USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write

commit b348d7dd upstream.

Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer
usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a
packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As
part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the input for
urb->actual_length comes from the network, it should be treated as untrusted.
Any entity controlling the network may put any value in the input and the
preallocated urb->transfer_buffer may not be large enough to hold the data.
Thus, the malicious entity is able to write arbitrary data to kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>

drivers/staging/usbip/usbip_common.c

@@ -741,6 +741,17 @@ int usbip_recv_xbuff(struct usbip_device *ud, struct urb *urb)
 	if (!(size > 0))
 		return 0;
 
+	if (size > urb->transfer_buffer_length) {
+		/* should not happen, probably malicious packet */
+		if (ud->side == USBIP_STUB) {
+			usbip_event_add(ud, SDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
+			return 0;
+		} else {
+			usbip_event_add(ud, VDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
+			return -EPIPE;
+		}
+	}
+
 	ret = usbip_recv(ud->tcp_socket, urb->transfer_buffer, size);
 	if (ret != size) {
 		dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "recv xbuf, %d\n", ret);