Commit 5c056fdc authored by Ilya Dryomov's avatar Ilya Dryomov

libceph: verify authorize reply on connect

After sending an authorizer (ceph_x_authorize_a + ceph_x_authorize_b),
the client gets back a ceph_x_authorize_reply, which it is supposed to
verify to ensure the authenticity and protect against replay attacks.
The code for doing this is there (ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply(),
ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply() + plumbing), but it is never
invoked by the the messenger.

AFAICT this goes back to 2009, when ceph authentication protocols
support was added to the kernel client in 4e7a5dcd ("ceph:
negotiate authentication protocol; implement AUTH_NONE protocol").

The second param of ceph_connection_operations::verify_authorizer_reply
is unused all the way down.  Pass 0 to facilitate backporting, and kill
it in the next commit.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: default avatarIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarSage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
parent 5418d0a2
...@@ -2027,6 +2027,19 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_connection *con) ...@@ -2027,6 +2027,19 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_connection *con)
dout("process_connect on %p tag %d\n", con, (int)con->in_tag); dout("process_connect on %p tag %d\n", con, (int)con->in_tag);
if (con->auth_reply_buf) {
/*
* Any connection that defines ->get_authorizer()
* should also define ->verify_authorizer_reply().
* See get_connect_authorizer().
*/
ret = con->ops->verify_authorizer_reply(con, 0);
if (ret < 0) {
con->error_msg = "bad authorize reply";
return ret;
}
}
switch (con->in_reply.tag) { switch (con->in_reply.tag) {
case CEPH_MSGR_TAG_FEATURES: case CEPH_MSGR_TAG_FEATURES:
pr_err("%s%lld %s feature set mismatch," pr_err("%s%lld %s feature set mismatch,"
......
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