool can_skb_orphan_partial(const struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE
+	/* Drivers depend on in-order delivery for crypto offload,
+	 * partial orphan breaks out-of-order-OK logic.
+	 */
+	if (skb->decrypted)
+		return false;
+#endif
+	return (skb->destructor == sock_wfree ||
+		(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) && skb->destructor == tcp_wfree));
+}
+
 /* This helper is used by netem, as it can hold packets in its
  * delay queue. We want to allow the owner socket to send more
  * packets, as if they were already TX completed by a typical driver.
@@ -2003,11 +2016,7 @@ void skb_orphan_partial(struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (skb_is_tcp_pure_ack(skb))
 		return;
 
-	if (skb->destructor == sock_wfree
-#ifdef CONFIG_INET
-	    || skb->destructor == tcp_wfree
-#endif
-		) {
+	if (can_skb_orphan_partial(skb)) {
 		struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
 
 		if (refcount_inc_not_zero(&sk->sk_refcnt)) {

net/ipv4/tcp.c

@@ -984,6 +984,9 @@ ssize_t do_tcp_sendpages(struct sock *sk, struct page *page, int offset,
 			if (!skb)
 				goto wait_for_memory;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE
+			skb->decrypted = !!(flags & MSG_SENDPAGE_DECRYPTED);
+#endif
 			skb_entail(sk, skb);
 			copy = size_goal;
 		}

net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c

@@ -398,10 +398,14 @@ static int tcp_bpf_send_verdict(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock,
 static int tcp_bpf_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
 {
 	struct sk_msg tmp, *msg_tx = NULL;
-	int flags = msg->msg_flags | MSG_NO_SHARED_FRAGS;
 	int copied = 0, err = 0;
 	struct sk_psock *psock;
 	long timeo;
+	int flags;
+
+	/* Don't let internal do_tcp_sendpages() flags through */
+	flags = (msg->msg_flags & ~MSG_SENDPAGE_DECRYPTED);
+	flags |= MSG_NO_SHARED_FRAGS;
 
 	psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
 	if (unlikely(!psock))

net/ipv4/tcp_output.c

@@ -1320,6 +1320,7 @@ int tcp_fragment(struct sock *sk, enum tcp_queue tcp_queue,
 	buff = sk_stream_alloc_skb(sk, nsize, gfp, true);
 	if (!buff)
 		return -ENOMEM; /* We'll just try again later. */
+	skb_copy_decrypted(buff, skb);
 
 	sk->sk_wmem_queued += buff->truesize;
 	sk_mem_charge(sk, buff->truesize);
@@ -1874,6 +1875,7 @@ static int tso_fragment(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int len,
 	buff = sk_stream_alloc_skb(sk, 0, gfp, true);
 	if (unlikely(!buff))
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	skb_copy_decrypted(buff, skb);
 
 	sk->sk_wmem_queued += buff->truesize;
 	sk_mem_charge(sk, buff->truesize);
@@ -2143,6 +2145,7 @@ static int tcp_mtu_probe(struct sock *sk)
 	sk_mem_charge(sk, nskb->truesize);
 
 	skb = tcp_send_head(sk);
+	skb_copy_decrypted(nskb, skb);
 
 	TCP_SKB_CB(nskb)->seq = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq;
 	TCP_SKB_CB(nskb)->end_seq = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + probe_size;

net/tls/tls_device.c

@@ -373,9 +373,9 @@ static int tls_push_data(struct sock *sk,
 	struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
 	struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
 	struct tls_offload_context_tx *ctx = tls_offload_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
-	int tls_push_record_flags = flags | MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST;
 	int more = flags & (MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST | MSG_MORE);
 	struct tls_record_info *record = ctx->open_record;
+	int tls_push_record_flags;
 	struct page_frag *pfrag;
 	size_t orig_size = size;
 	u32 max_open_record_len;
@@ -390,6 +390,9 @@ static int tls_push_data(struct sock *sk,
 	if (sk->sk_err)
 		return -sk->sk_err;
 
+	flags |= MSG_SENDPAGE_DECRYPTED;
+	tls_push_record_flags = flags | MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST;
+
 	timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
 	if (tls_is_partially_sent_record(tls_ctx)) {
 		rc = tls_push_partial_record(sk, tls_ctx, flags);
@@ -576,7 +579,9 @@ void tls_device_write_space(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx)
 		gfp_t sk_allocation = sk->sk_allocation;
 
 		sk->sk_allocation = GFP_ATOMIC;
-		tls_push_partial_record(sk, ctx, MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL);
+		tls_push_partial_record(sk, ctx,
+					MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL |
+					MSG_SENDPAGE_DECRYPTED);
 		sk->sk_allocation = sk_allocation;
 	}
 }